Doe v. CoreCivic, Inc.

District Court, S.D. Texas

Doe v. CoreCivic, Inc.

Trial Court Opinion

July 06, 2020 David J. Bradley, Clerk UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

JANE DOE, § CIVIL ACTION NO. Plaintiff, § 4:20-cv-01828 § § vs. § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE § § CORECIVIC, INC, et al, § Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYM The ex parte motion by Plaintiff Jane Doe to proceed under pseudonym is granted. Dkt 3. This case concerns allegations of sexual assault. Doe is a cit- izen of Mexico. She spent three months in the custody of Immi- gration and Customs Enforcement at its Houston Processing Center. She alleges that on the afternoon of the day she was to be deported back to Mexico, three men separated her and two other detainees from the general population and sexually as- saulted them. Doe and the two other women were then deported a few hours after the assault. Doe alleges that she became preg- nant as a result and suffered life-threatening medical complica- tions during the pregnancy and birth. Dkt 1 ¶¶ 3–5. Doe sued Defendants CoreCivic, Inc, Warden Robert Lacy, Jr, Assistant Warden David Price, TransCor America, LLC, Trin- ity Services Group, the United States of America, the Depart- ment of Homeland Security, and ICE for perpetuating, allowing, or failing to prevent the sexual assault at the Houston Processing Center. Doe also seeks to hold accountable the three men who allegedly engaged in the assault, but she is currently unaware of their identities. Id at ¶ 6. Doe moves to proceed under pseudonym. Dkt 3. She makes this request in order to protect herself from harassment, physical harm, ridicule, and personal embarrassment. Id at 1. She does so ex parte because Defendants had not yet answered or appeared at the time she filed the motion. Id at 16. Such ex parte motions are appropriate. For example, see Doe v Griffon Management LLC,

2014 WL 7040390

, *1 (ED La); Roe v Patterson,

2019 WL 2407380

, *1 (ED Tex). Parties to an action in federal court must typically proceed by a designated name. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) pro- vides that all parties must be named in the title of the complaint. Rule 17(a)(1) further states, “An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” The Fifth Circuit holds this to be a matter of public im- portance. “Public access to this information is more than a cus- tomary procedural formality; First Amendment guarantees are implicated when a court decides to restrict public scrutiny of ju- dicial proceedings.” Doe v Stegall, 653 F2d 180, 185 (5th Cir 1981), citing Richmond Newspapers Inc v Virginia,

448 US 555

, 580–81, n 17 (1980). But in certain circumstances a party may proceed under pseu- donym. The Fifth Circuit has advanced “no hard and fast formula for ascertaining whether a party may sue anonymously.” Stegall, 653 F2d at 186. The consideration typically balances maintenance of a party’s privacy against the presumption of openness in judi- cial proceedings. Rose v Beaumont Independent School District, 240 FRD 264, 266 (ED Tex 2007), citing Stegall, 653 F2d at 185; see also Southern Methodist University Association of Women Law Students v Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F2d 707, 712–13 (5th Cir 1979). Courts applying this balancing test have permitted plaintiffs to use pseudonyms in three general categories of situations. The first is “when identification creates a severe and specific risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm.” W.D.O. v Harris County Sher- iff Department,

2005 WL 8169263

, *2 (SD Tex); see also Stegall, 653 F2d at 186. The second is when anonymity is necessary “to pre- serve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature.” W.D.O.,

2005 WL 8169263

at *2 (citations omitted). The third is when the anonymous party is “compelled to admit [his or her] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution.” Stegall, 653 F2d at 185. This case of its very nature involves matters of the utmost privacy and intimacy—namely, the sexual assault that Doe and two other women allegedly endured while being held by ICE at the Houston Processing Center. These are sensitive and highly personal concerns. Such circumstances weigh overwhelmingly in favor of granting the motion to proceed under a pseudonym. In- deed, cases involving sexual assault have in many instances pro- ceeded in such manner in the Southern District of Texas. For instance, see Doe on behalf of MF v Harris County Precinct Six Consta- ble Sylvia Trevino,

2020 WL 1695054

, *1 (SD Tex); Doe v Wharton Independent School District,

2017 WL 932935

, *1 (SD Tex). This is so on ready acknowledgement that ensuring the anonymity of sexual assault survivors protects their confidentiality and dignity and is important to preventing additional psychological harm and humiliation. Patterson,

2019 WL 2407380

at *4, citing Doe v Cabrera, 307 FRD 1, 5 (DDC 2014). Allowing Doe to proceed under a pseudonym at this point will not prejudice Defendants. She asserts that Defendants are already aware of her true identity because of a previously submit- ted administrative claim as a condition precedent to proceed un- der the Federal Tort Claims Act. Dkt 3 at 10. While they will have to make redactions and take measures not to disclose Doe’s iden- tity, her anonymity in court papers should not otherwise hinder their defense of this action. See Doe No 2 v Kolko, 242 FRD 193, 198 (EDNY 2006). But to be clear, because the Court proceeds ex parte at this juncture, Defendants are not precluded from mov- ing for relief on this issue later if necessary. The interest of the public in knowing Doe’s identity does not outweigh her need for privacy in these circumstances. Doe as- serts that information about this case will only be minimally re- stricted, with most of the pertinent facts made on the public record. The only part intended to be kept away from media at- tention is her actual identity. Dkt 3 at 11–12. Other courts have noted a strong public interest in protecting the identities of sexual assault survivors so as not to deter other survivors from reporting such crimes. See Cabrera, 307 FRD at 5, quoting Doe v De Amigos LLG, No 11-cv—1755, ship op at 2 (DDC Apr 30, 2012); see also Doe No 2, 242 FRD at 195. The ex parte motion to proceed by pseudonym is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.

Signed on July 6, 2020, at Houston, Texas. (2 Ealcdye = Hon. Charles Eskridge United States District Judge

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