Royal v. Cobra Legal Solutions LLC
Royal v. Cobra Legal Solutions LLC
Trial Court Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION
GREGORY ROYAL, § Plaintiff § § v. § Case No. 1:21-cv-01079-LY-SH § COBRA LEGAL SOLUTIONS LLC § and PAULA DIAZ, § Defendants
ORDER Before the Court are Plaintiff Gregory Royal’s Complaint (Dkt. 1) and Application to Proceed In District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Dkt. 2), both filed November 29, 2021. The District Court referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, and the Court Docket Management Standing Order for United States District Judge Lee Yeakel. Dkt. 3. I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, seeks leave to file his Complaint without having to pay the filing fee. After reviewing his Application and financial affidavit in support, the Court finds that Plaintiff is indigent and hereby GRANTS Plaintiff in forma pauperis status. This indigent status is granted subject to a later determination that the action should be dismissed if the allegation of poverty is untrue or the action is found frivolous or malicious pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff is advised that although he has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court may, in its discretion, impose costs of court at the conclusion of this lawsuit, as in other cases. Jennings v. Towers Watson,
11 F.4th 335, 345(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(1)). II. Section 1915(e)(2) Frivolousness Review Because Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is required by standing order to review his Complaint under § 1915(e)(2). A district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes that the action is (1) frivolous or
malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A. Standard of Review Pro se complaints are liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki,
552 U.S. 389, 402(2008). The Court must “accept as true the allegations of the complaint, together with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Ryland v. Shapiro,
708 F.2d 967, 969(5th Cir. 1983). In deciding whether a complaint states a claim, “[t]he court’s task is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC,
594 F.3d 383, 387(5th Cir. 2010). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678(2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id.A plaintiff’s pro se status, however, does not offer him an “impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Anderson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
953 F.3d 311, 315(5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). B. Analysis Plaintiff alleges that he sought work as a document reviewer, but Defendants Cobra Legal Solutions, LLC and Paula Diaz discriminated against him in hiring “because of his prior Title VII opposition conduct and African American/Black race.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges claims of
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on race under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and
42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff filed with his complaint a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dated August 27, 2021. Dkt. 1-2 at 38-39. Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must plead two ultimate elements: (1) an adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because of his protected status. Olivarez v. T-mobile USA, Inc.,
997 F.3d 595, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2021). Here, Plaintiff pleads both ultimate elements by alleging, inter alia, that Defendants removed him from a job notice mailing list because of his African American/Black
race. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 18-19. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient at this stage of the case to avoid dismissal for frivolousness under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Accordingly, the undersigned does not recommend that the District Court dismiss this case under Section 1915(e)(2)(B). III. Conclusion The Court HEREBY GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Dkt. 2) and ORDERS his Complaint to be filed without prepayment of fees or costs or giving security therefor pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the Clerk issue summons and ORDERS the United States Marshals Service to attempt service in this case without pre-payment of a service fee. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk REMOVE this case from the Magistrate Court’s docket and RETURN it to the docket of the Honorable Lee Yeakel. SIGNED on September 20, 2022.
SUSAN HIGHTOWER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Reference
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