UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 6:24-cv-00016 Louis Jackson, Plaintiff, V. Mable Sweat et al., Defendants.

ORDER Plaintiff Louis Jackson, a prisoner of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) proceeding pro se and m forma pauperis, filed this civil-rights lawsuit pursuant to

. The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge John D. Love pursu- ant to

(b). Doc. 3. On January 22, 2024, the magistrate judge issued a report rec- ommending that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice for fail- ure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2). Doc. 5. Plaintiff filed written objections. Doc. 7. The court reviews the objected-to portions of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3);

(b)(1). Plaintiff alleges that defendants forged his name on a sign-in sheet for a urinalysis drug test, which resulted in a false conviction at a prison disciplinary hearing. Doc. 1 at 3-4. Plaintiff filed a griev- ance with TDCJ and his disciplinary conviction was overturned prior to filing this lawsuit. Jd. at 4-5. As the magistrate judge observed, the Fifth Circuit has held that there is no due process violation when a falsely accused prisoner “is given an adequate state procedural remedy to challenge the accusa- tions.” Doc. 5 at 5; Grant ». Thomas,

,

(5th Cir. Sept. 23, 1994). Plaintiff’s complaint therefore fails to a state a claim for due process violation.

The magistrate judge also found that plaintiff did not suffer any atypical and significant hardship as required to trigger a right to due process and that he has no constitutional right to have the defendants prosecuted or punished for any criminal acts. Doc. 5 at 4. Plaintiff’s objection to the report does not refute those findings. He confirms that his disciplinary conviction was overturned. Doc. 7 at 3. So any sentence credits that had been revoked were presumably restored. See

He now asserts that this incident is a “mark on [his] rehabilitation file,” but he does not allege any facts establishing any actual injury in connection with that “mark” in light of the adminis- trative reversal of his conviction. Id. at 4. And for the reasons the magistrate judge explained, any short time plaintiff spent subjected to other restrictions—including his newly-alleged forty-five days of cell restriction—do not rise to the level required to state a claim for a due process violation. Doc. 5 at 4. Plaintiff reiterates that defendants’ alleged actions were crimi- nal. But for the reasons the magistrate judge explained, that alone does not state a viable claim for relief under Section 1983. Doc. 5 at 4. Plaintiff also complains that defendants violated department codes of conduct, but violation of prison policy does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Jackson v. Cain,

(5th Cir. 1989). (“A state’s failure to follow its own procedural regu- lations does not establish a violation of due process, because ‘consti- tutional minima may nevertheless have been met.’”). Finally, plain- tiff alleges a conspiracy between the defendants, but defendants can- not be liable for conspiracy where there is no underlying violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights. See Jackson v. City of Hearne, Texas,

, 206 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that a defendant “cannot be held liable for participation in a conspiracy that failed to violate any of the plaintiff’s rights”). Having reviewed the magistrate judge’s report de novo, and be- ing satisfied that it contains no error, the court overrules plaintiff’s objections and accepts the report’s findings and recommendation. This case is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2). So ordered by the court on May 9, 2024.

j/ CAMPBELL BARKER United States District Judge

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