UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 4:25-cv-00465 Justin Randall Jones, Plaintiff, V. Andrew J. Passons et al., Defendants.

ORDER Plaintiff filed this action seeking relief pursuant to

. Doc. 3. The magistrate judge issued a report and recom- mendation that the case be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Doc. 18. Plaintiff filed written ob- jections. Doc. 20. The court reviews the objected-to portions of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3);

(b)(1). Plaintiff filed an- other lawsuit asserting the same claims and containing similar fil- ings. Jones v. Passons, No. 4:25-cv-00493 (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2025). Plaintiff begins by “object[ing] in full” to the magistrate judge’s report. Doc. 20 at 1. This general objection does not “spe- cifically identify portions of the Report and the basis for those ob- jections.” Houston ». Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 6:14-cv-00231,

, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2017) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)). It is therefore insufficient to warrant de novo review of the entire report. Plaintiff objects that he is not appealing a final state-court cus- tody judgment. Instead, he argues that the Texas Supreme Court “accepted full jurisdiction” of the case. Doc. 20 at 1. This is in- correct. As the magistrate judge noted in the companion case, the Texas Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petition for review. Jones, No. 4:25-cv-00493, Doc. 15 at 1. This objection is overruled. “Federal courts generally dismiss cases involving divorce and alimony, child custody, visitation rights, establishment of

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paternity, child support, and enforcement of separation or divorce decrees still subject to state court modification.” See, e.g., Womack v. Wright, No. 4:18-cv-00567,

, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2018), report and recommendation adopted,

(E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2019), aff’d in part and dismissed in part,

(5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished). Plaintiff’s claims seek to enforce a state-court agreement concerning child custody. Defendant’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision and thus are barred from federal court by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Uptown Grill, L.L.C. v. Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc.,

, 384 (5th Cir. 2022). “Federal courts have consistently applied the Rooker–Feldman doctrine as a bar to federal jurisdiction over matters related to the family disputes of divorce and child support.” Runnels v. Charles, No. 6:20-cv-00126,

, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2020), report and recommendation adopted,

(E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2020). The magistrate judge correctly concluded that plaintiff’s complaint does not seek relief available in federal court. Doc. 18 at 2 (determining that this court does not have ju- risdiction to modify child-custody decrees, to review final state- court proceedings, to nullify a state-court judgment, or to seek enforcement of a court agreement concerning child custody). Having reviewed the magistrate’s judge’s report de novo, and being satisfied that it contains no error, the court accepts the re- port’s findings and recommendation. Plaintiff’s objections are overruled, and his case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s pending motions are de- nied as moot. Plaintiff has submitted at least 13 filings seeking, or relating to, emergency relief. He also continues to file emergency motions in the companion case, which has been closed for nearly a month. See generally Jones, No. 4:25-cv-00493. Plaintiff is warned that the continued filing of motions that abuse this court’s emergency-re- lief procedures could result in the imposition of filing sanctions. So ordered by the court on June 26, 2025.

J. CAMPBELL BARKER United States District Judge

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