IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

JASON RUDOLPH STANFORD, § No. 1:25-CV-817-DAE § Plaintiff, § § vs. § § BEHROOZ P. VIDA, et al., § § Defendants. § ________________________________ ORDER: (1) ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS; (3) DISMISSING FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE; AND (4) DISMISSING STATE-LAW CLAIMS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Before the Court is: (1) a Report and Recommendation (the “Report”) (Dkt. # 6) submitted by United States Magistrate Judge Mark Lane; and (2) no less than fifteen motions and other filings by Pro Se Plaintiff Jason Rudolph Stanford (“Plaintiff” or “Stanford”) (Dkts. ## 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21). The Court finds these matters suitable for disposition without a hearing. After reviewing the Report, the Court ADOPTS Judge Lane’s recommendations and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s federal causes of action pursuant to

(e)(2)(B) and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s state-law claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s pending motions (Dkts. ## 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19) are DENIED. The Court again WARNS Plaintiff that continuing to file frivolous or duplicative suits in this court may result in imposition of monetary sanctions and a pre-filing bar.

BACKGROUND Jason Stanford, a resident of Irving, Texas, is a repeat pro se filer who was declared a vexatious litigant by the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas, where he must seek leave before filing any new litigation. See Stanford v. England Carrier Servs. LLC, No. 4:24-CV-00241-O- BP,

, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2024). The Northern District also sanctioned Stanford under Rule 11 for knowingly filing false and misleading

documents. England Carrier, No. 4:24-CV-00241-O-BP, Dkt. 24 (July 23, 2024). Since then, he has filed several cases in this District. See Stanford v. State of Texas, No. 1:24-CV-01132-RP (W.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2024) (sharing many of the

same defendants as the above-captioned action before it was dismissed as frivolous); Stanford v. Vida (“Vida I”), No. 1:25-CV-00792-DAE-ML (W.D. Tex. May 22, 2025). Vida I was filed six days before the above-captioned action and shares all the same defendants plus one additional defendant. Judge Lane also

issued a Report and Recommendation with a vexatious litigant warning in Vida I, No. 1:25-CV-00792 (Dkt. # 5), which this Court adopts in a separate order. In the present case, Plaintiff brings claims against Behrooz P. Vida,

the Chapter 7 Trustee in his bankruptcy matter and Vida’s law firm; Vida Law Firm, PLLC; and Erin Schmidt, a federal officer of the U.S. Trustee Program. (Dkt. # 1.) He sues corporate entities England Carrier Services, LLC (“ECS”);

NFusion Capital Finance, LLC; and GlobalTranz Enterprises, LLC (collectively, the “Corporate Defendants”). (Id.) He also sues the attorneys who represented these entities: Lauren M. Nelson, Christopher Snead, Joseph Luce, Ken Starr, and

Spencer Fane LLP, attorneys Nelson and Snead’s firm. (Id.) Finally, he sues his own previous counsel: Marcus Leinart, Richard Anderson, and Leinart Law, PLLC. (Id.) Plaintiff purports to bring this suit under § 1983, claiming that Defendants violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.) He

also asserts breach of fiduciary duty claims against Vida, Schmidt, and his past counsel. (Id.) On August 21, 2025, Judge Lane issued his Report in the present case,

recommending that this Court dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims as frivolous pursuant to

(e)(2)(B) and dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s state-law fiduciary breach claims against his counsel. (Dkt. # 6) Judge Lane further warned Plaintiff that continuing to file frivolous or duplicative suits in

this court may result in imposition of monetary sanctions and pre-filing bar. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to heed Judge Lane multiple warnings and proceeded to file at least 28 motions on the docket of this Court, including in Vida (I). Plaintiff filed two

separate objections to the Report, the first on August 28, 2025 (Dkt. # 20) and the second on September 5, 2025 (Dkt. # 23). Because Plaintiff already filed objections (Dkt. # 20) and the second set of objections (Dkt. # 23) contain around

26 separate objections which are conclusory, frivolous, and repetitive, the Court will only address the first set of objections (Dkt. # 20).1 APPLICABLE LAW

The Court must conduct a de novo review of any of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions to which a party has specifically objected. See

(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made.”). The objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations that the party wishes to have the district court consider.

1 Throughout his second set of objections, Plaintiff references his various pending motions for judicial notice (Dkts. ## 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18). A district court may take judicial notice of a “fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). While some of Plaintiff’s many pending motions for judicial notice may be procedurally proper, most are disguised attempts to re-argue various points and improperly ask the Court to take judicial notice of various conclusory allegations after Judge Lane already recommended dismissal. (See, e.g., Dkts. ## 8, 9, 12.) Objections to a Report and Recommendation are not the proper vehicle for allowing parties to raise at the district court new evidence, argument, and issues that were not presented to the magistrate judge. Cupit v. Whitley,

, 535 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, the Court also does not consider the second set of objections (Dkt. # 23) due to their heavy reliance on procedurally improper motions filed after the Report was issued. Thomas v. Arn,

(1985). A district court need not consider “[f]rivolous, conclusive, or general objections.” Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,

(5th Cir. 1987). “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”

(b)(1)(C).

Findings to which no specific objections are made do not require de novo review; the Court need only determine whether the Recommendation is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. United States v. Wilson,

(5th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, conclusory objections that fail to point out with

specificity any error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis are not cognizable,” and the Court here will not parse through the record to infer exactly what it is Plaintiff’s objections are based upon. See Palomo v. Collier, No. 2-23-CV-37,

, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Malacara v. Garber,

(5th Cir. 2003); Edmond v. Collins,

, 293 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993)). ANALYSIS

In his Report, Judge Lane first determined that “any claim that must be brought under section 1983 should be dismissed[]” because “[Plaintiff] alleges no facts that any Defendant is a state actor.” (Dkt. # 6 at 6.) As to the attorney

and trustee defendants, Judge Lane determined that each is entitled to immunity. (Id. at 7.) Judge Lane next determined that Plaintiff did not plead any specific claims against the Corporate Defendants and failed to plead a plausible § 1983 or

§ 1985(2) claim against these Defendants. (Id.) Lastly, Judge Lane determined that the breach of fiduciary duty claims against counsel have already been determined to be frivolous in prior actions and the court has no jurisdiction over

these claims after the federal claims are dismissed. (Id. at 8) (citing Texas, 1:24- CV-1132-RP (Dkt. # 10 at 3–4)). Plaintiff first objects that the Report is deficient because “[i]t does not specify what allegations were reviewed, what evidence was considered, or how

statutory standards were applied.” (Dkt. # 20 at 2.) The Court disagrees. Judge Lane stated each of Plaintiff’s claims before explaining why no claim is sustainable against the Defendants. (Dkt. # 6 at 5–8.) To the extent the Report

does not address each of Plaintiff’s allegations, any deficiency is due to the frivolous nature of Plaintiff’s pleadings and Plaintiff’s own failures to allege facts sufficient to support his claims. Plaintiff next objects that the Report “dismisses Plaintiff’s claims as

frivolous while ignoring that every allegation and claim pled in this action corresponds to a live and pending case in state, federal district, bankruptcy, or appellate court.” (Dkt. # 20 at 2.) Plaintiff then cites each of his thirteen ongoing

and closed lawsuits which have been identified as estate assets in his bankruptcy case, and thus it is “legally impossible for Plaintiff’s claims to be ‘frivolous.’” (Id. at 2–3.) The Court disagrees. Judge Lane recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s

federal causes of action pursuant to

(e)(2)(B) (Dkt. # 6 at 9) which mandates dismissal of a case if the court determines that the action “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Judge Lane did not state that the claims should be dismissed because they are frivolous but because Plaintiff had not stated a claim on which relief may be granted. (Dkt. # 6 at 5–8.)

Furthermore, Trustee Vida marking Plaintiff’s lawsuits as an estate asset does not negate the frivolous nature of Plaintiff’s claims. In Ch.7 bankruptcy cases, “[a]s representative of the estate, the trustee ‘succeeds to all causes of action

held by the debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.’” Drew v. Anderson,

(5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Miller v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc.,

(11th Cir. 1985)). That is because a lawsuit may result in monetary relief which would become the debt or asset of the bankruptcy

estate; it bears no relation to the merits of the case. In other words, just because Plaintiff’s causes of action are listed as bankruptcy estate assets does not mean they are likely to succeed or are not frivolous. Rather, Plaintiff’s list of thirteen lawsuits further indicates that his claims and cases are frivolous.2

Lastly, Plaintiff objects that dismissal of his claims would be a due process violation “because the dismissal of claims recognized by the Trustee as estate property would extinguish rights of both the Plaintiff and the bankruptcy

estate without notice, hearing, or adjudication on the merits.” (Dkt. # 20 at 3.) This argument is frivolous considering several of Plaintiff’s actions are against Trustee Vida himself and arise out of Plaintiff’s several failed attempts to remove Vida as trustee and later sue him because Trustee Vida did not believe Plaintiff’s

actions had merit. (See, e.g., Dkt. # 18 at 21, 42–44, 46–49) (Trustee Vida’s responses to Plaintiff’s various filings in bankruptcy court). Based on the foregoing and given his detailed consideration, the

Court finds that Judge Lane’s rulings in this matter were not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Court will overrule Plaintiff’s objections, and the Report will be adopted. The Court will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s federal causes of action pursuant to

(e)(2)(B) and dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s

state-law causes of action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s pending motions are denied

2 In fact, combing through Plaintiff’s filings reveals that a major source of Plaintiff’s dispute with Trustee Vida is because Plaintiff was unable to have Vida removed as chapter 7 trustee after he did not believe Plaintiffs various causes of action had merit. (See Dkt. # 18 at 21.) (Dkts. ## 4, 8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19). Lastly, the Court warns Plaintiff that continuing to file frivolous or duplicative suits in this court may result in imposition of monetary sanctions and a pre-filing bar. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court: (1) ADOPTS Judge Lane’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. # 6) as the opinion of the Court; and (2) DENIES Plaintiff's pending motions (Dkts. ## 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19). It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff's federal law causes of action in this case are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to

(e)(2)(B), and Plaintiff's remaining state-law causes of action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court again WARNS Plaintiff that continuing to file frivolous

or duplicative suits in this court may result in imposition of monetary sanctions and

a pre-filing bar. The Clerk’s Office is INSTRUCTED to ENTER JUDGMENT and CLOSE THE CASE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: Austin, Texas, October 22, 2025.

Senior United States District Judge