Juan Antonio Medrano Garcia v. Grant Dickey, et al

Southern District of Texas ENTERED February 24, 2026 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION JUAN ANTONIO MEDRANO GARCIA, § § Petitioner, § § VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-CV-00601 § GRANT DICKEY, et al, § § Respondents. § ORDER OF DISMISSAL The petitioner, Juan Antonio Medrano Garcia, is a detainee in the custody of United States Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officials. Through counsel, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his continued detention. Doc. No. 1.

While this case was pending, the Fifth Circuit decided Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ----, No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 (Sth Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). The Court may dismiss a habeas petition on the pleadings “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.”” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (authorizing preliminary review and summary dismissal of habeas petitions on the pleadings). !

1 A district court may apply any of the rules governing habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to those filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.

1/3 The petition and attached exhibits reflect that Petitioner is charged with being an alien present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. Doc. No. 1-1 at 4. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the statute permitting discretionary bond, and that he has been erroneously categorized as a detainee subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).

Petitioner’s arguments regarding sections 1225 and 1226 and their implementing regulations are foreclosed by Buenrostro-Mendez. Likewise, Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause claims are precluded, at this juncture, by Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003), because “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.” /d. (citations omitted); see also Jennings v. Rodriquez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018) (explaining that “§§1225(b)(1) and 1225(b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded”’).

In addition, his Fourth Amendment claim rests on his assertion that he wrongly detained under section 1225, which, as explained above, is contrary to Buenrostro-Mendez.

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows: 1. The petition (Doc. No. 1) is DENIED.

2. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

3. All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as MOOT.

2/3 4. Ifthe Fifth Circuit, en banc, or the United States Supreme Court enters a decision that is contrary to the decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, supra, Petitioner is granted leave to file a motion for reconsideration or initiate a separate petition.

SO ORDERED. A SIGNED on this 2* — day of February 2026. \ 4 \ ANDREW S. HANEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 3/3