Alvaro Barrera Leon v. Warden, Joe Corley Detention Facility, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT April 02, 2026 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk HOUSTON DIVISION

ALVARO BARRERA LEON, § § Petitioner, § § VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-1341 § WARDEN, JOE CORLEY DETENTION § FACILITY, et al. § § Respondents. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Petitioner Alvaro Barrera Leon is detained in the custody of officials with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Proceeding pro se, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1) and several motions for emergency relief (Dkt. 2; Dkt. 6; Dkt. 9). The most recent motion states that the petitioner has a hearing in immigration court set for April 8, 2026.

The petition and supporting documents state that the petitioner is a national of Cuba; that upon entry to the United States he was inspected and released into the country under Form I-220A; that he has complied with all requirements and appeared for all supervision appointments; that he has no criminal history and does not pose a danger or flight risk; and that he applied for legal permanent resident status and is actively pursuing immigration relief; and that he was detained on November 13, 2025, when he appeared for a scheduled check-in appointment and has been detained since; and that he has been afforded no process to challenge the legality of his detention. He further states that he recently graduated from high school and was preparing to attend college; that he was steadily employed before his detention; that he has strong family support and a stable residence; that his detention has caused significant emotional and psychological deterioration; and that his detention impedes his ability to meet with his counsel and pursue immigration relief. He attaches letters of support from his family (Dkt. 1-3). He brings a claim under the Due Process Clause, among other claims. He seeks immediate release from custody.

The Court entered an order for an expedited answer and instructed the respondents to show cause why the petitioner should not be immediately released from custody (Dkt.

7). The federal respondents then filed a motion to dismiss the petition or, in the alternative, for summary judgment (Dkt. 8). The respondents oppose habeas relief, arguing that the petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and is not entitled to relief under the Due Process Clause. They do not contest the facts recited by the petitioner.

They state that the petitioner entered in 2021 and was initially detained and released; that a Notice to Appear issued on November 11, 2025, shortly before his detention; and that a second Notice to Appear issued on March 26, 2026 (Dkt. 8, at 2; Dkt. 8-1). The petitioner then filed a reply (Dkt. 10).

On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit held in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), that two petitioners who has been present in the United States for many years, and who had not been apprehended by immigration officials before the detention at issue in the case, were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Court does not base this opinion on the statutory text but instead turns to the petitioner’s claim that his re-detention violates his rights under the Due Process Clause (Dkt. 1, at 23-24). The Court has previously addressed due-process claims in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Rozo-Teran v. Bondi, Civil Action No. 4:26-243 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2026); Navarette-Garcia v. Bradford, Civil Action No. 4:26-1503 (S.D. Tex. Mar, 16, 2026); Delgado-Rodriguez v. Tate, Civil Action No. 26-650, 2026 WL 517983 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026).

The Constitution guarantees due process of law to every person in the United States, regardless of the person’s immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (the Due Process Clause “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); see A.A.R.P. v Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (procedural due process protections apply to removal proceedings for persons detained under the Alien Enemies Act).

The Court notes at the outset that the petitioner in this case challenges only his detention, and not his right to relief from deportation or removal. District courts across the country have recognized that “as-applied due process challenges to detention without a bond hearing are not foreclosed” by Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), or other Supreme Court precedent.1 Destino v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No. 1:25-

Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40 (cleaned up) (considering case regarding noncitizen detained yards from the border and for whom immigration officials rejected his “credible fear” claim for purposes of political asylum). However, a challenge to detention, rather than to immigration proceedings, does not implicate the “sovereign prerogative” on which Thuraissigiam relies. See CV-374-SE-AJ, 2025 WL 4010424, at *4 n.6 (D.N.H. Dec. 24, 2025) (noting a “growing consensus” among district courts and collecting cases); see Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra, 806 F. Supp. 3d 690, 697-700 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 801 F. Supp. 3d 668, 681-85 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Bonilla Chicas v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-00131, 2026 WL 539475, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); Castro Coneo v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-09850 (NSR), 2025 WL 3754079, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2025); Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *5-*7. Many cases cited above also distinguish Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), from the detention challenge at issue in this case. See, e.g., Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *7-*9; Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *3-*8; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *4-*8.2 The Court agrees with this consensus and thus proceeds to review the petitioner’s constitutional claim.3

Rincon v. Hyde, No. CV 25-12633-BEM, 2025 WL 3122784, at *5-*6 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2025) (discussing “entry fiction” doctrine and its purposes).

The petitioner claims that his re-detention without notice, despite his compliance with all requirements imposed by the respondents, is punitive and violates his due-process rights (Dkt. 1, at 6 (claiming that he is not a flight risk or danger to the community)). When adjudicating a procedural due-process claim from a civil detainee, courts apply the three- part test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing and balancing the following factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, (3) the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

Regarding the first Mathews factor, the petitioner has a liberty interest that the Due Process Clause protects. Freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.

A noncitizen who has lived for years in the interior of the United States and established connections in the country acquires a protectible liberty interest. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 (“aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in deportation proceedings”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country”); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (noncitizen has a “weighty” interest in his or her right “to stay and live and work in this land of freedom” and to “rejoin . . . immediate family”).

As stated above, Barrera Leon has lived in the United States since 2021 and has no criminal history. He is actively seeking legal permanent resident status, was steadily employed and preparing to attend college before his detention, and has strong community and family ties. Moreover, the respondents briefly detained him and then released him into the country at the time of his entry in 2021. His current detention began in November 2025, when he appeared as instructed for a check-in appointment at ICE, and the respondents do not point to any condition of release he violated or other changed circumstance justifying his re-detention. Therefore, the petitioner acquired a protected liberty interest before the detention challenged in this case. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107; Vieira, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 700; Gunaydin v. Trump, 784 F.Supp.3d 1175, 1187 (D.

Minn. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d. at 685-86; Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *12; Barros v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-488-KC, 2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov.

10, 2025). The first factor weighs heavily in the petitioner’s favor.

The second Mathews factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the petitioner’s liberty interest by the procedures used for his re-detention, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards. “Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Due process requires adequate procedural protections to weigh the governmental interest against that of the individual. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“[G]overnment detention violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections or, in certain special and narrow[,] nonpunitive circumstances where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint”) (cleaned up).

“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (cleaned up). Immigrant detainees “are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the case.” Trump v. J. G.

G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (cleaned up).

The respondents argue that the petitioner’s claim should be denied based on Demore, 538 U.S. 510, which rejected a facial due-process challenge to a different statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). However, the Court does not consider in this case whether § 1225(b)(2) is facially unconstitutional, that is, “unconstitutional in all of its applications.”

See United States v. Morgan, 147 F.4th 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6677, 2026 WL 568341 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026) (cleaned up); Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *6. Instead, the Court considers whether § 1225(b)(2), “though constitutional in some circumstances,” has been unconstitutionally applied to the petitioner. See Morgan, 147 F.4th at 526.4

Here, the respondents have made no showing that the petitioner’s current civil detention is justified by his danger to the community, flight risk, or any other weighty government interest, and do not contest the petitioner’s statement that he has no criminal record. Rather, they argue that danger and flight risk are irrelevant under the plain language of § 1225(b)(2), thus ending the inquiry (Dkt. 8, at 6-8 (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003)). However, the question of whether procedural safeguards for the petitioner’s liberty interest are adequate is a constitutional question, not a statutory one, WL 4010424, at *8-*9 (distinguishing Demore); Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *7-*8 (distinguishing Demore). and a statute may not deprive a person of rights that are constitutionally guaranteed.

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Palm Valley Health Care, Inc. v. Azar, 947 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (“the Constitution, not statutes, determine the minimum procedures that due process requires”).5 They identify no procedures afforded to the petitioner to provide notice, an opportunity to be heard, or any individualized determination regarding his current detention. To the extent the respondents rely on the Notice to Appear dated March 26, 2026 (Dkt. 8-1), the document issued after the petitioner was detained and, moreover, does not adequately address the petitioner’s acquired liberty interest based on established connections in the country. See

Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271; Landon, 459 U.S. at 34. It also does not show that the petitioner was afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the justification for his detention. See J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 673 (immigrant detainees “are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the case”) (cleaned up).

In the absence of any available procedure to require the respondents to demonstrate danger or another adequate justification for detention, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the petitioner’s liberty interest is high. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 & n.7 (“When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount”) (citing, inter alia, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971)). When “the only mechanism Petitioner has to test the propriety of his detention is DHS’s discretionary authority,” that is “no real test at all.” Tenemasa- Lema v. Hyde, No. CV 25-13029-BEM, 2025 WL 3280555, at *9 (D. Mass. Nov. 25, 2025); see Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *13 (noting that the risk is heightened by the likelihood of lengthy delays in removal proceedings). This risk of deprivation could be addressed through an individualized assessment such as the bond hearings that respondents, until late 2025, routinely provided to assess a petitioner’s danger to community and flight risk. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (courts should assess whether “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would have “probable value”); Lopez- Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (an individualized hearing would provide an opportunity to be heard and a meaningful assessment of the petitioner’s dangerousness and flight risk, and thus would “greatly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty”); Barros, 2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (risk of erroneous deprivation “can be easily ameliorated through a bond hearing”). The Court concludes that the second Mathews factor weighs in the petitioner’s favor.

The third Mathews factor is the respondents’ interest in the petitioner’s mandatory, unreviewable detention at issue here. The respondents have not addressed this factor and do not argue their interest in detaining the petitioner under § 1225(b). To the extent the respondents rely on their general interest in enforcing the statute, their interest is insufficient to extinguish the petitioner’s right to due process. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *6 (“legislation cannot detract from the privilege afforded by the constitution”) (cleaned up) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 565 (1892), overruled on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)). Although courts have recognized a legitimate governmental interest in preventing a detainee’s flight and in protecting the community from any danger posed by the detainee, see, e.g., Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1189, these interests could be addressed by providing individualized hearings, as discussed above.6 Moreover, to the extent the purpose of the detention is punitive, the purpose is impermissible in the context of civil immigration

Because all three Mathews factors weigh in the petitioner’s favor, he is detained without due process of law. The Court concludes, in accordance with numerous other courts considering the question, that detention under § 1225(b)(2) as applied to this petitioner, without an individualized assessment or any notice or opportunity to be heard, violates the petitioner’s right to procedural due process. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 128 (2022) (“federal courts may grant habeas relief as law and justice require”) (cleaned up).

“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The remedy for unlawful detention “is, of course, release.” Id.; see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (based on statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and the common-law history of the writ, “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). Because the respondents do not acknowledge any process available to the petitioner, “there is no process to await.” See Aroca v. Mason, No. 2:26-CV-00057, 2026 WL 357872, at *19 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 9, 2026) (cleaned up) (collecting cases).7 After reviewing the authorities and all matters of record, the Court determines that release is the appropriate habeas relief for the unlawful detention in this case.

The Court therefore ORDERS as follows: 1. The respondents’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 8) is DENIED.

2. The petitioner’s petition for habeas relief (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED.

3. The respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE the petitioner from custody to a public location, under conditions of release no more restrictive than those in place prior to the detention at issue in this case, within 48 hours of this order.

4. The respondents are further ORDERED to inform the petitioner of the time and location of release at least three hours before the release. Because the petitioner proceeds pro se, the respondents are ORDERED to also notify any and all persons in their records as contacts for the petitioner, including immigration counsel and/or family members and friends of the petitioner, of the time and location of release at least three hours before the release.

5. The respondents are further ORDERED to return to the petitioner, at the time of his release from custody, any and all identification documents taken from him at the time of or during his detention.

6. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of the petitioner under this present detention is PROHIBITED and ENJOINED.

7. The respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report updating the Court within 72 hours of this order.

8. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on _ April 2 , 2026.

eee © MenQiQ _ GEORGE C. HANKS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14/14