Gouhenant v. Cockrell
Cases that cite this one
49 later published cases cite this decision. The 23 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Bishop v. Williams (Tex. App. 1920)
- Drake Interiors, L.L.C. v. Andrea Marie Thomas & Robert Warren Thomas (Tex. App. 2014)
- Drake Interiors, L.L.C. v. Andrea Marie Thomas & Robert Warren Thomas (Tex. App. 2014)
- Pierce v. Washington Mutual Bank (Tex. App. 2007)
- Morris v. Porter (Tex. App. 1965)
- Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co. (Tex. 1939)
- Milliken v. Coker (Tex. App. 1935)
- Jolesch & Chaska Co. v. Hampton (Tex. App. 1927)
- Ritz v. First Nat. Bank of Pecos (Tex. App. 1921)
- Cline v. Upton (Tex. 1882)
- Cox v. Harvey (Tex. Comm'n App. 1880)
- Thomas v. Williams (Tex. 1878)
- Carmack v. Park Cities Healthcare LLC (District Court, N.D. Texas 2023)
- Carmack v. Park Cities Healthcare LLC (District Court, N.D. Texas 2021)
- Brei v. Ben Brinck, Asset Acceptance, LLC (In re Brei) (United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas 2019)
- Martha N. Hill and Gary Hill v. Winnon Earl Sword (Tex. App. 2015)
- King Louie Mining, LLC v. Comu (In re Comu) (United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas 2015)
- Estate of Domingo Cantu (Tex. App. 2012)
- Union Square Federal Credit Union v. Richard R. Clay (Tex. App. 2009)
- Union Square Federal Credit Union v. Richard R. Clay (Tex. App. 2009)
- Union Square Federal Credit Union v. Richard R. Clay (Tex. App. 2009)
- Virgil A. Pierce v. Washington Mutual Bank, N.A. (Tex. App. 2007)
- Emma G. Barrera and Nickolas Barrera v. State (Tex. App. 2005)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This suit is to recover a lot of land in the town of Dallas, claimed by the plaintiff as his homestead, the defendant claiming title under Sheriff’s sale.
It should be remembered that creditors have no claim upon the homestead. They trust every man with the understanding that he either has or may procure a homestead, upon which they have no more right to seize than they have upon the person of the debtor or the property of a third person in satisfaction of the debt.
Admitting, however, as we have held, that less evidence may be sufficient, and that where there is abandonment with a fixed intention not to return, the property may be opened to creditors; yet it must be undeniably clear and beyond almost the shadow, at least all reasonable ground of dispute, that there has been a total abandonment with an intention not to return and claim the exemption. Do the facts in evidence show an unequivocal intention of such entire abandonment ? Is there such a preponderance of proofs as to show beyond dispute, that he had forfeited the protection guaranteed to him not only by law, but by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land? From an inspection of the record it will be seen that these inquiries should be answered not only in the negative, but that the overbalance of the proofs is to the contrary, in support of the claim of the plaintiff.
He was a Daguerreotypist, a wanderer by vocation; and it was proven that in pursuit of his business, he had been absent on former occasions. When he left Dallas for Fort Worth, to an inquiry if he was leaving for good, he replied in the negative ; that he would be back. There was no declaration of his at any time, and especially at the time of his removal, that he intended to abandon his residence in Dallas. The object of his temporary removal or residence was, by the proof, to settle a son or nephew in business; and by one witness, the carpenter employed by him, it was to raise means for the erection of a building on his homestead lot; that he boarded for some months after he went to Fort Worth with one of the witnesses, and afterwards rented a room and boarded himself; that he spoke to this witness of buying property, and that if he could sell his saloon (meaning his residence) in Dallas, he would be able to put up a house; and that if he should sell his saloon in Dallas, he would move to Fort Worth; that he had come up to settle his son in business. This evidence shows beyond a doubt, that he had some purpose of removing from Dallas, but that he would not remove unless he could sell his house; and quite overbalances all the other circumstances to the reverse, such as voting for county officers, being regarded at Fort Worth as a citizen, and that he employed two wagons to carry his plunder, &c.; and it seems that the most of that freight was his Daguerrean apparatus.
Reversed and remanded.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.