Swinney, Green & Co. v. Booth

Texas Supreme Court
Swinney, Green & Co. v. Booth, 28 Tex. 113 (Tex. 1866)
Moore

Swinney, Green & Co. v. Booth

Opinion of the Court

Moore, C. J.

—The charge given by the court correctly announced the legal principles applicable to the issues involved in the case. The jury were instructed that the burden of proof was upon the, claimant, and that it was incumbent upon her to establish the facts upon which she relied to sustain her claim to the property in controversy. There was no reason for reiterating the law in this particular by the charge asked by the plaintiffs in execution, even if the language in which their proposed instruction was couched had been altogether unexceptionable. - This, however, was not the case. It is asked by it, that the jury shall be directed that the claimant must sustain her title to the property in suit, not by reasonable or satisfactory evidence, but by “abundant proof.” Such an instruction would probably have misled the jury, rather than have guided them in arriving at a correct conclusion in making up their verdict.

The objection that the witness Edwards was improperly *116permitted, to testify as to his “impression” about a matter of fact, which could have been proved by recorded evidence, cannot be sustained. The title of the claimant may not have been of record; at least the brief and imperfect history imbodied in "the • transcript before us, of the proceedings in the case, does not indicate, with sufficient certainty, that her title or right to the property in dispute depends upon or grows out of a matter of record, or is evidenced by an instrument in writing, to require a reversal of the judgment. Hor should the evidence have been rejected, because .the witness qualified the certainty and conclusiveness of his reply to the question asked by adding, he had stated the facts, as to which he was interrogated, in conformity with his impression. He was testifying about a matter which had transpired sometime previous. His answer is, in substance, the same as if he had said, “ this is my recollection of the matter;” “I have answered to the best of my recollection, though I am not absolutely certain.” These are expressions frequently used by cautious and truthful witnesses, which, though they may detract from the weight of their evidence, certainly furnish no sufficient reason for its entire exclusion. The testimony on behalf of the claimant is quite vague and indefinite, and. we have had some hesitancy in holding it sufficient to sustain the verdict; but, as we cannot say that the finding of the jury was without or clearly contrary to the evidence, and it was satisfactory to the judge before whom the case was tried, it is not believed the judgment should be reversed solely on this ground.

There is no error in the judgment, and it is therefore

Affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
Swinney, Green & Co. v. Nancy Booth
Cited By
5 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
On the trial of an issue of the right of property, the plaintiifs in execution asked the court to instruct the jury that the claimant must sustain her title to the property “by abundant proof.” The court had already, of its own motion, charged the jury that the burden of proof was on the claimant, and that it was incumbent on her to establish the facts on which she relied to sustain her claim. Held, that the court was under no obligation to reiterate the law in this particular, even if the plaintiffs’ proposed instruction had been entirely unexceptionable; that the charge asked, however, was objectionable, as calculated rather to mislead the jury than to conduct them to a correct conclusion; and that there was no error in declining to give the instruction so asked. A witness testifying by deposition that the property in controversy had been acquired by the claimant from her father’s estate, added the remark, “this is my impression.” Held, that the qualifying remark was tantamount to a statement by the witness that he only testified to the best of his recollection, and however the implied uncertainty might impair the weight of the evidence, it could furnish no reason for its exclusion. The proof in this case, as disclosed in the record, appeared to be vague and indefinite, and this court hesitates to pronounce it sufficient to warrant the verdict in favor of the claimant; but, as it cannot be said to be without evidence, or that it was clearly contrary to the evidence, and as it was satisfactory to the judge before whom the cause was tried, the judgment will not be reversed.