Hartless v. State
Hartless v. State
Opinion of the Court
After a thorough and careful examination of the rulings of the court, and of the facts presented in the
The indictment was for murder. The finding of the jury, after hearing the evidence and the charge of the court, was “ guilty of murder in the second degree, and confinement in the penitentiary for a period of ten years.” We think the jury had abundant reason from the testimony, if credible, (and of that they were the sole jxxdges,) to justify them in the verdict which they reixdex*ed. The circumstances coxxdxxced xxxost strongly to show that a conspiracy had been formed, and a plaix regxxlarly laid for the taldxig off of this victim; and this woman, the appellant, if not the projector of the scheme and the chief actor in the complot, at least was present, and aiding and assisting in effecting the bloody tragedy.
Bxxt, notwithstanding this is the obvious complexion of the testimony to our view, as presented by the record, if there was sxxeh errors of law committed upon the trial as might probably have worked injustice, and have possibly led the jxxry to an en’oneoxxs conclusion, to the prejudice of the rights of the prisoner, we shoxxld feel no hesitancy in arresting the judgment and granting a new trial. Bxxt we can perceive no such errors in the record.
The coxxnsel for the convict xu'ges three several considerations in favor of the reversal of the case, neither of which, in our judgment, is sufficient to warrant our interposition. The first is, that testimony was admitted, touching the character of the accxxsed, before that character was drawn into issxxe by the party herself. The truth is, in a case like the present, where the prisoner had confessed her agency in the killing, the character of the prisoner was of no moment in the investigation, and coxxld neither avail, if good, nor prejudice, if bad. It is mainly in cases of doxxbt aboxxt the guilty agent in crim
It is very apparent from the evidence that the project was planned and arranged beforehand—that the convict was to provoke a quarrel with her husband, and her son and father were to come forth in the midst of this quarrel, and, then and there, to take such action and perform such deed as the occasion might require. ITow happened it that the father, who lived three miles off, and whither the son, with his wife, had gone that afternoon, not many hours before the killing, could hear the quarrel between the deceased and his wife, unless a plan had been concerted by which greatly to intensify their sense of hearing, and give them the faculty of distinguishing vocal sounds three miles distant? Yet, the son, with his wife, had gone three miles to stay all night at the father’s, and the son and father were back early in the night to hear the quarrel of the husband and wife at the house of the victim ! It is most obvious the whole matter was a concerted arrangement among
The last ground relied upon is, that three Avitnesses, xx'ho had been duly summoned to testify for the defense, xvere not in attendance at the trial, and that they had been kept away by fraud, force and threats. The fact of their absence Avas known to the accused and the attorneys at the time of the announcement of their readiness for, and their engagement in the trial; and they declined exren to ask for a continuance of the cause. They chose rather to specxilate upon the chances of the verdict, and to risk the appearance of the witnesses during the progress of the trial; and it is but just that they should abide the issues •of fate xxdiich they themselves created. If it was knoAvn to the parties that the Avitnesses Avere kept aAvay by force, or fraud, application ought to have been made to the court for its coercive poAver to remedy the evil. Certainly the case Avould liax'e been continued by the court until the attendance of the AX'itnesses could have been coerced by attachment. The laxv does not authorize the granting of a nexv trial upon an ex parte statement of the convict of the absence of material AX'itnesses, kept axxay by force, fraud or threats, unsupported by other affidavits ; especially xxdien that absence xvas knoxxm to the accused at the time of trial, and no continuance asked for, though the Avitnesses xvere duly summoned. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Amanda Hartless v. State
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- 1— As an abstract proposition of law, it is conceded that it is not competent, for the State to give in evidence the bad character of the accused, unless the accused has initiated the inquiry by evidence of good character. 2— But it is mainly in cases of doubt about the guilty agent in criminal accu . sations that character becomes important in public trials. 3— The appellant being on trial for the murder of her husband, the State, notwithstanding her objection, was allowed to introduce evidence as to her character, although she had not previously put her character in issue by any evidence respecting it. This being assigned as error, it is held that, under the circumstances of this case, and the appellant having confessed her participation in the homicide, the evidence as to her character was of no moment, and could have had no influence on the result of the trial; and hence its admission was not error, for which the judgment would be reversed. 4— The court below instructed the jury that “ although a homicide may take place under circumstances showing no deliberation, yet, if the person guilty thereof provoked a contest with the apparent intention of killing or doing serious bodily injury to the deceased, the offense does not come within the definition of manslaughter.” Held, that the instruction was not only correct as a legal proposition, but was applicable to the facts in proof in this cause, and it was, therefore, properly given to the jury. 5— A new trial will not be granted upon an exp arle and unsupported affidavit of a convict that by force, fraud, or threats, material witnesses for the defense had been kept from the trial; and especially will a new trial be refused when the absence of the witnesses and the materiality of their testimony were known to the defendant at the trial, and no continuance was asked, nor process to compel their attendance applied for, although they had been duly summoned.