Blair v. Gay
Blair v. Gay
Opinion of the Court
The only matter for adjudication in this case is, whether a defendant in a suit in the district court, based upon a judgment rendered against him in the county court, upon final settlement as a guardian of the property of a lunatic, at the instance of the same plaintiffs, can set up as a defense, within two-years after the rendition thereof, errors in the judgment so rendered.
There is no question hut that the defendant could, by cei'tiorari, have the the. judgment remhved to the district court for revision ; and also, that the parties antagonistic would he the same as in the 1 case before the court. (Art. 3992, • Paschal’s Digest.) In that case, the same identical questions would be raised for adjudication, that the defendant seeks to raise in the case as it is, having the same parties, the same testimony, and before the same tribunal. Until two years had elapsed, the judgment of the county court was similar to an interlocutory judgment in the district court, which the defendant could attack in any manner he might choose, before the district court, having cited the proper parties, and he can do the same thing if the opposing party should voluntarily appear, or, as is the present case, cite him to appear and show cause why execution shall not issue thereon.
Article 144Í provides, that “ the defendant may plead as many several matters, whether of law or fact, as he shall think necessary for his defense, and which may he pertinent to the cause,” etc.
The judgment is reversed and cause remanded.
This suit was brought at the fall term, 1868, of the District Court of De Witt county, by Gilbert Gay and Eliza Gay, as administrator and administratrix of the estate of John 27. Morrison, against Wm. A. Blair and the sureties on his bond as guardian of the estate of the lunatic, John 27. Morrison, to recover the sum of $157.15, which had been decreed and ordered by the' Probate Court of De Witt county, at its 27ovember term, ] 867, to be paid by Blair to the plaintiffs. Suit was dismissed as to all the sureties of Blair, except T. J. Wheat.
Blair and Wheat filed separate answers, each impugning the decree of the county court, alleging that it was rendered without an appearance, or answer filed by the guardian; that it was based upon the receipt by Blair of Confederate money, from an insolvent debtor of his ward, and that Blair was entitled to certain credits that had not been allowed.
A certified transcript of the proceedings in the probate court was filed as a part of their answers, and each prayed that the district court would review, revise and correct the decree and order of that court. The plaintiffs excepted to so much of the answers as attacked the decree and order of the county court. The exceptions were sustained, and for error in that ruling, the cause is brought to this court for revision.
It is contended by counsel for defendants in error, that the decree of the county court is conclusive as to the defendant, Blair, and his sureties, until reversed: and that it could only be reversed in one of the modes prescribed by the statute, viz : by appeal or certiorari.
It seems from the Constitution and statute above quoted, that the district court has general control, and original as well as appellate jurisdiction, “over all matters for settling the accounts of executors, administrators, and guardians; ” and it matters not in what manner a certified copy of the proceedings of the county court may come before it, whether it be in answer to a writ or otherwise.
In this case the district court had jurisdiction, and should have reviewed the proceedings of the county court. The attack was direct and not collateral.
The judgment of the district court in sustaining the exceptions to the answers was erroneous.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for ‘ further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- W. A. Blair and another v. G. Gay and another
- Cited By
- 6 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- 1. Administrators of a deceased lunatic obtained in the probate court (as organized in 1866) a decree for money against a former guardian oí the lunatic’s property ; and afterwards, but within two years, they brought, suit in the district court on the guardian's bond to recover the amount of the decree from the guardian and his sureties. - The defendants answered that the decree was rendered without any appearance or answer by the guardian ; that the guardian was not indebted to the estate; that the decree was based on Confederate money collected by the guardian from an insolvent debtor of the lunatic; and that the guardian was entitled to credits not allowed him in the decree ; and they filed a transcript-of the proceedings of the probate court, and prayed that its decree be revised and corrected. Held, that tips line of defense was competent, the two years allowed by Article 3922, Paschal’s Digest, for the revision by the district court of the probate court’s decree being unexpired, and it being immaterial in what manner the appearance of the parties was obtained in the district court. 2. A policy pervades our whole system of jurisprudence, which requires parties to settle all their controversies in a single suit, if practicable. (By Morrill, Chief Justice, citing Haggerty v. Scott, 10 Texas, 525 ; Ponton v. Bellows, 22 Texas, 681; and Henderson v. Morrill, 12 Texas, 3.) 3. The defense above indicated was a direet and not a mere collateral attack upon the decree of the probaie court. (By Denison, Justice.) 4. The Constitution cf 1868 and Article 3922, Paschal’s Digest, conferred on ■ the district court a general control and original as well as appellate jurisdiction over all matters for settling the accounts of guardians, etc.; and it was immaterial in wliat manner, and whether by writ or otherwise, a transcript of a probate court’s proceedings in such a matter was brought beiore a district court. ■ (By Denison, Justice.)