Brown v. McConnell
Brown v. McConnell
Opinion of the Court
The principal question in this case arises upon the validity of the deed made by Mrs. Adair, as executrix of Isaac Adair, deceased, to John H. Burnett.
On behalf of Mrs. Brown, plaintiff below, appellant in this court, it is sought to be avoided mainly on the ground that it is not shown in writing by the deed itself or otherwise, that William M, Taylor, John T. Smith and John Murchison, or a majority of them, advised and consented to the sale of the land, made by Mrs. Adair to John N. Burnett, as provided in the will of Isaac Adair, deceased.
In the well-considered case of Giddings v. Butler, 47 Tex., 535, the above distinction between the relief afforded by a court of law and that by a court of equity, in such cases, is clearly recognized, and it is there held, that when a trust is executed by one of several joint executors, with the consent and approbation of the others, or when the others subsequently ratify a sale made by one under the trust, the act of the single executor will be regarded in equity as binding upon the estate. And that a deed made by one of several executors, authorized by will to act independently of the control of the probate court, if authorized by the co-executors, and approved by them when made, is merely an irregular and imperfect execution of the power, which will be aided in equity.
Amongst other cases quoted in Giddings v. Butler, 47 Tex., 546, by the learned judge delivering that opinion, are those of Taylor v. Adams, 2 Serg. & R, 533, and Silverthorn v. McKinster, 12 Pa. St., 67. In the latter the court say: “As there was strong evidence that Thomas Miles, one of them (the executors), assented to the sale made by the other two to Bums, it was properly left to the jury to say whether, in truth, the sale was made by all the executors'; upon thq principle that 'subsequent ratifi-. cation is equivalent, to precedent participation. Taylor v. Adams, 2 Serg. & R, 534. That case shows, too, that a general power to sell, given by last will, may be executed by parol, and that such a sale, partly executed by possession, passes an equitable estate to the vendee, recoverable in ejectment, notwithstanding the statute of frauds, just as a similar sale by one in his own right conveys an equitable title. There is, in fact,, in this respect, no difference between the exercise of a power to sell, unshackled by particular directions for its execution, and a sale made of one’s own estate.”
These authorities are decisive of the case now before the court. The testimony shows that the sale by Mrs. Adair was made for the payment of debts against the estate; that the purchase money was paid by the purchaser, John H. Burnett, and he placed into possession, and the proceeds of the sale applied to the indebtedness; hence the sale was made in pursuance of one of the contingencies provided for in the will. The testimony also shows that both Taylor and Smith, who composed a majority of the three whose advice and consent were, required by the
It is further shown by the testimony that the appellees, McConnell et aZ., defendants below, were purchasers for value Under John H. Burnett, the. original vendee, and who was also a purchaser for value, and hence came within one of the classes in whose aid a court of equity will interfere.
The question of the forced sale of the homestead does not arise .in this case. In one contingency under the will, Mrs. Adair was the devisee and beneficiary of this property; and in any event she had the management, control and sale of it, with the advice and consent of Taylor, Smith and Murchison, or a majority of them. If, in fact, it were the homestead, she had the right to voluntarily sell it as she did for the payment of debts, in preference to other property, and the plaintiff had no such vested right in it, as a homestead, which would invalidate the sale on that ground.
Affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.