Texas Supreme Court, 1901

Travis v. Hall

Texas Supreme Court · Decided December 19, 1901 · Williams

65 S.W. 1077; 95 Tex. 116; 1901 Tex. LEXIS 130 (South Western Reporter)

Counsel

Ingham S. Roberts, for appellant. — When the statute of limitation for ten years has been plead and proved by a plaintiff, there can be no presumption that there are parties under disabilities, and it is incumbent on the defendant asserting title against such limitation, to plead and prove that there were and are persons laboring under disabilities. On the introducing by the defendant of an outstanding record title to defeat the title by limitation alleged and proved by such plaintiff, it is not sufficient to defeat a recovery by such plaintiff claiming title by limitation to presume that one might exist who might show disabilities protecting him from limitation. Rev. Stats., art. 3343; McGregor v. Thompson, 7 Texas Civ. App. 32[ 7 Tex. Civ. App. 32 ]; Mims v. Rafel, 73 Tex. 300 [ 73 Tex. 300 ]; Branch v. Baker, 70 Tex. 190 . Title by limitation of ten years is made by showing continuous occupation, etc., in the terms of the statute, of the land claimed for that period. Fisher Sears, for appellees. — Appellant based her right of recovery on ten years adverse possession. The petition alleged that this possession was for "more than ten years next before the filing of this suit." The uncontroverted testimony showed that plaintiff had not been in possession at "any time" within ten years "next before the filing of this suit," but that what possession she may have once had had terminated more than ten years before the suit was filed. The evidence, therefore, did not correspond with the pleading, and the court properly rendered judgment for the defendants. Banking Co. v. Stone, 49 Tex. 15 ; Hall v. Jackson, 3 Tex. 305 ; Harvey v. Cummings, 68 Tex. 607 ; Cunningham v. Frandtzen, 26 Tex. 39 [ 26 Tex. 39 ]; Lewis v. Hatton, 86 Tex. 535 . It is the settled practice of the upper courts in this State not to disturb a judgment which has been rightly entered upon the facts of the case, although the judge may have given a wrong reason for this action. Grace v. Miller, 4 Texas Civ. App. 53[ 4 Tex. Civ. App. 53 ]; State v. Hoff, 88 Tex. 299 [ 88 Tex. 299 ]; San Antonio Water Works v. Maury, 72 Tex. 113 [ 72 Tex. 113 ]. Defendants, being in actual possession of the land, were not required under the law to yield possession except to the owner of the title. The owner against plaintiff was shown to be John Doran. Plaintiff, however, claimed to be the owner by prescription — adverse possession — since Doran acquired title. Our contention and the ruling of the lower court is, that where limitation is claimed against one other than the defendant in the suit, plaintiff must not only show the adverse possession, but that the owner of the land was not under disability during the time the possession was claimed. If the real owner of the outstanding title was under disability during the time of plaintiff's alleged occupancy, then plaintiff did not own the land. On plaintiff was the burden of proof to show that she owned the title as against all parties, and as she did not show that the owner of the outstanding title was free from disability during the time of her occupancy, she failed to show title. Austin v. Hall, 57 S.W. Rep., 563, and cases cited.

Opinion of the Court

WILLIAMS, Associate Justice.

Certified questions from the Court of Civil Appeals for the First District, as follows:

“Sarah A. Travis brought an action of trespass to try title against Frank Hall and others in the District Court of Harris County for the recovery of the south half of block 34 of the James S. Holman survey. In her petition, the plaintiff, setting out title to the land in herself by limitation, alleged the facts necessary to show title by ten years limitation, and among other facts, alleged that she had been in adverse possession thereof, “cultivating, using, and enjoying the same for a period of more than ten years next before the filing of this suit and before the ejectment hereinafter alleged.” The suit was filed August 29, 1900, and the date of ejectment was laid at January 1, 1899. The defendants pleaded not guilty, under which they introduced evidence of an outstanding title. They also pleaded limitation of ten years and introduced evidence in support thereof. The cause was tried before the court without a jury and judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants, for the reason that the plaintiff had failed to support her proof of limitation as against the outstanding title by affirmative proof of want of disability to sue in the owner of the outstanding title. From the conclusions filed by the trial judge, it appears that the land in controversy was conveyed to Sarah Travis, wife of FT. W. Travis, in 1845; that in 1842 a judgment was rendered against H. W. Travis by the District Court of Harris County for the costs of a suit in that court; that by virtue of an execution issued on that judgment in 1846, the land was levied upon and sold as the property of FT. W. Travis, and that John Doran became the purchaser thereof. That the plaintiff was the heir of Sarah Travis and her husband, FT. W. Travis, and would be entitled to the land but for the execution sale which the court held valid. The court.further found that the plaintiff had had and held such adverse possession of the land between the years 1870 and 1890 as would confer title by the statute of ten years limitation, but that an outstanding title having been shown in John Doran, it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that there was no disability on the part of any owner of such outstanding title as would prevent the running of limitation. The court declined to find upon the issue of limitation made by the defendants. The evidence upon this issue was conflicting, and a finding thereon in favor of either party would not have been disturbed by this court.

“The following questions of law arise out of the facts above stated,. to which this court desires the answers of the Supreme Court:

“1. On proof of outstanding title in John Doran by the defendants,. *120 was it necessary for the plaintiff, in order to sustain her title by limitation otherwise fully shown, to show affirmatively that there was no disability on the part of the holders of the John Doran title?

“2. Was the allegation of title in plaintiff by limitation for ea period ■of more than ten years next before the filing of this suit and before the ejectment hereinafter alleged/ met by proof of a completed possession between the years of 1870 and 1890 ? Does such proof support the allegation so as to authorize judgment thereon?

“3. The court below sitting as a jury having expressly declined to find the facts upon the issue of limitation made by the defendants, and having based his judgment upon other issues, should this court, if the judgment could not be sustained otherwise, affirm the judgment upon -evidence sufficient to support it if there had been a finding thereon, either express or implied, when there is conflicting evidence sufficient to support a different finding?” ,

All of the questions had been decided by the Court of Civil Appeals, but a motion for rehearing having been filed, they were certified to this court while the motion is pending.

■ In regard to the first question, we think it proper to say that it hardly arises upon the facts stated in the certificate. The disabilities which, during the period ;in question, would have prevented the operation of limitation, were nonage, coverture, insanity, and imprisonment. Pasch. Dig., art. 4624; Rev. Stats., 1879, art. 3201. The certificate shows that in 1846 the outstanding title was vested in a person who was not a married woman. If he was then a minor, he would have reached majority before 1870. The presumption would be against insanity and imprisonment and would afford sufficient evidence that Doran was under neither of those disabilities. Ro evidence is stated of his death or of the divestiture of title out of him. The party whose case depended on a change in the condition thus proved to have existed would have the burden of proof, the time which elapsed not being sufficient of itself to raise the presumption of death. It would seem, therefore, that by the evidence as here stated, the fact mentioned in the first question was sufficiently proved. But as the Court of Civil Appeals certifies it as if it had not been shown, and as we can not know what other evidence there may be in the record before that court, we think it proper to answer it as well as the others.

All of the questions were, we think, correctly decided by that court in the opinion referred to, and it is therefore only necessary that we answer the first and third questions in the negative and the second in the affirmative.

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