Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas v. Lindsey
Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas v. Lindsey
Dissenting Opinion
joined by Justice BAKER and Justice GONZALES, dissenting.
Before today, our pronouncement in National Union Fire Insurance Company v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines was clear. We said that because negligent discharge of a firearm does not produce an injury “caused by ... use of a covered auto,” it is not a covered event under an automobile liability policy.
The Court must have forgotten that the issue in National Union was not the more narrow question of whether there was coverage, but the broader question of whether the insurer owed a duty to defend.
[I]n case of doubt as to whether or not the allegations of a complaint against the insured state a cause of action within the coverage of a liability policy sufficient to compel the insurer to defend the action, such doubt will be resolved in insured’s favor.3
Also, we considered and concluded in National Union that under the policy language, “a causal relation between the injury and the use of the auto is essential to recovery.”
But the Court claims the facts are different here. Let me compare. In National Union, the plaintiff asserted that a truck driver, while operating a truck, negligently discharged a firearm.
Curiously, the Court seems content to rely on the supposedly important distinction that in this case Metzer’s gun was in a gun rack. But negligent discharge of a gun in a gun rack in a truck that’s not moving is no more, and arguably less, a “use” of a vehicle than negligent discharge of a gun in a moving truck. Nor is the child’s entering the pickup any more a causal nexus between “use” of the vehicle and the injury than a trucker driving his truck down the highway when the injury occurs. Both injuries were incidental to the use of the vehicle. Neither established the necessary causal nexus between the vehicle’s use and the accident to implicate coverage under the automobile liability policy.
Further, the Court obfuscates the issue by claiming that this case is different because the gun was not “purposefully” handled.
Oddly, the Court recognizes as fundamental the question of what the insurer intended to provide and the insured intended to buy,
The Court unnecessarily embarks on an exhaustive search through other states’ jurisprudence to glean support for its conclusion that there is coverage here
. 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. 1997).
. Id. (quoting Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 26 (Tex. 1965), in turn quoting C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Allegations in third person’s action against insured as determining liability insurer's duty to defend, 50 A.L.R.2d 458, 504 (1956)).
. Id. at 142.
. Id.
. See id. at 141-42.
. See id. at 141.
. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 988 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. 1999) ("[Wlhen the injury complained of is purely incidental to the use of the vehicle, this nexus is not shown and the policy does not provide coverage.”).
. See 939 S.W.2d at 141-42.
. Id.
. See 988 S.W.2d at 745.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court,
The question is whether the underin-sured motorist provision of a standard Texas personal auto policy covers the insured’s bodily injuries resulting from the unintentional discharge of a shotgun on a gun rack in a pickup truck parked nearby. The answer, in this case, depends on whether, within the meaning of the policy, the injuries resulted from “an accident” “aris[ing] out of’ the “use” of the truck. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, respondent in this Court, and the court of appeals affirmed.
I
Richard Metzer and his wife had been fishing with their nine-year-old son when the boy returned to Metzer’s pickup parked nearby to retrieve his coveralls. Finding the truck locked, the boy climbed into the bed and attempted to enter the cab through the truck’s sliding rear window, which was open a few inches. In so doing, he accidentally touched a loaded shotgun resting in a gun rack mounted over the rear window, causing the gun to discharge. The buckshot struck Richard Lindsey, who was seated in his mother’s car parked next to the pickup. Lindsey’s wife and mother, also seated in the car, were not struck by the gunshot.
Lindsey and his wife sued Metzer and settled for the $20,000 policy limits on his truck, which were far less than Lindsey’s total damages. The Lindseys then claimed the $50,000 limits of the uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage of his mother’s policy issued by the Mid-Century Insurance Company of Texas, a division of the Farmers Insurance Group. Mid-Century, who had consented to the Lindseys’ settlement with the Metzers, denied the claim on the ground that there had been no physical contact between the two vehicles. The Lindseys then sued Mid-Century for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of warranty, and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices — Consumer Protection Act and the Insurance Code. The Lindseys and Mid-Century all moved for summary judgment on the contract claim, and the district court granted the Lindseys’ motion and severed the order, making it an appealable judgment. The court of appeals affirmed.
II
Mid-Century’s policy states:
*155 We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured [or underinsured] motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by a covered person, or property damage, caused by an accident.
The owner’s or operator’s liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured [or underinsured] motor vehicle.
The parties’ sole dispute concerning the applicability of this provision is over whether Lindsey’s injuries were caused by an accident arising out of the use of Met-zer’s truck. Taking each of Mid-Century’s arguments in turn, we consider, first, whether Lindsey’s injuries were “caused by an accident”, and second, whether Met-zer’s liability for Lindsey’s injuries “[arose] out of the ... use” of Metzer’s truck.
A
Mid-Century’s policy does not define “accident”, but we have held that an injury is accidental if “from the viewpoint of the insured, [it is] not the natural and probable consequence of the action or occurrence which produced the injury; or in other words, if the injury could not reasonably be anticipated by insured, or would not ordinarily follow from the action or occurrence which caused the injury.”
Metzer’s son intended only to gain entry to the truck. He did not intend to cause the shotgun to discharge or Lindsey to be injured, nor was it reasonably foreseeable that either consequence would result from the boy’s trying to enter the pickup through the rear window. Metzer’s son was not playing with the gun or acting recklessly. There is no evidence that he even knew it was loaded. His injuring Lindsey was an accident.
Mid-Century argues, however, that by “accident” the policy means “auto accident” or “motor vehicle accident”, as evidenced by the use of the latter phrases throughout the policy. An auto accident, Mid-Century argues, requires a collision. Assuming that “auto accident” is a more restrictive term in the policy than “accident”, and that a fair construction of the policy as a whole requires that the restriction be implied in the uninsured/underin-sured motorist provision where it does not appear, we do not agree that the term excludes the occurrence here. In Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Griffin we held that “ ‘[t]he term “auto accident” refers to situations where one or more vehicles are involved with another vehicle, object, or person.’ ”
We therefore conclude that Lindsey’s injuries were “caused by an accident” within the meaning of Metzer’s policy.
B
For liability to “arise out of’ the use of a motor vehicle, a causal connection or relation must exist between the accident or injury and the use of the motor vehicle.
The bus in this case was not in operation; it was parked, empty, with the motor off. The driver was not aboard; there were no students aboard. The bus was not ‘doing or performing a practical work’; it was not being ‘put or [brought] into action or service’; it was not being ‘employ[ed] or appl[ied] to a given purpose’. The bus was nothing more than the place where Monica happened to injure herself.15
We reached a similar conclusion in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., a case involving claims and circumstances more closely related to the case now before us. The issue there was whether a sufficient connection existed between a truck driver’s alleged negligent discharge of a firearm, striking a passenger in a van traveling alongside, and the operation of the truck, to invoke the
Two well-established treatises on insurance law, Couch on Insurance and Apple-man’s Insurance Law and Practice, distill from numerous cases throughout the country the following test for determining whether an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle for purposes of auto liability insurance coverage:
For an injury to fall within the “use” coverage of an automobile policy (1) the accident must have arisen out of the inherent nature of the automobile, as such, (2) the accident must have arisen within the natural territorial limits of an automobile, and the actual use must not have terminated, (3) the automobile must not merely contribute to cause the condition which produces the injury, but must itself produce the injury.19
Two Texas courts of appeals have used these factors to conclude that a drive-by shooting does not arise out of the use of a vehicle.
Fundamentally, of course, the issue is what coverage is intended to be provided by insurers and acquired and shared by premium-payers. A drive-by shooting involves a vehicle only incidentally. The shooter could be standing still and accomplish the same result. In such a situation, even if the first two factors of the Apple-man/Couch test were satisfied, the third could not be because the vehicle’s role in the occurrence is minimal as compared with the shooter’s. The vehicle is the mere situs of an incident that could have occurred anywhere.
Applying all these considerations to the facts of the case before us, we conclude that Lindsey’s injury arose out of the use of the Metzer truck as a matter of law. Metzer’s son’s sole purpose was to gain entry into the truck to retrieve his clothing. His conduct did not stray from that purpose. He did not play with the gun, or try to shoot it, or load or unload it, or purposefully handle it in any way. His contact with the gun was entirely inadvertent. Although the boy was attempting an unorthodox method of entry, it was not an unexpected or unnatural use of the vehicle, given his size, the fact that the vehicle was locked, and the nature of boys. It was the boy’s efforts to enter the vehicle that directly caused the gun to discharge and Lindsey to become injured. Surely if the movement of the truck had caused the shotgun to discharge, there would be little question that the vehicle produced the im
We believe this conclusion to be consistent with the majority of decisions in other jurisdictions in similar cases. In each case the court has attempted to assess the peculiar facts and circumstances that gave rise to the injury.
• while the occupant of a vehicle is handling or toying with the gun, courts consistently deny coverage holding that the vehicle is the mere situs for the accident and no causal connection exists between the discharge of the gun and the inherent use of the vehicle.
• while a person is loading the gun into or unloading the gun from the vehicle, courts generally find coverage.
• while using part of a vehicle as a “gun rest” for the purpose of firing a weapon, courts split, with the majority of cases denying coverage because a “gun rest” is not an inherent use of a vehicle.
• while the gun is resting in or being removed from gun racks permanently attached to vehicles, a majority of cases allow coverage for resulting injuries on the rationale that the presence of the permanently attached gun rack in the vehicle establishes a significant causal connection between the accident and the use of the vehicle.
• when the discharge occurs inside a vehicle caused by the actual movement or operation of the vehicle, courts afford coverage.28
Ward has been cited in a number of jurisdictions.
In the “gun rack” category are five cases, four of which afford coverage. In Kohl v. Union Insurance Co.,
We are aware of only one case involving a gun rack in which coverage was denied. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Powell,
We agree with the court in Powell that a firearm discharge related to a gun rack does not arise out of the use of the vehicle merely because the gun rack is permanently attached. Rather, the purpose and circumstances of the injury-producing act are determinative. The vehicle in Powell was being used only as a gathering place and the gun discharged for no apparent reason; it was merely the situs for the accident and injury. By contrast, the injury-producing act in this case — the Metzer boy’s entry into the truck to retrieve his clothing — involved the use of the vehicle as a vehicle. Moreover, the boy’s entry caused the gun’s accidental discharge. We disagree, however, with the Powell court’s emphasis on the victim’s relation to the vehicle as a vehicle. While the victim’s involvement with the vehicle is an important factor, it cannot alone determine whether the vehicle’s use produced the accident. The more important factors are the actor’s conduct and intent.
The dissent argues that no material distinction can be drawn between the circum
Applying the Appleman/Couch test, and consistent with the results in most similar cases in other jurisdictions, we conclude that Lindsey’s accident arose out of the use of Metzer’s pickup.
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Accordingly, we agree with the lower courts that, as a matter of law, Lindsey’s injury was covered by Mid-Century’s policy on Metzer’s pickup. The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore Affirmed.
. Id.
. 41 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 609 (Apr. 14, 1998).
. Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1976).
. Argonaut S.W. Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. 1973).
. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 828 (Tex. 1997).
. Id. at 827 (quoting Heyward, 536 S.W.2d at 555, in turn citing International Travelers’ Ass’n v. Francis, 119 Tex. 1, 23 S.W.2d 282, 284-285 (1930)) (second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
.955 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1997) (quoting State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peck, 900 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1995, no writ)).
. Id.
. LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. List., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992) (holding that "arises from” in the Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.021(1)(A), "requires a nexus between the injury ... and the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle”). See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that for an accident to "result[] from” the use of an auto "a causal relation between the injury and the use of the auto is essential to recovery"); 8 Couch on Insurance 3d § 119.28, at 119-43 to 119-44 (1997) (“A causal relation or connection must exist between an accident or injury and the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle in order for the accident or injury to come within the meaning of the phrase 'arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use’ of a vehicle.”); 6B John A. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (Buckley ed.) § 4317, at 359 (1979).
. See 8 Couch, supra note 11, § 119.37, at 119-56 (" ‘Use’ must be such use as arises out of the inherent nature of the automobile.”); 6B Appleman, supra note 11, § 4316, at 356 (" ‘Use’ as contemplated by an automobile liability policy, means the use of a vehicle as such and does not include a use which is foreign to a véhicle's inherent purpose but to which a vehicle might conceivably be put.”).
. Cf. 8 Couch, supra note 11, § 119.37, at 119-58 ("The determination, under an insurance policy of whether a person was in such a position in relation to a vehicle as to be injured in its use, involves consideration not only of what the person was doing when injured, but also of his or her purpose and intent.”); 6B Appleman, supra note 11, § 4317, at 367 ("In determining whether a person was in such a position in relation to automobile as to be injured in its use, consideration must be given, not only to what person was doing when injured, but also to his purpose and intent.”).
. LeLeaux, 835 S.W.2d at 51-52.
. Id. at 51 (alteration in original).
. National Union, 939 S.W.2d at 141.
. Id. at 142.
. Id.; accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 988 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); see Le v. Farmers Texas County Mut. Ins. Co., 936 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (en banc) (holding that "the use’ requirement of [uninsured motorist] coverage is not satisfied by a drive-by shooting”); Collier v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Co., 861 S.W.2d 286, 289-290 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (holding that a drive-by shooting does not involve the use of a motor vehicle "simply because an automobile provided the site for a criminal assault or provided transportation to the location of a criminal act").
. 8 Couch, supra note 11, § 119.37, at 119— 56; accord, 6B Appleman, supra note 11, § 4317, at 367-369.
. Le, 936 S.W.2d at 321; Collier, 861 S.W.2d at 289.
. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Batchelder, 421 So.2d 59, 61 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982) (stating that "the third prong requires a causal connection or relation between the use of the vehicle and the accident” and holding that heat inside the truck parked at length in the sun, together with the movement of the truck, contributed to the explosion of a beer bottle, injuring a passenger’s eye); Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 63 F.Supp. 939 (S.D.W.Va. 1945) (holding that a taxicab passenger’s injuries received in an assault by the taxi driver did not arise out of the use of the cab), rev'd, 155 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1946) (holding that the phrase "by reason of the ownership, maintenance or use of the cab” did not require that the automobile itself produce the injury, so that a taxi driver’s assault on a passenger would be covered by the policy); Thornton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 Mich. 643, 391 N.W.2d 320, 327 (1986) (holding that gunshot wounds received by a taxi driver in an armed robbery had no more than a " 'but for', incidental, and fortuitous” causal relation with the driver’s use of the vehicle as a vehicle because the vehicle was not the instrumentality of the injuries, but merely the situs); Keller v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 199 Mich.App. 714, 502 N.W.2d 329, 330 (1992) (holding that plaintiff's mental distress injury over her son's death in an automobile accident did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle and was wholly independent of the cause of that death, reasoning that the automobile did not itself produce the injury, but merely contributed to cause the condition which produced the injury); Taylor v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 622 So.2d 506, 510 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1993) (holding that injuries received when struck by a stray bullet during a drive-by shooting were unrelated to the vehicle’s use, but noting that coverage
. See also Lexie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 251 Va. 390, 469 S.E.2d 61 (1996) (holding that injuries from shots fired from a moving vehicle do not arise from the use of a vehicle as a vehicle); Coleman v. Sanford, 521 So.2d 876, 877 (Miss. 1988) (holding that a drive-by shooting was "a voluntary, deliberate act which rendered use of the vehicle incidental”).
. 8 Couch, supra note 11, § 119:64, at 119— 98 ("[E]ach court considers the specific nexus between the discharge of the gun and the involvement of the vehicle under the full package of facts present in the case.”); Sanchez v. Herrera, 109 N.M. 155, 783 P.2d 465, 467 (1989) ("[T]he proper inquiry ... is whether the use made of the vehicle at the time of the accident logically flows from and is consistent with the foreseeable uses of that vehicle.”).
. 8 Couch, supra note 11, § 119:64, at 119— 98.
. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Minnesota law) (holding that a hunter who was accidentally shot by another hunter while both were riding in the box of a pickup truck did not sustain injuries which arose out of the use of a vehicle); Criterion Ins. Co. v. Velthouse, 751 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986) (holding that injuries sustained while horsing around in a parked truck with a loaded shotgun had no connection with the use of the vehicle and could have occurred in the field or home); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 743, 574 S.W.2d 265 (1978) (holding that accidental death when teenager playfully pointed loaded pistol at decedent from inside parked camper was not causally related to the use of the vehicle as the accident could have occurred in the field, driveway or hunting lodge); National Family Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 269 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1978) (holding that no relationship existed between use of automobile for transportation purposes and passenger’s gunshot injuries sustained as he entered the vehicle when gun had been intentionally fired into air by insured before accidentally shooting the passenger); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Soules, 288 Ala. 163, 258 So.2d 872 (1972) (holding that there was no causal relationship between the use of an automobile and the shooting that occurred in parked car when occupant moved his pistol from behind himself to a more comfortable location); Norgaard v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1972) (holding that shooting death caused by hunter using roof of automobile as a gun rest did not involve a use arising out of the inherent nature of the automobile); Azar v. Employers Cas. Co., 178 Colo. 58, 495 P.2d 554 (1972) (holding that gunshot occurring when hunter retracted shotgun into the car after preparing to shoot rabbits through the car window did not arise out of the use of the vehicle as such); Mason v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 161 Colo. 442, 423 P.2d 24 (1967) (holding that gunshot injury did not arise out of the use of a vehicle when youth toying with gun in a parked car accidentally shot his friend); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642, 139 N.W.2d 821 (1966) (holding that gunshot accident that occurred while unloading a gun in a moving vehicle after a hunting trip did not arise out of the use of the vehicle); Colonial Ins. Co. v. Lumpkin, 207 Ga.App. 376, 428 S.E.2d 351 (1993) (holding that gunshot injury did not arise out of the use of the vehicle when gun discharged while insured was negligently handling his pistol in a parked car); Mueller v. Auto Club Ins. Assoc., 203 Mich.App. 86, 512 N.W.2d 46 (1993) (holding that passenger in parked car who was struck by nearby hunter's gunshot that missed its target did not incur injuries arising out of the use of the vehicle); Brown v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 838 S.W.2d 148 (Mo.Ct.App. 1992) (holding that accidental gunshot while showing gun to passenger in parked truck did not arise out of use of the vehicle); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Strope, 481 N.W.2d 853 (Minn.Ct.App. 1992) (holding that gunshot injury received while attempting to free dog
. See, e.g., Garrison v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 258 Kan. 547, 907 P.2d 891 (1995) (holding that the injury sustained by a driver, when a shotgun inside the car accidentally discharged as it was being removed from the car, was a natural and reasonable incident arising out of the use of the car for hunting); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 239 Va. 646, 391 S.E.2d 71 (1990) (holding that injuries received from the accidental discharge of a rifle as it was being removed from the front seat of a Jeep to go hunting, arose out of use of vehicle because the vehicle was being used to transport the hunters and their equipment to the hunting site and because the driver had not completed his use of the Jeep when the rifle discharged); Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 308 (Me. 1987) (finding a causal connection present where the vehicle was being used to transport two men and their firearms for hunting and the gun discharged as it was being removed from the insured’s vehicle); Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1986) (holding that a gunshot injury, that occurred when hunter lifted rifle out of Jeep’s gun rack to empty and safely store for the journey home, arose out of the use of the vehicle); State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 350 S.E.2d 66 (1986) (finding a causal connection between the use of a vehicle and gunshot injuries that occurred as the insured removed his rifle from the storage area behind the seat of a pickup truck where it was customarily transported); Transamerica Ins. Group v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 92 Wash.2d 21, 593 P.2d 156 (1979) (holding that a causal relationship existed between a gunshot injury and the use of a vehicle where a gun discharged as passenger removed his rifle's muzzle from the truck’s gun rack and the trigger brushed against the rear bracket of the gun rack), overruled on other grounds, State v. Olson, 126 Wash.2d 315, 893 P.2d 629 (1995); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 63 Wis.2d 148, 216 N.W.2d 205 (1974) (holding that the driver’s fatal gunshot wound, that occurred when his hunting companion removed his uncased, loaded rifle from the floor of the truck, arose out of the use of the vehicle because loading and unloading of hunting equipment was a normal incident to use of a vehicle for hunting), overruled on other grounds, Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis.2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 514 (1976); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94, 109 Cal.Rptr. 811, 514 P.2d 123 (1973) (holding that a causal relationship existed between the use of the vehicle and a gunshot accident where the gun discharged in a vehicle when the vehicle hit a bump while driving off-road hunting rabbits); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 491 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1973) (holding the requisite causal connection existed between the use of the vehicle and injuries sustained when a shotgun discharged as it was being placed inside insured's vehicle, which was being used to transport the men and their weapons on a hunting trip); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 127 N.C.App. 123, 489 S.E.2d 179 (1997) (finding a causal connection between use of the vehicle and gunshot injuries sustained as a handgun that was routinely stored and transported in the glove box of the vehicle was being removed from a holster); Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Orr, 141 Or.App. 441, 918 P.2d 457 (1996) (holding that the fatal gunshot received when a passenger moved guns in the vehicle to make room to enter and sit down in the vehicle arose out of the use of the vehicle); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 70 Ohio App.3d 431, 591 N.E.2d 362 (1990) (holding that gunshot injury which occurred as hunter was exiting the vehicle to return a borrowed shotgun, arose out of the use of the vehicle); Perryman v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 156 Mich.App. 359, 401 N.W.2d 367 (1986) (holding that gunshot injury arose out of the use of the vehicle when passenger removed his gun from the vehicle while unloading hunting and
. 599 S.W.2d 13, 15-16 (Mo.Ct.App. 1980).
. See id.
. See, e.g., Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 190 W.Va. 526, 438 S.E.2d 869, 875 (1993); Hamidian v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 251 Kan. 254, 833 P.2d 1007, 1011 (1992); Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 308, 311 n. 2 (Me. 1987); Criterion Ins. Co. v. Velthouse, 751 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1986); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 318 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1984); Garrison v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Kan.App.2d 918, 894 P.2d 226, 230 (1995), aff'd, 258 Kan. 547, 907 P.2d 891 (1995); Colonial Ins. Co. v. Lumpkin, 207 Ga.App. 376, 428 S.E.2d 351, 352 (Ga.Ct.App. 1993); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Strope, 481 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Minn.Ct. App. 1992); Quarles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 533 So.2d 809, 811 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 674, 691 P.2d 1289, 1290 (1984); Toler v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 123 Ill.App.3d 386, 78 Ill.Dec. 790, 462 N.E.2d 909, 914 (1984); Snouffer v. Williams, 106 Wis.2d 225, 316 N.W.2d 141, 143 (1982).
. 731 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1986).
. 92 Wash.2d 21, 593 P.2d 156 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Olson, 126 Wash.2d 315, 893 P.2d 629 (1995).
. 533 So.2d 809 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988).
. 33 N.C.App. 15, 234 S.E.2d 206 (1977).
. 227 Va. 492, 318 S.E.2d 393 (1984).
. Id. at 397.
. See id at 398.
. See id.
. Post at 165.
. 939 S.W.2d at 141 (quoting the court of appeals opinion).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS, a Division of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, Petitioner, v. Richard LINDSEY, Respondent
- Cited By
- 156 cases
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- Published