~ 1 .\ D»+e: bca s,zo'§ `,

110.‘ w 10_-7;__1`278,1<(11) A_ ’ WR~eq,ziq-Q/,_ 13 1 ._ __., / \

/\

Ex parte

*’"‘ ';

Gary Don Jennings

¢ .r‘ ` REBHTTA` __,C.our~t 01 C¢imilunl QPPQ¢:\'§ Of States' Response to ‘of Hu$HA/f&x&§ j.z\pplicanc'$ 11.07 wrir ’

To the Honorable Judge of said court. comes now Gery Don

Jennings, pro se, to present this "rebuttal" of the Honorable Distriot Attorney, Susan Hawk's state's response to Application

for Writ §f Habeas Corpus. Do wish to impress upon the Court, the fact that Petitioner is a laymen of the law, without any acdaim c§rtification, and therefore, askthat the Court accept

- his rebuttal and thus construe it liberally

_“"”"‘M”'"““_~ T%L»¥e¢stren¢be1sg wi hout~legaf Founsel or assistance ask

.¢_`._, -<~ ,1~,..‘.,, "““ 'W**¢>~¢<»»~ .~_¢-.¢,_-.~,,..z_,<_.]_ `__

that the Court §rovide such legal"Counsel to assist in the proper manner to proceed 1n pursuant to exhausting his -constitutionally

protected 'liberty interest rights'.

Furthermore, the Petitioner hereby request that the Honorable Court forward him'the conclusive fStatment of FactsV upon the

Coutt's disposal of the Petitioner's herein rebuttal.

RECEIVED |N COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

DEC 16 2015" Gary Don Jennings

Rebuttal to State’ s response ' ABQFACQ§QQ_C~IGFK

sanders Esc'é"s U`n11 1105) Hwy 1807 . _ _ Venus, Tx 7668 `? ; 11,.1»

W10-71278 K(A)

In The_Criminal Distritt

G Don Jennin s any g court No#4 of Dallas County, 'B¢

,REBUTTAL __ _ `OF STATE"S RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS;" "Writ of Habeas Cor;ms

In accordance with PLRA requirements - insofar es having exhausted necessary legal remedies, in hope to resolve such con~ stitutional and state legislative violations via YAppeal" of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles' decision to "deny" release to Mandatory Supervision - which proven futile. Wherefore, Petitioner herewith, present a "rebuttal" to the State' s Response to Applicants ll. 07 writ for Habeas Corpus relief. In pursuant to 28 U. S C 2254 Federal Habeas Corpus relief; such venue made available as in - _Prei`ser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.C. §75, S_OO,. 933. Ct 1827; which addre- sees the Fact or duration" of an individuals' imprisonment. ‘

'State or Federal habeas corpus relief cannot be granted unless

the Petitioner alleges he has been deprived of some rightsemned to him by the United States Const_._itution - or upon basis established by records of State legislature'.

The herein case involves the extent to which the Honorable Trial“

Court/_Appellate Court may judicially review the Texas Board of Pardons

and Paroles's "amended" Sept 1, 1996 7& legigislative House Billl&33 that governs the "Discretionary`Mandatory Supervi.sion." (DMS) rule and

process. upon such basis, the Betinioners' 11.07 writ claim -Gonstitu -

tdnml protected liberty interest rigths entails three grounds:

1) due process violation; Z)Ex post Fac'to; and , 3) Cruel unusual plmishment;

from which the Petisioner seek relief.

(1~0§-335

/, 1

PRocsbuRAL DEFAQLT

`ln most instances for the expressed purpose of eliminating discrepancies,contradictions and/or inconsistencies, the bulk of case law is quite redundant; and further, as strict measures against

misunderstandind, ambiguity, or to curtail the complexity of appeal, a method of repti»»tiouet:case citing is employed. Whereas, the Petitioner, for the sake of brevity - strains to avoild burdening the Honorable

court with such excessive legal jargon’ or the brute monotony of

case law citings - wherever feasible. Trusting, however, thS+a copy of the Fetitioners' 11.07 writ and attached 19 page Memorandum of law is at the Courts immediate disposal to peruse and contemplate, and thus, facilitate its decision to reach a modest conclusion.

."Court must be especially careful when faced with motion/decision y to dismiss for the lack of subject matter jurisdiction - and should accord plaintiffs’ complaint a reasonable tolerance and reading - because

dismissal could preclude another suit‘~ based on any theory that plaintiff might have advanced on basis of facts giving rise to the first action.."

Fed Rule Civ. Pro. Rule 126(6) 28 U.S.C.A.

If it pleases the“Honorable court, permit the Petitioner to¢emnmss

his resilient dissatisfied sentiments,however, nothing personal in the

neighborhood of casting doubt on the `integrity, competence,

or morals of the Honorable District Attorney;

` Susan Hawk - whose decapitated method of decorum and convoluted reasonin

g exemplified along her 'Statesl Response to Applicants'

11.07 writ, was a defen§e, conducted upon the gallows of prevaricated buffoonery; assailing the Hall of Justice

from a catapult of fling doctrine formulat

ed on the basis ofjudi¢ial rhetorical evasions.

Such response entail sheer conclusory staummnts

unsupported by factual arguments. One would have to be furlous or

e Petitioners' 11.07 complaints as frivolous and of no me to dismiss;

either delirious to have deemed th

grounds of " error" Plain

rits;and thus, subjected You can't be serious!

. . . "Plain error" is clear or 'obvi were derelict in countenan assistance in detecting it..

ous that trial judge and procecutors 'cing it, even absent the defendants timely Fed Rules Civ. Proc. Sl.(b),lB U.S.C.A.

(2-0£139 )

An inmate confined in the Texas prison system is entitled to aspect that the judiciary committee: the District Clerk, the Pro- secuting Attorney(DA),and the Justice of the Feace ~ will be expert and impartial in their approach to statutory mandates. The proper 4 objective of "rules" of civil procedure is to obtain a just, fair, equal and impatial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive lew. To the end that this _objective~may be attained with as great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense both to the litigants and to the State as may be practicible, these rules shall be given a liberal construction. ` _ d l 'The presiding judge in such challenging disputant cases bennmn a litigant and the State, has been known to uphold a special inst- itutional virtue as a neutral referee; wherefore a modicum offair - play can be ascertained; an umpire, able to read law impartially,; to consider the factual evidence as relevant between both, the common peasant and equally the elite. When the rights of the def~ endant are disregarded in the slightest degree in obtaining relief; or

either an accused worng-doer is afflicted with the abuse of officials, the courts will hasten to grant relief in favor of the accused.

to the disadvantage of th?incarcerated a claim to a right against an official Board, it ought to be incurred the same

entitled any other litigants. In short, any shdw of abuse or cruelty

on the part of a few in power seems to discredit the the entire government infrastructure.

offenders. If someone stake as notorious as the Parole type of genre of respect

authority of

In too many cases administrative or extreme bias -

he very antics that prom

ptsd the ori ins of the current challenge with the Parole Board; no doubt. g

tions regardless ed to implement them.." U.S;C.A.¢kmst.$.

(3-0£"-33) .

~'f ~“’~. 4 '.

..."Imzates' claim against members of the Texas Board of Parole, which called into question fact and duration of his confinement, should have been brought as a habeas corpus claim, rather than as a Section 1983 civil rights action.." see Thomas v. Torres 117 FZ 248.

To the contrary, with quite a deal of modesty and truth; however resolute, with courtroom decorum, the Petitiéner herein shallgndemnm to refute the superficiality of the DAs' charading ballerina of carnaging facts - whose portrayal is thus illustrated in such bellicose act as to have denied the Petitioners' due process

claim on-an abstract practicality; and literally dismissed his ex post facto claim with an attack of procedural jurisdiction

technicality - followed by the Petitioners' third claim of "¢ruel and unusual punishment" being thus, denied as an extract.

sTATEMENT oF cAsE The Petitioner is currently serving time for two sentences that

runs in separate "juris'dictions" - a 30 year UUMV conviction #F39-743228H,, and the 10 year burglary of the instant case#FlO-71278K- applicable to

the 11. 07 writ in process; and whose minium expiration date was 5/8/201§;

towards whom a 30 day advanced "timely” notice - issued ~ 4/16/2015(§$5%@”

was not provided. Although the Petitioners’ 30 year, 1989 sentence

"governs" his 779 legislative House Bill 1649 ~ "automatically”

release to Mandatory Supervision date 8/8/2015, since its the hugest of the two sentences which he must serve. see Exlubi% B (:¢494 JO/enr T'meshea¢)

Ihe crucial and logical question to ask; "

'4 why is the Petitioner still held impris¢ned?" '

Inretrospect, since the inception of the Petitioners' TDCJ

imprisonment: the for§éiture of his ten~years of street- was challenged

-time credH , and later restored; which proceeded a withdrawal of

a "parole denial" ~ a Set-fo; replaced with a "Serve~All" xq)until

the 8/8/2015, the Petitioner' s automatic release to Mandatory Sup - ervision; only to be unceremoniously snatched away by the im

propriety of the "Sept 1,1996 revised HB1633 "

Discretinhoy Nandatory &lpervision" rule. (a~of#§§ )

In accordance to - U.S.C.A. Amend lé:

. .""l‘he due process goal in any parole review is to mininize the risk of error in their decision making. The quantum and quality of due process in a particular situ~ ation depends upon the need of the Parole panel to mini- mize the risk of such errors."

Unfortunately, as herein the incriminating facts shown thatthis

has not been the objective of TDCJ/Parole in the Petitioners' case. Petitioner asserts that "Discretionary Mandatory Supervision" language in the 74“‘legislature House Bill 1433, creates a liberty interest release on_parole-if an inmate's accrued good conduct time is an accurate relflection of the inmate's potential for rehabili ~ tation; and that his release would not endanger the public'.Yet, the Petitions' 1001 accrued good conduct time an astute participant and completion of the TDCJ ITP prison program requirement; registered as a TDCJ "Peer Educator"/tutor - an accurate reflection of his ongoing "rehabilitation"; void of the slightest disciplinary case; by far from posing that of a "threat" to socety - Nonethelessy denied release to the Petitioner's statutorily Mandated automatic

Mandatory Supervision prison discharged date.

A most crucial point to keep bored in mind is the prevailing fact;

.~. .then an inmate enjoys a constitutiinal expectancy to an early release from prison based on the accumulation-of good-time credits, and the actual

calendar time served = equals the_térm to which the inmate was sentence thus, he has a protected liberty interest and is entitled to due process of law before he may be deprived or otherwise (connived) out of such entitlement." see Wolf, 418 U.S. at 557, 945, Ct. 2963.

`}.

Similar as incase citing of Orellana v. Kyle, 65 3d 29:‘the Petitioner is seeking to have the Parole Board comply with due process

of law procedures (as well as to ex post facto requirements) in its parole review process'. The Petitioner has been denied due process of law because

he was not given en advanced "timely" 30 day notice that’s applicable

to his 2013 10 year sentence that's under the Sept l, 1996 74"`legislative HB 1433 statute. "An inmate is entitled to a 30 day advance l'tin)ely" notic e' ` as specified in Ex parte Retzlaff”l$$ S.W.Hd 45

,SO(Tex, Crim. App. 2004). Traditionally, .

procedural due process protects an indiviidulas rights to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner'. U.S.C.A Const.S

(5-0£-33 )

The District Attorney, Susan Hawk, herself, concede with the

premise'"*;}of the "due process clause":. "Unlike Parole, Texas Mandatory Supervision statute creates a liberty interest in release that is protected by the Due Process Clause; see Ex parte Geiken, 28 S. W. 3d 553; while a live hearing is not required to satisfy due process, an inmate is entitled to a

meaningful opportunity to be heard before the Parole Board makes its decision

n concerning the inmate' s release' . see Ex parte Shook, 59 S. W. 3d 174, 175 An inmate is entitled to notice of a 30 day aovenced '"timely period guff-

icent enough: time to submit materials on his behalf " Ex parte Retzlaff.

Yet, the District Attorney, Susan Hawk is moved to put her own charlatan spin along the lines of the "statutorily" above quotes:

...'Whe ’Discretionary Mandatory Supervision' notice ~ clearly states

that Mandatory review hearing would take place within 60 days prior to your projected release date.."

A£firmatively, the Petitioner concedes. z

Yet, the District Attorny's second "quote" of the DMS notice is mere conjecture that proceeds assertions uttered out of admi- nistrative chauvioism:

..."The DMS notice made it clear to the Applicabt that the review of his Mandatory release in this instance case would take place no sooner than June 8, 2015, and was actually heard on June 25, 2015.."

Blatantly hegative! the futility of the second above "quote" is nowhere to be_found on the DMS notice, nor does it alludes to the precision of such dates - which is to strongly insinuate an act of camaradriecchort with the Board of Paroles (whdd!alm)em$ains why the Applicants' 11.07 writ had been returned Oct 8, 2015 - thirty days after

mailing it to Dallas County Clerk of conviction - yet, such writ wounds up in the hands of the Austin, 'l`x Court of Criminal Appeals clerlc, Abel Acosta; who

mysteriously forward the Applicants' 11.07 writ back to him "unprocessed") .

During the chivalrous males of the District Attorneys' "qudte§', the pangs was taken to omit the main centural line of the DHS mmjce:

...'Records indicate you have a conviction with an offense date afun'C&GH/UEH.

Hence, what other motive, if l might add, would an upholder of "justice" evade the ultimatum of the DMS primary notice ~ but yet,

astutely S@lect quote V€rbatim~ that does not promote the interior

of the "due process" violation being herein contested; while the "Plain error"

of the DMS notice is clearly totally defective. . (6-0£133

Similar it is found in Ex parte Ervin, 187 S.W.§d 386:v

... "Defendant filed a state habeas corpus petition in which he argued that the Parole Board did incorrectly apply Tex Gov. 503.149 to his

case, rsmher than the eariier applicable sentencing statute; consq- uently, the State ruled defendant claim cognizable in a post-ccnv - iction habeas application; and the Board of Paroles must comply."»

\

The Petitioner hereby implores that the_Honorable court peruse

the enclosed DMS notice; exhibit__ - as its' inference clearly

states: . . ."Records indicate you have a conviction with an offense date after 08/31/1$96.” Hencej designating the Petitioners' 2013 lOyear burglar senmamej

\I‘\»,

whose minimum expiration MS date is 5/8/2015; despite of the fact that such DMS notice arrived on 4/16/2015 - in stark due process error;

subsequently, such DMS notice is also satuated with an Ex Fost Facto ` violation; seeing how its' retroactivly applied to the minhmn)gnpiratdnz

zdate 8/8/2015 ~ annexex to the Petitioners’ 1989 30yearlConviction;, jubs,eq{uem+l\zj_,,bg_+)zes}ieerc'Hn§e:-`o)ta£beDM$-»/o+ice»pvjh$;hi}l+_:ihs@.§n¢€§~$$'»CL¢QMfl_£vl/:§L\di¢iici»:en..__\_

The crux of this whole panorama can all`boil down to -`as it is acknowledged in the DA,Susan Hawk's state response to Applicants' 11 .07 writs .."Applicants' 1989 UUMV 30 year sentence govern his release

. H eligibility as it is thelonger of the two sentences which he must serve.

Yet, the pervading irony that atigmatize the above postulate, is none other than the fact that the Petitioner is prohibited bylaw from even remotely drawing inference to the fact what such was the unlawful act of the Parole Boerd. As a matter of "jurisdiction", by all means, procedurally such an issue must resort to ah entnnly separate 11.07 writ of habeas corpus being thus ensued. Yet, while

the "Justice of the Peace" (1Fm DA) referee it as a foul on my pagt;

the Parole Board eiults tauntingly over their own mischief.

.§Jl$nere individual liberty interest is implicated, the Due Process clause requires that an excutive agency adhere to the standards by which it professes its action to be judges." Bonitto v. Bureu of Immg.

The Petitioner herein contest » the acts of the Pa.role Boards ' manip- ulating and monopolizing the DMS HBi433; creating a retroactive dichotomy, thus, arbitrarily extracting from my 1982%??3;e§§e - to be superimposed by rules ofrny ZOLB<FG€.

Due Process cont:

The case citing of;:Brown v. Estell at 712 F.Zd 1003; which is quite analogous with the previous case in Bonitto v. Bureu of Inn)g;

however, reminiscent of the Petitioner' s herein challenge:

. . . "f¢etitioner’ s claim that, by improperly assigning him Mandatory

prison term under inapplicable statute, stateim roperly deprived

him of his liberty interest in proper exercise o¥ sentencing authority S t discretion, although primarily implicating questions of state law, 4- ` * was cognizable in federal habeas corpus.' ~

In light of such analogous case law citings, unlike the ruthless cynicism_hy which the opponent contrives, the Petitioher trus£that the Honorable court will sumise the ongoing "due process"disposition, as to which side coincide more or less as a component of stare decisis §§ .or that of an exponent that has sat a precedence in an affair ofcmisis.". The Petitioner petulanthwrebuke the 'prosecutorial’ convoluting quotes

with half- §ruths - as§.ploy to mitigate the 'due process' errors tthat

the Parole Board has made at the behest to keep the Petition' s freedom

deprived beyond itsf statutorily mandated days; however, the “Plain error"

estate reflects herein like a mirror and need not be scrutinized.

The following response from the DA is so obnoxious, it' s obvious that task of

"due diligenc~_e" relative to the documented exhibits submitted by the Petitioner md uo+ beam suaqu

as substantial ev»i;dence:W .. "lfhus, even if this Court were to find a 'Due Process' violation there's'no evidence to support it." My ole my! the proof is in the pudding

The due process violation is preponderantly established; the exhibits clearly suffice. However, the relevance of the "due process" is not relative

to such instances of some procedural scheme that may warrant it} _1391,:£!.\01€_. +hard” n live hearing rs No+ reached to .th`si}/ due procé_<.$.

Hence, irregardless as to whether an inmate failed to ""complain , or even

didn' t seize upon the opportunity to submit documents to the Parole Board,

as alluded to in the DAs' argument; thus doesn't preclude an inmate’s

entitlement to "due process of law".

_<s_of§zz)

5 Due Process Cont: al g 1 ` The laws and policies regulating the Sept ly l996 74“legislative "Discretionary'Mandatory Supervision" House'Bill 1433, can appear qiute complicated indeed, and the language rather ambiguous?hnwemm 83 alluded to earli€r, the Petitioner hereby strain to avoid much redundacy.

"We also find in Lynce v. Mathis, atli7 S.Ct.S‘.ll:y

..."‘J?he Court of Criminal appeals ordered the Board of Paroles to

provide a 30 day timely notice '_- and held that States’ amended_or _ revised statute to the computation of the offenders. parole eligibility

on the prior sentence(such as my 1989 30yr. sen.) does constitute a violation of (both, due process) ex post facto clause."

Lets not flip the script here; it was.not the Petitioner whose

the culprit. lts none other than the Parole Board themselves -howev@r

inanely the DA has herein shown to go over-board in defense of’ "Plain error".

such The misleading_point being argued by the DA is an wl assumption ~ that`by the Applicant having failed to submit any form of document to the`Boardloinarole, thus, entitlement to be the recipient of the notice; however absurd!`While in fact pid Nsubmit" a letter, titled: .'the erroneous application of th

he forfeited his statutory 30 day advanced timely DMS

'Parole Deposition', in complaintzmout` e DMS notice; yet, to no avail.

How obtuse. .: "had the Applicant absorbed the available remedy of such due proces violation it woul

l ’ d be remanded to the Parole Board so the Applicant may provide materials on his behalf for consideration at the next eligibility."

Granted, yet, such ideology and

Board is not at all transparent that the Parole Board is known

proposition concerning the §hrole ; giving the notorious disposition

to neglect its respondent; what HKeDA is endorsing is a mute point.

Moreover, on July 15, 2015, a week after receiving a DMS (Denied Mandatory Supervision), a total of 5 letters were addressed mo several of the Texas Parole Board

regions to request an 'Appeal' of such denial;

yet, nearly five months later; NOTHING!

Due process - 'Ihe conduct of legal proceedi

ngs according to established rules and principles.for the protection and enfo

rcement of an individuals rights. Absudity of abuse - is the reliance on arbi

trary whim and the act of cammdce to achieve those of "due process" ends. ~

(9-0£-33) .

, o`n"`A'f>"r'il 23,"2615,` éh"‘;»," 'P@tici§hés"'

Dueprocess - Conc1usion:

The Petit~; oner humly relent, and wholly apelogize to the Hgnorable

court for the extent of a "due process" defense being at such length_

Perhaps the following "two" claims, as a result, has soemwhat tame; the atmosphere and assuage the indepthnees of the aim to present a

short phase; at any rate, let it be upon the stage of such contending woes, against the backdrop of the herein opposing odds ~ &m¢ ge Petitioner' s <hm>puxassrights nas been highway robbed by the Board

of Paroles having reneged on its administrative law-abiding job: "f§i}_ure

to comply with State legislature statute to provide a 30 day exwence

t ime 1 y DMS no t' 1 ce; ".and +hus grA/\J.+Jhe_nelig§ehe_"see143 .

Lets not get it twisted; The 74*Legislature HB lé33 of the DMS rule

explicitly states: .."the change in law made by this .Act applies only to imzates

serving a sentence for an offense committed after Sep't_ 1, 1996 of this A¢,L-."

Hence, since the Petioner s 2013- -10year burg}any sentence is in

fact governed by this HB1433; 'why wasn’ t a timely 30 day notice issued prior ~ to 5/8/2015 the miniumu expiration MS date? As oppxw§ '“'to having arrived and signed on 4/16/2015; erroneously being thusly

applied to the Petitioner's 1989-30 year UUMV Sentence;foe which the

embarkment upon of such "retroactive" influx brings us to the Ex Posg

Facto clai m. Hen{ce 'us+ because +he garcia B¢nrc{ Erred fm umlnwiu”`¢j APP/inj +}1€ DMS »/o+»`ce

doesn/1 n!€cea$n+n+e +he 5+¢)+@3 a_++em .+_+o mem ¢`_+3_ Ev£r iaae+ ier baird w»`+}\ 5¢1;¢{ <;om+§ P 3

J“'“SA’L+'°'“' Ex PosT FAcTo vlo;.ATIoN.

f Ex post fact clause applies to statutory or polocy change that alters detention of criminal conduct or penalty by which a crime is punishable; new law or policy violates Clause when it is tatro - active, i.e, applied to events occurring before its enactment. lt entails the putting an offender et a greater disadvantage than the

situation warranted previously.

Penal Code governs range of punishment; whereas, Criminal Cod@

n <10*°£133}0£ Procedure ensures that punishment is carried out oronerlv.

EX PosT FAc'ro

The Petitioner, admimnnghh pursuing such challenge against the

Board of Pardons and Paroles, quite a formidable entity; asauzamauam'

_ without the remoteness of legal assistance; and vdiose knowledge Of the rud- §1{ iments of "jurisdiction" prohibition is rather skimpy; however, lmmeby hmnore the Honorable court to deem the herein "rebuttal@§ibendiy Fbr

the District Attorney, Susan Hawk made its constraints to note:

... "Applicant is procedurally precluded from raising issues pertaining to a previous current conviction# W89-74322 "

The District Attorney, out of an act of °‘omission", alludes to

the fact that the Petitioners' ex post facto rights has indeed been violated by the Board of Pardons and Parole

es '- via - incorrectly applying the amended Sept 1,1996 DMS statute

"retroactively" to his 1989 I)year

sentence; thus, the Parole Board erred by denying him its' stamnmry

"automatic" release upon its Mandated "Mandatory Supe‘rvision" date: 8/3/'201,5.-_ A blatant "ex post facto" violation; thus subjecting the Petitioner to a prolonger imprisonment; certainly placing him at a grave disadvantage - Via of being deprived - day-by~day his "freedom”, that would have otherwise va transpired had the Parole Board simply complied to its StaunmryrmmdauIL

."Ex post facto is criminal or penal measure which is retroactive

and is disadvantageous to offenders because it may impose greater punishment". U. S. v. Leonard, 868 F 2d 1393.

,,,"Statutes enacted or ammded after prisoner was sentenced cannot be applied to alter condition of his pre-existing parole eligibility -

(an interceding NDTE - a concurring clause is thus interjected......

Contf .. "notwithstanding that conduct », . 1 _ z App]ication of statute 0ccuffed”3f12nF“tts“snactnent**§r§v€hsn€bnst.

Hence, at this incredible junction, the Petitioner shall present substattial evidence -stemming from the above statute that contest the DA Susan Hawk' s arguments

.."Applicants’ specific grievances in his second rouddfor relief ' (ex post facto) arise out of cause no 7W83-74322 1989 30 rear case). '

WRONG ANSWER!...Each of the Petitioner's three grounds derives from the same source ~ the DMS notice which specifically states its' 'reference to a conviction committed after Sept 1996." Hence, explicitly studied to the rudiments of his 2013 10 year conviction in which the said Court has full "jurisdiction" thereof. The DMS notice is "precluded" from such const- ituents cit the Petitioner's 1989 court of "jurisdiction"; However may the conduct

purportedly mggg;§d an "ex post facto" violation, the "jurisdiction __________________ the authority that resides in the

(N <>¥~33)

'" withstand upon 2013 10 year court case -annexed to the 115-

. ~.=~».\, `\ w

\, '. 1 ` ' '5:"*‘*

EX POST FACTO,RAMIFICATION

Tne judicial branch palys a complex role in the

"system" of law and order.

Judges apply the language of the constitution and statutes to specific court cases which often involve circumstances thatcould

not have otherwise been foreseen when such laws or conclusive arguments

|! " _were made, however, then enacted as statute

. These judicial interp- retations can either be of a conflictual

nature - or that of a sign~ ificant importance than even what the original text (Qnmt.)provisions v they interpreted.

Real life issues does not always divide neatly between rq§m or

wnx@, truth\vs. false; whereas, a matter of caution is not to pigeonhole an issue

too narrowly. It may be assume that a District_Attorney is obligated

to follow the law. But even then it is not the most natural or onhn@ry w construction of the law - and certainly not the construction thatsud1 _a administrators as the Parole Board might ensue to put their spin m1a POliCY that the legislature has enacted into law ~

cuting Attorney@A)would stroll along and terrible expense of struggling litigantS.

lt is the duty of state legislature'to ask judiciary to "interpret" those

seeks to effectuate collective enacted legislation; and interprets it in

that a state prose- }feel oblige to uphold atthe

e laws{

.and`the function of ::§ laws, When court inte

rprets statute, it ` legislatures who

w\ _ es on text of statute

literal manner - attempting to discern fair objec€'

tive meaning of the text as a whole. Take the enactment of the revised "

House Bill 1433, that governs' the

statute. Its' ordinance states':

amended" seize 1, 1996 74“’1egisiative

"Discretionary Mandatory _Supev:vision".'`l

..'The changes in law made by this act

only a sentences ccmnited after 1996:`

pplies to prisoners serving

...‘The instant 11.07 writ is specific ` #F10-712728(his 2 court>¢ "| .

ing issues out of 013 10 year conviction) which

waslmnnihe&ne due Thus, the above quoted DMS 1996 statue ~'and its' every component- resides within "jutisdiction" of the said court - and must be achmmdedg%iand heard! The 1115 policy strictly states' "' which

" 1 d n .. itapplies onlyi=" prec u s f

Ex post facto :

The District Attorney, Susan Hawk conceded to the fact that the Petitioners' "ex post facto" rights has indeed been violated by the Board of Pardons and Paroles via "incorrectly applying the current amended Sept l, 1996 statutory rule" retroactively tolus 203.3-1.9 year burglary sentence; thus the Parole further erred 'by deny-‘ ing him the statutory "automatic? release upon its Mandatory Supe- rvision date 8/8/2015 - a blatant "ex post facto" violation; thus subjecting the Petitioner to a prolonger imprisonment; certainly placing him at a grave disadvantage - thus having to endure such day-by-day increased term deprived of his freedom - than would have otherwise occurred had the Parole'Board simply complied to its statutory mandates;_as a direct result of the more severe

punishment the Petioner is having to endure. Yet, to add insult

to injury; now comes the "Justice of the Peace" to close a blind

eye to such cruelities under the provincial of "jurisdiction" is

essentially just as cruel and unusual of a humiliating punisnment

being propounded than the likes of that wHich the Petitioner is

having to endure from the axis of TDCJ and the Parole Board. §.."Indeed, courts have repeatly held that "parole eligibility is

part of the law annexed to the crime at the time of a persons' off- ense." see Schwart v. Muncy 834 F.Zd 396, 398; also Burnside vz White,

760 F.Zd 217, 220.

tggmm_The Petitioner, admittingly, pursuing such challenge against

the Board of Paroles, a quite formidable entity, as an amateur without the remotenessof legal assistance; and whose knowledge

of “jurisdiction" protocol is rather skimpy; hereby implore the Honorable court to deem the herein "rebuttal”, liberally. For the District Attorney made its contraints to notes

.."Applicant is procedurally precluded from raising issues pertaining to a previous current conviction #F89~74322." ' 113-(.§.33\

"`} q' .'

dis extended free reigns - in spite of the law£{ ~ to manipulateznd

'interest rights..Tl

“’improper applications of

rights,

Ex post facto Cont:

.."Statutes enacted or amended after prisoner was sentenced cannot be applied to alter conditions of or revoke those of his re- exi.sting parole eligibility; notwithstanding that conduct pur§ortedl triggering application of statute occurred after its enactment " ' y U. S. C. A. Const. Art 1;10,¢1.““#’ §

Thus, the subsisting irony lies in the fact that - although `R

the Petitioner has been deemed "procedurally prohibited" from ~§ raising the primary issue herein pertaining to the unlawful act4 that the.Parole Board is guilty of "retroactively" applying to ll the Petitloner’s previous 1989 30 year sentence - running concu-' rrent with his persent 2013 10 year sentence; the former of which

_ collides, thus creating a dichotomy from which the Parole Board

“* _z

monopolize at the behest of infringing upon an offenders liberty ~"~.»a@

1a essence of "procedural errorV stems from exh

"policy" adherence - thus broueh+before the Courts

_only to be neglected and dismissed upon the feeble grounds of ¢`j»

>"jurisdiction" .

g

As in the case citing of wilson, 52611.8.119 S.CR atleS:

."Supreme Court ruled that a district court must first evaluate the merits of a p}.aintiffs claim to determine if his Constitutional rights are violated, before it proceeds to determine whether the ~.

violated right was Wlearly established at the time of incident.

Constitutional government means that when a judge is called upon to decide the case of John Doe v. U S., he is not automatically to assume

e oovern ment. fairness to John Doe seems to require that the

judge assure him his rights under the lew, regardless of what govrnment officials

may deem expedient for the public.

How shocking, to stand before a Justice of the Peace, who pronounce| .."Yes, Mr. Jennings, you may have presented a valid claim about your liberty interest //

but we are not going to honor it, because it would be politically or otherwise l technicality, the courts has

to take side of th

awkward to do so.' ’..Due to some procedural Jurisdictioa similarly turned a b].ind eye to the Petitioner§ herein legitimate ex post facto claim.

"» (MPO£€B)R¢

..."Ex post facto policy, although partly discretionary, is still subject to ex post facto analysis when there are sufficently' discrenable criteria to suggest that new retroactive policies are g being applied against offender’s liberty interest." U.S.C. C. Art/1;9 c1.3, 10. C l. f

The gist of the concurring situation involves the arbitrary

matter in which the Board of Paroles has shown to flectuate from one extreme of the Petitionersl“two separate, yet, concurrent sen - tences, thus putting the Petitioner at a grave disadvantage by the

sheer act of retnoactively ~ toying with the rudiments entail in each opposing statute; as if to imply merely a "partial" theme of

discretion is thus being applied into the DMS scheme.

..'The ex post facto clause flatly prohibits retroactive penal legislation." Lynce v. Mathis 117 S. Ct. 891§ ‘

The District Attorney, Susan Hawh despite of the ensuing ramifi - cation of the Parole Boards' explicit "Plain error" trampling upon the Petitioner's constitutionally protected liberty interest rights, emits the slightest allowance other than to hasten with its dismissal' of the;Petitioneris every ll.C?Zwrit claim. Under the "current sen - tencing" doctrine, meaning that existence of one valid convictionnmy` make unnecessary review of.other convictions when current sentence

1 of f ~

have been given. Concurrent Sentence Doctrine: The existence of only one valid conviction makes unnecessaryrevdnz of other convictions which run "concurrently” with yalid conviction.U.S. v. Stovall, 825, F. 26 817; opinion amended 833 F. 2d 526 Crim.law 1177.

n Sentence is not "concurrent" where mandatory special assessmenrs are separately imposed on each conviction." U.S.Benqq 977F¥h1915.

Moreover, the word "concurrent" means running together,'boqmuath@", contributing to the same event - acting in conjunction,,agreeingih the same context - co~operating, accompyin n . f `

_ _ g. East lex Fir Ins. C . . ‘ s.w. 572, 76._ o v Blum 13'

Any law is ex post facto which inflicts greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed, or which alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. U.§lLA.(bnst.art.l.

9. c1. 3. and @10; Vernons' Ann. St. Const. an. 1, 16 -/Ex parte Alegria, 464 S.W. 2d 868. - Const. law 197.

Hence, it is constitutionally un&uwibhato squash or preclude the

.statutory amenities annexed to the Petitioners' 1989 30 year sentence- to be Super 'liéof finame 'by the adversed rudiments Of his concur/alt 2013 10 Y@ar S€l'lf€n¢€; an unlawful ' '\ ,. - cr t ` 7 1 ' ' ‘ l t s incumbent open toth r~ the former and the'latter statute.

~‘,Ex?post`facto

Applicant is Procedurally Precluded From Raising Issues Pretaining to #F89=74322 (~1989_30yr. concurrent case) - ` The District Attorney

"The retuen and all suggestions made_by the Court against the

Applicants 11.07_writ may be amended by leave of court, before or after being filed~" . °”"'” -

"Newly discovered evidence that, if prove and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and thus convincing evidence that no reasonable fact~finder would have found the movant party guilty or in error of the offense or by some retroactive means." '

Furthermore: §

..VTo escape dismissal a;plaintiff need not set out in details

the facts upon which a claim is based, but must allege suffic ~ ient facts to outline the cause of the action." see Marmon Group, Inc. v. Resnord Inc. 822 F2 31, 34. , "

* On behalf ot the District Attorney's state response to Applicants'

_ 11.07 writ of habeas corpus ~ upon grounds of its denial and-dismissal due to "procedural jurisdiction prohibittion that precludes the App- licant from raising issues pertaining to his concurrently ran gentenc@.. #F39j743é2 30 yeare~UHMV conviction; with that of his coujoining:gg%eng§}ym

#10-712778 of 2013 10 year»burgiary conviction » to which the instant 11507 do addresses .

Thus, due to the uderlying facts herein presented to establish clear convincing and sufficient evidence that 4 for Constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finding insight would have otherwise reached sucha conclusion ot dismissal of the Applicant's claim - hence, does the Petitioner hereby request a Preliminary injunction intercede as a referendum bases on the case citing of Ex parte Woodward,éHB SJN &5179; Ex parte Campbells, 565 S.W. 952 - whose situation is analogous to ttuat of the Petitioner's "jurisdiction" predicament; in faith that the Honorable court will proceed its due process with writ of handamus if so suggest

otherwise.

Also: h ‘ .."where prisnoner was currently incarcerATED lN TDCJ in the Southern Distri¢t of Texas and where he had been convicted in th Northern District of Texas, jurisdiction under Federal habeas corpus statute was appropriate in

either district. see U.S.C.A @2241(@)-King v. Lynaugh, 729 F. Supp. 57

The Court of Criminal Appeals and each judge therefore shall have final appellate and review jurisdiction in cases co-excessive_"with the limits of the state, and its determination shall be tinal. Such ordinances is notaalnatter'<>f right, but of sound judicial discretion enacted by Act 1965, 59 Lg. ch.722(5b),

(16~0£133)

: /.-\ 5 '

Ex Post Facto Credible Defense against procedural jurisdiction Prohibition:

The Petitioner shall rely upon the case citing in waldachmidt vs. Amoco Oil Co» 92& F. Supp; as to lend credence in sustaining the "recovery" of his "ex post facto" claim from the fate of a dismissal; thus, substantiating the motive of "foul play",

.;4`€:»‘_ ..."Compleint must contain either direct or inferential allegations ` respecting all material elements necessary to sustain recovery uncler some viable legal theoryf’ Waldschmidt vs. Amoco Oil Co. 924 F; SuppSS.

,;::' . In accordance to Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules; p.1086,

Sec. 2243 lssuance of writ; return; hearing; decision: Hence,fmenemly\ discovered evidence that solicit "foul-play" ensuing the due process phase of the Petitioner's 11.07 writ of habeas corpus initially met

~_t

its rendezvous fate at 133 North Riverfront Blvd TB lZ-Dallas Teras ` ` ’.\)

Countv~District Clerk - the court of'convirtion»to whom thePetitioner . ` 1

' l via TDCJ Estes Unit Law library Indigent Postal; certified notary,_TDCJ" \ . Law Librarian official, Ms Scott; on'€ept 8}`201SHIdsmhnuBJnm&ljudleL

as truth herein unfolds - the shrews act in which the "Courts" has sought to be so bold.and uphold - its' obstruction of justice 4 will be

shown as being an even more severe violation of the Petitioners° Congt- itutionally protected due process rights - than the likes of what his

,til.O7 writ cliam to blame against the Board of Parole.

Gn”bct 8?2015, the Petitioner's 11.07 writ was returned via addressed

P.O.Box 12308, Capitol Station ~ Austin, Tx; from the Court of Criminal

Appeals - "unprocessed"; by Clerk Abel Acosta; alleging that such]l.O?vmith

did dot'-,.comply ~ and must be sent to District Clerk of convi.ction. Ludicrous!

The irony - how did the Petitioner ll.O7 writ wound-up in such &nroff jurisdiction of "Austin, Tx"; since said writ was not in "compliance",

who would forward it to a "higher Court" ~ unprocessed? As quseito qu£y returning the defective 11.07 writ back to its original gend@r?

How bizarre, the exact same Dallas County District Clerk-court of

conviction has been caught in the act of foul~play by the sheer fact of .N[ a procedural "jurisdiction" prohibition committed by hevbu;fomemdeithe etit`:'toner's Bnprocessed 11.07 writ to Austin Tx;and thus, dimissed his writ nn

(FTQBBZ)P,

similar procedural jurisdiction prohibited grounds. Absurd!

Foul~play_of 11.07 writ by the jCourt

Cont:

On' Sept 8, 2015, Applicant, Gary Don Jennings, a¢¢()rding to Art_ll_m Sec.3 - of the Code of Criminal Proce`dure,, on~'prope;r form, W_ith attached _19 peg Memorandum of' law in support of legitimate claims against the Board cf"Paroles,. did address and maied such writ to the Dallas County District Clerk ~ tne court of conviction; only to have had such 11§07 writ "returned"

approximaely 30 days later, 'unprocessed'.

'To the Applicants"utter dismay, the Dallas County District Clerk, whose duty bound to statutorily render "due process of law", reneged, and obviously, rescinded from the ethical responsibility to either, honor the Applicant' 11.07 writ via due process; or otherwise return such sol lemn legal document back to its original "sender", dreAppMcant. Instead, the Dallas C'oun-ty Dis»tric_t l(»Jlerl< - under the pretense '°that 11.07 writ “didrwt_comply - did erred by forwarding such writ of habeas corpus -

"unprocessed' ~ to an inappropriate "jurisdiction”; Austin, Tx -to dui '

;. nom-g <>f.`.(71.~:1111;§1.3.1»_/lp;;\?;gn_l'_s_{_;,_,'h`"`a,,s'm i t_s_clerl», _Abel_ Acosta, zenclosed, a notification

g .

1¥9-0£~33

alleging chat"‘che. Applicancs' 11.07 writ did not ¢on{>'l'y,.;,*thg`;`”i§mustbe

"sent to (Dallas County District Clerk of conviction)thus,unprocessed.-

The Dallas County District Clerks' ignoble attempt to extricate

¢$themselves as the sole culprit, is clearly futile - as their'exposure

is quite apparent by the sheer fact of the existing proof that the urit was definitely addressed and certified notary sent to them. A blatant

act of "obstruction of justice".

By the arbitration provision of filing, and the legal documentppro- cess, any writ or legal form required or permitted to be presented u)the Court or to a Judge shall be filed with the District Clerk. If m£mdtted by an inmate confined in an institution, a document is timely filed if it is ’ deposited through the Prison Unit internal mail system - and is accom- panied by a notarized statement or declaratio setting out the date of deposits and indi has been paid.

n in compliance wid1 23 U,S_ 1745 - eating that first class postage

And more often than not, it is known that the DA, not the Court orthe judge, is who wounds up with access of writs, court logs and docket even before the Grand Jury gets hold of them. In State and Federalcases,i¢$ the prosecuting District Attorney (DA) that always present the indictment under the

Yrong statute. With such amazing facts in mind, it doesn't take any stretch Qf the ` )1magination to conclude how the Applicants{ writ got shipped to Austin Tx.'innnxmessad?

To Vindicate Habeas Writ Claim From Dismissal

_ we -"

As a matter of public policy, any act that hinders or usurp the legal operation of the judicial system or its legal proceeding ~ must be resisted or punished by the `Courts themselves'; the judicial system could not long continue to maintain respect and demand obedience unless they controlled such conduct that's remotely ltended to obstruct or corrupt 4 the administration_,of justice. ` ` ` "

tBy sheer virtue of the Applicant's 11.07 writ having wound-up in the4 hands of, Cler!<, Abel'Acosta§ of the Court of Crimnial Appeals - far-away in a totally inappropriate 'jurisdiction", Austin 'l`e.xas - than from where it

was expressly addressed and mailed to - Dallas County Clerk;is quite bizarr¢" " in and of itself; a stark act of defective process of law in the lease;' yet, a blatant act of "obstructing justice" at worst. `

vNotwithholding the fact that upon receipt of Applicantsl unprocessed

returned ll.O`/' writ; however foul were the pretenses for its rejection, .`

the enclosed 'notification alleged that such wasn’t in compliance by not ";

being sent "to the Di"srtict Clerk of conviction" - whereas, the Applicant did ` subject his 11.07 writ to thorough analysis, insofar as referred its' iv entire content to close scrutiny - and finding no rendition of possib]_; defau"lt'~,' nor the ~f?‘a~»intes probability .o.f .inco.rrec§,addre,s_see;\ _:as;r a matter

of fact, the Ml?C/IDCJ'Estes Unit law 'Librarian official, Ms.$cott, had not only z certified its "notary, she made contact via /’phone`; to the Dallas' County’ .. C.lerk - the court of conviction; inquiring about the status'of the App - licants§ `11.07 writ and was told that the Court had already\pre-mature],y

denied it. Show-nough, upon having re-submitted the exact same writ~Oct-l‘); addressed to the same place - Behold! no longer than a W€el< - Nov 2,2015

a notice did arrive, the Dallas County District Clerl< Felicia Pitre, informing `the Applicant that his 11.07 writ is being thus, processed.

'~ A definitely admission that clearly attest to the fact in thevalidity of Applicants' 11.07 writ having satisfactorily been in compliance from ` ` the start.', Yet; within only five days later the Applicant received the pre - g mature dismissal of said 11.07 writ.

In the final analysis, it would be wholly inappropriate that no agtionjo against such manifest error oil the "courts'" obstruction of justice"'; thus, having subjected the Applicant to "jurm)" though a superfluity of hoopa in pursuit of exhausting his U.S. Constitutional rights to present a legitimate and

sound complaint against such "due process", ex post facto, and cruel unusual v punishment - only to have had reeked upon him a double dose of the same

malaise by the "so-called'"Justice of the Peace".

'/' (19-0£53 )

'It's not so much as the Petitioner having detoured frmnraishg a civ l ,defense against specifically the`"dismissal" of his er,post facto `u,' claim j than has been the Petitioner's aim to draw a parallelanahgy of his existing restraints of "procedurally 11.07 writ jurisdiction »1 prohibition”j- imposed by the District Attorneys' response that emitted such dismissal; however, paired with the astute act of a '§urisdiction"

violation that stems from the judicial clergy themselves #@g‘#d§hnmy

be much more challenging as to sat a precedence in case law over the

issue at hand. Thus, embarking upon the "newly discovered evidence" that the "legal w§it document" protoco]. extends to litigants. Surely

"no reasonable fact- finder" would have stumbled upon such validincrin-

inating evidence against the judiciary "movant" party t hemselves. 1

Legal challenges to administrators' action or obtuse_decisions d¥@f,

in principle, be conducted like any other sort of impartial litigation,_

Law, in essence is associated with fixed rules to "protect" people fran

unwanted intrusion - including the intrusions of government officials. Administrative law, thus suggest_that administrative officialsbe alhnmd: to operate with a more managerial or policy~oriented notion of law. 2 53 4 ln traditional view, however, the rule of law is thusly understood as an Wv'|hl element that guarantees that administrators themselves would be held ?,accountable to the same legal process as private citizens.

1..,

“'An appellate court review a Trial court's decision concerning a pre- adjudication habeas corpus application in the light most favorablto the Trial courts' ruling; and must uphold that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Vern.ons" Ann. Tex. C.C.P. art 1108. Ex parte Simpson, 260 S- W~ 3d 172

Thus, the influnece of Courts can never be measured simply by the apparent consequences of any particular case. For this reason admin-

istrative law seem to parallel many of the effects of the constitutional vscheme in its normal operation and functioning.

To escape dismissal along either of the Petitioner' s he reing;

it is strongly advisable that an explicit description,

itutional, statutorial, but yet,

laims,

whether:€onst- or jurisdictional or otherwise -'IS concise,

resilient in such manner to synthesize the relevance as a whole ln short, the objective of t 'rebuttal" ' . J.S to

substantiate such herein cia ex post facto smelli punishment - with a train of Stare decisis;

the doctrine f under‘ _ o precedent, dnch a Court must folknveariier judicial decisions whe points arise again in litigation. n the same

t ` 20-0€~33)

he Petitioner' s herein

lmS' due p§xmms.~

v ossTRucrlom or JusTIcE- "* (The Applicant' added claim)

The crux of the Petitioners' argument is that his application

bath demonstrated the issuance of a perfect and legitimate 11 07

Writ§ wholly sufficient to establish an entitlement to the furth-

erance of "due process of law" - without having been subjected to the juggernauts of the judicial clergy.

Herein are tne material facts - by commission did the Dallas County District Clerk, however anonymously, interacted with the said clerk, Abel Acosta, of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Austin Texas;bou\of who juggled the Applicant§ 11. 07 writ like an acrobat » about the inappropriate jurisdiction of the "Capitol” of the Parole Board -at

whom the Applicant_il,07 writ attack, And without the slightest inha~ bition did the same court dismiss the Applicants' 11.07 ex post facto

complaint due to "jurisdiction" restraint from rad@§ the main issue from his prior criminal conviction.

Hence, if there's any form of unethical "non~compliance? let the record show that the Cour. s' judicial system has been herein t:uslyl exposed of committing the very acts that violates the Texas Cr.-mina Procedure Code. What a sight to behold!

Howbeit, the clerk, Abel Acosta, of the Court of CriminallAppeals

by far can't be absorbed of culpability, however, whether by "Qmigsion" void of any suspicion, acted as the recipient, and respondent\sho,

knowledgable of.the desecrated 11.07 writ made by the former Disrrict

Cleik of Dallas, yet, contrived the burden to further violate the sanctity of "due process of law" by forwarding such 'unprocessed'

11. 07 writ back to the Applicant (also Peti`tioner) under the pretenses herein emphasized. `

Despite of the fact that the re-submitted 11.07 writ did obtain

finally the ”due process of law warranted, yet it does not

preclude or invalidate the important fact that a most cruel miscarriage of

gustice bath been ensued ~ which further, in all likelihood, 1mbued

the final process that resulted from the "pre-mature" dismissal of the

Petitloner s application for Article 11.07 writ of habeas corpus

5'(2#~0£-33)

~s'!""

However, in every era governments have sought to skew civil§liberties

by illicit dissent ~ inasmuch as the penal system has been marred by

administrive officials tyranny - whose abusive and cruel actsarelxdng unilaterally imposed and thus, succeeding to overshadow and mute the

very voices of petitioners who are?being repelled with injury.

As it was herein alluded to previously, 'administrative law doctrine tries to accommodate such realities by insisting that the role of the courts is not to direct public policy - but merely to guide and'

channel the essential discretion of administrators or to ensure dmi dm

exercised thereof is distributed fair and in a proper manner.

To "quote" one dissenting judge; "We are not required to "Stricbly construe" the applicable statutory provisions -(or,as hithis¢ume, the jurisdiction irregularities), instead, we are required to "liberally"¢on.. strue them according to the fair import of its term, to promote justice and effect the objective of State statutory code.|°c

see v_..'A.,c.c.P. stine vs., sta@,.sos s.w. 2d 429, 435. - -» t

The purpose of the Article 11»07 writ of habeas corpus,eimph/put,is

mto obtain a speedy adjudication of a persons' right to liberation me illegal restraint’. Ex parte Ramzy, 424 S.W. 2d 220 - Hab Corp 207. Furthermore,

A writ employed to bring a person before a court, must frequentlyis to ensure that the persons imprisonment or detention is not illegal - its essence is of immemorial antiquity.

The Applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny anycf dm' alleged facts set forth by the District Attorney (DA) in the return '°state's response to Applicants' 11307 writ" - or any other material facts -

The Court shall summarily bear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require. §ewly discovered evidence;

( as the "jurisdiction foul-play herein bringJ fortb) as a whole, WCLlld be sufficient as to establish that no reasonable factvfindin§ wouldhave found the Petitioner, Gary Don lannings, herein,

v legitimate 11.07 writ "due process" and

' ~ 'ex post facto" claims no more worthy of

dismissal than the substantiating fact of such "

cruel and Unusual punishment" is

attacks by the juggernuats of the judiciary clergy are permissible-

"(_2-2-0'£-53)

Criminal law§ in essence, is a "stablilization ofpsHHdMB Smjgl - miicy ~ its objective is to guide and to regulate the conduct of ind-

_ °l Principle_i$ the maxim that judges, lawyers, and the administrative officials apply in the criminal code of pro- cedures as a method of following standardlized protocol; such as the exhausting of the proper "due process" as means of gaining or refraining access of the Courts. Prisoners challenging the Parole Board, or such agencies, is required to exhaust such remedies on

a admininstrative level; similar are there are different levels

that one must proceed ~ due to "jprisdiction" or venue.

Juridiction, in its narrow sense, is something possessed by cmnms,

not by judges (who are merely officers of court, like lawyers , bailiff reporters), it encompasses only power of tribunal

»andcxmrt-

over subject matter ` _ and person. see Vernons' .Ann. Tex. Const. art. S, 1, 8; Davis v. State 952, S.W. 555.~

Reports of judicial decisions are among the most important spaces of legal authority in the criminal law system, Over the course of time, judges shape legal doctrines to address the complex issues oflour changing society.|?[.eg- islative enactments cover even broader range of issues, but even a statute that

.; appears Straight-forwerd must be read in light of the court decisions that construe and apply its provision.

AS alluded to previously, the term "stare decisis", the core ele~ ment of the Common law; from whence, the Petitioner's sole pbjective q is herein duty bound to substantiate his argument; the "case-book"

§* ` effect, <mntails that the majority rule - based on such legalprinciples presenting a case as having precedence upon which prior court rulings were estab~ lished in favor of the lititg challenge Such method of case

novel<n:even

o"' - ant s facts, evidence, and relevance to gm

precedence provide guidance to con

4. v l rts faceiWHh similar issues, and aid in preventing disputes.

As judges look for order, symmetry, continuity, and precedent,

that guard against " n

fact. Thus,

`, the Co (23*0f:i3)

are factors arbitrary discretion" it is the Petioners'

urt, the 'h:uth, and nothing but

, ambiguity, and a twisting of the

ambitious intention to presentbefore the "truth". 'w

Litigation usually begins in a trial court, the lowest lerel of the hierachy; consequently, exactly where the Petitioner herein,did 1 B ~ forward his 11.07 writ, addressed to the Dallas County Districtclerk, di 3 court of said conviction. The legal process of'resolving a dispute, § the process of judicially deciding a case is termed " :_; Even inthese days and times, }`_ "' lt’n'elr"e'are those who are anxio

ication.Vs. administration.

adjudication. where we care strongly about "rights," k s us to draw a line sharply between adjud- \§”'

;ln light of the impending doom that the Petition ;§a _ ; oning the §ate of sure gloom, ' harbor`Such'sentiments.

rha$ j been reck-

its smablwounder why a great majority q Criminal negligent acts, compounded with du&_ofzi iobstructing justice by the nefarious intrusion of

the "Courts";_,» resulting in the Petitioners?

*application for writ of

habeas corpus being inordinately returned "unprocessed" - under some p di }

to comply with the 11.07 writ protoc

conEHms otherwise. udenc il _i , _ " di d- _ . . e lnev tably ` . ` .. ._,_ _ lsap?e?rs lnt° a Strangely disembodied-struggled between the host f g d'?z "zythe litigantsf rights and the spec ` ' ` ` g ‘ 0 ' ‘ `# `

' ter of administrative o ~‘ ‘ ;cing apprehension.‘ _ ~ ffivlals'mena_

resumptuous rule of_such writ'fgued’ ,?

ol; while in fact , _ overwhelming evidence `

The eventful proceeding of jurispr

:/Despite the resonance of obstructing espousible judicial entities ;: 'mitigate the ramification of

justice enananting from the irr-‘ herein specified - whose shrewd attempt to

their conspiratory exploits; given these vtdde : k precepts,however, prudence will dictate, that by virtue of sheer esteem

.elong these legal proceedings, the §awful synopsis den &dmtmniaum the

Petitioner's herein validity of truth

shall prevail ove ' ‘ ‘l' ;q A\'A hpcmc § , ggm§§i§€§a§§P?kep§?guf§“$#aS§P@§@szg§né%&§ter§§d?@q{ \of the Parole Boards' manipulating bureaucracy. `

b r the at%%city _ MMQ-ic§rer bna adm

The proper leading judiciary authorities: The Attorney General, NAACP,

the U.S. Dept.of Justice Civil Rights Div.; the Federal Bureau of Prison,

Maoist Int. Min¢, the National Media, and the State Comm. on Judicial Conduct{i

all such Departments of "justice", Orgenization, Corporates entities shall concede and, insofar be compelled

, and such related 90 render the notification

letter received from Abel Acosta, clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals, sufficient ~i*-.@hough eviden¢e - as an accessory to the fact; henc€,'bbsbnmthxxof~hwtdx?'

l

(24-*0f-33 )

shall reign their own destruction!

APPLICABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES:

"The court shallm on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditionsjg@@r Sec. 1383 of this title; similar is reliance upon the dme pnxx£s of law clauseé'Neither habeas nor civil rights relief can be absent 05

the allegation by a plaintiff that he or she bas_been deprived of some right'secnred to him or her by the United States Constitution

or those of statutory legislative laws of the state. seelHlliamiv~ Board of Paroles, 759 F. 2d 1190 (5 Cir. 1935).

To the extent that the Petitioner, Gary Don Jennings, herein seeks relief regarding alleged due process/ex post facto/and mmmllnnwualgmn- ishment ~ violations resulting from the Texas Board of Paroles’review

"process - the District Attorney, Susan Hawk inordinately dismissed the Petitioners° due}nxmess claim on an astute practicality that argued- to the effect that the Petitioner, more or less, forfeited his entit- lement to such "30 days advance timely notice".by Virtue inami'hbsent"

of a complaint about the lack of any availability thereof; for which 'tbe Petitioner's rebuttal ~ asserts that such a "statutory entitlement, by law, to provide a recipient whose eligible for parole a 30 day notb:¢

is not dependent upon the recipients' utilization via a mdmdttei<nesۤ if

The District Attorney, Susa Hawt's "states' response to Applican§s’writ:t,

.'."A`;pplicants' controlling case for his eligibility was his instant case n ' ~ . ,

88 H~ clasms(due process violation); Applicant has not demonstrated any prej -

udice or sharm from any untimely notice". ‘

Hence, irregerdless as to whether Applicant was "prejudiced" m¥dnst

or `not, nor does the Statutory entitlement of a "30 days advance notice"

depmwmnt.on whether any "harm" is done; the Parole Board is "Plainl¥ int

error” by the sure fact that such DMS notice was not issued al

ong the Supreme Courts' mandated prescribed "30 deys". Period! _

'l`he Supreme Court of the United States stands at the head of the judicial

brance of government, and provides the definittive interpretation of the

U.S. Constitution and Federal statutes.

l In reliance upon such 'Supreme` authority’,

the Petitioner's 11.07 writ application

, due process ought to be granted the relief it seeks. l

The District Attorney, Susan Hewk's claim - ex post facto was attack by... from raising issues peetaining to his

"di.SmiSSal@ 05 Applicants' second

"Applicant is procedurally precluded 1989 30year conviction to which the ex post facto

around as onset inn uwus'uAL Pu)nsnnsn'r

Tne District”Attory, Susan Hawk’s overall conclusive argument

for denial of Petitionera’ third claim, 'crueland\nuwual;nmi§nemt is based on the precepta:

.."Tne Boerd's decision to deny Applicant release was not Cruel and'Unnsuédg there is no evidence supporting such claim, third ground for relief is denied.f‘

‘rahiia, in seen the P@ei;ionerfs 11.07 writ ~ attached a 19 page Memornndum of law in support of the)Petitioner‘s cleims, which had_

adamantly asserted that 'batween the atrocity of enduring a due - process violation, and the hypocricy inflicting an ex post facto

infrinpement ~ thus, an abuse of arbitrary discretion having ensued, however, only servering to exacerbate the insufferable train ot

oppressive authority being 6isproportionally misused, thus pivots

'_such extreme cruel and unusual pnnishment" l ,.H__. WHH_M. _ “MWI

'3 ribs ¢ruel and Unuaual Punishment=

Punsihment that is tortuous, degrading, inhumane, grossly disprop ortionate to the crime in question, or otherwise, shocking to_the notes sense of conscience. Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by thelt Eight Amendment. '"` . " '”

The Petitioner contest the "cruel" entice of the Parole Board's manipulating and monopolizing the statutory amended Sept 1,19§5531§33\ that governs the "Discretionary Mandatory Supervision" statute. AB it

has herein been undisputably shown to prevail throughout the Texas Prison industrv. The ramification from which stems such disparity 05

cruel abuse of administrative authoritv would take volumes to list only ` a small fraction of its many application bei.ng thus, inflicted under

guinea of "rules” and "policy”. For starters, due to such foul

im os~ ition of having one's p

""due;nxmess" rights resolutely trampled upon as some 3 class citizen from Syian, yet at anotner extreme l‘u.~wimg1 had the revised Sept 1,1996 DMS statute unlawfully imposed to retroactively

santch away ny statutori" y mandated ”automatic" Mandatory Superv:lsion ;:::ase date » 8/8/2015; only to be extricated, expunged, and entwiw§ o end of my maxim am discharge date 7/23/2021; essentially placed in the

ag&,r sav - ' » x an !1)' g g ’

f '¢ v \’;6¢>¢33) my °“"”

.:' .:-'?\""i‘:"' "5`"'~".

'qnl e

OVERVIEV , CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT:

.."Sentencing lacking any legitimate penological justification

is by its nature disproportionate to the offender's offense constitutes 'cruel and unusual punishment." U.S.C.A. Const. Arna\d.§‘._;

Hence,Petititoner, who has a non-violent offese and has served over 1002 of his sentence while in full compliance with institutional mell.s;void of any disciplinary infractions; participant and completion of TDCJ ITP and Re-Entry Programmiclrequirements; recent registered as TDCJ 'Peer Educator/Wall 'l`alk tutor - all, an accurate reflection of his ongoti.ngstaue of rehabilitation which qualifies him for MS release - without the least Of an imposing threat to society; Yet, denied release to his 'automatic' date ’ 8/8/20.15; Absurd!

.. ."Such unfettered discretion shown by denial of Mandatory Supervision as prerequisite of the 77_‘“Legislative HB 1469 - does raise entitltment and thus v does crest 'liberty interest' subject to due process analysis." U.S.C.A.S'. 14.

The Petiaioner raise what he perceive to be 'abuse of discretion'; that is subjecting him to further forms of 'cruel and unusual punishment; by the sheer constituents of the amended 7!+"`Leg. HB 11433 DMS rule - whose

application has explicitly herein shown to have literally treated his

'non-violent' burglary offense within the 3-g aggravated category;guch whose

not eligible for'release to MS. Petitioner has not been previously convicted of any listed serious offenses that would be a predecessor to enumerated offenses that may current make him 'uneligible' for MS release. Ex parte Ervin 187 S.w. 3d `386. `

Abuse of discretion - an adjudicator's failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decisionemaking. An Appellate court's standard of reviewing a decision that is asserted to be grossly unsound, unrealistic, illegal, unsupported by the evidence present." see Discretion(ls) Appeal and Error 946; Federal Court._

Abuse of process- The improper and tortious use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process in

scope." Also termed, abuse of legal process.

The Petitioner has yet drawn forth the decimated attempt of thev res- ' ponsi’nle l'judiciary Court clergy° to render the Petitioner's legitimate 11.07 writ ineffective through their maze of error and acts of ’obstructing justice’. Black's Law -"obstruction of just_ice";interference of any kind with the law ful

service or execution of writ, warrant, or other such lawful processes ~»thus, and squected to prosecutorial and punitive reimbursement." ` j

.` <22~-¢~;'_»33) \, y §

libility ~ yet, to be unceremoniously snatched, discarded, and "

Cruel Unusual Punishment: {R'\

, v . 1 l In determining whether a Parfi¢ular PU“lShmth 18 omni mrimmwual,

the courts must look beyond historical conception to the evolving `

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society; the stardard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive but necessarily

embodies a moral judgement, and while the standard it same,

self remains the its applicability must change as the basic morals of society; change. see U.S.C.A.

Const. Amend. 8; Meadox v. State, 325 SJL 3d 18§.

' The Petitioner maintain his stance toward the State District Attor~

ney, Suan Hawk's ”underhanded" antics of belitteling the truth, as well

as to misappropriate facts. To assert that the Applicant's claim of

'cruel and unusual punishment' is withou ` §

n _ t any supporting evidence, mule~ the Petitioner's replete with an abundance of

page Memorandum of law.‘How

11.07 writ application was such supporting "evidence" along the 19

could a "clergy" of law be so cruel and

of such astounding facts. The Petitioner is petulantly.besieged by the clamor of judicial rhetoric that refuse to warrant the Petitioner's writ the sensible fortitude it so deserv of humiliation and degradation.

deliberately ignorgthe validity:

es; as opposed,to moral trupitude. " ':

The State district Attorney's argument:

.."in other words, a prisoner is not guaranteed release on parole." Hence, what more closer of a word in the engligh vernacular can be more~

synonymous with "guarantee release" than that of, "automatic release"; as that of which the 77*1egislature HB 1469 statute thusly entitles the Petitioner's 1989‘,_30 year UUMV conviction that '°govern" his parole elig..'

toyed" ‘ with as a playething in the tyrannical hands of the Farole Board.

.."Faciall’y permissable forms of punishment of inmates may, throughr continual use, inflict 'cruel and unusual ptmishment. U.S.C.A. C()NSI`. Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex,, 929 FZ 1078.

.Hence, it doesn'_t take any stretch of the imagination to preceive the

"pattern"; of arbitrhry and

caprious train of 'cruel and unusual acts of punishment that

has become`typical and "facially permissable"' - under the guises of rules and

policies; sinice the Petitioner's inception into TDCJ: 'forfeiture of-street-tdm&

credit, followed by amultiple Set-Offs;‘ then a 'witMrawal' of one Set-fo, only

to =L_be issued a -Serve-All; which proceeded an unlawful DME' notice. ..then denied Pero]e. ` .' (27~0;-33)

Equal protection claims, in federal civil right action, can be pursued and presented by inmates ~ in which they alleve that without b justification they are treated unfair compared to other inmates sanctioned m unparalleled sentencing guidelins." U.S.C. Const. Amend 14,1_2. U.S A 1933

No primer of an example of such 'cruel and unusual shrewd angles o.":` this can be seen than in the enactment of the amended Sept .,l 1906

74 legislative House Bill 143 3 tha t govern the 'Discretionary Mandatory Supervision' -statute. Which is, beyond a matter of opinion, a blatant travesty of

justice, a mockery of 'due process' , anda mere joke! for many who harbor gm

expectancy of being released on such DMS provision any time shy of`their long vwayrm-J>:imum discharge 'day-for~day' date; its° a marginal oriented notion ot` law and policy.

Hence, 'Equal protection’ clause requires no more than that a person under particular sentencing guiglines be treated according to its' statutory ru`l@, and~ng¢

indiscriminately shuffled about like a "play~thing" in either extreme. If gha-n llenged, government action does classify or distingush between two or more groups; however, action does not violate 'equal' protection, it re- quires equal law; not equal results. Precisely, the equivalence of the

3-g aggravated -DMS policy ought not be imposed upom the Petiti_oner' s ~\ § 'non-violent' past or current offense by the Parole Board nor by TDCJ. -'»':"

Abuse of Discretion Law:

Agency 'ahuse of discrtion' means that, in making decisions, agency has either omitted from its consideration factors that legislature intended

agency to consider in circl.tmstances, included it

s initial consideration of guch factors of irrelevant import;

reached completely unreasonable result after

W@i£hing Only assumable releva . “ nt fact . . Railroad, 753 S W. 2d 800 _ crs Se¢ Statewlde`Convoy Tran_

or however ,

vs . " ` `The premise of such endeavor is that the Constitution has implied

distinct limits on legislative discretion, limits clear enough for Courts to

discern so that such legislative (tmreacrates) would enact legitimate '1aws' r ather

than merely applying its 'own' form of bureaucratic spin - or narrow-minded agenda

of one's own self-centeredness. The initial problem is not so much as

.’ 0 1 o selfishness than, self-conceit', which makes one's discretion awful

opinionated or fiercely dogmatic in perspective.

`<11»#-33)

£-§@+hi$ §“oc§s§ %§§om§ LnFai:'v éxfffculi when §§ %p;§ig;§how§ winqt%&

§ l QVRRALL §YNQPSIS ` Of 11.&7 Writ`

Wb§n, in the course of inca§§§rat§d §v§ncs, it becomzz §_ n§c§s

arv for an offend§r to petition t%e t%§ hands of servitude that r§§i駧 in the unequal yoke of his c§p§§r§: and d§clar§ his alaim 09 s;atut§ry 'lib b§rtv int§cst' » with legitimate expectations §§ fair €r§atm§nt and 'p§rol§';'thus; guarant§§d under the Unit§d St§te§ Con§t£tg§ion. '

Fr§§dom to p§tition gov§rnm§nt, expressly tha admi§i§§r§t€§n. of the Bo§rd of P§rdon§ and P§rol§s, for r§dr§§s cf g:i§v§nces, means the right to bring such probl§ms ana concern§ to Ph§ att§n~ ltitan pf elected and §ppoint§d judicial officials - in §n hon§§t 'pursuit tp have them rectified or co$r§cteé.

§ vary significant part of judicial r§gul§tory admins£r§tion has made a hug§ §§f§ct 1a th§ T§xas Corr§ction§i system. Tn§ com~ pil§§ion or collection of st§tutory leaislmtiv§ ordin§n§ as being, the §quv§ L§nr of the 'St§t§ Criminal. Coc§ of rro§e edur§ , my g§n» er§l synopsis can b§ narrowed down to ake challeng § of the 74“ i.eglslativ§ HB 1433, the 'Disc retion§rv Man@§to*y Sup§rvi§ion°

§t§tut§ Not over the annals of le§i§}§tiv§ ni§torv %as su¢h §Houa§ will had § profound impact upon the d§tzim§§t oftHe in- :§rc§r§t§d offend§r§; who, by d§F§u}t, will turn out t$ des pis§

ith§ operation of th§ §uéi.c' mal/pen§l §y§r§m far greater upon their ' §v§§tual relea§e - than their initial imprisonment. _ d Prudence, £hd§§d will dic€§te thai government long §St§blish i§ §§€ to he changed on behalf of light and transi§n€ mean§; in§s ~ m§§H as § criminal, by virtu§, owes § debt _tor§@é@§£§j, and éa¢w§

'enti¢n`i§ jusifi§bl§; y§t, °tumult and oppr§§§ion'i§ worst than §l§u§ht§rl -

Lt§d St-t§ 3 Supr§m§.€ourt rmm§x§§ hmm£§§ u)em§mm§ such gdmin,

:,3,"_ -

"r§é n istr§tiv§ le view b§For§ entering the ar§n§ of ju§ici§ §1 r§view vaw@r,

;.,,,

P§ri§§dh§; 9 33 0?§§£#-§udzoif1c1§1§ tamper witm €h§ '*`

,ch§r f q. z )HAZQ'S t§t§ officials §homld und§r§ §nd and r§§§§ct th§ §m$\§m . qf'n

and d§Lib§rat§ int§rf§r§c§ with ita 'proc§dur§‘ can result in civil`or ;woéeéééorial p§ na!ty. Th§z§ §houlan the any d§h§t§ over 1§ sues that points out that admi§i§t

ll » v -~ .,\ 1.‘€:1" cars 10?§1 capacity ar§ bo h, inevitabl§ and §§§§ntail: y§t, hy§

such g§§ici§lg ought to be Criti similar §tand§rd

F}n 0 § d Eor pool performenc§, and equally cru§inized For

their wrong decision§ that le§§.é?>s§vnzf r§p§rcus§ion 04 .

BYNoPsIs cont,

v ""v‘]_ "The law consists of the recorded 'rules that society Nll enforce

and the procedures by which they are implemented. These rules and procedures are created in various ways, some by elected legislatures

and others through judicial decisions. However, these rules`shall »govern the procedure in the justice, county, and district courts

of the State of Texas in all actions of a civil nature, with such exceptions as may be hereinafter stated."

The Petitioner sole objective being to substantiate his argument along the realm of the "case book" method; in retrospect, as most effective in achieving the relief he seeks. However, may Providence see fit that references of many similar case laws lends much strenght and confidence in what's current - the State courts are not too<ndck to rule in favorable of such contents that may, not only sat a new precedence, but then the State will have to:acquit the lot ofthm§ands 'of convicts whose imprisonment is under the same statutory basis and thus, are being subjected to sidilar unlawful conflicts.

Habeas corpus may be issued only if prisoner whose release is sought within physically confined territorial limits of court which issue-it, 'sh@pherd v. set¢, 227 F. supp 806.

Though it is incorrect to suggest_that authorit

y of judge presiding over case has no bearing on valididty of proceedi

ng, it is also incorrect toeppeal of 'jur‘i_:sdiction' of judge outside realm of jurisdiction of court in which he sits. Davis v. State 956 S.w. 2d 555.

lechnically, district judge does not 'transf

. er' authority to a preside over case to criminal law megistrate; rather judge acts through magistrate. Gov. Cod. 54.651.

Procedural irregularities in district court'

s order refering criminal case to criminal law magistrate was not jurisdi

ctional error and did not render conviction void, and thus could not be first raised on appeal'

plea. Vernonsf Ann. Tex. Const.gart. 12: Gov. Code 54.651.

' The issue of "jurisdiction" need not$be viewed aslsome insurmountable. factor when grasp with a resilience of 'insight'. Jurisdiction is gen- erally understood to denote judicial power or authority. However,this

term is often misapplied. Art, V, Sec. 1, of the Tk Const. established jurisdiction.

The Petitioner ask the Honorahle court to factor in the relevance of‘

suct\ leading 'jurisdiction' elements as they collaterally also applies to his similar

situation - as rebuttal of the States' grounds to dismiss.’ see Ex parte Woodward;619 S.W. 2d 179/ Ex parte Campbell, 565 S.W. 962 Cyw§33)

` °;received dn 4/16/2015, yet the minimum expired date 5/8/2015; hence, which dues not

”. aroument of "dismissa?” is just as much of a 'Blain error' ;Seeing

SYNOPSIS cont:

Knowing when to condense your REBUTTAL into that final draft can be just as exhausting than having begun gathering legalres@nch material. Such being the case, there comes the moment when it is §cher

necessary to synthesize the reasearched information into a whole, however, such an attempt to condense the broad range of the'judicial.f dynamics of penology' into a synopsis shall be the basis upon which my conclusive argument of rebuttal is to be ascertained.

The Petitioner hath seized as an argumentive advantage to admin- ister both facets of the "Plain error" doctrine; the former requires that 'a minimum of clear or obviouse evidence of law were in place'at time of trial under "current law" (such_as the statutory allotted 30 days advance timely notice due process scheme; or the app].icable ex post facto clause; both of which stands out V?lain" as majors …errors made by the Parole Board).

The evidence presented by the Petitioner - 'copy of the 1245 notice

allocate for an advanced '30 day notice' as stipulated by Statutory law.

And the Parole Board, as well as the District Attorney,&man}vwk'$

that the Applicants' prior l989 conviction - toward which the Court has no jur13- 1 def diction - however, is an act after the fact of the ’ex post facto' retroactive act. -' Al though the amended Sept 1,1996 DEB statute was incorrectly applied to the ‘ Petitioner' s 1989 30 year UUMV conviction ~ yet, its the UMS notice that explicitly lends reference to the Petitioner' s 'current conviction' of 20l3 - whicixcpincides o with the DMS notice:.."records show you have a conviction committed after 1996".. '\ Iherefore given the Court absolute "jurisdiction" of authority to grant the relief that the Petitioner seek.

Moving right along...

The latter facet of the "Plain error" clause is thus construed as the absent of any 'plain error’ under "current law” - if - defendants' dwmry requires the extension of precedent(such in the herein _'jurisdiction vs. venue conflict. As the above rendition pointed out; the District Attorney, Susan Hawk has obviously misconstrued the resolute irregularity of the ex post facto introduction in the Petitioner' s instant 2013 10 year burglary conviction - annexed to the ong notice that specify its’ relevance to a conviction committed after 1996; and surely this doesn' t

"preclude" the Petitioner from raising issues from that which is adamantly atteched

to it; and which further authorize this Court full' ’juriadiction". .How@ver, Such an instance may warrant the setting of a.'jnxxuxknxx?§ in accordance with the clause. see Fed Rule Ct Troj 610 F. 3d 308 - Crim. Law.

owes )

Plain error'

'The Board e~¥ Pm~c(o»£$ amf Paro(es PnNe(memb€r‘_§, resin/fig FLs s bon/ch c)i:~

appointed renegades whohconsider themslves demigods, has convened into a bureaucracy - a system so defined as a need to follow compdhd procedures that impedes effective action; which ought not be take lightly, given the havoc they've reeked in and around the penal institutions that far outweigh what their vociferous demnds and costly expenditures warrants.

lt is found in:Orellana v. Kyle. 65 F 3d 29; "that if prisoners complaint alleges unconstitution, coupled with state law violation of the Parole Board having indirect or an inadvertent impact on whether prison eventually receives or denied parole, and both asserts claim\nder federal civil right statute, and seek writ of habeas corpus, the court should separate the claim and thus decide". Hence, the Petitioner Gary Jennings, hereby request.

Guaranteeing persons' liberties the right to petition, protect from abuse discretion, or from being excluded or denied due proce% and thus, being subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, is the revelant provision of the U.S; Constitution.

ln form, as the Petitioner herein emphasize, judicial djigatkm in cases invoking the higher law of the Constitution - arise when an individual asserts his rights against an entity that has violated his rights,the Board of Paroles; if the resolution ofsud1cawais of that which requires the court to analyze the validity<n:futiLUW in a statute in question, and if the courts then judge the staun£

'to be in conflict with the Constitution'.;or those of statutory l w, the

court will deem that such statute be rectified,#n@dfa§h@ »

"Liberty interest" along specified penal instiunjpnal]inesenmaus those vested grounds of an inmates' accrued gomicomhmt umw isadimw with calendar time, coupled with utter compliance to rules consiS'-;.'ting as all achnnate reflection of rehabilitation,¢thus, qualifying him release to Mandatory Supervision. Hence. Statutory librty interst guaranteed by law.

To; translate in layman terms,,g'Liberty interest' is sought as the prison timeserved being equivalent to that of an offenders' wages, his debt owe to society, or his salary in compensation for an allotment of time served, and thus, pay-day, entails being released u)lwndatory Supervision. Yet. the enactment of the 74”Legialtive HB 1433 rule is an encroachment of that liberty interest,atlmst,an arbitrary 'discretion' to deny a prisoner his vested (wages) entitlement to MS release. Which is somewhat analogous to an employer_suddenly decides not to pay his employee his pay-check for his timely task duly performed. '

From this perspective, it shouldnt' at all be in conflict or even problematic for an individuals? litigation to demand that the court check the administrators from encroaching on his liberty interest when such encroachment curtails the provision of the U.S. Const - itution; as by some illicit authority under the guises of policy.

The judge presiding over such issues of 'policy', upholds a special institutional virtue - as a neutral referee an umpire, able tO read the law impartially - checkhu:extremrabuse on the part of administrators and assuring some medicum of fair playgnddhegmwh£&ii

"péz”%{ \

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NOTE:_ In your specific case you do not meet the highlighted criteria and therefore are not eligible t"§_ receive credit for your “street time”. Therefore you are required to serve the remainder of your sentence without credit for any time that you served on the streets while on parole or mandatory supervision. The projected release and maximum expiration dates (short~way and long-way) are-ch __ recomputed when you are reprocessed into the prison system. Not' being eligible to receive credit for your “street time” does not mean the sentence has been illegally extended (0r illegally stopped and started again). Also, it is not considered double jeopardy (even if you are ineligible due to a previous crime). -

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