Supreme Court of Texas
                          ══════════
                           No. 23-0376
                          ══════════

                         Fossil Group, Inc.,
                             Petitioner,

                                  v.

                           Nicole Harris,
                            Respondent

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
              On Petition for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                      Argued March 21, 2024

      JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

      JUSTICE BLACKLOCK filed a concurring opinion.

      JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice
Hecht joined.

      The central question in this workplace sexual-harassment case is
whether the summary-judgment record bears any evidence that a
company knew or should have known its employee was being harassed
and failed to take prompt corrective action.    The court of appeals
reversed the trial court’s judgment for the company, holding that the
employee’s testimony that the company failed to respond to an email she
allegedly sent through an anonymous reporting system is some evidence
of the company’s knowledge and failure to act. 1
      The parties dispute whether the company received the email, but
we hold that even if it did, there is no evidence that its subsequent
actions were not prompt and remedial. Mere days after sending the
putative email, the employee voluntarily resigned, and she has not
identified any instances of interim harassment. The following week, the
store manager met with the employee after learning about the
harassment from another source and then immediately reported the
matter to human resources. By the end of the month, the company had
fired the harasser. We also hold that the employee did not raise a fact
issue that the company knew or should have known about the
harassment before the date of the email. Accordingly, we reverse the
court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment reinstating the trial
court’s take-nothing judgment.
                                    I
      Fossil Group, Inc. hired Nicole Harris to work as a seasonal sales
associate at its store in Frisco, Texas. Harris started in November 2018;
Fossil promoted her to a regular sales associate in January 2019; and
she worked in that position until she resigned in early May 2019.




      1 

, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023).




                                   2
During Harris’s brief term of employment, Carey Zaborowicz was the
store manager and Leland Brown was an assistant store manager.
      Shortly after Harris was hired, Brown began exchanging
social-media messages with her.         Brown found her profile because
Harris kept it public to promote her modeling career. On December 3,
Brown sent her obscene and sexually explicit videos and photos of
himself with sexually suggestive messages. Harris blocked him on social
media, but at his request, she later unblocked him, and the exchange
continued.
      From December to April, Brown sent Harris social-media
messages about her appearance and posted emojis on her modeling
photos. At work, according to Harris, Brown would comment on her
appearance, brush up against her, take pictures of her from behind, and
follow her to her car. In April, Harris again blocked Brown on social
media, and after April 16, she received no further messages. Harris told
two seasonal sales associates about Brown’s conduct. But she did not
feel comfortable telling someone with authority over him and did not
speak to management about the harassment until after she resigned. 2
      Around the same time, Brown also sexually harassed K.K.,
another sales associate, through social media. 3 K.K. later expressed
discomfort to a “Third Key” employee, a store keyholder whose role is to


      2 Harris acknowledged that while employed at Fossil, she was aware of

the company’s policy against sexual harassment, the mechanisms to report
harassment, and where to find additional details about the policy.
      3 Brown admitted that between January and April, he sent K.K. more

than ten messages expressing how he “wanted to do sexual things with her or
tell her she looked good.”




                                    3
assist the store manager. At the end of April, the Third Key employee
told Zaborowicz that Brown might be sexually harassing K.K.
Zaborowicz asked the Third Key employee to tell K.K. to come talk to
her, but K.K. did so only after Zaborowicz reached out to her directly in
early May. 4
       In February, Harris became dissatisfied with her work schedule.
During that time, Harris was working two retail jobs—morning shifts
at Athleta and afternoon shifts at Fossil 5—along with taking college
courses and babysitting. Harris wanted to switch to morning shifts at
Fossil to avoid working with Brown. But she did not mention this reason
to management and was unaware that Fossil did not schedule sales
associates for weekday mornings because sales were not part of the job
responsibilities for those shifts.
       In April, Harris worked only four shifts at Fossil—on April 3, 6,
19, and 28. Then, on May 2, Harris sent the following email to store
management:
       I’m having trouble with my schedule and my jobs putting
       everything together. I’m very sorry to do this but I need to
       make Saturday [May 4] my last day with the team. I’m
       getting over exhausted and putting a lot of stress on myself
       trying to juggle 3 jobs and finish school to graduate.
Her last and only shifts in May were on May 3 and 4.




       4 Zaborowicz explained that she did not immediately reach out to K.K.

or report the possible harassment in late April because K.K. had told the Third
Key employee in confidence and Zaborowicz wanted K.K. to feel comfortable
coming to her as the manager.
       5 Harris worked six afternoon shifts in February and thirteen in March.




                                      4
       After sending her resignation email, Harris met with K.K. and
discussed Brown’s harassing conduct. On May 8, another Third Key
employee reported to Zaborowicz that K.K. had mentioned Brown’s
misconduct and that Harris might also be a victim.                Zaborowicz
immediately called Harris, who described the sexually explicit content
Brown had sent her. The next day, Zaborowicz met with both Harris
and K.K. in person and reported the harassment to human resources the
same day. After an investigation, Fossil fired Brown at the end of that
month. In the interim, neither Harris nor K.K. worked with Brown
because Harris had voluntarily resigned and K.K. was studying abroad.
       Harris sued Fossil for a hostile work environment under
Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. 6 Harris alleged that in “late April
2019,” she “began efforts to formally report” Brown’s conduct and “sent
an email in response to an in-store company survey in which she stated
she felt she was being sexually harassed” but “received no response.”
When Fossil deposed Harris, she claimed she sent the email through
Fossil’s anonymous reporting system, not in response to a survey. 7
       Fossil moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment.
Among other grounds, Fossil argued that there is no evidence it knew or
should have known about the harassment but failed to remedy the
situation and, to the contrary, the undisputed facts conclusively


       6 Harris has conceded that Fossil is not vicariously liable for Brown’s

actions because he “was not a supervisor in the sense he did not have authority
on his own to alter her conditions of employment.”
       7 Harris testified that the email described the sexually explicit nature

of the videos and pictures and Brown’s conduct of “taking pictures of me in the
store without me even noticing” and “brushing up against me.”




                                      5
establish that Fossil took prompt remedial action. Specifically, Fossil
cited evidence that: (1) a report from the anonymous reporting system
shows no record of any complaints related to its Frisco store while Harris
was employed; (2) the company learned about Brown’s misconduct only
after Harris resigned; and (3) it then took prompt remedial action by
proactively reaching out to Harris and subsequently firing Brown.
      In response, Harris asserted that Fossil knew or should have
known about the harassment because (1) Harris had told two coworkers
and K.K. that Brown was harassing her; (2) two Third Key employees
learned of Brown’s harassing conduct through K.K.; and (3) the store
manager, Zaborowicz, found out about Brown’s misconduct from the
Third Key employees in late April and early May. The response also
states that Harris “believes she sent” the email reporting the
harassment “[i]n late April” but “she cannot locate that email.” For
support, Harris attached the transcript of her own deposition as well as
testimony from Brown and Zaborowicz. 8
      The trial court granted Fossil’s motion for summary judgment,
and Harris appealed.      The court of appeals reversed, holding that
Harris’s testimony about her email is some evidence that Fossil knew or
should have known about Brown’s misconduct. 9             The court then


      8 At the time of her response, Harris had a pending motion for leave to

file her third amended petition. In that petition, Harris pleaded additional
facts based on Brown’s deposition testimony that his previous employer, Old
Navy, had fired him for sexual harassment. Harris also relied on these facts
as summary-judgment evidence “that a prudent employer knew or should have
known” about Brown’s sexual misconduct. The trial court struck her amended
petition as untimely, and Harris has not challenged that ruling on appeal.
      9 

, 904-05 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023).




                                     6
summarily stated that “Fossil took no remedial action after Harris sent
the email.” 10 Fossil petitioned this Court for review, which we granted. 11
                                       II
       Section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code, which is modeled on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate “against an individual in connection with
compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
because of sex. 12 Following federal case law holding that Title VII




       10 

.


       11 In the trial court, Harris also sued Brown individually for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Brown filed a motion for summary judgment
on her claim, which the trial court granted. Although Harris purported to
appeal the rulings in favor of Fossil and Brown in her notice of appeal, she
identified Fossil as the only appellee in her appellate brief, made no argument
with respect to her claim against Brown, and prayed only that the court of
appeals reverse the judgment as to Fossil. Brown nevertheless filed a response
brief urging that Harris had waived any error as to his favorable judgment and
asking that it be affirmed. In its opinion, the court of appeals did not mention
Harris’s claim against Brown or list him as a party. See 

. The court
of appeals’ judgment lists Brown as an appellee but reverses only “the trial
court’s order granting Fossil’s motion for summary judgment” without
mentioning the order dismissing the claim against Brown. We conclude that
Harris waived any challenge to the trial court’s judgment with respect to
Brown by failing to brief it. See Nall v. Plunkett, 

 (Tex.
2013) (holding that issues not raised in a brief to the court of appeals are
waived); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f)–(i). We therefore treat the court of
appeals’ judgment as having affirmed the portion of the trial court’s judgment
dismissing Harris’s claim against Brown. Cf. Allen v. Allen, 

 (Tex. 1986) (“The absence of any reference to pleaded alternative grounds
of recovery does not render an order intrinsically interlocutory. All pleaded
issues are presumed to be disposed of, expressly or impliedly, by the trial
court’s judgment absent a contrary showing in the record.”).
       12 TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051(1); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).




                                       7
prohibits sexual harassment, 13 we have recognized that a statutory
cause of action for a hostile work environment 14 arises when (1) an
employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (2) the
employee was harassed because of his or her sex, (3) the harassment
was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and
create a hostile work environment, and (4) some basis exists for holding
the employer liable. 15
       The issue in this appeal is whether there is some basis for holding
Fossil liable for Brown’s harassing conduct. The parties agree that, in


       13 An express purpose of Chapter 21 is to “provide for the execution of

the policies of Title VII” as enacted and amended. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.001(1).
Consistent with that purpose, this Court has looked to federal law for guidance
when applying the state act’s analogous statutory language. Waffle House, Inc.
v. Williams, 

, 804 & n.25 (Tex. 2010).
       14 Sexual-harassment claims may also take the form of “quid pro quo

harassment, in which employment benefits are conditioned on sexual favors.”
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 

, 445 n.5 (Tex. 2004).
Harris does not allege quid pro quo harassment.
       15 Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 

 (Tex.

2018); see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 

 (1993) (“‘The phrase
“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” evinces a congressional intent
“to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women” in
employment,’ which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily
hostile or abusive environment.” (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,

 (1986))); Twigland Fashions, Ltd. v. Miller, 

 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that the purpose of a
hostile-work-environment claim “is not to combat sexual harassment as an end
in itself, however reprehensible such harassment may be, but to provide a
remedy when sexual harassment rises to a level so ‘extreme’ and ‘abusive’ that
it deprives the victim of equal opportunity in the workplace”).
       The Labor Code now expressly prohibits sexual harassment, see TEX.
LAB. CODE §§ 21.141–.142, but those provisions do not apply to claims based
on conduct occurring before September 1, 2021, see Act of May 14, 2021, 87th
Leg., R.S., ch. 172, §§ 2–3, 

, 379.




                                      8
this case, the standard for liability requires evidence that the employer
“knew or should have known of the conduct” and failed to take prompt
remedial action. 16 In other words, an employer is liable if it is negligent
in having actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and
failing to take prompt remedial action to stop it. 17


       16 Our courts of appeals, as well as federal courts applying Title VII,

have consistently articulated this standard for sexual-harassment claims. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll.,

 (5th Cir. 2024); Arredondo v. Elwood Staffing Servs., Inc., 

 (5th Cir. 2023); Green v. Franklin Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis,

 (8th Cir. 2006); In re Parkland Health & Hosp. Sys. Litig.,
No. 05-17-00670-CV, 

, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 4, 2018,
orig. proceeding); Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Whitman, 

 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016, no pet.); Smith v. Carter
BloodCare, No. 02-12-00523-CV, 

, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Mar. 27, 2014, no pet.); Twigland Fashions, 

.
       17 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 

 (1998) (“An

employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should
have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.”); Johnson, 

(“When the harasser is a co-worker, ‘the negligence standard governs employer
liability,’ and employers are only negligent if they ‘knew or should have known
about the conduct and failed to stop it.’” (quoting Hudson v. Lincare, Inc., 

, 229-30 (5th Cir. 2023))); see also Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc.,

 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying the “knew or should have
known” standard in the Title VII context by looking for evidence of actual or
constructive knowledge of the harassment); Smith, 

, at *3,
*6-8 (same for a Chapter 21 hostile-work-environment claim).
        When the harasser is a supervisor, the employer may be vicariously
liable for the supervisor’s conduct in creating a hostile work environment,
without establishing the employer’s negligence, because the employer has
imbued such persons with “the authority to effect a tangible change in a
victim’s terms or conditions of employment.” See Vance v. Ball State Univ.,

 (2013); Parkland Health, 

, at *8; Smith,

, at *4-5. As Harris concedes in this Court, Fossil had not
empowered Brown to hire, fire, or take other tangible employment actions
against its employees and, therefore, was not a supervisor for purposes of her




                                       9
       Where, as here, a trial court grants a motion for summary
judgment that raises traditional and no-evidence grounds and both
parties present evidence, the ultimate issue is whether the nonmovant
raised a fact issue to preclude summary judgment. 18 Our review is de
novo, and to determine if a fact issue exists, we examine the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging reasonable
inferences and resolving any doubts against the moving party. 19
                                      A
       We first consider Harris’s email to the anonymous reporting
system, which the court of appeals relied on to determine that a fact
issue exists about Fossil’s knowledge of the harassment and its failure
to respond. 20 Although the parties primarily dispute whether Harris
presented competent evidence that she sent such an email, we need not
resolve that matter. Assuming Harris submitted an email complaint in




Chapter 21 claim. Supra note 6; see Vance, 

 (“We hold that an
employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment only
when the employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment
actions against the victim.”); Arredondo, 

 (noting that a
“supervisor” is the person “the employer has empowered,” not who the plaintiff
perceives to be a supervisor). We express no opinion on whether this
understanding of “supervisor” applies to the recently enacted
Sections 21.141(2) and 21.142 of the Labor Code. See supra note 15.
       18 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c), (i); Scripps NP Operating, LLC v. Carter,

 (Tex. 2019) (noting that when both parties presented
summary-judgment evidence on a hybrid motion, the varying burdens for the
different types of motions are immaterial).
       19 Scripps NP Operating, 

.


       20 

, 904-05 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023).




                                      10
“late April 2019,” there is no genuine issue of material fact that Fossil
failed to take prompt remedial action. 21
       Prompt remedial action must be reasonably calculated to end the
harassment—a fact-specific and context-dependent inquiry. 22 Here, it
is undisputed that the store manager notified human resources about
Brown’s harassing conduct on May 9, the day after learning about it
from a Third Key employee; human resources then began an
investigation; Fossil fired Brown at the end of May; and Brown did not
work with Harris or K.K. during that time period. All this occurred
approximately within a month of Harris’s late April email and was
reasonably calculated to (and did) end any harassment by Brown. 23

       21 See Gulf States Toyota, Inc. v. Morgan, 

 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (explaining that to prevail on a claim
for sexual harassment by a coworker, the employee bears the burden to
establish the employer did not take prompt remedial action); cf. Hudson, 58
F.4th at 230 (“[A]n employer is not negligent when it takes prompt remedial
action that is reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 

 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that a company on notice of sexual harassment
may avoid Title VII liability by taking prompt remedial action).
       22 River Oaks L-M. Inc. v. Vinton-Duarte, 

 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Gulf States Toyota, 

; McMillon v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 

 (Tex. App.—Austin
1998, no pet.); cf. Johnson, 

 (explaining that a Title VII inquiry
of whether there was prompt remedial action is fact specific); Hudson, 58 F.4th
at 230 (noting that prompt remedial action must be reasonably calculated to
end the harassment to avoid Title VII liability).
       23 Cf. Green v. Franklin Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 

(8th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]he firing of the harasser in a hostile work
environment case can effectively bar a plaintiff’s claim,” although some cases
have concluded otherwise “where the employer waited much longer than one
month to terminate the employee”); cf. also, e.g., Johnson, 

(holding that an eleven-day delay to commence investigation after a complaint




                                       11
That the actions were taken in response to Fossil’s learning of the
harassment from another source does not change their remedial nature,
so long as they were sufficiently prompt from the time Fossil first
received notice.
       Although Fossil’s response did not immediately follow the late
April email, complainants often must “tolerate some delay” for the
employer to gauge the complaint’s credibility and the seriousness of the
situation, 24 especially when a complaint is sent through an anonymous
reporting system. Within days of sending the email, however, Harris
voluntarily resigned on May 2 (effective May 4) without giving Fossil a
reasonable time to address her complaint while she was still employed. 25
Her resignation also lessened the urgency for the employer to respond



“does not demonstrate that [the employer’s] response was unreasonably
calculated to end the harassment”); Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt Supply, Inc.,

 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding that twenty-one days was a
reasonable time for the employer to investigate a complaint, formulate a
remedy, and end the harassment); Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 

 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that no rational jury could conclude that a nine-day
delay to investigate a sexual-harassment complaint was not prompt); Smith v.
Carter BloodCare, No. 02-12-00523-CV, 

, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Mar. 27, 2014, no pet.) (concluding that a fifteen-day investigation
before firing harasser was prompt remedial action).
       24 Alvarez, 

 (quoting Dhyne v. Meiners Thriftway, Inc.,

 (8th Cir. 1999)); see Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp.,

 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Since the demise of the institution of
dueling, society has seldom provided instantaneous redress for dishonorable
conduct.”). But see TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.142 (requiring “immediate and
appropriate corrective action,” effective September 1, 2021); supra note 15.
       25 Cf. Lopez v. Whirlpool Corp., 

 (8th Cir. 2021)
(holding that when the employee resigned four business days after notifying
the employer, she did not give her employer reasonable time to address her
complaint).




                                       12
to prevent exposing her to ongoing or future harassment and provides
further support for the conclusion that Fossil’s action of firing Brown
one month later was sufficiently prompt as a matter of law.
       Harris acknowledged that no one at Fossil terminated her
employment or took any adverse employment action against her, and
she did not plead or allege retaliation or constructive discharge. 26 In the
absence of a constructive discharge, a plaintiff can “make out a statutory
sexual-harassment claim” by “show[ing] that she remained in her
position and endured a hostile work environment.” 27 After her late April
email, however, Harris worked only three more days—on April 28, 28
May 3, and May 4—and she has provided no evidence of a hostile work
environment on those days. And by then, Harris had blocked Brown
from her social-media account—the primary source of harassment.
       Depending on the circumstances and seriousness of the alleged
harassment, an employer may need to take intermediate steps to
address the situation while it evaluates a complaint. 29               In this


       26 A sexual-harassment claim based on constructive discharge requires

“proof that the employer made the working conditions so intolerable that a
reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.” Waffle House, Inc. v.
Williams, 

 (Tex. 2010).
       27 

.


       28 The record does not indicate whether the email in “late April” was

sent before or after April 28.
       29 See Swenson v. Potter, 

 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing

the obligation as comprising two parts: “the temporary steps the employer
takes to deal with the situation while it determines whether the complaint is
justified” and “the permanent remedial steps the employer takes once it has
completed its investigation”); Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging,
Inc., 

 (5th Cir. 1999) (“What is appropriate remedial action




                                      13
procedural posture, however, the onus is on Harris to raise a fact issue
that interim steps were needed for Fossil to satisfy its obligation. 30
Harris did not meet that burden. Not only was there no evidence of any
harassment on April 28, May 3, or May 4, but also the record does not
indicate that Brown worked with Harris on those days.
       We therefore hold that Harris did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact that Fossil failed to take prompt remedial action following
her late April email. The court of appeals erred in concluding that
“Fossil took no remedial action after Harris sent the email.” 31
                                         B
       We now turn to whether there is evidence that Fossil had actual
or constructive knowledge of the harassment—thereby triggering the
obligation to take prompt remedial action—before the late April email. 32
       An employer is put on notice of harassment when “a person within
the organization who has the ‘authority to address the harassment

will necessarily depend on the particular facts of the case—the severity and
persistence of the harassment, and the effectiveness of any initial remedial
steps.” (quoting Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 

 (5th Cir. 1989)));
cf. Johnson v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 

 (5th Cir. 2024) (noting that the employer took steps so that
the complainant did not have to interact with her harasser while an
investigation was pending, including by relocating the harasser’s workspace
and instructing the harasser not to have contact with or be around the
complainant); McMillon v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 

 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1998, no pet.) (noting that the employer placed the alleged harasser on
administrative leave while the investigation was pending).
       30 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).


       31 

, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023).


       32 We have had no occasion to consider what constitutes actual or
constructive knowledge for purposes of imposing liability on an employer under




                                         14
problem’ or an ‘affirmative duty’ to report harassment learns of the
harassment in question.” 33 A person who has the “authority to address
the harassment problem” will often be in “higher management.” 34 And
an individual has an “affirmative duty” to report harassment, for



Section 21.051 for a hostile-work-environment claim. To argue that it lacked
actual or constructive knowledge, Fossil relies primarily on Title VII case law
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Harris neither
contests Fossil’s use of federal precedent nor proposes an alternative standard.
Accordingly, we consider this issue guided by Fifth Circuit case law. See Tex.
Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.–El Paso v. Niehay, 

, 937 (Tex.
2023) (recognizing that “federal–state synchronization” and “consistency”
between Chapter 21 and federal discrimination law are “desirable, and while
federal authorities do not bind us, they frequently assist us in our independent
obligation to construe Texas law”); San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 

 (Tex. 2015) (“We look to relevant federal law for guidance
when the relevant provisions of Title VII are analogous.”); supra note 13; see
also Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 

, 782 (Tex. 2020) (noting
that our adversarial system generally depends on the parties to frame the
issues for decision).
       33 Abbt v. City of Houston, 

 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Williamson v. City of Houston, 

 (5th Cir. 1998)); see Johnson,

 (“[T]he key to whose knowledge may be imputed to the
employer is remedial power: There is no actual knowledge until someone with
authority to address the problem is notified.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Sharp v. City of Houston, 

 (5th Cir. 1999))).
       34 Sharp, 

 (“A title VII employer has actual knowledge

of harassment that is known to ‘higher management’ or to someone who has
the power to take action to remedy the problem.”); see Kramer v. Wasatch Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 

 (10th Cir. 2014) (“In assessing whether an
employer was negligent in dealing with known harassment, ‘[a]ctual
knowledge will be demonstrable in most cases where the plaintiff has reported
harassment to management-level employees.’” (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 

 (10th Cir. 1998))); Mackey v. U.P. Enters., Inc.,

 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no writ) (“[A]n employee can
demonstrate that her corporate employer knew of the harassment by showing
that she complained to ‘higher management’ of the harassment[.]” (quoting
Bundy v. Jackson, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).




                                       15
example, when an employer’s policy provides that person with “the
authority to accept harassment complaints” and “place[s] an affirmative
duty on him to pass such information up the chain of command.” 35
       The constructive-knowledge inquiry likewise homes in on these
same “appropriate persons” within the organization but asks whether
they “should have known” of the harassment through the exercise of
reasonable care. 36    In effect, for an employer to have constructive


       35  Williamson, 

 & n.1; see 

 (“When an
organization designates a particular person or persons to receive harassment
complaints, it sends a clear signal that those persons have the authority to
accept notice of harassment problems.”). Other United States Courts of
Appeals have taken similar approaches. See, e.g., Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp.,

 (1st Cir. 2011) (“If an employer has designated a particular
individual to accept notice of harassment, notice to that individual ordinarily
will satisfy Title VII’s knowledge requirement vis-à-vis employer liability.”);
Duch v. Jakubek, 

 (2d Cir. 2009) (imputing knowledge if a
“co-worker has an official or strong de facto duty to act as a conduit to
management for complaints about work conditions” (quoting Torres v. Pisano,

 (2d Cir. 1997))); Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods.
Corp., 

 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying agency principles to
impute knowledge when an employee is designated as the “point person” for
receiving harassment complaints “based on the specific mandate from the
employer to respond to and report on sexual harassment”); Breda v. Wolf
Camera & Video, 

, 889 (11th Cir. 2000) (imputing knowledge if an
employee reports suspected sexual harassment to an individual specifically
designated by the company policy to receive harassment complaints); Young v.
Bayer Corp., 

 (7th Cir. 1997) (focusing on, for the purpose of
imputing knowledge, “whether the information comes to the attention of
someone who ought by specification of his duties or, failing that, general norms
of management to do something about it, either directly or by referring the
matter to some other corporate employee”).
       36 Arredondo v. Elwood Staffing Servs., Inc., 

 (5th Cir.

2023) (“Ultimately, a company can only be said to have constructive knowledge
of a hostile work environment where ‘the appropriate persons within’ the
company, meaning someone with ‘remedial power over the harasser[,]’ ‘knew
or should have known’ about the situation.” (quoting Sharp, 

)).




                                      16
knowledge, the harassment must have been “so open and pervasive”
that the appropriate persons should have known of it had the employer
“opened its corporate eyes.” 37 However, “[a] holding that an employer
had constructive knowledge will be less likely if it had in place a
procedure by which employees could report instances of harassment.” 38
       We cannot conclude there is evidence that any “appropriate
persons” within Fossil knew or should have known about Brown’s
harassing conduct before late April.           Fossil’s employment policy
designates the employee’s manager (or another member of management
if the employee is uncomfortable contacting her manager) and members
of its human resources department as the individuals to receive
harassment complaints. The policy also places an affirmative duty on
managers and supervisors who suspect harassment is occurring, receive
a complaint, or witness harassing behavior “to report such suspected
harassment to Human Resources.”             But here, the store manager
Zaborowicz learned about Brown’s harassing conduct from Third Key
employees only at the end of April and beginning of May. Harris also
admitted she did not tell anyone in management about the harassment
until after she resigned in early May and does not claim anyone in




       37 

 (quoting Sharp, 

); Sharp, 

 (“Of

course, harassment by definition always will be open and pervasive as to some
group, if only as to the harasser and victim. But that is not enough. To impute
constructive knowledge to the employer, we must find constructive knowledge
on the part of someone whose actual knowledge also would impute knowledge
to the employer.”).
       38 Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 

 (5th Cir. 2012).




                                      17
human resources knew about the harassment before the late April
email.
         There is some evidence that certain Fossil employees knew about
Brown’s harassing conduct before late April, including K.K., two other
sales associates, and at least one Third Key employee. But Harris did
not adduce evidence that any of these individuals were authorized to
address the harassment or were managers or supervisors that had an
affirmative    duty   under   Fossil’s    employment    policy   to   receive
harassment complaints and report them up the chain of command. And
Fossil submitted evidence to the contrary, including (1) corporate job
descriptions for Third Key employees and sales associates, neither of
which described or imposed any such authority or duty for those roles,
and (2) an affidavit from its human resources manager, who averred
that a Third Key employee “has no supervisory responsibility over any
employees.” 39
         In sum, there is no evidence to raise a fact issue that any
“appropriate persons” within Fossil knew about the harassing conduct
before late April or that Fossil would have known of the harassment,
which mostly occurred off-site through social media, had it opened its
corporate eyes.


          Harris also argues that Fossil should have known about Brown’s
         39

harassing conduct because he was fired for sexual harassment by his previous
employer, Old Navy. See supra note 8. In his deposition, Brown admitted he
would have informed Fossil about the reasons for his separation from Old Navy
if he had been asked in his job interview. But Fossil presented evidence that
when Brown interviewed, he represented in his resume that he was currently
employed by Old Navy. Fossil therefore had no reason to ask why he had left
that job. And Harris presented no other evidence that Fossil had reason to
know about Brown’s sexually harassing conduct at Old Navy.




                                     18
                                 *   *    *
      Our holding today does not minimize the seriousness of Brown’s
misconduct in sending unwanted sexually explicit social-media content
or any anguish Harris may have suffered. All agree Brown’s harassing
conduct was reprehensible. But Harris failed to adduce evidence to hold
her employer, Fossil, liable for Brown’s actions. We therefore reverse
the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment reinstating the trial
court’s take-nothing judgment.




                                          John P. Devine
                                          Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 14, 2024




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