Supreme Court of Texas
                           ══════════
                            No. 21-1097
                           ══════════

                 American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
                             Petitioner,

                                  v.

                           Sarah Milburn,
                             Respondent

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
              On Petition for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                    Argued September 13, 2023

      JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Blacklock, Justice Busby, Justice Bland,
Justice Huddle, and Justice Young joined.

     JUSTICE BLACKLOCK filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Busby joined.

       JUSTICE DEVINE filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Boyd
joined.

      In this products liability action involving an automobile
manufacturer’s alleged negligent design of a seat-belt system, the
primary issue presented concerns the statutory rebuttable presumption
of nonliability that attaches when a product’s design complies with
applicable federal safety standards. The trial court rendered judgment
on the jury’s verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, and the court of appeals
affirmed. The court of appeals held, among other things, that legally
sufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings that the presumption of
nonliability applied and that the presumption was rebutted. We hold as
a matter of law that the presumption both applied and was not rebutted.
Because that holding is dispositive, we reverse the court of appeals’
judgment and render judgment for the manufacturer without
addressing the remaining issues.

                             I. Background
                       A. The Seat-Belt System

      The standard seat-belt system in motor vehicles is a Type 2
system that integrates the shoulder belt and lap belt into one continuous
piece of webbing with three points of attachment.          Typically, the
shoulder belt attaches to the car’s frame or seat, the lap belt attaches to
the car’s floor or seat, and the passenger creates the third point of
restraint by pulling the belt across her body and latching it into a buckle
next to her hip.
      The seat-belt system at issue here is a ceiling-mounted
detachable Type 2 anchor system, which is used in the third-row middle
seat of the 2011 Honda Odyssey, among many other vehicles. The belt
in the 2011 Odyssey is mounted to the ceiling on the right side of the
middle seat and has a detachable anchor that latches into a minibuckle
at the right hip. When the anchor is attached, the passenger creates the
third point of restraint by buckling the belt at her left hip. But if the



                                    2
passenger fastens the belt in that way when the anchor is not attached,
and the passenger fails to reattach the anchor, the passenger’s lap will
remain unbelted. A key-like object is required to detach the anchor.
       The reason for the detachability feature is to allow the seat belt
to retract into the ceiling, which in turn facilitates the rear seat’s folding
flat into the floor pan, significantly increasing the amount of cargo space
without risking damage to the seat belt.         Generally, the anchor is
intended to remain connected when the seat is in the upright position.
The Odyssey’s owner’s manual contains warnings about using the seat
belt when the anchor is detached, and an additional warning label is
located on the seat belt itself.            It is undisputed that the
detachable-anchor system used in the rear middle seat of the 2011
Odyssey complies with mandatory federal regulations, as the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards expressly allow that system to be used
in passenger cars manufactured after September 1, 2007, in the middle
seating position of a seat for which the seat back can be folded nearly or
fully flush with the floor. See 

, S4.2.7.4.

                             B. The Accident

       On the evening of November 14, 2015, Sarah Milburn went out
with five friends to a bar in Uptown Dallas. Shortly after midnight, the
group decided to meet up with other friends at a different bar a short
distance away. A member of the group called an Uber, and Uber driver
Arian Yusufzai picked them up in a 2011 Odyssey. Milburn sat in the
third-row middle seat. That seat’s detachable anchor was not latched,
and the webbing was retracted into the ceiling-mounted retractor.
Milburn fastened her seat belt by pulling the belt down from the ceiling



                                      3
across her body and attaching it to the buckle at her left hip, leaving her
lap unbelted. 1
        As the Odyssey entered an intersection, a pickup truck hit the
minivan on the passenger side, causing it to overturn and come to rest
on its roof. 2 The impact caused Milburn to move forward and to the right
until her neck was “clotheslined” by the shoulder-strap portion of the
belt.   While the other five passengers exited the van unassisted,
paramedics extracted Milburn on a backboard and took her to the
hospital. Milburn, who was twenty-three years old at the time of the
accident, suffered severe injuries to her cervical vertebrae that rendered
her a quadriplegic.

                               C. The Lawsuit

        Milburn sued Honda, Uber Technologies and two of its
subsidiaries, Yusufzai, and the Odyssey’s owner. 3 Before trial, Milburn
settled with all defendants except Honda and amended her petition to
assert only product liability claims against Honda. Milburn alleged that
the Odyssey was “defective and unreasonably dangerous in that it was



        1 As the court of appeals described, conflicting evidence was presented

at trial regarding whether Milburn was wearing her seat belt at all. 

, 27–28 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021). It was within the jury’s province to
resolve that factual dispute.
        2 The police report concluded that Yusufzai ran a red light.
                                                                There was
also testimony that he entered the intersection as the light changed from
yellow to red.
        3 Milburn’s parents were also named plaintiffs, but they later nonsuited

their claims. The named defendants were American Honda Motor Co., Inc.;
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (which was later nonsuited); Uber Technologies, Inc.;
Rasier, LLC; Uber USA, LLC; Arian Yusufzai; and Dawood Kohistani.



                                       4
not adequately designed, manufactured or marketed to minimize the
risk of injury.” More specifically, she alleged that Honda was negligent
in (1) designing the Odyssey “with a third-row center seatbelt system
which an ordinary passenger would likely not be able [to] use as
designed because the intended method of use was dangerously unclear,
confusing, counter intuitive, and misleading”; (2) failing to adequately
test and evaluate the usability and safety of the seat belt system; and
(3) failing to provide adequate warnings and instructions. 4
       Honda raised several affirmative defenses in its answer.
Relevant here, Honda first pleaded that the Odyssey’s compliance with
mandatory federal safety standards gave rise to a presumption of
nonliability   under    Texas    Civil    Practice   and   Remedies     Code
Section 82.008. That statute entitles a manufacturer to a rebuttable
presumption that it is not liable in a products liability action based on a
product’s design if the manufacturer establishes that the design
complied with applicable federal safety standards or regulations “that
governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 82.008(a).          The claimant may then rebut that
presumption by establishing that the standards or regulations “were
inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or
damage.” Id. § 82.008(b)(1).
       As an additional affirmative defense, Honda pleaded that, under
Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 33, its liability should be
reduced by the “percentage of responsibility” attributable to Milburn,


       4  Although Milburn alleged design, manufacturing, and marketing
defects in her petition, only a design-defect claim was submitted to the jury.



                                      5
the settling defendants, and the driver of the pickup truck. As to the
Uber entities specifically, Honda alleged that their negligence, negligent
undertaking, and fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations were a
producing cause of Milburn’s injury.        Milburn specially excepted to
Honda’s pleadings relating to the Uber entities’ proportionate
responsibility under Chapter 33, arguing that (1) submission of the Uber
entities for comparative apportionment would be improper because
Uber’s liability was derivative of another tortfeasor (Yusufzai) and thus
(2) all evidence regarding the allegations against the Uber entities
should be excluded as irrelevant.         Milburn then moved for partial
summary judgment, arguing no viable legal claim would permit the
submission of the Uber entities in a proportionate-responsibility
question. The trial court granted the motion.
       The parties proceeded to a three-week jury trial.             Milburn
presented two expert witnesses to testify about the seat-belt system’s
design. Joellen Gill, a human factors engineering consultant, 5 testified
that the seat-belt system’s design was defective from a human factors
perspective because it was foreseeable that owners would not reliably
maintain the belt in the anchored position and that passengers would
neither fasten the unanchored belt correctly nor recognize that they
were belted incorrectly.      And she concluded that Honda did not
adequately mitigate those foreseeable risks.           In so opining, Gill



       5 Gill described human factors engineering, which began as a discipline

in the 1950s, as combining traditional design engineering and cognitive
psychology to consider how people interact with the products and systems that
engineers design, with the goal of making those systems safer.



                                      6
explained that her conclusions were supported by two “usability studies”
conducted by Milburn’s counsel in which fifty out of fifty-three people
asked to fasten an unanchored seat belt in a 2011 Odyssey’s rear center
seat did so incorrectly. Honda sought to exclude Gill’s testimony on the
grounds that she was not qualified and that her testimony was
unreliable; Honda further sought to exclude the usability studies as
unreliable and unscientific. The trial court denied those requests.
       Milburn also presented the expert testimony of Steven Meyer, a
mechanical engineer specializing in automotive safety, who concluded
that the likelihood of the seat belt’s incorrect usage, weighed against the
utility of the additional cargo space, rendered the system unreasonably
dangerous as designed. He further testified that a safer alternative
design that is both economically and technologically feasible is an
“all-belts-to-seat” (ABTS) system, meaning the belt is attached to the
seat, with no detachability feature, and thus cannot be erroneously used
as a two-point belt. 6
       Honda presented its own engineering and human factors experts
to testify about the product’s design. Michael Klima, a mechanical
engineer,    opined      that   the   Odyssey’s   seat-belt   system    was
“well-designed, consistent with peers out in the motoring public today.”
He further opined that the ABTS alternative design Meyer suggested
would require additional seat height and bulk, which in turn would
interfere with the ability to retract the seat into the floor. Nathan



       6 Both the detachable system used in the Odyssey’s rear middle seat

and the ABTS design that Meyer endorsed are “Type 2” systems in that they
have three points of attachment. The difference is the detachability feature.



                                      7
Dorris, a human factors and safety consultant, opined that the design of
the seat-belt system was “reasonably safe . . . from a human factors
perspective,” taking into account expected knowledge and attitudes
regarding seat belts, including the expectation of a lap belt and the
ability to ask a driver for assistance.
      Honda’s corporate representative testified that no other
complaints or lawsuits regarding the seat belt had been filed and that
the system “is used widely throughout Honda and the rest of the
industry and has been for almost 20 years.” When asked whether Honda
conducted any usability studies with respect to the detachable seat belt
in the 2011 Odyssey, he explained that Honda would not have done such
a study “since it wasn’t a new technology” and was “used in the
marketplace for almost over 10 years before it was applied to this
vehicle.” Honda began using roof-mounted detachable seat belts in its
vehicles in 2001 or 2002 and had used them in the Odyssey since 2005.
      In a single liability question, the jury was asked whether Honda
was negligent in designing the 2011 Odyssey and whether Honda’s
negligence, if any, proximately caused Milburn’s injury. The charge
instructed the jury that “[f]or American Honda to have been negligent,
there must have been a defect in the designing” of the Odyssey. The
charge went on to define “design defect” as “a condition of the product
that renders it unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into
consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use.
For a design defect to exist there must have been a safer alternative
design.” In turn, the charge defined “safer alternative design” as
      a product design other than the one actually used that in
      reasonable probability (1) would have prevented or



                                     8
      significantly reduced the risk of the injury in question
      without substantially impairing the product’s utility and
      (2) was economically and technologically feasible at the
      time the product left the control of American Honda by the
      application of existing or reasonably achievable scientific
      knowledge.
(Formatting altered.) The jury answered “yes” to the liability question.
      The charge then asked the jury two questions about the Odyssey’s
compliance with federal safety regulations. The jury first found that the
Odyssey’s design complied with mandatory federal safety standards or
regulations “that were applicable to the product at the time of
manufacture and that governed the product risk that allegedly caused
harm,” meaning that the statutory presumption of nonliability applied.
However, the jury also found that those standards or regulations were
“inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or
damage,” meaning Milburn rebutted that presumption.
      The jury went on to find that Milburn’s and Yusufzai’s negligence
also proximately caused the injury in question and attributed 63% of the
responsibility to Honda, 32% to Yusufzai, and 5% to Milburn. Finally,
the jury found that approximately $37 million in damages would fairly
and reasonably compensate Milburn for her injuries. The trial court
rendered judgment on the verdict, reducing the amount awarded by 5%
for Milburn’s proportionate responsibility and applying a credit based
on Milburn’s settlements with the other defendants. Because the jury
attributed more than 50% of the responsibility to Honda, the trial court
deemed Honda jointly and severally liable for Milburn’s recoverable
damages. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.013(b)(1). Accordingly,




                                   9
the trial court’s judgment ordered that Milburn recover from Honda just
under $26 million in damages and prejudgment interest.
      Honda appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Honda
negligently designed the Odyssey, proximately causing the injury in
question, and the jury’s finding that the nonliability presumption was
rebutted. Honda further argued that the trial court erred in excluding
the settling Uber entities from the jury’s consideration of proportionate
responsibility.
      The court of appeals affirmed. 

 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2021). On the sufficiency issues, the court concluded that the case
amounted to a “battle of the experts” and that it was within the jury’s
province to resolve the conflicting evidence in Milburn’s favor. 

.   In so holding, the court rejected Honda’s challenges to Gill’s
qualifications and the reliability of her testimony.        

 at 22–24.
Regarding the evidence of a safer alternative design, the court concluded
that Meyer sufficiently explained how the ABTS system could be
implemented while maintaining the stowaway feature of the rear seat
and that, even if his testimony on that point was conclusory, conflicting
evidence was presented about whether the loss of cargo space associated
with the stowaway seat would substantially impair the utility of the
product. 

 at 25–26. On the proportionate-responsibility issue, the
court of appeals held that (1) Honda’s negligence theories could not
support submission of the Uber entities to the jury to apportion liability
because those entities’ liability was derivative of Yusufzai’s and (2) no




                                    10
evidence supported a fraud or negligent-misrepresentation claim. 

 at
31–34.
       In its petition for review, Honda renews its legal sufficiency
challenges to the jury’s findings of regulatory inadequacy and
negligence. 7 Honda alternatively argues that it is entitled to rendition
of judgment under federal conflict-preemption principles.              Finally,
Honda asserts that, if rendition is inappropriate, it is nevertheless
entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in refusing to submit
the Uber entities in the proportionate-responsibility question.

                               II. Discussion

       A products liability claim involving a design defect requires proof
that the product’s design rendered it unreasonably dangerous, taking
into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its
use, and that a safer alternative design existed. Timpte Indus., Inc. v.
Gish, 

 (Tex. 2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 82.005(a). 8 When the product at issue is a motor vehicle, the vehicle’s
compliance with applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards is



       7 In the court of appeals, Honda argued the evidence was insufficient as

to both negligence and proximate cause. 668 S.W.3d at 12–14. Honda does not
challenge causation in this Court.
       8 Under Texas law, a products liability action can be based on
negligence or strict liability, among other theories. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 82.001(2); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 

 (Tex.
1999). Only a negligence question was submitted to the jury in this case;
however, as noted, the jury was instructed that for Honda to have been
negligent, “there must have been a defect in the designing of the 2011 Honda
Odyssey.” “Defective design” was defined in accordance with the applicable
common-law and statutory requirements.



                                      11
often presented as evidence tending to show the design was not
defective. A motor vehicle safety standard is “a minimum standard for
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance,” 

(a)(10), and a vehicle may not be manufactured for sale absent
compliance with all applicable safety standards, 

 § 30112(a)(1).
Under federal law, such compliance does not exempt the manufacturer
from liability at common law. Id. § 30103(e). But under Texas law, it
does under certain circumstances.
      Specifically, in 2003, the Legislature enacted Civil Practice and
Remedies Code Section 82.008 in response to “a finding that
manufacturers and sellers were being held liable in products liability
cases even though the products at issue complied with all applicable
federal safety standards.” Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 

 (Tex. 2014). Section 82.008 entitles a product manufacturer to a
presumption that it is not liable for injuries caused by its product’s
design if the manufacturer establishes that (1) the design complied with
mandatory federal safety standards or regulations, (2) the standards or
regulations were applicable to the product at the time of manufacture,
and (3) the standards or regulations governed the product risk that
allegedly caused the harm. 

 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 82.008(a)); 9 see also Wright v. Ford Motor Co., 

 (5th


      9 Section 82.008(a) states in full:


      In a products liability action brought against a product
      manufacturer or seller, there is a rebuttable presumption that
      the product manufacturer or seller is not liable for any injury to
      a claimant caused by some aspect of the formulation, labeling,




                                       12
Cir. 2007) (“Section 82.008(a) is not limited to preemptive regulations,
and, in fact, appears to assume non-preemptive regulations . . . .”). 10
      That presumption, however, is rebuttable. A claimant may rebut
the presumption by establishing either that “the mandatory federal
safety standards or regulations applicable to the product were
inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or
damage” or that “the manufacturer, before or after marketing the
product, withheld or misrepresented information or material relevant to
the federal government’s or agency’s determination of adequacy of the
safety standards or regulations at issue in the action.” TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 82.008(b).       Only the rebuttal ground premised on
inadequacy of the applicable federal safety standards is at issue.
      As in other cases addressing Section 82.008, the parties and the
lower courts here treated the applicability of the presumption as an
affirmative defense, on which Honda bore the burden of proof, and the
presumption’s rebuttal as an exception to or matter in avoidance of that



      or design of a product if the product manufacturer or seller
      establishes that the product’s formula, labeling, or design
      complied with mandatory safety standards or regulations
      adopted and promulgated by the federal government, or an
      agency of the federal government, that were applicable to the
      product at the time of manufacture and that governed the
      product risk that allegedly caused harm.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a).
      10  Notwithstanding the federal statute’s express statement that
compliance with federal law does not exempt a manufacturer from liability at
common law, Honda maintains that federal law preempts Milburn’s claims.
Because we hold that Honda is not liable under Texas law, we need not reach
its preemption argument.



                                    13
defense, on which Milburn bore the burden. 11 See Kia Motors, 

 n.5 (noting that Kia raised the presumption as an
affirmative defense in its pleadings and challenged the jury’s verdict in
part because no evidence was presented rebutting the presumption);
Wright, 

 (noting that if the rebuttal evidence relied on by
the plaintiff “presents a fact question [with respect to regulatory
inadequacy], then, in a jury tried case, it appears logical to conclude that
the statute proceeds on the assumption that any such fact question as
whether the presumption has been rebutted will be submitted to the
jury”). The statutory language supports that treatment to some extent,
as a defendant manufacturer or seller must “establish[]” that the
presumption applies due to the product’s compliance with applicable
safety standards, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a), and if it does
so, the claimant must then “establish[]” the inadequacy of those safety
standards to rebut the presumption, id. § 82.008(b). As discussed below,
however, the presumption’s applicability in the first instance will rarely
lend itself to resolution by the factfinder.
      Further, considering the statutory context and structure of
Section 82.008, 12 the presumption, when applicable, essentially


      11 See Zorilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 

 (Tex. 2015)

(noting that the defendant bears the burden of proof “to establish [an
affirmative] defense and obtain the requisite jury findings”); Walters v.
Cleveland Reg’l Med. Ctr., 

 (Tex. 2010) (discussing the
plaintiff’s burden with regard to the open-courts exception to the
statute-of-limitations defense).
      12 In interpreting a statute’s plain language, we construe the words and

phrases chosen by the Legislature in context. Aleman v. Tex. Med. Bd., 

 (Tex. 2019).



                                     14
presents an independent hurdle that the claimant must clear to
establish a manufacturer’s or seller’s liability on a defective-design
claim. If the manufacturer establishes the presumption’s applicability
and the claimant fails to rebut it, the manufacturer is “not liable” on the
claim, and further inquiry into the claim’s elements is immaterial. 

§ 82.008(a). But if the claimant rebuts the presumption, the defendant’s
compliance with applicable safety standards becomes just another piece
of evidence relevant to whether the product was defectively designed.

                  A. Applicability of Presumption

      We first address the presumption’s applicability: whether the
2011 Odyssey (1) complied with mandatory federal safety regulations
that (2) were applicable to the Odyssey at the time of its manufacture
and (3) “governed the product risk that allegedly caused the harm.” Id.
The federal safety regulations at issue—the Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards—are promulgated by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA).
      Although this issue was presented to the jury—who resolved it in
Honda’s favor—and Milburn challenged the finding on appeal on
no-evidence grounds, Milburn also favorably cites a recent Fifth Circuit
decision for the proposition that the presumption’s applicability is a
question of law for the court. Kim v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 

, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2023). As we implied in Kia Motors, we agree that
the presumption’s applicability, at least in most instances, will be a
question of law rather than one of fact. See 

 (holding
as a matter of law that the presumption did not apply because the
pertinent federal safety standards did not govern the product risk that



                                    15
allegedly caused the harm). Determining a product’s compliance with
identified, mandatory safety regulations that were applicable to the
product at the time of manufacture will typically be a straightforward
affair with little room for disagreement. Indeed, there is no dispute here
that the 2011 Odyssey complied with the mandatory motor vehicle
safety standards that govern seat belts and were applicable to the
Odyssey at the time of its manufacture.
      The only disputed issue is whether those standards “governed the
product risk that allegedly caused the harm.” But that question too
lends itself to resolution as a matter of law, see 

 because it requires
the interpretation of a government agency’s regulation in order to
determine its relation to the relevant product risk—a quintessentially
judicial task. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Xerox State & Loc. Sols., Inc.,

, 577 n.26 (Tex. 2023) (“As we do, federal courts interpret
regulations by applying similar construction principles used to interpret
statutes.”); State v. Shumake, 

 (Tex. 2006)
(“Statutory construction is a question of law . . . .”). While we do not
foreclose the possibility that there could be disputed relevant facts,
whether the presumption applies in the first instance will generally be
a question of law.     With that backdrop in mind, we examine the
pertinent safety standards and the product risk they allegedly govern.
      NHTSA promulgated the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
in accordance with congressional direction to prescribe such standards
for the purpose of “reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries
resulting from traffic accidents.” 

; see also 

. Most pertinent here is Safety Standard 208, which “specifies




                                    16
performance requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in
crashes.” 

, S1. The regulation’s stated purpose is “to
reduce the number of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity of
injuries, by specifying vehicle crashworthiness requirements in terms of
forces and accelerations measured on anthropomorphic dummies in test
crashes, and by specifying equipment requirements for active and
passive restraint systems.” 

 § 571.208, S2 (emphasis added).
         With narrow exceptions, Safety Standard 208 requires all
passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 2007, to be
equipped with a “Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard
No. 209 and to S7.1 and S7.2 of this standard at each rear designated
seating position.” 13 Id. § 571.208, S4.1.5.5.1. The regulations go on to
state:
         Any inboard designated seating position on a seat for which
         the entire seat back can be folded (including the head
         restraints and any other part of the vehicle attached to the
         seat back) such that no part of the seat back extends above
         a horizontal plane located 250 mm above the highest [seat
         reference point] located on the seat may meet the
         requirements of S4.1.5.5.1 [to equip the car with a Type 2
         seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard 209 and to
         S7.1 and S7.2 of Standard 208] by use of a belt
         incorporating a release mechanism that detaches both the
         lap and shoulder portion at either the upper or lower
         anchorage point, but not both. The means of detachment
         shall be a key or key-like object.




          The referenced standards govern requirements for seat-belt
         13

assemblies such as hardware, durability, adjustment, and latch mechanisms.
See 

, S7.1, S7.2; 571.209.



                                     17


 § 571.208, S4.1.5.5.2. The third-row middle seat of the 2011 Odyssey
qualifies as such an “inboard designated seating position on a seat for
which the entire seat back can be folded . . . .”      Id.   Thus, Safety
Standard 208 expressly authorizes “use of a belt incorporating a release
mechanism that detaches both the lap and shoulder portion at either the
upper or lower anchorage point, but not both,” as the means of equipping
the vehicle with the required Type 2 seat-belt assembly for that seating
position. Id. The Odyssey undisputedly complies with that standard by
using a belt with a release mechanism that detaches both the lap and
shoulder portion at the lower anchorage point, with a key-like object as
the means of detachment.
      Relying largely on our decision in Kia Motors, Milburn argues
that the Odyssey’s compliance with Safety Standard 208 is irrelevant
because it does not govern the product risk at issue—specifically, “the
risk that owners, drivers, and passengers will fail to reliably use the
detachable seat belt system in a correct manner.” Honda responds that
the product risk at issue is the dual detachability of the lap and shoulder
belt, which the regulation expressly allows. We do not view those risks
as mutually exclusive, as the risk of misuse accompanies a detachable
seat-belt system. And for the reasons discussed below, we also conclude
that Safety Standard 208 governs that risk.
      We begin with a discussion of Kia Motors, which guides our
inquiry on this issue and is cited by both parties to support their
opposing positions. That case involved a products liability suit against
Kia for injuries suffered when a vehicle’s frontal air bag failed to deploy
during a collision due to allegedly defective wiring connectors in the




                                    18
air-bag system. Kia Motors, 

. The vehicle complied
with Safety Standard 208’s requirement that it be equipped with front
driver’s side and passenger’s side air bags that met certain protection
criteria during a crash test. 

 at 870 (citing 

, S5.1,
S6).    Nevertheless, we held that Section 82.008’s presumption of
nonliability did not apply because the regulation had no bearing on the
risk associated with the alleged product defect: “the risk of occupant
injury due to the failure of the air bag to reliably activate and deploy.”

. We noted that the result would have been different, and the
presumption would have applied, had the alleged defect been the lack of
specific occupant-restraint equipment—such as a third frontal air bag—
that the regulation did not require. 

        Milburn argues that, just as the regulation at issue in Kia Motors
“presume[d] air bag deployment” and did “not measure or apply to air
bag failure rates,” 

 (emphasis omitted), the regulations applicable to
seat belts “all presume that the seat belts are correctly being used in
their intended manner” and do not contemplate the risk of misuse. That
assertion ignores an important distinction between the air-bag
regulations at issue in Kia Motors and the seat-belt regulations at issue
here.    It is true that the Safety Standards’ mandated crash tests
measure the efficacy of seat belts when used in their intended manner,
just as they measure the efficacy of air bags when they properly deploy.
However, unlike the air-bag regulations reviewed in Kia Motors, the
seat-belt regulations are not limited to how seat belts perform in a crash;
they also contemplate equipment types, locations, and designs for
various seating positions. And they expressly authorize the precise




                                    19
design that Milburn alleges is defective: a system with a release
mechanism that detaches both the lap and shoulder portion at the lower
(or upper) anchorage point. In that respect, the hypothetical we posited
in Kia Motors—that the presumption would apply to an alleged defect
premised on the lack of a third frontal air bag when the regulation only
required two—is instructive.      Milburn essentially alleges that the
Odyssey was defective because it used a dual-detachable seat-belt
system in the third-row center seat instead of an ABTS system. But
while Safety Standard 208 mandates a Type 2 assembly in that seating
position, it does not mandate an ABTS system.            Instead, NHTSA
deliberately chose to allow the dual-detachable system. 14
      Indeed, any detachable system necessarily involves a risk of
misuse, and that risk was contemplated when NHTSA assessed whether
to allow this type of system at all; that is, the risk of misuse was part of
the cost–benefit analysis.     NHTSA said as much in its published
comments in 2004 to the final rule amending Safety Standard 208 to
allow the dual-detachable system. See 

, 70908–09
(Dec. 2004). In those comments, NHTSA noted that the then-existing
standard permitted detachability of the shoulder portion of the belt in
certain seating positions but that many manufacturers were already
using “a ‘minibuckle’ design that permits the entire belt to detach from
the seat and retract into the upper shoulder anchorage,” like the one at
issue here. 

. That design was also being used in seats for



      14 We do not address whether the presumption would apply had the

regulation neither expressly precluded nor expressly authorized use of the
detachable system.



                                    20
which manufacturers, at the time, were given the option of using either
a Type 1 (lap-belt only) or Type 2 system, such as rear center seats and
rear outboard seats located adjacent to an aisle. Id.; see 

,   S4.1.4.2(a)   (1989)   (requiring   most   passenger    cars
manufactured on or after September 1, 1990, to be equipped with a
Type 2 system “at every forward-facing rear outboard designated
seating position”); 

 § 571.208, S4.1.5.1(a)(2) (1993) (requiring most
passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1996, to be
equipped with either a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly “at any rear
designated seating positions that are not ‘rear outboard designated
seating positions’”).
       “Given the advances in safety belt technology,” NHTSA was
considering “whether it was appropriate to reconsider the detachability
allowances for these seats.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 70908. NHTSA continued:
       In the [Notice of Proposed Rulemaking], the agency
       acknowledged that for certain seat designs Type 2 belts
       could not be installed without integrating the upper
       shoulder anchorage into the seat back or permitting
       designs that allow for detachability of the shoulder belt.
       Because detachable belts can be misused, we were
       particularly interested in exploring the possibility of
       integrated belts.
Id. Ultimately, NHTSA concluded that “integrated [e.g., ABTS] belt
designs are not an optimal design for all types of seats,” and it “decided
to retain the existing detachability provisions with some revision” and
“to expand the detachability provision to the inboard seating position of
folding seats [like those in the Odyssey], bus seats, and outboard seats
adjacent to an aisle.” Id. The limitation that prohibiting detachability
would have on effective use of cargo space and the increased cost



                                    21
associated with incorporating an integrated belt were both relevant to
that expansion. Id. at 70908–09. In approving the dual-detachable
minibuckle design, NHTSA also chose to expressly prohibit the use of a
pushbutton mechanism to detach the belt, instead requiring use of a
key-like object, to reduce the likelihood of inadvertently releasing the
minibuckle. Id. Finally, NHTSA expressly “decided against permitting
detachable belts at the outboard seating position of [folding] seats
because . . . we believe manufacturers can use the roof or side pillars to
attach the upper shoulder anchorage.” Id. at 70909 (emphases added).
      This discussion reflects a cost–benefit analysis involving the
benefits of Type 2 detachable belts—including the kind of detachable
belt used in the Odyssey—and the risks associated with their use.
Indeed, the only discernible reason for limiting the use of detachable
belts to certain seating positions is that the risk of misuse outweighs
any potential benefits in other positions.      NHTSA concluded that
detachable belts were a sufficiently safe option for implementing a
Type 2 seat-belt system at some seating positions considering the
benefits associated with those systems, despite the recognized risk of
misuse.
      Milburn argues that the regulation itself does not discuss the risk
that people will not understand how to operate the detachable system.
True, but it does “specify[] equipment requirements for active and
passive restraint systems” for the purpose of “reduc[ing] the number of
deaths of vehicle occupants[] and the severity of injuries,” 

, S2, and again, in promulgating those requirements NHTSA
took into consideration the risk that detachable systems will be misused.




                                   22
As noted, in Kia Motors, the regulation’s equipment requirements did
not encompass (or even contemplate) the design aspects of the air-bag
system intended to ensure that the air bag deployed when necessary.
Here, the equipment requirements did contemplate and encompass
certain design aspects of the seat-belt system intended to ensure
adequate occupant restraint, including the allowance of Type 2 systems
with a dual-detachable belt in certain seating positions.
       We hold that the 2011 Odyssey’s design complies with mandatory
federal safety standards “that were applicable to the product at the time
of manufacture and that governed the product risk that allegedly caused
harm.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a). Accordingly, Honda
was entitled to Section 82.008’s presumption of nonliability for injuries
caused by the Odyssey’s design. 15 We therefore turn to whether the
presumption was rebutted.

                  B. Rebuttal of Presumption:
            Evaluating Inadequacy of Safety Standard
       We have not had occasion to address what is necessary to
establish that “the mandatory federal safety standards or regulations
applicable to the product were inadequate to protect the public from
unreasonable risks of injury or damage” under Section 82.008(b)(1),




       15 Because the presumption applied as a matter of law, submission of

the question to the jury was improper. However, because the jury found that
the presumption applied, the error was harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 61.1(a).



                                     23
thereby rebutting the presumption of nonliability. See Kia Motors, 

. However, the issue is squarely before us today. 16
       The jury agreed with Milburn that the applicable safety
standards were inadequate to protect the public, and Honda challenges
the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support that finding. We review
legal sufficiency challenges to a jury’s verdict by considering whether
the evidence at trial, viewed in a light favorable to the verdict, “would
enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under
review.” Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, 

, 161 (Tex.
2022) (citations omitted).
       In arguing the insufficiency of the evidence, Honda asserts that a
showing that a federal safety standard was “inadequate to protect the
public from unreasonable risks of injury or damage” requires the
testimony of a “qualified regulatory expert.” “Among other things,”
Honda continues, that expert “would need to explain why, in the context
of the entire regulatory history and the delicate balance between
absolute safety and commercial feasibility, the agency’s determination



       16 Several other states have statutes creating a similar rebuttable
presumption that a product’s design is not defective if it complied with
applicable government standards. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403; FLA.
STAT. § 768.1256; IND. CODE § 34-20-5-1; KAN. STAT. § 60-3304; KY. REV. STAT.
§ 411.310; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(4); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-09;
OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 57.2(A)–(B); TENN. CODE § 29-28-104(a); UTAH CODE
§ 78B-6-703(2). Of those, only two contain any direction about how to rebut
the presumption: Oklahoma’s statute is identical to our Section 82.008, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 76, § 57.2(A)–(B), while Kansas’s provides for rebuttal when “the
claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably prudent
product seller could and would have taken additional precautions,” KAN. STAT.
§ 60-3304(a).



                                     24
was an ‘inadequate’ solution to ‘protect’ against an ‘unreasonable’ risk
faced by the entire public.” Here, Honda asserts, neither Gill nor Meyer
evaluated or criticized the regulatory decision-making underlying
NHTSA’s adoption of the pertinent standard.
       Milburn responds that the evidence demonstrates NHTSA “did
not consider the risk that the detachable seat belt system would not be
usable, and it did not require manufacturers to test for usability.”
Further, she criticizes NHTSA’s decision to allow the detachable system
as being driven by cost rather than safety. Finally, Milburn asserts that
the absence of other customer complaints, lawsuits, and recalls cannot
by itself overcome the jury’s finding of regulatory inadequacy.
       As an initial matter, we note that whether a product’s design is
defective and whether the applicable safety standards with which the
design complies are inadequate to protect the public necessarily
constitute distinct inquiries. 17    If the standard for rebutting the
presumption mirrored the standard for a product defect, then the
presumption would serve no purpose at all. See TIC Energy & Chem.,
Inc. v. Martin, 

 (Tex. 2016) (“In [construing a statute],
we consider the statute as a whole, giving effect to each provision so that
none is rendered meaningless or mere surplusage.”). Accordingly, a
determination that an applicable federal safety standard is inadequate
to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury requires


       17 By contrast, in Ohio, “[t]he extent to which [a product’s] design or

formulation conformed to any public or private product standard that was in
effect when the product left the control of its manufacturer” is one of the
statutory factors to consider in determining whether a product is defective in
the first instance. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.75(B)(4).



                                     25
something other than proof of a product’s defective design—that is,
something more than a conclusion that the risks outweighed the benefits
with respect to the particular product design at issue.
       The court of appeals essentially ignored this distinction,
summarizing its analysis of regulatory inadequacy as follows:
       Like many product liability cases, this case was a battle of
       the experts. The Milburns’ experts examined physical
       evidence, performed tests, reviewed data, performed
       calculations, criticized Honda’s experts, and concluded that
       the federal standards pertaining to the ceiling-mounted
       detachable anchor seat belt system for the third-row
       middle seat were inadequate to protect the public from
       unreasonable risks of injury or damage. Honda’s experts
       conducted the same examinations, tests, reviews,
       calculations, and critiques of the Milburns’ experts, but
       concluded that the standards were adequate to protect the
       public. The jury properly exercised its prerogative to
       resolve this conflicting evidence and believed the Milburns’
       experts.
668 S.W.3d at 20. Assuming the admissibility of the evidence the court
of appeals described, 18 the court of appeals made no effort to explain how



       18 As noted, Honda unsuccessfully sought to exclude both Gill’s
testimony and the usability studies on which she partially relied, arguing that
Gill, a human factors engineer, was not qualified and that neither her
testimony nor the studies were reliable under E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
v. Robinson, 

 (Tex. 1995). Honda does not dispute that human
factors engineering is a recognized scientific discipline. See Mihailovich v.
Laatsch, 

 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that, “[b]roadly
speaking, a human factors analysis focuses on the interaction between human
behavior and the design of a machine[ or] product” and that an expert engaging
in that analysis “will consider whether, in light of predictable human behavior,
the design or condition of the subject item poses a potential hazard”); see also
Douglas R. Richmond, Human Factors Experts in Personal Injury Litigation,




                                      26
the showing required to prove regulatory inadequacy is in any way
distinguishable from the showing required to demonstrate that the
design of the Odyssey’s seat belt system for the rear center seat was
defective—that is, unreasonably dangerous considering the product’s
utility and the risks involved in its use. Timpte Indus., 

.    Milburn similarly argues that “the fact that a product is
defective [e.g., by virtue of its confusing design] is some evidence that the
federal standards allowing [that] design are inadequate to protect the
public.”
       But again, defective design and regulatory inadequacy are
necessarily independent inquiries. And while evidence tending to show
a product was defectively designed can certainly also be relevant to the
adequacy of the regulation allowing that design, legally sufficient
evidence of the former does not automatically amount to legally
sufficient evidence of the latter. By conflating what is necessary to prove
liability with what is necessary to rebut the presumption, both Milburn
and the court of appeals render the presumption superfluous.



46 ARK. L. REV. 333, 337 (1993) (noting that “numerous corporations,
industries, and organizations employ human factors experts,” who “testify in
all types of personal injury litigation”). Indeed, one of Honda’s own witnesses
was presented as a human factors expert. Rather, Honda notes Gill’s lack of
experience with the automotive industry in general and seat belts in
particular, along with the fact that Gill was unfamiliar with the federal safety
regulations governing seat belts. Milburn responds that “human factors
experts need not have expertise on the specific product or industry at issue
because their knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education apply
universally across all products and industries in which humans are involved.”
Because we may assume without deciding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Gill’s testimony, we need not address the parties’
disagreement about Gill’s qualifications and the reliability of her testimony.



                                      27
      The dissent claims this conclusion rests on a faulty premise; the
standards can mirror each other because the presumption highlights for
the jury the significance of compliance with the federal standards, which
benefits the manufacturer. Post at 6 (Devine, J., dissenting) (citing
Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 

 (Utah 2007)). We
disagree.   Had the Legislature merely wanted to highlight such
compliance as part of the evaluation of whether a product is defectively
designed, it could have done so. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.75.
Instead, the Legislature chose to create an independent presumption
that can be rebutted only by establishing the inadequacy of the standard
itself, allowing manufacturers to reasonably rely on those standards
when designing their products. And the dissent ultimately accepts that
the standards do not mirror each other because one focuses on the
particular product and its intended user, while the other focuses on the
applicable safety standard and the public as a whole. See post at 7
(Devine, J., dissenting). On this point, at least, we agree.
      At bottom, if Milburn’s interpretation of the statute is correct,
then the analysis is as follows: a defendant is liable for a defective design
if the plaintiff proves X, unless the product complies with an applicable
federal safety standard, in which case the defendant is not liable unless
the plaintiff proves X (which has already been proven). Such a reading
would effectively delete the presumption of nonliability. We do not read
Section 82.008 to provide such illusory protection to compliant
manufacturers.
      Turning to the safety standard at issue, if evidence existed, for
example, that NHTSA simply failed to consider the possibility of misuse




                                     28
associated with detachable belts or based its decision to allow detachable
belts solely on cost without any consideration for safety, we do not
disagree that such evidence could overcome the presumption that the
regulation adequately protected the public. See Nat’l Truck Equip. Ass’n
v. NHTSA, 

 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting, in the context of a
challenge to the validity of a federal agency rule, that federal courts will
invalidate an agency action if, among other things, the agency has
“entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem [or]
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency” (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

 (1983))). But no such evidence
was presented. Gill testified that she had not read the Safety Standards
or the regulatory history, nor did she purport to evaluate NHTSA’s
decision-making process.     And to the extent Meyer opined that the
standards were inadequate, his reasoning was that the permitted
detachable design was unreasonably dangerous; in other words, he
disagreed with NHTSA’s conclusion that the permitted design was not
unreasonably dangerous. Meyer’s conclusory opinion that NHTSA got
it wrong is not enough.
      Further, NHTSA’s thorough documentation of its decision to
approve the dual-detachable seat belt for use in vehicles like the
Odyssey provides no indication that NHTSA simply failed to consider
the risks associated with a detachable belt. Indeed, the risk of misuse
associated with detachable belts is the very reason NHTSA was
reconsidering the allowance of detachable belts at all. 69 Fed. Reg. at




                                    29
70908. 19   NHTSA weighed the benefits associated with requiring a
Type 2 belt assembly (rather than allowing manufacturers the option of
a Type 1 or Type 2 system), the risk of misuse associated with a Type 2
system that incorporates a detachable belt, the cost and feasibility of
requiring a fully integrated seat-belt system in certain vehicles—such
as those with removable or folding seats—and the risk of inadvertently
detaching the minibuckle used in the authorized design. Nothing in the
record suggests that the conclusions NHTSA reached ran counter to the
evidence before it.       Moreover, NHTSA recognized that many
manufacturers were already using the kind of dual-detachable system
that NHTSA ultimately approved in the rule. It was certainly within
the agency’s province to consider the practical experience gleaned from
the real-world use of the system, and there is no indication that NHTSA
ignored any red flags related to that usage.
       As another example, to the extent Milburn contends that NHTSA
simply “got it wrong”—that is, improperly weighed the myriad factors
that go into a motor vehicle safety standard—we agree with Honda that
considerably more evidence of the various considerations NHTSA must
take into account in making regulatory determinations about vehicle
safety is required than Milburn presented. For instance, in discussing
an earlier safety standard that gave manufacturers the choice of
installing either a Type 1 or a Type 2 belt in the rear center seating
position, the Fifth Circuit noted NHTSA’s conclusion that requiring



       19 Contrary to the dissent’s accusation, post at 14–15 (Devine, J.,
dissenting), we do not simply “surmise[]” that NHTSA considered the risk of
misuse in promulgating the standard. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 70908.



                                    30
Type 2 belts “would yield small safety benefits and substantially greater
costs, given the lower center seat occupancy rate.”           Carden v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 

 (5th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other
grounds by Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 

 (2011).
The lower occupancy rate in a rear center seat is a consideration that
would affect any safety regulation applicable to that seating position,
but Milburn’s experts did not discuss it.
       Further, as discussed, Milburn presented no evidence of other
incidents involving injuries from a dual-detachable seat belt, which was
already being utilized before Safety Standard 208 was amended to
expressly authorize it. When asked about the significance of the absence
of reported injuries, Gill dismissed it:
       What we don’t know is if, indeed, there have been no
       complaints, how many people actually got into the car, the
       Honda Odyssey, sat in the second or third row center seat
       and put the seat belt on incorrectly with no consequences
       because there wasn’t a crash.
While that’s true, Gill did not discuss how either of those
considerations—the lack of reports and any statistics indicating that the
seat belts are nevertheless being misused—would have affected
NHTSA’s risk–benefit analysis.         And although Gill opined that the
driver of an Odyssey would be unlikely to reliably leave the seat belt in
the anchored position when the seat is upright, 20 she did not discuss



       20 Gill gave two principal reasons for her conclusion that a driver is

unlikely to leave the seat belt in the anchored position. First, she stated that
when the seat belt is anchored, it hangs down in the center of the vehicle and
creates a visual obstruction. Our review of the record does not support that




                                      31
expectations regarding whether a driver would reliably attach the belt
before transporting a passenger in the rear middle seat or how those
expectations would affect NHTSA’s analysis.
       In enacting Section 82.008, the Legislature made a policy decision
that manufacturers at risk of liability for injuries caused by an allegedly
defective design are entitled to rely on a federal agency’s cogent
determination that the pertinent risks associated with that design are
not unreasonable. NHTSA made such a determination with respect to
the safety standard authorizing dual-detachable seat-belt systems in
some vehicles and seating positions. Absent a comprehensive review of
the various factors and tradeoffs NHTSA considered in adopting that




assertion. Rather, photographs of a “surrogate” 2011 Odyssey show the
anchored belt suspended in front of the headrest of the rear seat on the right
side of the vehicle, not obstructing the middle of the rear window. Second, Gill
testified that because a tool is necessary to release the anchor, “that means you
have to walk around the vehicle [and] get in through the side door” to do so,
making it “inconvenient for a user who maybe wants to stow [and] unstow the
seat frequently.” While the need to use a key-like object makes detaching the
anchor a more deliberate act, it is unclear why that requirement makes the
process more complicated logistically. And while Gill also criticized the owner’s
manual as failing to adequately communicate the importance of reattaching
the anchor when the seat is not stowed, Milburn did not pursue a
marketing-defect claim, which is distinct from a defective-design claim. Am.
Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 

 (Tex. 1997) (stating that “[a]
product may be unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in marketing,
design, or manufacturing”); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 

(Tex. 1995) (holding that liability for a marketing defect attaches “if the lack
of adequate warnings or instructions renders an otherwise adequate product
unreasonably dangerous”). In any event, while Gill testified that vehicle
owners would not reliably leave the belt attached when the seat was not
stowed, she said nothing about whether they would reliably attach the belt
before transporting a passenger in the rear middle seat.



                                       32
safety standard, 21 as a general matter neither we nor a jury can deem a
particular regulation “inadequate” to prevent an unreasonable risk of
harm to the public as a whole. 22
       That said, even in the absence of evidence that the standard was
inadequate based on the information available to NHTSA when it was
adopted, we do not foreclose the possibility that subsequent
developments could demonstrate that the standard was no longer
adequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury at the
time of the compliant product’s manufacture. For example, a material
change in technology or a proliferation of new studies or data about risks
and injuries associated with a compliant product could demonstrate the




       21 Honda argues that a “regulatory expert” is always necessary to make

this showing. While we do not foreclose the possibility that rebutting the
presumption would not require an expert, certainly a witness familiar with the
regulatory process for approving safety standards relating to the type of
product at issue would be integral in most cases in demonstrating the
inadequacy of a federal regulation.            Cf. Robinson v. Ethicon Inc.,
No. H-20-3760, 

, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2021) (evaluating a
proposed safer alternative design and holding that the plaintiff could have
created a fact issue regarding the feasibility of that design by presenting expert
testimony that the FDA likely would have approved it).
       22 The dissent asserts that in analyzing the evidence of a regulation’s

inadequacy to protect the public, we “unduly restrict[] the focus to the federal
government’s decision-making.” Post at 9 (Devine, J., dissenting). Relatedly,
the dissent opines that the considerations underlying the agency’s adoption of
a safety standard have no bearing on whether the standard is inadequate to
protect the public. 

. We cannot agree. The agency’s decision-making
is what led to the regulation whose adequacy is being challenged. We fail to
see how a jury could second-guess that decision without evaluating the process
by which it was reached.



                                       33
standard’s inadequacy. 23         We leave further exploration of the
parameters of such a showing for another day, noting only that no
evidence regarding such developments was presented here.                       As
discussed, the record demonstrates a complete absence of prior
complaints, lawsuits, or recalls associated with the Odyssey’s seat-belt
system. Nor is there evidence of complaints, lawsuits, or injuries related
to any of the many other vehicles that used a roof-mounted detachable
minibuckle system, either before or after the applicable regulation was
adopted.
       In sum, no evidence was presented that NHTSA engaged in an
improper or erroneous decision-making process in approving the
regulation that authorized the detachable seat-belt system used in the
Odyssey’s rear center seat, and no evidence was presented of
post-approval developments that call the regulation’s adequacy into
question. Accordingly, legally insufficient evidence supports the jury’s
finding of regulatory inadequacy, and the presumption that Honda was
“not liable” for the injuries allegedly caused by the Odyssey’s design was
not rebutted as a matter of law. 24




       23 As the concurrence notes, post at 4 (Blacklock, J., concurring), and

contrary to the dissent’s assertion, post at 3–4 (Devine, J., dissenting), nothing
in our opinion should be read to limit the grounds on which the presumption
may be rebutted. Indeed, we broadly recognize that, among other possible
showings, a plaintiff could demonstrate to the jury that a federal agency simply
got it wrong.
       24 In light of this holding, we need not address Honda’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s negligent-design finding or its
challenge to the trial court’s refusal to submit the Uber entities in the
proportionate-responsibility question.



                                       34
                            III. Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 2011 Odyssey’s design
complied with mandatory federal safety standards that were applicable
to the Odyssey at the time of manufacture and governed the product risk
that allegedly caused harm, entitling Honda to a presumption of
nonliability. We further hold that the presumption was not rebutted, as
no evidence supports the jury’s finding that the federal safety standards
failed to adequately protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury.
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render a
take-nothing judgment for Honda.



                                        Debra H. Lehrmann
                                        Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 28, 2024




                                   35