Supreme Court of Texas
                            ══════════
                             No. 23-0756
                            ══════════

                    BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG,
                              Petitioner,

                                   v.

                Sheema Shaik and Touseef Siddiqui,
                             Respondents

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
              On Petition for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

      JUSTICE BUSBY, joined by Justice Devine, concurring.

      I join the Court’s opinion, which faithfully applies the law of
personal jurisdiction to the facts of this case. But I do so with growing
concern about the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision to
enshrine “fair play” and “reasonableness” as the constitutionally
mandated touchstones of personal jurisdiction.          These squishy,
subjective standards—unmoored from constitutional text and history—
have failed on their own terms, producing inconsistent, unpredictable,
and thus unfair results in factually similar cases brought in different
courts. Indeed, this very case would have been decided differently had
it been filed in a Texas federal court.         Jurists, scholars, and
commentators have all written extensively on the problem, but nothing
has changed: my colleagues and I must still apply this broken regime
ushered in by International Shoe Co. v. Washington nearly 80 years ago.1
      As explained below, the doctrine is unworkable: it yields mixed
results in indistinguishable cases, allowing one court to assert personal
jurisdiction where another will not. Even worse, the current regime
makes it easier for Texas federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over nonresident corporate defendants—via the so-called “pure” stream-
of-commerce test—than for Texas state courts—which apply the more
stringent stream-of-commerce-plus test. All this uncertainty is costly
for parties and inefficient for courts.
      These difficulties in applying International Shoe consistently are
the unsurprising result of the Supreme Court’s decision to deviate from
a deeply rooted historical understanding of courts’ power over parties—
their jurisdiction to adjudicate.         But the tide is shifting: recent
scholarship has helped recover the original practice of American courts
regarding personal jurisdiction. This practice shows that International
Shoe went beyond what the Constitution requires: it constitutionalized
personal jurisdiction under the banner of “due process” even though that
concept alone offers no judicially discoverable or manageable standards
for determining jurisdiction. Because this error still haunts courts and



      1 

 (1945).    We are bound to follow U.S. Supreme Court
precedent on questions of federal constitutional law. See Josh Blackman,
Originalism and Stare Decisis in the Lower Courts, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
44, 51 (2019). “[F]idelity to Supreme Court precedent must trump fidelity to
text and original public meaning.” Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki
Kaisha, 

 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., concurring).




                                     2
litigants today and results in federal-versus-state forum splits like the
one here, I write separately to urge the Supreme Court to reconsider its
approach to personal jurisdiction.

                                      I

       I begin by explaining the Court’s current fairness-based approach
to constitutional personal jurisdiction and showing that it yields
inconsistent and unpredictable results that are unfair on their own
terms. This case provides a typical illustration of these problems.

                                      A

       Since International Shoe, the Supreme Court of the United States
has focused its approach to personal jurisdiction mostly on one
guidepost: “general fairness.” Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,

 (1952).2 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
the Court explained its view of the Due Process Clause as a “guarantor
against inconvenient litigation,” observing that this “protection . . . is
typically described in terms of ‘reasonableness’ or ‘fairness.’” 

 (1980). Over the decades, many justices writing separately
have agreed with this description: the inquiry turns on “fairness” to the


       2 True, the Supreme Court’s opinions have sometimes considered other

principles when discussing personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach.,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 

 (2011) (plurality opinion) (sovereign
authority of the State); Calder v. Jones, 

 (1984) (convenience
to and burden on the parties); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 

 (1982) (individual liberty). But each case eventually
reduces to one basic question: is exercising personal jurisdiction over the
defendant consistent with “overall principles of fairness”? Richard D. Freer,
Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice
Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 554 (2012).




                                      3
defendant.3 Equally clear “is what does not drive [this analysis]: original
meaning.”4
       In assessing “fairness,” International Shoe and its progeny
instruct courts to apply a basic rule taught in 1L Civil Procedure courses
across the Nation: “due process requires” that a defendant “have certain
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”     

 (internal quotation marks omitted).           Put
slightly differently, there must be “such contacts . . . with the state of
the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require [a defendant] to defend a particular suit which
is brought there.” 

; see also 

 (considering whether defense
would “lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the [defendant] to
comport with due process”).
       “[O]bvious and necessary though the principle may [have] be[en],
it is an abstraction without easy application.” Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar
Bottling Co., 

 (Tex. 2006). As nearly 80 years of


       3 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 

 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“A core concern in this Court’s personal
jurisdiction cases is fairness.”); Nicastro, 

 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations and other
legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave prime place to reason and
fairness.”); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 

(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principal focus when determining
whether a forum may constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant has been on fairness and reasonableness to the defendant.”); Ins.
Corp. of Ir., 

 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Whenever the Court’s
notions of fairness are not offended, jurisdiction apparently may be upheld.”).
       4 Mila Sohoni, The Puzzle of Procedural Originalism, 72 DUKE L.J. 941,

990 (2023).




                                       4
trying to break in International Shoe have revealed, its fairness-based
approach to personal jurisdiction fails on its own terms.             Scholarly
criticism of the doctrine’s shortcomings in the modern world and
empirical data from judicial decisions agree: using subjective concepts
of fairness, reasonableness, and justice to measure personal jurisdiction
simply does not work.
      In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court stated the doctrine’s
objective: “[t]he Due Process Clause, by ensuring the orderly
administration of the laws, gives a degree of predictability to the legal
system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will
and will not render them liable to suit.” 

 (quoting Int’l
Shoe, 

). A few decades later, the Court reiterated that
having    “[s]imple   jurisdictional       rules   ...   promote[s]     greater
predictability”; it “is valuable to corporations making business and
investment decisions” and “also benefits plaintiffs deciding whether to
file suit in a state or federal court.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 

 (2010).
      Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s current fairness-based
approach is the opposite of consistent, predictable, and orderly. Legal
scholars have recognized for decades that International Shoe means “too
many things to too many people,”5 yielding a body of cases that is




      5 Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction,

108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1305 (2014) [hereinafter Sachs, Fix Personal
Jurisdiction].




                                       5
“plagued” by “[a]mbiguity and incoherence.”6 This personal-jurisdiction
regime breeds inconsistency in the law, leaving litigants guessing what
contacts amount to “minimum contacts” and courts unsure whether
their exercise of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial
justice.”7 Such uncertainty increases litigation costs, incentivizes forum
shopping,8 and consumes more of our scarce judicial resources.
       Extensive scholarly research shows that this doctrine has
produced confusion among state and federal courts nationwide9—
nowhere more pervasively, perhaps, than where jurisdiction is
predicated on a nonresident defendant’s “contacts” with a forum through




       6 Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward

a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998); see also
Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 850 (1989) (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . has failed to
expound a coherent theory of the limits of state sovereignty over noncitizens or
aliens.”).
       7  See Christina Ackemjack, Federal Personal Jurisdiction: Derailing
Corporate-Friendly Litigation, 4 ST. THOMAS J. COMPLEX LITIG. 41, 41 (2018)
(explaining that state courts are uncertain about when jurisdiction is proper
given the lack of “clear and predictable rules”); Tracy O. Appleton, The Line
Between Liberty and Union: Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over Officials
from Other States, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1944, 1990 (2007) (“[A]ll states suffer
from the unpredictability of current personal jurisdiction rules.”); see also
Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony,
Confusion, and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth
Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 681 (2009) [hereinafter Laughlin, Texas Two Step].
       8 See Sachs, Fix Personal Jurisdiction, at 1307 (“The more malleable

the doctrine, the broader the forum shopping opportunities of highly
sophisticated plaintiffs, who can select courts with plaintiff-friendly judges,
juries, procedures, or choice of law.”).
       9 See Laughlin, Texas Two Step, at 727 app. A.




                                       6
the internet.10    Different States’ courts are divided on the correct
standard to apply in deciding whether a corporate defendant has
“minimum contacts” with the forum,11 as are federal circuit courts across
the Nation.12 Even more troubling, state courts and the federal circuits
that include those States have split on what standard to apply, as this
case shows.13



       10 See Bryce A. Lenox, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Teaching

the Stream of Commerce Dog New Internet Tricks: Compuserve, Inc. v.
Patterson, 

 (6th Cir. 1996), 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 345 n.129
(1997); Renaud Sorieul et al., Establishing a Legal Framework for Electronic
Commerce: The Work of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 35 INT’L LAW. 107, 121 (2001) (discussing conflicting
outcomes on substantially similar facts among courts where personal
jurisdiction is based on internet-related contacts with forums).
       11 See Laughlin, Texas Two Step, at 727 app. A (demonstrating how

different States apply different standards—i.e., some apply “pure” stream of
commerce, others require “plus,” and a few apply an unclear hybrid standard).
       12 Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publ’g, 

 (6th Cir. 2003) (following stream-of-commerce-plus test), Lesnick
v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 

 (4th Cir. 1994) (same), Boit
v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 1992) (same), and Holland
Am. Line Inc. v. Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 

, 459 (9th Cir. 2007) (same),
with Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 

(8th Cir. 1994) (following “pure” stream-of-commerce test), Ruston Gas
Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 

 (5th Cir. 1993) (same), and
Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 

 (7th Cir. 1992) (same). Some
federal circuits have refused to choose a side. See, e.g., Monge v. RG
Petro-Mach. (Grp.) Co., 

 (10th Cir. 2012); Vermeulen v.
Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 

 (11th Cir. 1993); Kernan v.
Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 

 (2d Cir. 1999); Akro Corp. v. Luker, 

 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd., 

 (3d
Cir. 1994). But most of the States within those circuits have selected one
governing standard. See Laughlin, Texas Two Step, at 727 app. A.
       13 See Laughlin, Texas Two Step, at 727 app. A (illustrating conflicts

between federal circuit courts and States within those circuits).




                                       7
       The Supreme Court not only has allowed these conflicts to persist,
it has also facilitated their growth by producing a string of plurality and
closely divided decisions.14 Even in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth
Judicial District Court (one of the Court’s recent attempts at untangling
the doctrine) there was fair-minded disagreement on what the majority’s
opinion meant.15 “It is a perilous project [for lower courts] to interpret
a Supreme Court [doctrine] that the Justices themselves interpret
differently.” Ethridge v. Samsung SDI Co., 

 (5th Cir.
2025) (Oldham, J.).
       These signals all point in the same direction: courts are doing
their level best to apply a flawed doctrine. And “[t]he impact of these
differing approaches is clear: disharmony and unpredictability.”16 The
Court’s approach to personal jurisdiction should be “rooted in part in a
realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a
litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a
federal court.” Hanna v. Plumer, 

 (1965). But the
current doctrine does no such thing: far from “discourag[ing] . . .
forum-shopping,” 

, it instead “render[s] impossible [the] equal




       14 See, e.g., Mallory v. Norfolk So. Ry., 

 (2023) (partial
plurality opinion); Nicastro, 

 (plurality opinion); Burnham v.
Super. Ct. of Cal., 

 (1990) (plurality opinion); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 

 (1987) (plurality opinion); World-Wide
Volkswagen, 

 (plurality opinion).
       15 Compare  Ford, 592 U.S. at 373 (Alito, J., concurring), with id. at
375-78 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
       16 Laughlin, Texas Two Step, at 712.




                                      8
protection of the law,” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 

(1938).17

                                       B

       I can think of no better illustration of the problem than the aspect
of personal jurisdiction at issue here: the stream-of-commerce doctrine.
Our journey through this doctrinal labyrinth begins with the Supreme
Court’s decision in World-Wide Volkswagen. After purchasing a car in
New York, the Robinsons embarked on a cross-country trip to their new
Arizona home. While passing through Oklahoma, they were involved in
an accident. The Robinsons sued (among others) the car’s regional
distributor, World-Wide, and its New York retailer in Oklahoma state
court, alleging various products-liability claims. Contrary to its name,
World-Wide contended that exercising jurisdiction over it would violate
due process, but the Oklahoma courts disagreed. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed. Considering “the apparent paucity of contacts between
[World-Wide] and Oklahoma,” 

, the Court held that
Oklahoma’s exercise of jurisdiction would offend principles of
“reasonableness or fairness,” 

, as World-Wide did not “deliver[]




       17 Erie, of course, curtailed federal common law.     But the principles
underlying Erie—its “twin aims,” see Hanna v. Plumer, 

(1965)—apply with great force in requiring procedural fairness here too. As
explained below, where entry into federal court is easier than entry into state
court—especially when the courts are within the same federal circuit—
plaintiffs are incentivized to forum shop and the law is necessarily inequitable
in opening the courthouse gates. Although the Court’s personal-jurisdiction
precedent currently permits that inequity, the Constitution and the practical
underpinnings of the Court’s related doctrines surely do not.




                                       9
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
[would] be purchased by consumers in the forum State,” id. at 298.
      Not even a decade later, the Court was presented with another
opportunity to address the stream-of-commerce theory in Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 

 (1987)
(plurality opinion). After an allegedly defective tire caused a fatal car
collision, the plaintiffs sued a Taiwanese manufacturer that filed a
cross-complaint against Asahi, a Japanese corporation. Asahi’s contacts
with the United States were limited: its manufacturing occurred in
Japan and its products’ arrivals here were indirect, occurring mostly
through the Taiwanese manufacturer’s sales. Even if it did not directly
target the United States, testimony showed Asahi knew very well that
its products would end up here. The Court granted certiorari to decide
      whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign
      defendant that the components it manufactured, sold, and
      delivered outside the United States would reach the forum
      State in the stream of commerce constitutes “minimum
      contacts” between the defendant and the forum State such
      that the exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend ‘traditional
      notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”

 at 105 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 

).
      Writing for a plurality, Justice O’Connor answered “no”: mere
awareness could not serve as a basis for jurisdiction unless some further
action was taken—the minimum contacts “must come about by an action
of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id. at
112. “The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without
more,” the plurality held, is not such a purposefully directed act;




                                    10
“[a]dditional conduct” indicating an intent or purpose to serve the
market is required. Id.
      Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, disagreeing with the
plurality’s reasoning and seeing no need for a showing of “additional
conduct” indicating an intent or purpose to serve the forum. Id. at 117
(Brennan, J., concurring). Instead, he viewed the stream of commerce
as referring not “to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular
and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to
retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the
final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a
lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.” Id.18
      Since Asahi, “[t]he rules and standards for determining when a
State does or does not have jurisdiction over an absent party have been
unclear.” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 

 (2011)
(plurality opinion).    Lower “courts have sought to reconcile the
competing opinions,” 

, and so has the Supreme Court. Just
over a decade ago in Nicastro, for example, the Court again tried to offer
guidance on which approach—Justice O’Connor’s or Justice Brennan’s—
better applied to the “decades-old questions left open in Asahi.” 

. But to no avail—again, a plurality agreed with Justice O’Connor’s
“plus” approach, 

, while their colleagues preferred Justice
Brennan’s approach, 

 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Several




      18 Justice Stevens also concurred, arguing the plurality’s creation of an

“intent or purpose” test was unnecessary to decide the case. Asahi, 

 (Stevens, J., concurring).




                                     11
scholars have criticized the split of authority.19 And various courts
attempting to apply the governing stream-of-commerce doctrine have
reached opposite holdings in different jurisdictions on similar facts.20
       We are left today with just as many questions as before. Courts
across the Nation have chosen inconsistent approaches to this stream-
of-commerce conundrum: some apply a “pure” standard based on
foreseeability while others require a “plus.”                 Nowhere is this
inconsistency more vividly on display than in the approach taken and
reasoning used in Texas federal and state courts.




       19 See, e.g., Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question

Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1593 (1992) (explaining how lack of clarity in
stream-of-commerce theory yields confusion, inconsistent holdings, and
unpredictable results); Erik T. Moe, Comment, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court: The Stream of Commerce Doctrine, Barely Alive but Still
Kicking, 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 213-15 (1987) (discussing cases that reach opposite
holdings on similar facts given Supreme Court’s conflicting guidance on
stream-of-commerce theory).
       20 Compare Gavigan v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 

 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (subject to jurisdiction for actively soliciting clientele in
the forum), Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 

 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (same), and Oliff v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 

 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969) (same), with Whalen v. Walt Disney World Co., 

 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (not subject to jurisdiction for similar
contacts), Dirks v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 

 (D. Kan. 1986)
(same), and Miller v. Kiamesha-Concord, Inc., 

 (Pa. 1966)
(same). Compare also Volkswagenwerk, A. G. v. Klippan GmbH, 

 (Alaska 1980) (permitting jurisdiction under stream-of-commerce theory
over German car-seat manufacturer because manufacturer designed,
manufactured and sold product to company knowing it would market product
throughout the United States), with Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 

 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting jurisdiction under stream-of-commerce-plus
theory over Japanese car-seat manufacturer on similar facts because suit in
forum was only foreseeable).




                                        12
       The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit follows the
“stream-of-commerce” approach to personal jurisdiction, “under which
the minimum contacts requirement is met so long as the court ‘finds that
the defendant delivered the product into the stream of commerce with
the expectation that it would be purchased by or used by consumers in
the forum state.’” Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 

(5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 

 (5th Cir. 1987)).     In applying that test, “mere foreseeability or
awareness is a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction
if the defendant’s product made its way into the forum state while still
in the stream of commerce.” Luv n’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 

 (5th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). But “the defendant’s contacts
must be more than ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated, or . . . the
unilateral activity of another party or third person.’” Ainsworth, 

 (internal citation omitted); see also Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 

 (1985). Texas federal district courts have
attempted to follow this approach faithfully.21




       21 See, e.g., ATEN Int’l Co. v. Emine Tech. Co., 

(E.D. Tex. 2009); Sunshine Kids Found. v. Sunshine Kids Juv. Prods., Inc.,
No. H-09-2496, 

 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2009); Ritzmann v. Nalu
Kai, Inc., 

 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Animale Grp., Inc. v. Sunny’s
Perfume, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-13, 

 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2007); Philip
Morris USA, Inc. v. Lee, No. EP-05-CV-490-PRM, 

 (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 28, 2006); Sorkin v. Dayton Superior Corp., No. H-06-1318, 

 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 2006); Biggs v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC,
No. 304CV1920R, 

 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2005).




                                      13
       This Court, on the other hand, has adopted the Asahi plurality’s
approach, endorsing the so-called stream-of-commerce-plus test.22 Spir
Star AG v. Kimich, 

 (Tex. 2010) (“[O]ur precedent
generally follows Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi, which
requires some ‘additional conduct’—beyond merely placing the product
in the stream of commerce—that indicates ‘an intent or purpose to serve
the market in the forum State.’”); see also In re Christianson Air
Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC, 

, 677 (Tex. 2022). Our
courts of appeals have attempted to apply this theory faithfully,23 and
this Court applies it faithfully today. Ante at 8-10.
       Given this division between Texas state and federal courts,
whether a court in Texas has personal jurisdiction over Rotax depends
on where the case is filed: state court or federal court. As the Court




       22Only 20 years ago, the question whether “plus” was required for
personal jurisdiction in Texas state courts remained unclear. See Michiana
Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 

 (Tex. 2005)
(“Whichever of these standards is ultimately correct, [the defendant]’s conduct
meets none of them.”).
       23  Unfortunately, given the prevailing confusion regarding the
“fairness” analysis of personal jurisdiction and the stream-of-commerce
concept specifically, these faithful attempts are sometimes unsuccessful. See,
e.g., Hyundam Indus. Co. v. Swacina, No. 24-0207, ___ S.W.3d ___, slip op. at
___ (Tex. June 20, 2025); LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 

, 350
(Tex. 2023) (noting “multiple decisions of our courts of appeals . . . involving
factually similar claims . . . yielding seemingly conflicting conclusions about
whether personal jurisdiction exists” under stream-of-commerce-plus test);
State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 

, 417 (Tex. 2023)
(reversing court of appeals’ judgment and holding Texas court had personal
jurisdiction over German manufacturer in case not “involv[ing] a typical
stream-of-commerce scenario”).




                                      14
explains, Texas state courts cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over
Rotax under the stream-of-commerce-plus theory. Ante at 10, 22.
      But a Texas federal court surely could under the pure stream-of-
commerce theory. Plaintiffs allege and the record confirms that Rotax,
an Austrian manufacturer of airplane engines for markets worldwide,
placed an allegedly defective airplane engine into the stream of
commerce with the knowledge that it could reach the Texas market.
Specifically, Rotax created, controlled, and employed a network of
authorized independent distributors to sell its engines. It entered into
a distribution agreement with Kodiak, and Texas is in the territory that
the agreement requires Kodiak to serve. Hundreds of Rotax engines are
registered in Texas, and the record shows that the engine at issue here
traveled through the stream of commerce from Rotax to Texas through
Kodiak and one of its sub-distributors. Rotax also authorized Kodiak to
create centers to service, repair, and fulfill Rotax’s warranty obligations
on Rotax engines. Kodiak established such a center in Bulverde, Texas,
and Rotax is required to reimburse Kodiak for warranty claims made
through the center.    Because this evidence shows Rotax “delivered
[engines] into the stream of commerce with the expectation that [they]
would be purchased by or used by consumers in [Texas],” a federal court
in Texas would have specific personal jurisdiction over Rotax. Bearry,

; see also Luv n’ care, 

 (requiring “mere
foreseeability or awareness” that product will enter forum state while in
stream of commerce). Nothing in this Court’s opinion today is to the
contrary.

                              *     *      *




                                    15
       If “fairness” is to be our constitutional north star in determining
personal jurisdiction, as the Supreme Court has directed, this result
surely shows we have been led astray. Today’s holding—that the U.S.
Constitution does not permit personal jurisdiction over Rotax, a holding
that directly results from International Shoe’s fairness-based scheme—
allows plaintiffs suing in Texas to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
court over a defendant when they could not do so in state court. Unless
we revisit what the Constitution requires, anomalies like this one will
continue confusing lower courts and litigants alike.

                                      II

       It should come as no surprise that state and federal courts in
Texas have broken from each other on the stream-of-commerce test, and
that International Shoe has proven difficult to apply in a predictable,
even-handed fashion. As many courts and scholars have explained, the
existing fairness-based approach is unmoored from our Constitution’s
text and history.24 In particular, nothing in the text or history of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides an objective
basis for determining when an exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
foreign corporate defendant would be “unfair”—for example, whether
that clause requires the stream of commerce to have a “plus.” Instead,


       24 See, e.g., Ethridge v. Samsung SDI Co., 

 (5th Cir.

2025) (Oldham, J.) (“The doctrine does not come from constitutional text or
original law.”); Lawrence B. Solum & Max Crema, Originalism and Personal
Jurisdiction: Several Questions and a Few Answers, 73 ALA. L. REV. 483, 486
(2022) [hereinafter Solum & Crema, Originalism and Personal Jurisdiction]
(“[I]t seems very unlikely that International Shoe’s ‘fair play and substantial
justice’ standard can be grounded in the original meaning of the 1868 text.”).




                                      16
I urge the Supreme Court to consider the guidance provided by early
American practice regarding personal jurisdiction, which supports a
sovereignty-based approach rooted in principles of customary law
governing jurisdiction to adjudicate.

                                       A

       “The one thing jurisdiction scholars agree on is the sad state of
personal jurisdiction law.”25 For the most part, attacks on International
Shoe have focused on the Court’s inability to speak with one voice on
when a forum’s exercise of jurisdiction will comport with “fair play and
substantial justice.”26 Instead, the Court has offered a potpourri of
“catchphrases and buzzwords”27—i.e., “minimum contacts,” “substantial
justice,” “fair warning,” “purposeful availment,” and “reasonableness”—
that are detached from early American personal-jurisdiction practice.
See Burger King, 

. And it has sent conflicting signals
regarding the importance of particular considerations, such as the




       25 Sachs, Fix Personal Jurisdiction, at 1304.


       26 See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial

Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 171 (2004)
(“Although the extensive body of commentary on federally imposed limitations
of state court jurisdiction agrees on very little, the one point of consensus is
that Supreme Court personal jurisdiction doctrine is deeply confused.”); James
P. George, Running on Empty: Ford v. Montana and the Folly of Minimum
Contacts, 30 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 5 (2022) (calling personal jurisdiction
doctrine “an unworkable maze of a test whose precedents are a repetitive
patchwork of contradictions”).
       27 Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (2010).




                                      17
burden on the defendant28 and the plaintiff’s interest in a convenient
forum.29     Volatility   and    inconsistency in      providing    a   single,
constitutionally rooted focus has left lower courts scrambling to find a
true “touchstone” in this analysis. “[W]e should endeavor to make the
law simpler, not more byzantine.” Douglass v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki
Kaisha, 

 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., concurring).
       Calls to discard International Shoe’s regime have also come from
its creator—the Supreme Court. The first objection to a fairness-based
doctrine of jurisdiction came from Justice Black in International Shoe
itself. After a majority of the International Shoe Court held that “fair
play,” “justice,” and “reasonableness” applied whenever personal
jurisdiction was involved, Justice Black wrote separately to emphasize
the danger International Shoe posed to “our federative system of
government.” 

 (opinion of Black, J.). International Shoe’s
reasoning, he explained, “introduced uncertain elements confusing the
simple pattern and tending to curtail the exercise of State powers to an
extent not justified by the Constitution.”       

   He saw no basis for
“stretch[ing] the meaning of due process so far as to authorize this Court
to deprive a State of the right to afford judicial protection to its citizens




       28 Compare Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 

 (1978) (holding

burden too great where East Coast resident forced to litigate on the West
Coast), with Calder, 

 (holding burden not too great where
East Coast resident forced to litigate on the West Coast).
       29  Compare McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 

 (1957)
(emphasizing plaintiff’s interest in suing out-of-state defendant in convenient
local forum), with Kulko, 

 n.15 (deemphasizing plaintiff’s
interest in suing defendant in convenient local forum).




                                      18
on the ground that it would be more ‘convenient’ for the corporation to
be sued somewhere else.” Id. at 325.
      Moreover, Justice Black foresaw what International Shoe
threatened to become:
      I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each State,
      without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’, a power to tax and to open the
      doors of its courts for its citizens to sue corporations whose
      agents do business in those States. Believing that the
      Constitution gave the States that power, I think it a
      judicial deprivation to condition its exercise upon this
      Court’s notion of ‘fairplay’, however appealing that term
      may be.
Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added). He explained that a test focused on
“reasonableness, justice, or fair play, makes judges the supreme arbiters
of the country’s laws and practices,” while the Constitution and our oath
to preserve it require a less judge-centric approach. Id. at 326.30 As
Justice Black’s prophecy has come true, more judges are questioning
whether International Shoe and its progeny should be revisited.
      Just a few Terms ago, for example, Justice Gorsuch expressed his
skepticism about the Court’s “personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and
International Shoe’s increasingly doubtful dichotomy.” Ford Motor, 592
U.S. at 384 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). After a majority of the Court
added another chapter to the already confusing International Shoe saga,
Justice Gorsuch took the occasion to explain why another chapter had
become necessary: “because the old [International Shoe] test no longer


      30 See Solum & Crema, Originalism and Personal Jurisdiction, at 485

(“International Shoe’s adoption of the minimum-contacts and fairness
standard as the test for compliance with the Due Process of Law Clauses is a
paradigm case of living constitutionalism.”).




                                    19
seems as reliable a proxy for determining corporate presence as it once
did.” Id. at 382-83. International Shoe offered “a heady promise,” but
all the Court has done since, Justice Gorsuch explained, “is struggle for
new words to express the old ideas.” Id. Instead, Justice Gorsuch
suggested that the Court should “seek to answer the right question—
what the Constitution as originally understood requires, not what nine
judges consider ‘fair’ and ‘just.’” Id. at 379 n.2.
       Implicit in Justice Gorsuch’s criticism is the reality that
International Shoe’s attempt to “modernize” the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction in response “to the fundamental transformation of our
national economy” has not worked as expected. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins.
Co., 

 (1957). Shortly after International Shoe, the
Court explained that “modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a
State where he engages in economic activity.” 

.31 And that
burden has only continued to decrease,32 especially for larger
corporations.33 Yet many corporations doing business nationwide have
sensibly structured their affairs to minimize jurisdiction under

       31 See also Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 

 (D.C. Cir.

1943) (Rutledge, J.) (“In general the trend has been toward a wider assertion
of power over nonresidents and foreign corporations. . . .”).
       32 See World air passenger traffic evolution, 1980-2020, INT’L ENERGY

AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/world-air-passenger-
traffic-evolution-1980-2020 (showing how during the 1980s, world
air-passenger traffic was less than a billion passengers annually, but how
recently the number has reached nearly five billion yearly passengers).
       33 John F. Coyle, Financial Hardship and Forum Selection Clauses, 103

N.C. L. REV. 641, 646 (2025) (“When a wealthy corporation is directed to
litigate in a distant forum, it will typically have the resources to do so.”).




                                      20
International Shoe34—consenting to all-purpose jurisdiction in their
“home” state, see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

 (2014), while
limiting their exposure to personal jurisdiction in other States under the
fairness-based minimum-contacts rubric.35 Small businesses are less
likely to be able to afford such structuring, yet it is they who face a
greater burden when called upon to defend themselves in remote
States.36
       Another oddity of International Shoe is that foreign corporations
like Rotax receive more protection under the Due Process Clause than
foreign individuals, and more protection than under other provisions of
the Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has been abundantly clear:
“it is long settled as a matter of American constitutional law that foreign
citizens outside U. S. territory do not possess rights under the



       34 Only two Terms ago, a plurality of the Supreme Court revisited part

of its doctrine concerning corporations and personal jurisdiction. See Mallory,

. Now, in States where there is a consent-by-registration statute
on the books, a corporation is said to have consented to personal jurisdiction in
that forum as a condition for doing business there—think something akin to
“tag” jurisdiction for individuals. But outside this context, International Shoe
remains alive and well. Id. at 146 n.11 (“International Shoe governs where a
defendant has not consented to exercise of jurisdiction.”).
       35 Robert H. Jackson, What Price “Due Process?” 5 N.Y. L. REV. 435, 436

(1927) (explaining how corporations invoke their foreign charter when
confronted with personal jurisdiction, enjoying the forum’s economic benefits
while avoiding liability there).
       36 For example, a family business operating out of a Texas home and

selling on eBay might be subjected to nationwide jurisdiction under the “pure”
stream-of-commerce test solely because it foresaw its product reaching another
forum. But it is for these small enterprises that nationwide jurisdiction is most
“unfair” from a burden standpoint. See Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash,
Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 1209 (2014).




                                       21
U. S. Constitution.” Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc.,

 (2020). This principle includes foreign corporations:
“foreign organizations operating abroad,” as well as “foreign affiliates”
of domestic corporations, “possess no rights under the First
Amendment.” 

. Even in criminal cases, where life and liberty
may be at stake, foreign citizens abroad cannot claim constitutional
protections. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 

 (1990) (Fourth Amendment); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 

 (1950) (Fifth Amendment). Several scholars have explained
that this principle logically extends to the personal-jurisdiction
context.37
       Given this precedent, should a separate foreign corporation that
has structured its activities to benefit from the U.S. market without
entering the country directly be able to invoke constitutional limits on
the jurisdiction of American courts in a civil suit for harm caused by its
product?     As just explained, “[t]he American Constitution exists
primarily to secure the rights of Americans.” Douglass, 

(Elrod, J., dissenting). Constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction


       37 Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA. J.

INT’L L. 325, 351 (2018) (“The right of foreign defendants to benefit from the
protections of . . . [d]ue [p]rocess personal jurisdiction is unclear.”); Lea
Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal
Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J.
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 617, 633 (2012) (granting
foreign defendants due-process protections is “both highly controversial and
contrary to other Supreme Court precedent” in other contexts); Austen L.
Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident
Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 33 (2006) [hereinafter Parrish,
Not Due Process] (arguing foreign private defendants should not be granted
due-process protections in the personal-jurisdiction context).




                                     22
would not apply if the corporation were charged criminally or if a foreign
individual sent a harmful product into the country, and such a
corporation cannot claim other important constitutional protections.
Yet every relevant Supreme Court decision has assumed that foreign
corporations are protected from undesirable litigation in the United
States as a matter of due process—without offering any reason why.
       Several judges have called this discontinuity into question.
Now-Chief Judge Elrod recently criticized the contradiction between
demanding the right to stay at home abroad while claiming the due
process rights that belong to those at home in the United States. See 

Citing to Asahi and discussing its application to foreign corporations,
Judge Williams has urged that “it may be valuable for courts to
reconsider both the merits of the assumption in Asahi Metal and kindred
cases that private foreign corporations deserve due process protections.”
GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 

 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(Williams, J., concurring). And a D.C. Circuit panel, just a few decades
earlier, expressed the same sentiment in an opinion by Judge Randolph:
“[a] foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no
constitutional rights, under the due process clause or otherwise.”
People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 

(D.C. Cir. 1999).    Many scholars have agreed, arguing that foreign
corporations generally have no entitlement to due-process protections as
an originalist matter.38 “To the extent that the Constitution is a social


       38  See Parrish, Not Due Process, at 33-34 (“Several academics have
convincingly argued that the Framers never intended [the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment] to limit territorial assertions of power




                                     23
contract establishing a system of self-government, permanent outsiders
. . . seem to have little claim to invoke constitutional ‘rights.’”39
       I discuss these difficulties and debates not to venture an opinion
on how they should be resolved but instead to suggest that the very
difficulties themselves indicate it is time for the Supreme Court to
reexamine the fairness-based approach to personal jurisdiction that
gives rise to them.     As I explain next, consulting our history and
tradition reveals a very different relationship between the Constitution
and limits on courts’ personal jurisdiction over defendants.

                                      B

       To no part of the Constitution can one trace International Shoe
and its progeny. Considering the Due Process Clauses’ text and history,
nothing there offers an objective basis for determining when an exercise
of personal jurisdiction would be “fair” to a foreign corporate defendant.
       Almost a century after the American Founding, courts assessing
personal jurisdiction over a defendant began asking a novel question:
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a given case comported
with due process. Courts today automatically associate restrictions on
the assertion of personal jurisdiction with due process. But why? What
constitutional role could due process play in imposing nonprocedural
limits on the scope of a court’s personal jurisdiction? And are courts




even in the domestic context,” and the “logic applies with greater force when
the case involves a foreign defendant.”).
       39 Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L.

REV. 483, 487 (1987).




                                     24
correct in automatically associating personal jurisdiction with due
process without constitutional support on point?
       From an originalist perspective, the phrase “due process”
provides no basis for divining territorial limits that can be used to
answer questions of personal jurisdiction.40 Limits on a court’s personal
jurisdiction over a defendant have always existed;41 their connection to
constitutional due process has not.         As one scholar has explained,
“[w]hen American courts first began articulating limits on personal
jurisdiction, they didn’t look to state or federal due process clauses, but
to rules of general or international law that regulated the authority of
separate sovereigns.”42
       “States that wanted to exercise broad jurisdiction would do so,
and would execute judgments within their borders on as much of the
defendant’s property as they could find.”43          These judgments were
entitled to full faith and credit in other States, but only to the extent



       40 See Stephen E. Sachs, The Unlimited Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1703 (2020) [hereinafter Sachs, Unlimited
Jurisdiction]; see also Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV.
1249 (2017) [hereinafter Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right].
       41  Before Pennoyer, these limits on state judgments, as a matter of
customary law, simplified into one question: “whether anyone else would listen
to them.” Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, at 1274; see, e.g., Hart v. Granger, 

 (1814) (holding that if defendant is “so within the
jurisdiction of the court,” “they can be commanded” “to appear and answer”).
       42 Sachs, Unlimited Jurisdiction, at 1708-09. See, e.g., Hitchcock v.
Aicken, 

 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (opinion of Kent, J.); 

(opinion of Radcliff, J.); accord Picket v. Johns, 

(1827) (opinion of Henderson, J.).
       43 Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, at 1270.




                                      25
they complied with customary law and international conventions,44
which focused on “a state’s sovereign power over persons or property
within its territory.”45 Within this practice, constitutional principles of
due process played an indirect and procedural role, limiting enforcement
of judgments rendered without personal jurisdiction according to
substantive customary limits on the sovereign’s jurisdiction to
adjudicate.     Defendants could challenge a judgment’s enforcement
through “remov[al of] their cases into federal court or . . . through
diversity suits.”46 There, “[a] judgment without jurisdiction was void,
and it wouldn’t count as ‘due process of law’ to” enforce such a judgment
depriving the defendant of life, liberty, or property.47
       Following Pennoyer v. Neff, 

 (1878), American courts
began rooting personal jurisdiction in due process. But Pennoyer did not
hold that the Constitution itself dictated substantive limits on personal




       44 See, e.g., Hall v. Williams, 

 (1828) (holding

“principles of the common law” applying “to judgments of the tribunals of
foreign countries” were still just as applicable “to the judgments of the courts
of the several States when sought to be enforced”).
       45 Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, at 1287.


       46 

       47  Sachs, Unlimited Jurisdiction, at 1722-23.            Professor Sachs’
argument fits squarely within the doctrine articulated in Erie: although state
and federal courts could disagree on the content of general law prior to Erie,
see Swift v. Tyson, 

 (1842), “they couldn’t disagree any
longer about personal jurisdiction, because due process issues were subject to
federal-question review on direct appeal.” Sachs, Unlimited Jurisdiction, at
1725.




                                       26
jurisdiction.48 Instead, Pennoyer simply recognized what the then-new
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had done: “creat[ed]
an obligation for state courts—one that hadn’t existed before
[Pennoyer]—to follow the federal courts’ lead on questions of personal
jurisdiction” as a matter of cooperative federalism.49 Both federal and
state courts were still looking to traditional territorial rules of personal
jurisdiction—not to the Constitution itself—to answer those questions,
however. In other words,
       The Fourteenth Amendment changed th[e] picture for state
       courts, because it enabled direct federal-question review of
       their jurisdictional rulings: as Pennoyer explained,
       “proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal
       rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has
       no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”50
       This view finds strong support in Pennoyer itself. There, the
Court held that an Oregon state court lacked jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. But nothing in the Due Process Clause inspired
that holding: instead, Pennoyer rooted it in principles of sovereignty
derived from customary law that had existed for centuries. Courts long
held that a forum’s “attempt to give ex-territorial operation to its laws,
or to enforce . . . ex-territorial jurisdiction by its tribunals, would be
deemed an encroachment upon the independence of the State in which

       48 Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due

Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729,
732 (2012) (viewing due process as a “hook” for exercising jurisdiction); Sachs,
Pennoyer Was Right, at 1288.
       49 Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, at 1288-89.


       50 Sachs, Unlimited Jurisdiction, at 1709 (quoting Pennoyer, 

).




                                      27
the persons are domiciled or the property is situated.” Pennoyer, 

 (emphasis added).
       What due process meant in this context, as Pennoyer reaffirmed,
was that an “exertion of power affecting private rights” can occur only
through “a course of legal proceedings [that] accord[] to those rules and
principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence
for the protection and enforcement of private rights.” 

. In the
era of Pennoyer, those rules and principles required that a defendant “be
brought within [the State’s] jurisdiction by service of process within the
State, or [the defendant’s] voluntary appearance.” 

 The Oregon state
court’s exercise of jurisdiction did not comport with those customs, so
the Supreme Court decided that the judgment sought to be enforced was
invalid and not constitutionally recognizable.
       One benefit of not constitutionalizing substantive limits on
personal jurisdiction, as Justice Story recognized long ago, is that they
can be adjusted by the politically accountable branches as times change.
Should Congress and the President conclude that customary limits on
courts’ jurisdiction to adjudicate are out of step with the modern world,
they would retain the power to change the applicable rules by statute.
See Picquet v. Swan, 

 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134)
(Story, J.) (explaining that general jurisdictional principles, which kept
with the law of nations, applied unless Congress clearly and expressly
legislated otherwise).51

       51  As Justice Story further explained, Congress could authorize
unlimited federal-court jurisdiction by acting clearly enough, and if Congress
did so, “the court would certainly be bound to follow it.” Picquet v. Swan, 

 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).




                                       28
      In sum, the text of the Due Process Clauses offers no guidance on
what constitutes a “stream of commerce.” And as a historical matter,
the Constitution always permitted American courts—state and
federal—to rely on customary principles of sovereignty in assessing
personal jurisdiction, as demonstrated by the common practice near the
time of the Founding and nearly a century thereafter. True, the current
regime ushered in under International Shoe has existed for almost
80 years, and uprooting it to restore the early American tradition would
surely create new questions that courts would be left to answer. But
perhaps not: “Pennoyer’s reasoning can be right without International
Shoe’s outcome being wrong; international law and American practice
might just be different now than they were in 1878 or 1945.”52

                              *      *      *

      So where do we go from here? As far as I can tell, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. was a step
in the right direction. 

 (2023). That case revived—or, more
correctly put, reaffirmed—an early American court practice of exercising
jurisdiction over corporations through consent-by-registration statutes.
See id. at 137. But as long as International Shoe’s ahistorical appeal to
“fairness” remains, the doctrine will continue to befuddle judges and
bedevil parties with an eye-of-the-beholder quality that the Supreme
Court has, despite its best efforts, failed to tame.
      I encourage the Supreme Court to consider returning the
personal-jurisdiction inquiry to the touchstone Pennoyer identified:


      52 Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, at 1250.




                                    29
sovereign power.      The Fourteenth Amendment’s role under this
originalist approach is simple: channeling federal-question review of a
state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction to ensure compliance with
traditional limits on sovereignty.       Courts would not look to the
Constitution to give content to these prevailing limits on when a
sovereign’s courts can exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate.     Instead,
courts would take guidance from the customary law regarding territorial
rules of personal jurisdiction.     I hope the cobbler will soon take
International Shoe and its fairness-based regime back to the workshop
to consider such an originalist “resoling.”53



                                         J. Brett Busby
                                         Justice

OPINION FILED: June 20, 2025




      53 Donald L. Doernberg, Resoling International Shoe, 2 TEX. A&M L.

REV. 247 (2014).




                                    30