The State of Texas and Kyle Madsen in His Official Capacity as Director of Right of Way v. Jrj Pusok Holdings, LLC

Supreme Court of Texas ══════════ No. 24-0447 ══════════ The State of Texas and Kyle Madsen in his Official Capacity as Director of Right of Way, Petitioners, v. JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, Respondent ═══════════════════════════════════════ On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas ═══════════════════════════════════════ JUSTICE HAWKINS, joined by Justice Sullivan, and by Chief Justice Blacklock except as to Part III(A), dissenting.

Since our State’s Founding, our Court has enforced the bedrock principle, known as sovereign immunity, that private citizens may not sue the State to redress private injuries unless the State has given its express permission to be sued. That rule exists for good reason. A private individual’s suit against the State is really a suit against all of us as taxpayers. Every dollar the government spends defending a lawsuit or paying a judgment to benefit one individual is a dollar that could have been spent on schools, roads, and public safety to benefit us all.

Some individual claims vindicating certain rights are so important to the fabric of our society that we accept that tradeoff. But reasonable minds can and do disagree about where to draw the line— which is why we insist that the Legislature, not courts, decides when to waive sovereign immunity. In our system of democratic governance, our elected representatives are the only ones authorized to balance the competing interests of individuals seeking redress against the State and the burdens their claims place on the public.

We have long insisted that to be operative, a legislative waiver of sovereign immunity must be unmistakable. It need not be marked by any particular magic words, but it must make unambiguous the Legislature’s declaration that a suit against the State may proceed.

Anything less risks judicial overreach—the usurpation of the Legislature’s exclusive prerogative to decide when private citizens may bring suit against the State and burden us all to redress their private individual grievances.

Today, the Court holds that Chapter 21 of the Property Code waives immunity for repurchase claims. In reaching that decision, the Court acknowledges that the statute contains none of the statutory indicia that traditionally signal the waiver of immunity. It agrees that the statute neither mentions “waiver” nor requires the State’s participation—the two hallmarks of immunity waivers. It acknowledges that the statutory scheme would have at least some effect without a waiver. Nevertheless, the Court invokes various other considerations— including the constitutional backdrop unique to property interests,

Chapter 21’s broader statutory context, and practical concerns—to declare that immunity is waived.

Clear-statement rules exist in large part to obviate the need for these searching multi-factor inquiries. When it comes to immunity waivers, the analytical task should be simple: look for an unambiguous declaration that the State may be sued. Is there such a declaration? If so, then immunity is waived. Otherwise, it is not. That basic heuristic should have made this case easy. This statute lacks an unmistakable waiver of immunity, and so the only permissible answer is that no such waiver exists.

The good news is that the Court’s approach today is expressly limited to this particular statutory provision, which is born of unique considerations (including a special constitutional backdrop) and inherently distinct from virtually every other statutory right known to our law. Today’s decision thus has no bearing on our sovereign- immunity jurisprudence in any other context. Even still, I cannot join the Court’s approach or outcome. Properly understood, the State is immune to this suit. I would reverse the judgment below and render judgment for the State.

I respectfully dissent.

I I first review the principles of sovereign immunity that underlie my analysis.

A Sovereign immunity is “an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex.

2006) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857)). Its origins predate the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“It is inherent in the nature of [a State’s] sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.”); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 214 (4th ed. 1876) (“[N]o suit or action can be brought against the sovereign, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him.”). The U.S. Supreme Court has described “States’ immunity from suit” as “a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).

Our Court’s embrace of sovereign immunity goes back to our State’s earliest days. As we recognized in 1847, “no state can be sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent.” Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847).

In the 180 years since, we have ratified this foundational aspect of our sovereignty generation after generation. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hall, 9 S.W. 148, 149 (Tex. 1888) (“The state cannot be sued without its consent, either directly or indirectly.”); State v. Isbell, 94 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1936) (“[A] state cannot be sued without its consent, and then only in the manner, place, and court or courts designated.”); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (“[I]mmunity from suit bars an action against the state unless the state expressly consents to the suit.” (citing Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997) and Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist.,

4 453 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex. 1970))); Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495, 500 (Tex. 2018) (“The common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits suits against the state unless the state consents and waives its immunity.” (citing Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. 2017)).

We have adhered to this principle for our entire history for many reasons, two of which bear emphasis here. The first involves the separation of powers—the “preserv[ation] [of] executive and legislative power from judicial encroachment.” Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. 2020) (citing cases). The second implicates public policy. Sovereign immunity “shield[s] the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of their governments.” Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332. In this sense, sovereign immunity “protect[s] the public treasury.” Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 404.

After all, when the government is sued, we all collectively, through our government, must expend resources litigating cases and paying judgments to satisfy one individual’s grievance. See Brown & Gay Eng’g v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. 2015).

Safeguarding the public fisc is an important part of sovereign immunity, but the doctrine has never been limited to that purpose alone.

See Nazari, 561 S.W.3d at 507-08. The doctrine broadly preserves “the relationship between the legislative and judicial branches of government,” irrespective of purely financial concerns. Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 97 (Tex. 2012); Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 414-

16 (Hecht, J., concurring) (outlining modern political and financial reasons for sovereign immunity). 1 In light of the important values sovereign immunity protects, our State’s judiciary has been particularly careful to ensure that the State has waived its inherent immunity anytime we encounter a suit naming the State as a defendant. And we have insisted time and again that because the decision to waive immunity requires the balancing of competing policy interests, immunity waivers are the prerogative of the Legislature, not courts. Our Legislature, as the branch that decides how to allocate resources and money, is the branch that decides which harms merit a judicial remedy. This Court may not, consistent with the separation of powers, determine which claims waive sovereign immunity and which do not—regardless of how we ourselves might weigh the competing public-policy concerns. See City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Tex. 2007) (“Th[e] heavy presumption in favor of immunity arises [in part] from separation-of-powers principles.”). When we set aside that rule, we usurp power allocated elsewhere and commit our State’s resources in ways reserved to the

1 The Court rightly rejects Respondent’s argument that this suit against the State of Texas does not implicate sovereign immunity at all because it does not threaten the public fisc. We have long held that “immunity is implicated by any suit that seeks to control governmental action.” Hays St. Bridge Restoration Grp. v. City of San Antonio, 570 S.W.3d 697, 704 (Tex. 2019). Here, Respondent seeks to “control government action” by forcing a sale of land.

Anyway, Respondent’s argument fails on its own terms. Its live petition expressly asserts that “Plaintiff is entitled to damages.” And it expressly demands the State pays its “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” Moreover, there is no denying that a suit against the State of Texas requires the expenditure of the resources of the State of Texas, regardless of the relief ultimately awarded.

political branches. See Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, (Tex. 2023) (observing that plaintiffs can overcome immunity “only by demonstrating that the legislature, as the branch of government constitutionally empowered to manage the State’s financial affairs, has waived immunity by statute”); Seay v. Hall, 677 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tex. 1984) (“[I]t would be a usurpation of our powers to add language to a law where the legislature has refrained.”).

B The State always retains the power to waive its sovereign immunity if and when it so chooses. Relevant here, we have traditionally recognized two paths through which the State can and does forego immunity to suit: legislative pronouncement, and constitutional implication.

The State’s standard path for waiving sovereign immunity is through an unambiguous declaration by the Legislature. As we have explained, the Legislature retains the power to consent to suits, but courts will not give effect to that consent unless it is “clear and unambiguous.” Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2016) (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034)). Only “express[] consent[]” suffices. Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638.

This test is inflexible. Even when our Court might otherwise be sympathetic to a type of claim or a particular plaintiff, we have declined to find a waiver of immunity when the Legislature has not provided the clear language our precedents require. In Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 361 (Tex. 2019), for example, we held that the Michael

Morton Act did not waive a county’s immunity for a wrongful- termination claim brought by a former prosecutor who was fired after he refused to withhold allegedly exculpatory evidence. However disappointing some might find that result as a matter of policy, we held firm: no express statutory language equals no waiver. See also Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 693-94 (Tex. 2003) (holding that the Texas Health and Safety Code did not waive sovereign immunity for a wrongful-death claim brought against a hospital on behalf of a patient who committed suicide).

Our jurisprudence is rife with examples of statutes that we declared inadequate for purposes of an immunity waiver. For example, in Taylor, we held that a statute providing that “[a] treatment facility . . . is liable” for violating the statute and that “[a] person who has been harmed by a violation may sue” does not waive immunity. Id. at 698 (emphases omitted) (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 321.003(a), (b)). In Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley, we held that Section 203.058 of the Transportation Code—which provides that “adequate compensation . . . shall be made” when the State’s acquisition “deprive[s] the agency of a thing of value”—does not waive immunity. 146 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. 2004) (quoting TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 203.058(a)). We explained that “[n]othing in the plain language of section 203.058 indicates the Legislature intended to waive immunity in situations like the one presented.” Id. at 642. And in Tooke, we held that “sue and [or] be sued,” “[im]plead and [or] be impleaded,” and other similar phrases, without more, did not waive immunity. 197 S.W.3d at 333-42 (quoting TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 51.075).

What gets the job done? Consider one good example from the same subject matter relevant here—property rights. The Property Rights Act provides that “[s]overeign immunity to suit and liability is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.004(a). So does the Texas Tort Claims Act, in nearly identical language. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.025(a) (“Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.”). And so does a different provision of the Property Code, which provides that “[t]he state’s immunity from suit without consent is abolished with respect to suits brought under this section”—namely, appeals of Comptroller decisions regarding claims for unclaimed property. TEX. PROP. CODE § 74.506(a), (c). Where the Legislature uses such explicit waiver language, “we have had little difficulty recognizing a waiver of immunity from liability.” Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 696.

Our precedents recognize an additional—albeit narrow—path by which the State has surrendered its immunity to certain types of claims.

In a line of cases exemplified by Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980), we have recognized that the Takings Clause itself operates as a waiver of immunity for inverse-condemnation claims. I will document that precedent in order to illustrate that this line of cases offers no interpretive force as to the statutory-interpretation question before us today.

Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a). By prohibiting takings absent public use and just compensation, our Takings Clause plays a critical role in protecting “the sacred and inviolable rights of private property,” a natural right that preexists our government. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134-35 (1765)); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977); see also Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 789 (“Uncompensated governmental taking of property was unlawful before Magna Carta.”).

The text is built around the core injuries “taken, damaged, or destroyed.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a). It ties those injuries to a “public use.” Id. And most critically, it provides that when a taking, damage, or destruction is perpetrated, the property owner “shall” be entitled to “adequate compensation.” Id. § 17(a), (d). In that sense, our Takings Clause is foundational but commonplace, mimicking that of the federal Constitution and most of our sister States. 2

2 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”); see also, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“The property of no person shall be taken for public use, without just compensation therefor.”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(1) (“Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit.”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 24 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18 (“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being made . . . .”); MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefore being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law.”).

Virtually all of our Takings Clause jurisprudence turns on those core elements that describe a constitutional injury. We have assessed whether a taking was really for a “public use.” See, e.g., Hous. Auth. of City of Dall. v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79, 83-85 (1940); KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Tex. 2019). We have analyzed whether some regulatory action is really a taking at all. See, e.g., Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 453 (Tex. 1992); City of Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 180-81 (Tex. 2022). We have considered whether “damage” to property was significant enough to implicate the Takings Clause. See, e.g., State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6, 10- (Tex. 1996). We have evaluated what constitutes “adequate compensation.” See, e.g., Uselton v. State, 499 S.W.2d 92, 96-99 (Tex. 1973). These cases are multifaceted, but they share a common theme: each turns on the core constitutional injury expressly identified in the text of the Takings Clause.

While nothing in that text refers to immunity or causes of action, our Court has interpreted the Takings Clause to waive the State’s immunity for a certain narrow class of claims that implicate the constitutional injury at the Clause’s heart. The rationale is set out most clearly in Steele. See 603 S.W.2d at 791. There, police officers for the City of Houston destroyed a home while pursuing a criminal suspect. Id. at 789. The landowner (and his renters) sued the City to recover costs for the damage to the home and their belongings. Id. at 788.

The plaintiffs lacked an “enabling statute” for this claim, which arose not as the result of the condemnation process, but rather from a police action without a formal “transfer of property rights.” Id. at 790.

We nevertheless allowed the claim to proceed. We held that under these circumstances, the Takings Clause “itself is the authorization for compensation for the destruction of property and is a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking, damaging or destruction of property for public use.” Id. at 791. We specifically tied this waiver of immunity to the constitutional text, noting that the destruction the police inflicted on the home is exactly the injury the Takings Clause describes. We summarized: “It was a claim for the destruction of property, and governmental immunity does not shield the City of Houston.” Id. In short, the plaintiffs presented a classic constitutional injury, and we in turn found a constitutional remedy with a constitutional waiver.

Various post-Steele cases ratified that approach—but only when the government action at issue implicated the Takings Clause’s constitutional injury. For example, in State v. Biggar, we held that the State’s denial of an easement exchange—which caused a decrease in the plaintiffs’ land value—resulted in compensable damages that were actionable as an inverse-condemnation claim because “[i]f government is able to use its power as sovereign to adjust the value of ‘just compensation,’ the constitutional protection is rendered meaningless.” 873 S.W.2d 11, 12, 14 (Tex. 1994). In Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Limited Partnership, a town conditioned its approval of a subdivision development on the rebuilding of an asphalt road with concrete. 135 S.W.3d 620, 623-24 (Tex. 2004). The town rejected the developer’s request for an exception, and the developer ended up paying nearly $500,000 to rebuild the road. Id. at 624. We held that the exaction imposed by the town constituted a taking for which the developer was entitled to compensation. Id. at 645.

Similarly, in Tarrant Regional Water District v. Gragg, we held that a regional water district committed a taking when its actions— releasing water through a reservoir’s floodgates—caused extensive flooding to the plaintiffs’ land. 151 S.W.3d 546, 549-55 (Tex. 2004). In Texas Department of Transportation v. Self, we allowed an inverse- condemnation claim to proceed where the State cut down trees on the plaintiffs’ property outside the scope of the State’s easement and refused to compensate the plaintiffs for the cost of replacing the trees. 690 S.W.3d 12, 17-18, 32 (Tex. 2024). And most recently, in Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd. v. City of Houston, we held that a regulatory taking can occur even when the regulation at issue—an ordinance requiring construction two feet above the floodplain—resulted from a valid exercise of police power and was intended to ensure compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program. 711 S.W.3d 666, 681, 684 (Tex. 2025).

All of these cases illustrate the Steele principle: when the government denigrates the core prohibition of the Takings Clause and inflicts a constitutional injury, the Constitution itself supplies a cause of action and a remedy. We have declared that there is no need in these situations for the Legislature itself to step in with its own statutory immunity waiver. Whether out of respect for the fundamental rights the Takings Clause protects or to exalt the social contract between government and citizen, our jurisprudence consistently—but narrowly—holds that the Constitution’s categorical exclusion of core takings claims from sovereign immunity has always been limited to just that: the taking, damaging, or destruction of property absent public use or adequate compensation. By contrast, government actions that are merely adjacent to or downstream of takings are subject to immunity absent express legislative waiver. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.021(a) (authorizing a property owner to bring suit “to determine whether the governmental action . . . results in a taking under this chapter”); id. § 2007.004(a) (“Sovereign immunity to suit and liability is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.”).

II With that backdrop in mind, I now turn to the statute before us.

I would hold it does not waive immunity because it lacks the “clear and unambiguous” language necessary to effectuate an immunity waiver.

See Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 38. I respectfully disagree with the Court’s contrary conclusion.

A Section 21.101 of the Property Code provides that a person “is entitled to repurchase [] property” under certain circumstances, and that “[a] district court may determine all issues in any suit regarding the repurchase of a real property interest acquired through eminent domain by the former property owner or the owner’s heirs, successors, or assigns.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.101(a), (c). Additionally, Section 21.003 provides: A district court may determine all issues, including the authority to condemn property and the assessment of damages, in any suit:

(1) in which this state, a political subdivision of this state, a person, an association of persons, or a corporation is a party; and (2) that involves a claim for property or for damages to property occupied by the party under the party’s eminent domain authority or for an injunction to prevent the party from entering or using the property under the party’s eminent domain authority.

Id. § 21.003.

It is immediately obvious that this text lacks two critical ingredients. First, there is no reference to waiver. This is an important omission because when the Legislature wishes to waive immunity, it says so by, for example, labeling the provision “Waiver of Immunity.”

E.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.0035; see also id. § 2007.004(a) (“Sovereign immunity to suit and liability is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.025(a) (“Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.”); TEX. PROP. CODE § 74.506(c) (“The state’s immunity from suit without consent is abolished with respect to suits brought under this section.”). Second, nothing in the text makes the State a necessary party. True immunity waivers expressly declare that “[t]he state shall be made a party.” E.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 571.0167(b). This statute says no such thing.

The closest the text comes is a single phrase that refers to a district court “determin[ing] all issues.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.003. But that is a classic jurisdictional grant, not a waiver of immunity. The “determine all issues” phrase simply confirms that a district court has jurisdiction to decide issues in suits already properly before it—such as, for example, a repurchase suit brought against a private entity that acquired land through eminent domain, id. § 21.101(c), or an inverse- condemnation claim, id. § 21.003(1); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a). Our precedents have always distinguished between a grant of jurisdiction and a waiver of immunity, and they make clear that the language we see here exemplifies the former. See, e.g., In re Nestle USA, Inc., 359 S.W.3d 207, 212 (Tex. 2012) (holding that the “grant of jurisdiction to this Court” in the Texas Franchise Tax Act “is not a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity”); Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp, 283 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Tex. 2009) (explaining that “sue and be sued” language “anticipates the district’s involvement in civil proceedings of some nature at some point, but it does not address immunity from suit”). 3 In short, the text is missing the key ingredients we expect to see in an immunity waiver, and the only phrase it does supply addresses something different. We should easily conclude, consistent with our precedents, that Section 21.101 does not waive the State’s immunity.

B The Court nevertheless holds that “the State has no immunity from Chapter 21 [repurchase] claims.” Ante at 26. The Court concedes that the traditional indicia of an immunity waiver are absent. It nevertheless finds a waiver by weaving together three extraneous

3 The Court calls my invocation of Nestle “misplaced” because the statutory provision in that case used the word “jurisdiction,” whereas Section 21.003 uses the phrase “determine all issues.” But Section 21.003 is situated in Subchapter A, which is entitled “Jurisdiction.” Cf. TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 311.023(7), .024.

considerations: constitutional background, context, and practical concerns. I will unpack each.

The first thread in the Court’s reasoning is the constitutional background of this statutory scheme. While the Court does not (and could not) claim that the Constitution itself waives immunity for statutory repurchase claims, it nevertheless insists that it “cannot ignore Chapter 21’s constitutional overlay, requiring that the State take property only for public use.” Ante at 20. The Court does not specify how much work this consideration is doing. But because the Court gives it at least some weight, I will explain why, in my view, the constitutional background has no meaningful bearing on the particular question before us today.

The injury Respondent identifies—a price difference between current market value and original sale value in connection with the attempted repurchase of land previously sold to the State—is distinct from the type of injuries for which the Takings Clause itself waives immunity, and it does not follow that one informs the other. See supra Part I.B.2. Even under Respondent’s own telling, the right it seeks to vindicate is a very different concept from the injury at the heart of the Takings Clause and the circumstances our previous precedents have encountered. Respondent’s operative petition alleges that the State “refused to comply with Sections 21.101, 21.102, and 21.103 of the Texas Property Code” by not selling the surplus land at the price purchased by the State. Respondent admits the State sent an “offer letter” to purchase its land. The State thereafter initiated condemnation proceedings, but

Respondent later “entered into rule 11 agreements with the State to settle the condemnation.” The record confirms that the parties negotiated and agreed upon a sale. Respondent even acknowledges that the State is now willing to sell the “surplus land” back to Respondent.

The sole injury, according to Respondent, is that the State wants to charge “current market value as opposed to the price paid by the State” in the original sale contract. None of this describes one of the core constitutional injuries the Takings Clause addresses. See supra Part I.B.2. 4 That repurchase claim differs from the Takings Clause not only textually, but also temporally. By design, the repurchase statute comes into play after the work of the Takings Clause is complete. The State initiated condemnation proceedings in order to take land for a public use. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.101(a). Those condemnation proceedings ended in dismissal, after the parties negotiated and agreed to a sale. The landowner received adequate compensation—some $682,000. At that moment, when the check cleared and the deed changed hands, the constitutional process ended. See City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 236 (Tex. 2011) (“[I]t is not the taking of property, as such, that raises constitutional concerns, but the taking of property without just

4 The Court points out that the State’s offer to sell the property at its current market value aligns with the statute’s pre-Kelo amendments. Ante at 24. That changes nothing: Respondent’s suit does not implicate a Takings Clause injury. Moreover, the current version of the statute requires the entity “to sell the property interest to the person for the price paid to the owner by the entity at the time the entity acquired the property through eminent domain.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.103(b). As I will explain below, Respondent’s land was not acquired “through eminent domain.”

compensation.”) (citation omitted); see also City of San Antonio v. Grandjean, 41 S.W. 477, 479 (Tex. 1897) (noting that “when a dedication [to public use] is offered and accepted, it is complete, even before any act is done by the representative of the public, which changes the position for the worse” (emphasis added)). That sets this claim apart from Steele and the other cases discussed above, all of which confronted a constitutional injury identified in the text of the Takings Clause. See supra Part I.B.2.

The Court implies that the Takings Clause’s “public use” requirement impacts its analysis today, but I do not see why it would.

The Takings Clause presents a fixed-in-time requirement—not a permanent constitutional lien on all government property. Even if one could conceive of a negotiated purchase as a taking, the public use inquiry occurs at the moment of the transaction, not indefinitely into the future. Put another way, once a taking is executed for a legitimate public use, the constitutional requirements are satisfied, and the constitutional inquiry ends. A constitutional injury does not spring into being years later when the government’s plans change. 5 Our Court confirmed as much shortly after the Constitution of 1876 was ratified. In 1897, we held that a plaintiff could not reclaim property taken by the State for which she had received compensation.

See Grandjean, 41 S.W. at 480. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that a taking is complete when the transaction is

5 I of course am not addressing the rare situations involving dishonesty, bad faith, or pretext in which the government falsely claims a public use it does not actually intend. Nothing like that is alleged here, and no one has doubted that the State intended in good faith at the moment of acquisition to put Respondent’s property to public use.

effectuated: “when a dedication [to public use] is offered and accepted, it is complete, even before any act is done by the representative of the public, which changes the position for the worse.” Id. at 479 (emphasis added).

In other words, “[t]he conditional paramount title of the government becomes absolute when the compensation is assessed or agreed upon and paid.” Id. When a landowner “accepts as compensation a sum of money, whatever the amount, and in whatever manner arrived at, his property, to the extent of the taking, is expropriated and appropriated to the use of the public.” Id. We confirmed that taken land does not need to be put to public use in perpetuity: for “a public use[] to be effectual,” it need not “be evidenced by the use of it having been continued for any particular time.” Id. (quoting Oswald v. Grenet, 22 Tex. 94, 99 (1858)).

Rather, “[i]t is enough that there has been some clear, unequivocal act or declaration of the proprietor evidencing an intention to set it apart for a public use, and that others have acted in reference to, and upon the faith of, such manifestation of intention.” Id. (emphasis added).

The interests the Takings Clause’s “public use” requirement protects were satisfied and extinguished at the moment of transaction.

I would ascribe to it no meaningful interpretive force in deciding whether Chapter 21 contains an express and unambiguous statutory waiver of immunity for repurchase claims long after that transaction concluded.

The second strand in the Court’s analysis is statutory context.

The Court zooms out to Chapter 21 writ large: “the Legislature nested the repurchase statute within existing law governing eminent domain— proceedings from which the State enjoys no immunity.” Ante at 15. In my view, the fact that the Court needs to consider context only proves that the statute lacks the clear and unambiguous waiver our precedents demand.

No one doubts that context can inform meaning. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012). And we have noted that “[a]mong the core contextual considerations that generate reliable constructions are the surrounding provisions of a disputed text and how that text arises within the statute's larger historical sweep.” Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2023) (citing READING LAW at 33). But as our decision in Brown illustrates, we “proceed to examine the larger statutory context” only after concluding that the “plain text” of the particular provision at issue is indeterminate. Id. at 752. To resort to context, as the Court does, is to concede that the text lacks the unmistakably clear and unambiguous statement that our precedents demand of an immunity waiver. See supra Part I.B.1. This is a sure sign that the actual provision before us provides no clear statement waiving immunity.

Even if we could draw some meaning from context, its interpretive force here would be particularly weak. True, Chapter 21 is nested among provisions about condemnation proceedings, which we have recognized fall outside sovereign immunity. See Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 3 v. Hidalgo Cnty. Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 669 S.W.3d 178, 188 (Tex. 2023). But condemnation proceedings lack immunity because the State is the plaintiff. Sovereign immunity is a shield against being sued, not a barrier to suing. The absence of immunity in condemnation proceedings tells us nothing about whether immunity has been waived for a separate, subsequent claim brought by a private party against the State. See generally id. The fact that the Legislature, as a matter of good housekeeping or statutory hygiene, placed the repurchase right near provisions involving eminent domain cannot be read as an unmistakable immunity waiver.

Chapter 21’s other provisions prove exactly that. Section 21.0112, for instance, requires a condemning entity to provide a “Landowner’s Bill of Rights” to property owners before initiating condemnation. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.0112. If a state agency fails to provide this document, has immunity been waived for a private suit to enforce compliance? Similarly, Section 21.0111 requires entities with eminent domain authority to prepare certain reports. See id. § 21.0111. If TxDOT files an incomplete report, can an injured party sue? And Section 21.023 requires condemning entities to disclose the former owner’s repurchase rights in writing at the time of acquisition. See id. § 21.023. If TxDOT fails to make this disclosure, has immunity been waived for a suit to enforce the disclosure obligation? The answer to all three of these questions is surely “no,” which confirms that mere placement in Chapter 21 cannot provide the “clear and unambiguous” indicator our precedents demand.

Moreover, when the Legislature wishes to waive immunity across an entire statutory chapter, it can and does say so. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.025(a) (“Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.” (emphasis added)). And our precedents reject the wholesale importing of immunity waivers across multiple provisions absent clear instructions. See Rusk, 392 S.W.3d at 94 (“The Legislature has waived governmental entities’ immunity from certain claims by means of the Tort Claims Act (TCA).

But the TCA embodies only limited waivers of sovereign immunity; it does not abolish it.” (citations omitted)); Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. 1996) (rejecting a result that “would be tantamount to abolishing governmental immunity, contrary to the limited waiver the Legislature clearly intended”). All this is consistent with the foundational and uncontroversial principle that waivers of immunity must be construed narrowly. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034.

Finally, the Court invokes practical concerns, claiming that the repurchase statute would “serve[] virtually no purpose absent a waiver of immunity.” Ante at 18. Of course, the broader logical consistency of a statutory scheme is a relevant consideration in the interpretive task.

See, e.g., Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2000).

But here, the repurchase statute makes adequate sense on its own terms absent a waiver of immunity.

First, Section 21.101 still directs governmental conduct, even if it does not provide a back-end option to sue the State when it fails to allow for a repurchase. The State is subject to innumerable statutory commands—procurement rules, environmental regulations, employment standards, records retention requirements—enforceable through internal oversight, legislative appropriations, audits, and political accountability rather than private litigation. See Redus, 602

S.W.3d at 411 (“Political accountability is a vital counterweight to sovereign immunity[.]”); CPS Energy v. Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., 671 S.W.3d 605, 629 (Tex. 2023) (Boyd, J., dissenting) (“[T]he political process often serves as a substitute for private lawsuits to deter arbitrary and imprudent governmental action.”). There is nothing remarkable about our Legislature imposing rules on our government that cannot be enforced through private litigation, and we have held repeatedly that the mere creation of a substantive right does not necessarily waive immunity to enforce it. See, e.g., Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 700, 702 (holding that the Texas Health and Safety Code did not waive sovereign immunity, even though it provided a “meaningful cause of action against private mental health care facilities”); Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d at 641-44 (holding that a statute did not waive immunity to enforce right to “adequate compensation” found in the Transportation Code).

Second, the repurchase right binds private condemnors who lack sovereign immunity. Railroads, pipelines, electric utilities, and others possess legislatively granted condemnation authority. See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 112.002(b)(5). When these private entities acquire property through eminent domain and later abandon the public use, Section 21 grants former landowners a right to sue, and the condemnors cannot invoke sovereign immunity. We have relied on this exact consideration in the past to declare that a statutory right still carries “meaning” when it is “construed against an asserted waiver of immunity.” Rolling Plains Groundwater Conservation Dist. v. City of Aspermont, 353 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Tex. 2011) (citation omitted).

*** Today the Court holds that in this particular statutory context, the Legislature waived immunity not by saying “immunity is waived” or “the State is liable” or “the State is a necessary party,” but by placing a statutory right in a particular code chapter, granting courts jurisdiction over disputes arising under that right, and using the phrase “may determine all issues.” That is no “clear and unambiguous” waiver. I thus would conclude that Chapter 21 does not waive sovereign immunity and end the analysis there.

III Even if Chapter 21 waived sovereign immunity, Respondent did not properly invoke that waiver. This property was not acquired “through eminent domain”—the necessary prerequisite for the statutory scheme to take effect. And Respondent sued in the wrong court. I respectfully disagree with the Court’s contrary conclusions on each point.

A Section 21.101 operates on properties acquired “through eminent domain.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.101(c). Respondent’s property was acquired through a privately negotiated and mutually agreed upon sale, not eminent domain. The State, therefore, does not occupy the land under its “eminent domain authority,” the statute’s necessary prerequisite. Id. § 21.003(2).

Honoring our duty to construe every word in the provision, see e.g., City of San Antonio v. Realme, 731 S.W.3d 342, 349-50 (Tex. 2026), we must place due weight on the word “through,” which traditionally means “passage into and out of some . . . process.” Through, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (2002) (emphasis added)). Another dictionary notes that “[p]rimarily through expresses the general relations of passage from boundary to opposite boundary of anything, penetration to all parts, continuance to the end of a period . . . . Into, for subjection to some treatment, and then out of[.]” Through, WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW INT’L DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (1954). Those definitions indicate that for property to be “acquired through eminent domain,” the eminent domain process must have not only begun—but also concluded.

Here, it would be most natural to say that the State acquired the property at issue “through purchase.” True, the condemnation process began. But the negotiated sale is what effectuated the change in the property’s legal status. And the Legislature itself treats condemnation and purchase as distinct. The Transportation Code, for instance, authorizes the Texas Transportation Commission to “acquire [an interest in real property] by purchase . . . or by the exercise of eminent domain, in the name of the state.” See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 203.051(a)(1) (emphasis added). It could have done the same here, but it instead limited the repurchase right to circumstances when eminent domain, not “purchase,” does the actual work.

The distinction comports with standard usage, as a simple analogy illustrates. Suppose the State charges a defendant with felony bank robbery. The State gets an indictment and initiates criminal proceedings. The jury is empaneled, and trial starts. The defendant hears the government’s first witness—and realizes he is doomed. He asks the court for a recess to work out a plea deal with the prosecutor.

The prosecutor offers a misdemeanor, which the defendant accepts, and the court enters a corresponding judgment of conviction. Would any ordinary speaker of English say that the defendant was “convicted through a jury trial”? Of course not. The process started, the jury heard some evidence, and the court rendered judgment. Any ordinary speaker would say that the defendant was “convicted through a plea bargain.”

The jury in my hypothetical plays much the same role the State’s eminent domain power plays in this case—a powerful incentive to settle, but not the legal mechanism that effectuates the end result.

By consenting to the warranty deed, Respondent has effectively conceded that the eminent domain process started but never finished.

The document itself expressly states that “[t]he consideration recited herein represents a settlement and compromise by all parties as to the value of the property herein conveyed in order to avoid ED proceedings and the added expense of litigation.” (emphasis added). Respondent agreed to a sale to prevent the very process it now claims occurred. The State did not acquire the land “through” eminent domain—it acquired it through a negotiated purchase. It thus was acting “within a color of right under the contract”—the warranty deed—rather than within its eminent domain powers, and therefore lacked “ ‘the requisite intent under constitutional-takings jurisprudence.’ ” Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 844 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little–Tex Insulation Co. Inc., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598-99 (Tex. 2001)).

For these reasons, I would conclude Section 21.101 does not encompass the claim Respondent seeks to assert. 6 B Irrespective of the above, the State is entitled to judgment because Respondent filed suit in the wrong court. We have always held that immunity waivers may prescribe the form of the waiver, and when the Legislature waives immunity subject to conditions, the failure to strictly adhere to those conditions negates the waiver. See Nestle, 359 S.W.3d at 208 (“[S]tatutory prerequisites are conditions on the legislative waiver of the State’s immunity from suit.”); Mission Consol.

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. 2008) (“[T]he Legislature . . . has consented to suits brought under the TCHRA, provided the procedures outlined in the statute have been met.” (emphasis added)). That principle forecloses Respondent’s suit.

6 The Court asserts in passing that its “approach coheres with” this Court’s reasoning in Texas A&M University-Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2002). Ante at 19. I do not take this observation to be doing any work.

In any event, the plurality decision in Lawson carries no relevance here. The plaintiff, a former university faculty member, sued a university for violations of the Whistleblower Act. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 518. The parties later settled, and the plaintiff sued for breach of the settlement agreement. Id. at 519. The university, invoking sovereign immunity, argued the suit was barred. Id. This Court held that the university was not immune because “when a governmental entity is exposed to suit because of a waiver of immunity, it cannot nullify that waiver by settling the claim with an agreement on which it cannot be sued.” Id. at 521. In this case, by contrast, the parties settled the State’s condemnation lawsuit; sovereign immunity was not implicated in that initial action because the State brought suit as the plaintiff. Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Lawson, Respondent has not alleged that the State breached any contract.

The unheeded condition specifies what type of court may hear these suits. Both Section 21.003 and Section 21.101, which provide the statutory hooks for a purported immunity waiver, refer to the “district court.” TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 21.003, 21.101(c). The Legislature has proclaimed, in other words, that any immunity waiver that might exist is limited to suits brought in district court. It is entirely reasonable for the Legislature to route these important and complex suits that implicate significant sovereign interests to district courts rather than county courts at law. When a plaintiff tries to override that decision and sue elsewhere, he falls outside the waiver.

Respondent sued in a county court at law, not a district court. See id. The waiver does not extend to county courts at law. Respondent did not adhere strictly to the “conditions on the legislative waiver.” Nestle, 359 S.W.3d at 208. Its claim thus necessarily fails.

Neither the Court nor Respondent offers a plausible solution to this dispositive defect. The Court’s analysis is limited to whether, as a matter of the jurisdictional limits in our Constitution’s Article V, a county court at law has authority to hear this type of claim. But that assumes the premise that immunity is waived. We need not reach the question of constitutional limits on county courts at law because Respondent did not comply with a prerequisite necessary for the waiver to be effective. See TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 21.003, 21.101(c); Nestle, 359 S.W.3d at 208. Any legislative waiver is effective only when the plaintiff complies strictly with its terms, including filing in the court the Legislature has identified—an issue unrelated to the abstract question of what types of claims can proceed in a county court at law. Respondent did not comply with the terms of any waiver, and so its claim fails at the outset.

Neither of Respondent’s proposed solutions is satisfactory. First, Respondent claims that Sections 21.003 and 21.101(c) use a permissive “may,” and thus permit—but do not require—district courts to hear repurchase suits. But the State “cannot be sued without its consent, and then only in the manner, place, and court or courts designated.” Isbell, 94 S.W.2d at 424 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also City of Madisonville v. Sims, 620 S.W.3d 375, 379 (Tex. 2020) (explaining that even where a statute waives immunity, “strict compliance with the [statute’s] procedural requirements is required to bring a claim”). Even if the repurchase statute “permits” the State to be sued in a district court, the statute does not affirmatively permit such suits to be brought in a county court at law.

Respondent next invokes Government Code Section 25.1032, which grants “[a] county civil court at law in Harris County” “jurisdiction” to “hear a suit for the recovery of real property.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25.1032(a), (d)(6). But as its text makes obvious, Section 25.1032(d)(6) is a run-of-the-mill jurisdictional grant. See AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2008) (labeling Section 25.1032 as a “jurisdictional grant to statutory county courts in Harris County”). It does not even purport to (much less actually) modify or excuse compliance with the separate provision in which Respondent claims to find a waiver. Indeed, a neighboring provision allows county civil courts at law to “hear a suit to recover damages for slander or defamation of character,” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25.1032(d)(2), but this language obviously does not waive immunity for slander suits brought against the State.

Nor does Property Code Section 21.001—which provides that “[d]istrict courts and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction in eminent domain cases”—waive immunity. TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.001.

As the Court correctly observes, Section 21.001 is a jurisdictional grant that vests county courts at law with the power to hear “eminent domain cases.” Ante at 25. However, as with Section 25.1032(d)(6), such jurisdictional grants are not waivers of immunity. See supra Part II.A.

For these reasons, I would hold that even if Chapter 21 could be read to waive immunity for repurchase suits, that waiver does not extend to suits—like Respondent’s—brought in a county court at law.

IV I would reverse the judgment below and render judgment for the State. I respectfully dissent.

Kyle D. Hawkins Justice OPINION FILED: June 12, 2026

Supreme Court of Texas ══════════ No. 24-0447 ══════════ The State of Texas and Kyle Madsen in his Official Capacity as Director of Right of Way, Petitioners, v. JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, Respondent ═══════════════════════════════════════ On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas ═══════════════════════════════════════ Argued November 4, 2025 JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, Justice Busby, Justice Huddle, and Justice Young joined.

JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion.

JUSTICE HAWKINS filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sullivan joined, and in which Chief Justice Blacklock joined except as to Part III(A).

The right to own property is “fundamental, natural, inherent, inalienable, not derived from the legislature and . . . preexist[s] even constitutions.”1 The Texas Constitution grants the State the power to interfere with this right only for public uses, subject to providing adequate compensation to the landowner. When condemned property is unnecessary for public use, the former owner has a statutory right to repurchase the property from the State in defined circumstances. In this case, we decide whether the State may claim immunity when a landowner invokes this right.

We conclude it cannot. Repurchase claims derive from constitutional limits placed on the State’s eminent domain power. The Legislature placed a repurchase right among provisions authorizing other suits for which the State lacks immunity. It granted trial courts the power to determine all issues arising under such claims, expressly including cases against the State. To the extent immunity exists, the Legislature has waived it for such claims in the circumstances it has prescribed.

Property Code Chapter 21 sets forth the criteria a landowner must satisfy to allege a repurchase claim. As to those criteria, we hold the State’s initiation of a condemnation suit to determine the value of property it takes sufficiently establishes a taking “through” eminent domain. A later settlement to fix that value does not waive the repurchase right. Further, a landowner may repurchase a portion of the land taken if only that portion is no longer necessary for public use.

Finally, a county court at law has jurisdiction over a repurchase claim.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals

1 Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).

denying the State’s jurisdictional plea as to the landowner’s repurchase claim.

I A Joyce Hutcherson, Rudolph Pusok, and Jimmie Pusok (collectively, the Landowners) owned acreage in Tomball, Harris County, Texas. In October 2013, the State notified the Landowners that it intended to acquire their property for a highway project. The State offered $496,120, describing the payment as “just compensation . . . in accordance with State law.” The State outlined the process for accepting its offer or submitting a counteroffer. It also provided a copy of the Landowner’s Bill of Rights in accordance with Government Code Section 402.031 and Property Code Chapter 21.2 The Bill of Rights states that it “applies to any attempt by the government or a private entity to take your property.” Pertinently, the Bill of Rights states: If private property was condemned by a governmental entity, and the public use for which the property was acquired is canceled before that property is used for that public purpose, no actual progress is made toward the public use within ten years or the property becomes unnecessary for public use within ten years, landowners may have the right to repurchase the property for the price

2 See Tex. Gov’t Code § 402.031(a) (“The attorney general shall prepare a written statement that includes a bill of rights for a property owner whose real property may be acquired by a governmental or private entity through the use of the entity’s eminent domain authority under Chapter 21, Property Code.”); Tex. Prop. Code § 21.0112(a) (“[T]he entity [with eminent domain authority] must send by first-class mail or otherwise provide a landowner’s bill of rights statement provided by Section 402.031, Government Code . . . .”).

paid to the owner by the entity at the time the entity acquired the property through eminent domain.3 The Landowners received a final offer from the State in December 2013. The letter repeated the initial offer and further provided: “If this offer is not accepted within fourteen (14) days from the date of delivery of this letter, it will be considered as having been rejected. . . . If you elect to reject this offer, eminent domain proceedings will be initiated by the State.” The letter included another copy of the Landowner’s Bill of Rights, as well as a deed the State described as a “proposed instrument by which the property or property interest would be conveyed to the State.”

The State petitioned for condemnation in April 2014 with a suit in a Harris County civil court at law. The State alleged: (1) it intended to acquire the land for public use; (2) it had sent a copy of the Landowner’s Bill of Rights; and (3) it had made a bona fide purchase offer as required by law.

About three weeks later, the State and the Landowners settled on a value for the condemned land. A special warranty deed conveyed the property to the State in exchange for $681,705. The deed provides: “The consideration recited herein represents a settlement and compromise by all parties as to the value of the property herein conveyed . . . .” The Landowners agreed not to “seek any additional compensation, damages, attorney’s fees, or expenses from the State of Texas.” The trial court granted the State’s motion for nonsuit and dismissed the case in August 2014.

3 Emphasis added.

Government officials decided to reroute the highway project, leaving a portion of the condemned land unused. Counsel for the Landowners emailed the Department of Transportation, inquiring whether the State still intended to use that portion of the property. A representative for the Department’s Right of Way Division responded in February 2017, stating: “Please see the attached pdf showing what TxDOT would consider surplus.” When the State refused to sell the Landowners the identified surplus property, the Landowners assigned their rights to JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, to pursue a repurchase claim.

B JRJ sued the State and the Department of Transportation Director in a different Harris County civil court at law, alleging violations of JRJ’s repurchase right under Property Code Chapter 21.

The State responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting sovereign immunity and lack of justiciability. The trial court granted the State’s plea and dismissed the case.

The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of JRJ’s repurchase claim.4 Relying on a similar case, the court of appeals first held that “a full reading of Chapter 21, including the purpose of Subchapter E,” demonstrates the State’s waiver of immunity for repurchase claims.5

4 693 S.W.3d 679, 689 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023). JRJ did not challenge the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming dismissal of its additional inverse condemnation and ultra vires claims in this Court. Id. at 688–89. Accordingly, we do not review those claims. See Tex. R. App. P. 53.2(g).

5 693 S.W.3d at 683–84 (quoting State v. LBJ/Brookhaven Invs., L.P., 650 S.W.3d 922, 932 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, pet. denied)).

Second, the court reasoned that the State acquired JRJ’s property “through eminent domain” because the State compelled the transfer by initiating a condemnation action.6 Finally, in a supplemental opinion denying the State’s motion for rehearing, the court of appeals concluded that the Harris County civil court at law had jurisdiction to decide the repurchase claim.7 We granted the State’s petition for review, in which it challenges each of these holdings.

II We first address whether sovereign immunity bars repurchase claims, conferred as a landowner’s “right,” when the State designates property as unnecessary for public use.8 The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that “no state can be sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent.”9 Although it is the Legislature’s role to waive sovereign immunity, “it remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.”10

6 Id. at 685.

7 693 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024).

8 The State properly asserted its immunity defense in a plea to the jurisdiction. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2020).

9 Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847).

10 Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Tex. 2006).

Our analysis begins with an acknowledgment that “the State derives its authority from ‘the people.’”11 “[T]o waive immunity, consent to suit must ordinarily be found in a constitutional provision or legislative enactment.”12 “[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.”13 The Legislature may simply state that “sovereign immunity is waived” for a particular claim,14 but when it does not, the rule “cannot be applied so rigidly that the almost certain intent of the Legislature is disregarded.”15 As always, we consider statutory language in its full context.16

11 Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Tex. Const. art. I, § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit.”)).

12 Id.

13 Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034.

14 See, e.g., id. § 554.0035 (“Sovereign immunity is waived and abolished to the extent of liability for the relief allowed under this chapter for a violation of this chapter.”); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 110.008(a) (“Subject to Section 110.006, sovereign immunity . . . from liability is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by Section 110.005 . . . .”); Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 52.035(c) (“The state waives its right to claim sovereign immunity in any action commenced against the state . . . .”).

15 Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. 2000) (quoting City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1995)).

16 See Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 69 (Tex. 2019) (“Statutes cannot be read intelligently if the eye is closed to considerations evidenced in affiliated statutes.” (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 539 (1947))).

A Our Constitution recognizes both adequate-compensation and public-use limits on the State’s eminent domain power.17 Beginning with the 1876 Constitution, it provided: “No person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made . . . .”18 To that end, the Legislature prescribes a process for adjudicating the “adequate compensation” the State must pay.19 The past half-century has seen a shift toward strengthening landowner protections based on the public-use limit to the eminent domain power. Our early jurisprudence recognized immunity as a potential defense to suits grounded in the takings clause.20 The law changed significantly in 1980, however, when our Court recognized inverse condemnation claims in Steele v. City of Houston.21 We held that the State has no immunity against condemnation claims when it takes

17 George D. Braden et al., The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 63 (1977); see also Repub. Tex. Const. of 1836, Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822–1897, at 1083 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (“Thirteenth. No person’s particular services shall be demanded, nor property taken or applied to public use, unless by the consent of himself or his representative, without just compensation being made therefor according to law.”).

18 Tex. Const. of 1876, art. I, § 17.

19 See Tex. Prop. Code § 21.011.

20 See City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 567–68 (Tex. 2012) (summarizing the history of our eminent domain and inverse condemnation jurisprudence).

21 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980).

property via eminent domain and fails to pay adequate compensation.22 We reasoned that “[t]he Constitution itself is the authorization for compensation for the destruction of property and is a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking, damaging or destruction of property for public use.”23 From Steele onward, our Court has acknowledged that “the Takings Clause is self-executing—that it alone authorizes suit, regardless of whether the Legislature has statutorily provided for it.”24 In 2003, the Legislature created the first statutory repurchase right. Appended to the existing Property Code chapter governing eminent domain, the right applied to property “acquired by a governmental entity through eminent domain for a public use that was canceled before the 10th anniversary of the date of acquisition.”25 Under this version of the statute, the government was required to notify the property owner that the property was no longer designated for public use and offer to sell it “for the fair market value of the property at the time the public use was canceled.”26

22 Id.

23 Id.; see also State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007) (“[S]overeign immunity does not shield the State from a claim based upon a taking under Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, known as the ‘takings clause.’”). 24 Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 568.

25 Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1307, § 2, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 4739, 4739 (amended 2011).

26 Id. at 4740.

Two years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City of New London,27 upholding private economic development as a valid public use under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.28 In reaching its controversial holding, however, the Court emphasized that “nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”29 Over forty states accepted the invitation and amended their laws. Among these, fifteen states either created or strengthened the right to repurchase condemned property no longer intended for public use.30 Texas responded to Kelo in three relevant ways. First, in 2007, the Legislature proposed expanding the repurchase right and to require the government to resell the property at the price the government paid to acquire it, rather than fair market value at the time of repurchase.31 To eliminate any gift clause bar, the Legislature also proposed a corresponding amendment to the Constitution.32 The Governor vetoed

27 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

28 Id. at 483–84.

29 Id. at 489.

30 See Ala. Code § 11-47-170(c) (2005); Fla. Stat. § 73.013(1)(f)(2) (2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (2006); Ind. Code § 32-24-1-15 (2006); Iowa Code § 6B.56 (2006); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-1144(a) (2006); La. Const. Ann. art. I, § 4(H) (amended 2006); Minn. Stat. § 117.226(a) (2006); Nev. Const. art. I, § 22(6) (2008); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.211 (2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 27, § 17 (2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 35.385 (2011); S.D. Codified Laws § 11-7-22.2 (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-17-1005(a)–(b) (2014); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-801(d) (2007).

31 Tex. H.B. 2006, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).

32 Tex. H.J.R. 30, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).

the statutory amendments, citing cost,33 but the People of Texas nonetheless voted to amend the Constitution to expressly permit the repurchase of property “at the price the entity paid at the time of acquisition” if: “(1) the public use . . . is canceled; (2) no actual progress is made toward the public use during a prescribed period of time; or (3) the property is unnecessary for the public use.”34 Second, after the next legislative session, the People of Texas further amended the Constitution to enshrine additional limits on the eminent domain power found in Article I, Section 17.35 The limits focused on the public-use requirement, mandating that a taking must be for: (1) the ownership, use, and enjoyment of the property, notwithstanding an incidental use, by: (A) the State, a political subdivision of the State, or the public at large; or (B) an entity granted the power of eminent domain under law; or (2) the elimination of urban blight on a particular parcel of property.36

33 Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 2006, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).

Tex. Const. art. III, § 52j; see also Tex. Leg. Council, Analyses of Proposed Constitutional Amendments 49–55 (2007) (summarizing the history of Section 52j).

35 Act of June 1, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., § 1.01, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 5655, 5655–56.

36 Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a).

Whatever power the State enjoyed in 1876, the People curtailed it in response to perceived abuses of the public use requirement.37 Finally, building on this history, the Legislature succeeded in amending Chapter 21 in 2011.38 Like the vetoed 2007 amendment, the 2011 amendments require the governmental entity to resell the property at “the price paid to the owner by the entity at the time the entity acquired the property through eminent domain.”39 Bearing this history in mind, we turn to the statutory framework.

B Chapter 21, Subchapter A provides that a district court may decide “all issues, including the authority to condemn property and the assessment of damages,” in a suit involving a claim for property “occupied by the party under the party’s eminent domain authority”: A district court may determine all issues, including the authority to condemn property and the assessment of damages, in any suit: (1) in which this state, a political subdivision of this state, a person, an association of persons, or a corporation is a party; and (2) that involves a claim for property or for damages to property occupied by the party under the See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (acknowledging that states may “impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline”); see KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 194–200 (Tex. 2019) (Blacklock, J., dissenting) (connecting the dissenting opinions in Kelo to the Texas constitutional amendments and describing new limitations on the takings clause as a “judicially administrable legal standard”).

38 Act of May 6, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 81, § 19, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 354, 361–63 (codified at Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.101–.103).

39 Id. party’s eminent domain authority or for an injunction to prevent the party from entering or using the property under the party’s eminent domain authority.40 Subchapter E, Section 21.101 provides that a person whose property is acquired “through eminent domain,” as well as that person’s successors and assigns, are “entitled to repurchase the property” under certain conditions: (1) the public use for which the property was acquired through eminent domain is canceled before the property is used for that public use; (2) no actual progress is made toward the public use for which the property was acquired between the date of acquisition and the 10th anniversary of that date; (3) the property becomes unnecessary for the public use for which the property was acquired, or a substantially similar public use, before the 10th anniversary of the date of acquisition; (4) the entity that acquired the property through eminent domain: (A) has an obligation to pay ad valorem taxes on the acquired property; (B) has received a tax bill from the taxing authority for the ad valorem taxes on the acquired property; and (C) has failed to pay any ad valorem taxes on the acquired property before the third anniversary of the date on which the unpaid taxes became due; or (5) the entity:

40 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.003.

(A) acquired through eminent domain a fee simple interest in the property; (B) has an obligation to pay ad valorem taxes on the acquired property; (C) has received a tax bill from the taxing authority for the ad valorem taxes on the acquired property; and (D) has failed to pay any ad valorem taxes on the acquired property before the third anniversary of the date on which the unpaid taxes became due.41 Finally, “[a] district court may determine all issues in any suit regarding the repurchase of a real property interest acquired through eminent domain.”42 The State contends that these statutes confer jurisdiction over repurchase claims but grant no waiver of immunity to pursue them against the State. Despite the recent constitutional amendments, the State argues that repurchase is a statutory right not found in the Constitution. JRJ responds that the statute authorizes relief associated with a waiver of immunity—such as damages—for “all issues” in which the State occupies property “under its eminent domain authority.”43 Such a reading is consistent with the Constitution’s authorization that the State offer a repurchase price valued as of the time of acquisition.

We generally find waiver “if the Legislature requires that the [governmental] entity be joined in a lawsuit even though the entity

41 Id. § 21.101(a).

42 Id. § 21.101(c).

43 Id. § 21.003.

would otherwise be immune from suit.”44 We also consider whether the Legislature “provided an objective limitation on the governmental entity’s potential liability” as well as “whether the statutory provisions would serve any purpose absent a waiver of immunity.”45 We conclude that the State is not immune from repurchase claims.46 First, the Legislature nested the repurchase statute within existing law governing eminent domain—proceedings from which the State enjoys no immunity.47 Chapter 21 permits district courts to “determine all issues . . . in any suit . . . in which this state . . . is a party” and that involves “a claim for property . . . occupied by the party under the party’s eminent domain authority.”48 The repurchase statute implements the 2009 constitutional amendments limiting public use, just as an inverse-condemnation claim fulfills the adequate-compensation guarantee. As we reasoned in Hidalgo County

44 Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 844 (Tex. 2009)).

45 Id. (quoting Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 844).

46 See Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 435 (Tex. 2016) (“The judiciary determines the applicability of immunity in the first instance and delineates its boundaries. If immunity is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.” (citation omitted)).

47 See Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 568 (“[T]he Takings Clause is self-executing . . . it alone authorizes suit, regardless of whether the Legislature has statutorily provided for it.”).

48 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.003. We also presume that the Legislature acted with knowledge of our decision in Steele twenty years earlier, in which we held that no immunity exists against inverse condemnation claims. 603 S.W.2d at 791; see In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 706 (Tex. 2012) (“We presume the Legislature is aware of relevant case law when it enacts or modifies statutes.”).

Water Improvement District No. 3 v. Hidalgo County Irrigation District No. 1,49 the government is not immune from claims on the “back end” after it takes property without compensation.50 Similarly, the government is not immune from claims involving condemned property no longer intended to benefit the public.51 The statute cannot be read consistently with the Constitution in the absence of a waiver.52 The 2011 statutory amendments make clear that the Legislature anticipated the State as a defendant in suits to vindicate repurchase rights. It expressly authorized district courts to “determine all issues in any suit regarding the repurchase.”53 The State and the dissent reduce this to jurisdictional language.54 However, the authorization to “determine all issues” does not only appear in the jurisdictional

49 669 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2023).

50 Id. at 187.

51 We have not been asked to determine whether the public-use requirement is self-executing. The relationship between the statutory repurchase right, the public-use requirement, inverse condemnation claims, and eminent domain proceedings forms the background against which the Legislature acted.

52 See Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tex. 2012) (“[W]e must look at whether a statute makes any sense if immunity is not waived.” (quoting Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d at 6)).

53 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.101(c) (emphasis added).

54 The dissent’s reliance on In re Nestle USA, 359 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. 2012), is misplaced. Post at 16 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The statutes involved in that case granted “exclusive and original jurisdiction” to hear taxpayer suits. Nestle USA, 359 S.W.3d at 209–10 (emphasis added). In contrast, Subchapter E authorizes the courts to “determine all issues” in repurchase claims, and Chapter 21 also expressly contemplates that courts may assess damages against the State. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.003, .101(c).

subchapter; it also appears in Subchapter E—the right of repurchase— without jurisdictional limitation.55 In amending a chapter in which the State enjoys no immunity, while mindful of the People’s desire for heightened scrutiny of the public use requirement, the Legislature expressly authorized property owners to seek judicial vindication of the public use limitation in claims against the State.

Further, Chapter 21 objectively limits the government’s liability for repurchase claims. Mirroring the Constitution, Section 21.103(b) provides that “the [condemning] entity shall offer to sell the property interest . . . for the price paid to the owner . . . at the time the entity acquired the property through eminent domain.”56 The funds the State expended to acquire the land are returned to the State, and the property is returned to the landowners upon payment of those funds.

What the State loses is any appreciation in the property’s value between the time it was condemned and the repurchase.57 But under the constitutional and statutory framework, the State was never entitled to profit from its eminent domain authority. The People amended the Constitution to permit the landowner to recover the loss of that profit, with supporters aiming to minimize speculative overuse of condemnation authority.58 Any liability the repurchase right creates for the government is both limited and purposeful.

55 See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.003, .101(c).

56 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b).

57 JRJ also seeks damages, fees, and costs; whether it is entitled to any of these in a repurchase suit is far from certain.

58 See Tex. Const. art. III, § 52j; Tex. Leg. Council, Analyses of Proposed Constitutional Amendments 51 (2007) (reporting supporters as arguing “[i]f

Finally, the repurchase right serves virtually no purpose absent a waiver of immunity, distinguishing this case from Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley.59 There, we concluded that a provision requiring compensation for intergovernmental property transfers “provides a mechanism” for “budgetary protection” between and among government agencies but does not waive immunity to permit one governmental unit to obtain a money judgment against another.60 Much like we reasoned in Oncor Electric Delivery Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit in connection with another statute, “[t]he obvious purpose of [the statute]—indeed, its only apparent purpose—is to provide for rights that can actually be exercised.”61 The subchapter “creating specific, restricted ‘rights’” for a landowner to repurchase their formerly condemned property “cannot reasonably be read to tacitly condition their exercise on a separate waiver of immunity” when it is directly linked to a constitutional limit on the State’s power.62 the amendment results in giving certain property owners a windfall from any increase in the value of the property, the amendment is still fair because it would be a disincentive to governmental entities taking property they may not need and may indirectly reduce instances in which property is taken through eminent domain”).

59 146 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2004).

60 Id. at 643–44.

61 369 S.W.3d at 850.

62 Id. Section 21.102 supports this reading by providing that once condemned property becomes surplus, the condemning entity “shall” contact the original owner by certified mail and inform the owner of its right to repurchase the property.

The State and the dissent contend that the repurchase statute is effective even if the State is immune because some private entities exercise condemnation authority.63 Initially, however, the repurchase statute applied only to “property . . . acquired by a governmental entity”—not by private entities.64 It was not until 2011 that the Legislature expanded the right to allow landowners to repurchase land condemned by private entities.65 The Legislature’s later expansion did not disavow the repurchase right first granted to curb State overreach in exercising its constitutionally prescribed authority.

Our approach coheres with our reasoning in Texas A&M University–Kingsville v. Lawson.66 In that case, the statute governing the underlying claim provided a legislative waiver of immunity.67 The parties settled, but the plaintiff later sued for breach of the settlement agreement.68 In rejecting the university’s immunity defense, a plurality of the Court held that “a governmental entity that settles a suit in which it lacks immunity cannot claim immunity in a subsequent suit to enforce the settlement.”69 Similarly, the Landowners in this case ceded their

63 Post at 23–24 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

64 Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1307, § 2, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 4739, 4739.

65 Act of May 6, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 81, § 19, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 354, 361.

66 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2002) (plurality op.).

67 Id. at 518–19, 521.

68 Id. at 519.

69 Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2019) (citing Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 522–23).

property to the State’s eminent domain power—a power subject to a public-use limitation. This limitation carries forward in the same way a waiver of immunity from the underlying claim carried forward in Lawson.

We cannot ignore Chapter 21’s constitutional overlay, requiring that the State take property only for public use.70 Over time, this matter became one of such importance that the People twice amended our state’s Constitution.71 We hold the State is not immune from Chapter 21 repurchase claims.72 III We next turn to whether JRJ alleges a repurchase claim satisfying Chapter 21’s criteria. The State first contends that it did not acquire the property “through eminent domain,” as required by

70 Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a).

71 See In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142, 158 (Tex. 2024) (“‘Our guiding principle when interpreting the Texas Constitution is to give effect to the intent of the voters who adopted it,’ which requires sensitivity to the full context of the constitutional language and history.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Degan v. Bd. of Trs. of Dall. Police & Fire Pension Sys., 594 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tex. 2020))). Relying on precedent from 1897, the dissent contends that the State need honor the public use requirement only at the moment of condemnation. Post at 18–20 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (citing City of San Antonio v. Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430, 434 (1897)). This ignores the obligations found in the recent amendments to the Texas Constitution limiting State power with respect to public use.

72 Our holding in this case does not authorize repurchase suits outside Chapter 21’s strictures. See City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 236 (Tex. 2011) (“The constitution waives immunity for suits brought under the Takings Clause, but this does not mean that a constitutional suit may be brought in every instance. . . . When the Legislature creates [an eminent domain] statutory procedure, recourse may be had to a constitutional suit only where the procedure proves inadequate . . . .” (citation omitted)).

Chapter 21, because it later settled upon the value of the condemned property with the Landowners. The State next contends that Chapter 21 does not apply when only a portion of the property is no longer necessary for public use. We address these arguments in turn.

A A right of repurchase belongs to “[a] person from whom a real property interest is acquired by an entity through eminent domain for a public use.”73 The State concedes that it acquired the property for public use, and it does not dispute that JRJ meets one of the five predicates for seeking repurchase. The State argues, however, that its acquisition was not “through eminent domain,” as Chapter 21 requires, because the Landowners settled with the State on a value for the land after the State filed suit.

“Through” means “by way of”; “passage into and out of a treatment, handling, or process”; or is “a function word to indicate means, agency, or intermediacy.”74 “Eminent domain” is “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking.”75 The logical reading of “through eminent

73 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.101(a) (emphasis added). The statute’s extension of the repurchase right to a landowner’s assigns addresses the State’s argument in its jurisdictional plea that JRJ lacks a justiciable interest.

74 Through, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 2021); Through, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/through (last visited June 5, 2026).

75 Eminent Domain, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

domain” is “by means of the State’s power to take private property for public use.”76 The State and the dissent posit that property is not acquired “through eminent domain” absent a final judgment adjudicating the property’s value.77 When analyzing statutes, we presume the Legislature chose its words with care and that “words not included were purposefully omitted.”78 The State’s interpretation essentially swaps the language the Legislature uses—“eminent domain”—for language it did not use—“condemnation judgment.”79 Eminent domain is not a process that the State “goes through.”80 Rather, eminent domain is the State’s power.

A settlement as to the property’s value does not alter the State’s acquisition of it “through eminent domain.” The deed in this case acknowledges the Landowners conveyed the property as a result of “ED proceedings.” The Landowners did not sell the property in an arm’s length transaction on the open market; rather, the Landowners surrendered their property in concession to the State’s coercive power.

76 See Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar, 500 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. 2016) (“If an undefined term has multiple common meanings, it is not necessarily ambiguous; rather, we will apply the definition most consistent with the context of the statutory scheme.”).

77 Post at 25–27 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

78 In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008).

79 See KMS Retail Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d at 183 (“We must enforce the statute ‘as written’ and ‘refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose.’” (quoting Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014) (plurality op.))).

80 Post at 26 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).

Once the State invokes its eminent domain power, landowners need not proceed to a judgment as to adequate compensation to preserve their repurchase right.81 The State’s forced transfer via a condemnation suit is an exercise of its power to obtain the property “through eminent domain.”82 B The State next contends that the right of repurchase does not apply when only a portion of the condemned property is no longer necessary for public use. Under Section 21.101(a), a landowner is “entitled to repurchase the property.”83 The phrase “the property” is used consistently throughout Subchapter E to refer to the “real property interest . . . acquired by an entity through eminent domain.”84 The State observes that Section 21.101(a) does not expressly permit the repurchase of a portion of the property. Neither, however, does the statute reference “the entire property.” A portion of property is accurately described as “property.”85 We decline to adopt an interpretation that limits the right in a manner the Legislature did not indicate.

81 See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 178 (Tex. 1997) (emphasizing that Texas law favors settlement).

82 We do not address whether other kinds of State action sufficiently invoke the State’s eminent domain power.

83 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.101(a).

84 See, e.g., id.; id. §§ 21.102, .1021, .103.

85 See Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “real property” as “[l]and and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land”).

This case illustrates the repurchase right in practice. The Department used ninety-seven percent of the condemned property for a highway project. By the Department’s admission, the remaining three percent of the property became surplus within ten years of its acquisition.86 Once the State identifies that condemned property is no longer required for public use—as it did in this case—the State must notify the landowner of its repurchase right.87 The State argues that it is difficult to calculate a price for a partial repurchase. We are not persuaded. The State offered to sell the surplus portion in this case at its current fair market value, indicating it is capable of valuation.88 Section 21.103(b) provides the rule for determining the repurchase price: “the price paid to the owner by the entity at the time the entity acquired the property through eminent domain.”89 The State can apply this statutory directive to calculate an offer price on portions of land it deems unnecessary for public use.

86 A repurchase right exists if “the property becomes unnecessary for the public use for which the property was acquired, or a substantially similar public use, before the 10th anniversary of the date of acquisition.” Tex. Prop.

Code § 21.101(a)(3).

87 Id. § 21.102(3).

88 The dissent refers to the State’s offer to sell the property at today’s fair market value. Post at 17–18 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The State’s offer aligns with the statute before the post-Kelo constitutional amendments rather than the current version, which requires it to be valued at the time the State takes the property. Compare Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1307, § 2, sec. 21.103(b), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 4739, 4740 (“[T]he governmental entity shall offer to sell the property interest to the person for the fair market value of the property at the time the public use was canceled.” (emphasis added)), with Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b).

89 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b).

IV Finally, we address the trial court’s jurisdiction. Chapter 21 provides that “[d]istrict courts and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction in eminent domain cases.”90 The State contends that a repurchase claim is not an “eminent domain case.”

Article V of the Texas Constitution vests judicial power in various courts, including this Court, district courts, county courts, and “such other courts as may be provided by law.”91 “County courts at law are among ‘such other courts as may be provided by law.’”92 The Legislature expressly granted such courts concurrent jurisdiction in eminent domain cases.93 In placing repurchase claims within Chapter 21, and in granting county courts at law jurisdiction over “eminent domain cases,” the Legislature made it plain: first, a repurchase claim is a species of an eminent domain case; and second, county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction to hear such a case. Chapter 21 does not parse jurisdiction depending on the types of claims found within it. Instead, Sections 21.003 and 21.101(c) grant power to the district courts, each stating that “[a] district court may determine all issues” in suits Chapter 21 governs.94 Section 21.001 then grants county courts at law

90 Id. § 21.001.

91 Tex. Const. art. V, § 1.

92 Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez, 669 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tex. 2023) (quoting Tex. Const. art. V, § 1).

93 Tex. Prop. Code § 21.001.

94 Id. §§ 21.003, .101(c).

commensurate power.95 Together, these provisions vest district courts and county courts at law with concurrent jurisdiction over eminent domain cases and to hear and decide “all issues” pertaining to them.96 * * * The State has no immunity from Chapter 21 claims to repurchase condemned property no longer necessary for public use. The State’s exercise of eminent domain power in a condemnation suit is property acquired “through eminent domain,” regardless of the parties’ later agreement upon the value of the property taken. Further, Chapter 21 permits the repurchase of a portion of condemned property no longer necessary for public use. Finally, district courts and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction to hear repurchase claims if other statutory requirements are met. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Jane N. Bland Justice OPINION DELIVERED: June 12, 2026

95See Brazos River Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Reese, 146 S.W.2d 519, 524–25 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1940, no writ) (noting that the county court was historically the exclusive tribunal for initiating and executing condemnation proceedings and listing Texas precedent).

96 Tex. Prop. Code §§ 21.003, .101(c). Harris County Civil Courts at Law have a jurisdictional limit requiring that the amount in controversy not exceed $325,000. Tex. Gov’t Code § 25.1032(c). The parties may address the applicability of this statute on remand.

Supreme Court of Texas ══════════ No. 24-0447 ══════════ The State of Texas and Kyle Madsen in his Official Capacity as Director of Right of Way, Petitioners, v. JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, Respondent ═══════════════════════════════════════ On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas ═══════════════════════════════════════ JUSTICE YOUNG, concurring.

As the Court’s opinion well and thoroughly explains, sovereign immunity poses no barrier to repurchase claims brought under Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code. The legislature’s choice to place the repurchase right in Chapter 21—our State’s comprehensive eminent- domain scheme, within which sovereign immunity does not apply—is how the legislature clearly and unambiguously waived immunity for suits like this one. The Court could stop there, but it confirms this result by invoking various inquiries suggested by our sovereign-immunity precedents. The Court’s application of those precedents is entirely accurate, and I join its opinion in full. I write separately only to express my view that assessing whether a statute waives sovereign immunity can and should be simpler than our precedents may suggest.

First, a postulate of our law is that the legislature “must use ‘clear and unambiguous language’ ” to waive sovereign immunity. Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tex. 2006)). This principle is not unique to Texas law; it inheres in the very nature of sovereign immunity, which is why the leading treatise on interpretation can frame it in general terms: “A statute does not waive sovereign immunity . . . unless that disposition is unequivocally clear.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 281 (2012).

Like any clear-statement rule, this one’s effect is to place a substantive thumb on the scale. Because clear-statement rules are powerful, they can be dangerous. They are meaningful only because they direct courts to results that courts might otherwise not reach. True, some cases—the easiest ones—will come out the same way with or without such a rule, but if no cases come out differently, the rule is illusory and achieves nothing. Because meaningful clear-statement rules drive judgments, mistakenly adopted clear-statement rules generate judicial error.

But it is also judicial error for courts not to adopt and apply clear- statement rules that are warranted. Essential clear-statement rules recognize and implement principles that are woven into the fabric of the law or that are built into the law’s very foundations. Refusing to find “accidental” or casual waivers of sovereign immunity is a good example.

We cannot avoid having clear-statement rules, but neither may courts impose such rules whenever they feel like it. Clear-statement rules are valid when they recognize default principles of such importance that not adopting them would override substantive and structural legal principles, typically of constitutional magnitude.

In those instances, clear-statement rules function much as the doctrine of constitutional avoidance does—they assure the legislature that courts will not deem it to have crossed important lines unless and until it does so with clarity. Clear-statement rules of that sort provide freedom for the legislature to address complicated issues without having to anticipate every conceivable lawyerly argument that—surprise!—the adopted statute actually adjusts important governmental interests without the legislature’s ever having considered them.

At the same time, every clear-statement rule “effectively impose[s] a ‘clarity tax’ on [the legislature] by demanding that it speak unequivocally if it wants to accomplish certain ends,” such as waiving sovereign immunity.

Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 508 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (quoting John Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 339, 403 (2010)). It is a “tax” in various ways, including forcing the legislature to consciously think about specified high-importance issues. One of the most important ways clear-statement rules “tax” legislative bodies is by preventing them from avoiding accountability for their choices or shifting responsibility to the judiciary. If sovereign immunity is waived, it is because the legislature clearly waived it—not because a court has read a waiver into a statute in a way that the legislature can later plausibly disclaim. And if it is not waived when the People expect it should be, the legislature cannot blame the courts rather than itself for that result. The same is true for any area subject to a clear- statement rule. See, e.g., S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 436 (Tex. 2022) (explaining that only a clear statement will allow us to find a statutory divestiture of subject-matter jurisdiction, so we “resist classifying a provision as jurisdictional absent clear legislative intent to that effect”).

Every clear-statement rule—every thumb on the scale—must therefore be justified by a structural or interpretive principle such that not adopting the rule would inject error into the law. Given the universal recognition of the essential consensus that sovereign immunity cannot be waived by “accident” or implication, finding a waiver without a clear statement by a legislative body would be intolerable. See, e.g., Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 331 (describing sovereign immunity as “ ‘an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations’ [that] required no justification” when this Court first acknowledged it (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857))); Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847) (recognizing the common-law rule that “no state can be sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent”); see generally Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 145–50 (2010) (tracing the history of the sovereign- immunity clear-statement rules in early American jurisprudence).

Sovereign immunity protects the public fisc by “leav[ing] to the Legislature the determination of when to allow tax resources to be shifted ‘away from their intended purposes toward defending lawsuits and paying judgments.’ ” Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. 2002) (plurality opinion)). And it preserves the separation of powers “by preventing the judiciary from interfering with the responsibilities of other branches.” Nettles v. GTECH Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 738 (Tex. 2020) (citing Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Tex. 2019)). We would disrespect the legislature’s authority if we casually found exercises of the solemn power to waive sovereign immunity.

Because the legislature knows that we will not impute such an intention to it without unmistakable clarity, our resulting decisions will be reliable and predictable to it and to the public in ways that they could not be without the clear-statement requirement.

Second, therefore, our task is to interpret a statute and—based upon its text, context, and statutory history—assess whether the legislature has evinced with the requisite clarity an intent to waive sovereign immunity.

That task is often quite simple. The legislature can be clear by expressly stating something like: “Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code § 101.025(a); see also post at 9, 15 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (collecting examples). Or it may waive sovereign immunity by making the State a necessary party to litigation, see post at 15 (citing Tex. Health & Safety Code § 571.0167(b)), which is a clear enough indication of its intent that the State be a party and thus a clear enough indication of its waiver of immunity.

An express waiver is therefore the easiest but not the only way that the legislature may satisfy its obligation to consent to suit or liability clearly if it wishes to consent at all. Requiring clarity is not the same as requiring formulaic or magic words.

Third, applying these principles within this preexisting framework makes clear that the legislature’s waiver of sovereign immunity here was manifest, albeit not “express,” from the start. That “sovereign immunity does not apply in eminent-domain proceedings” is well established. Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist. No. 3 v. Hidalgo County Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 669 S.W.3d 178, 188 (Tex. 2023). That is at least in part because “a governmental entity may be sued for inverse condemnation, by either a public or private landowner, for taking the owner’s property without paying just compensation.” Id. at 187; see also City of Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S.W.3d 174, 178 (Tex. 2022) (explaining that “our constitutions” provide the vehicle for inverse-condemnation claims). The repurchase right is a product of legislative grace, not constitutional mandate; nothing requires the legislature to waive sovereign immunity as to that right. But it did so nonetheless, and we can be sure of that because the legislature chose to place the repurchase right within our State’s comprehensive eminent-domain scheme, as to which everyone agrees sovereign immunity is inapplicable. That legislative choice makes the waiver here no less clear than if it had been express.

Fourth, I would find that conclusion to be enough. I would prefer to begin and end there without wading into “whether the statutory provisions would serve any purpose absent a waiver of immunity,” Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 360 (quoting Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 844 (Tex. 2009)), asking “whether a statute makes any sense if immunity is not waived,” Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tex. 2012) (quotation omitted), or diluting this strong-form canon by “not requir[ing] perfect clarity” if a “statute creating specific, restricted ‘rights’ . . . cannot reasonably be read to tacitly condition their exercise on a separate waiver of immunity,” id.

The Court addresses these considerations, see ante at 15–18, and I acknowledge that they have roots in our precedents, see Hillman, 579 S.W.3d 354 at 360 (enumerating five factors relevant to finding a sovereign- immunity waiver). I take the Court’s opinion to accurately reflect the precedents it invokes. I agree with the Court that the answers to these inquiries clearly favor the outcome reached today. But they are not necessary for the result today, and I do not read the Court’s opinion to deem them outcome-determinative. At best, these assessments are, as here, redundant and merely emphasize that a finding of waiver must be rooted in a statute’s text. Sometimes they may be affirmatively harmful, though, by asking us to assume the role of the legislature by second-guessing whether sovereign immunity makes sense, is necessary, or is helpful for effectuating a statutory scheme. The very nature of a clear-statement rule is inconsistent with allowing questions like that to be outcome-determinative.

No such problem arises today. But in a future case where those meandering questions and inquiries are more difficult to answer and turn out to matter to the result, I hope that the Court will discard them. I do not regard today’s opinion as further entrenching those inquiries, and I think its judgment is entirely justified based on the statute’s text and context. On that understanding, I gladly join the Court’s opinion.

Evan A. Young Justice

OPINION FILED: June 12, 2026