United States v. Specialist AARON M. RENTFROW
Opinion
UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
Before KERN, ALDYKIEWICZ, and MARTIN Appellate Military Judges UNITED STATES, Appellee v. Specialist AARON M. RENTFROW United States Army, Appellant ARMY 20110732 Headquarters, United States Army Alaska Mark A. Bridges, Military Judge
Colonel Randall J. Bagwell, Staff Judge Advocate (advice) Colonel Tyler J. Harder, Staff Judge Advocate (recommendation)
For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Imogene M. Jamison, JA; Major Richard E. Gorini, JA; Captain James P. Curtin, JA (on brief) For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, JA; Major Elisabeth A. Claus, JA; Captain Timothy C. Erickson, JA (on brief)
23 December 2013
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SUMMARY DISPOSITION
--------------------------------- Per Curiam:
A panel of officer and enlisted members sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, contrary to his plea, of premeditated murder, in violation of Article 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The panel sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for life with the eligibility of parole, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence, and credited appellant with two hundred fifty-seven days of confinement against the sentence to confinement.
Appellant’s case is now before this court for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. In a signed declaration attached to appellant’s brief in support of an assigned error, appellant alleges, inter alia, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in the post-trial phase of his court-martial when the trial defense counsel failed to request a waiver of automatic forfeitures. On a standard post-trial and appellate rights advisement form, appellant indicated that he “request[ed] [his] defense counsel to petition the convening authority to waive automatic forfeitures RENTFROW—ARMY 20110732 for the benefits of [his] dependents.” C ontrary to appellant’s expressed desires, the record fails to reveal that any such waiver request was ever presented to the convening authority. Furthermore, the record reflects that appellant has two dependent daughters and the appellate filings indicate that appellant never changed his post-trial and appellate rights selections. 1 Accordingly, after reviewing the record and the appellate filings, we will grant appellant relief specified in the paragraph below. 2 See United States v. Fordyce, 69 M.J. 501 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2010) (en banc); see also United States v. Axtell, 72 M.J. 662 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2013) (en banc).
CONCLUSION
The convening authority’s initial action, dated 1 June 2012, is set aside. The record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General for a new staff judge advocate recommendation and a new action by the same or different convening authority in accordance with Article 60(c)–(e), UCMJ. In addition, appellant will receive assistance from a new defense counsel.
FOR THE COURT:
ANTHONY O. POTTINGER Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.