United States v. JOHN T. LONG

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before FLOR, POND, and ARGUELLES'

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee v. Inmate JOHN T. LONG

United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20240334

Headquarters, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth

Scott A. Oravec, Military Judge Colonel Robert L. Manley III, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Colonel Frank E. Kostik, Jr., JA; Lieutenant Colonel Kyle C. Sprague, JA; Major Peter M. Ellis, JA; Captain Andrew W. Moore, JA (on brief). For Appellee: No brief filed.

19 March 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent. POND, Senior Judge:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, consistent with his pleas, of two specifications of assault upon a person in the execution of law enforcement duties, in violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928 [UCMJ]. Consistent with the plea agreement, the military judge sentenced appellant to confinement for 120 days.2 LONG - ARMY 20240334

Before this court, appellant argues the military judge erred in accepting his plea of guilty to the assault in Specification 1 of The Charge because the military judge failed to adequately resolve whether appellant was acting in self-defense. Appellant argues this unresolved inconsistency rendered his guilty plea improvident and requests this court set aside the conviction and sentence for Specification 1 of The Charge. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree and affirm the findings and sentence.3

BACKGROUND

Appellant is an inmate confined at the United States Disciplinary Barracks on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As an inmate, appellant was subject to a routine frisk after leaving the dining facility on 19 May 2023. During the frisk, a correctional specialist repeatedly ordered appellant to open his hands, an order that appellant disobeyed. Instead, appellant walked briskly towards the nearby latrine. The correctional specialist attempted to prevent appellant from entering the latrine by blockipg the door. Appellant, noticing this, used force to open the door, causing the door to strike the correctional specialist's foot. This conduct formed the basis for the assault in Specification 2 of The Charge, which is not at issue on appeal.

Appellant then walked into the latrine and the correctional specialist pressed the duress button, summoning the correctional officer on duty, a First Lieutenant, who quickly responded to the alarm. Appellant was standing at a toilet when the correctional officer entered the latrine and approached appellant from behind. The correctional officer attempted to restrain appellant's hands, to which appellant replied, "my d*** is out!" In response, the correctional officer placed one hand on appellant's neck and right shoulder area. Appellant then spun around, striking the correctional officer on the face with his arm, concussing the correctional officer. The appellant then walked out of the latrine and stated, "I will walk myself to the SHU [special housing unit]." This conduct formed the basis for the assault in Specification 1 of The Charge, which appellant now challenges on appeal, arguing his plea of guilty was improvident.