United States v. Staff Sergeant LEWIS T. LOPEZ

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before FLOR, MORRIS, and STEELE

Appellant Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee v. Staff Sergeant LEWIS T. LOPEZ United States Army, Appellant ARMY 20240141

Headquarters, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk Scott Z. Hughes, Stephan E. Nolten, and Javier E. Rivera-Rosario, Military Judges

Colonel Leslie A. Rowley, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Major Andrew M. Hopkins, JA; Phillip D. Cave, Esquire (on brief). For Appellee: Colonel Richard E. Gorini, JA; Major Stephen L. Harmel, JA; Captain Andrew T. Bobowski, JA (on brief).

25 September 2026 SUMMARY DISPOSITION

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent. STEELE, Judge:

An officer panel convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of twenty-two specifications of sexual abuse of a child, 1 fourteen specifications of knowingly and wrongfully receiving and viewing child pornography, and one specification of knowingly and wrongfully viewing child pornography, in violation of Articles 120b and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 920b2 and 934 (2019) [UCMJ]. The officer panel sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge, thirty­ five years of confinement, total forfeitures, and reduction to the grade of E-1. LOPEZ -AR MY 20240141

On appeal before this court, appellant raises four assignments of error, two of which merit discussion but no relief. Specifically, appellant argues that: (1) the military judge abused his discretion in allowing the prosecution to present evidence under Military Rule of Evidence [ MRE] 404(b); and (2) the sentence of thirty-five years of confinement was inappropriately severe. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and affirm.3

BACKGROUND

In March 2018, appellant began communicating with a thirteen-year-old autistic girl ( Ms. ) he met while playing the online video game Animal Crossing. Holding himself out to be a seventeen-year-old boy named Wesley and using the screen name "Loopy," appellant engaged in an online romantic relationship with Ms.

At the time of the charged misconduct, appellant was in his forties. Appellant's online relationship with Ms. formed the basis for thirty-six of the thirty-seven offenses for which appellant was convicted. Over the course of their three-and-a-half year relationship, appellant sent numerous lewd messages to Ms. , received intimate images from her, engaged in "phone sex" with her on multiple occasions, sent her pictures of his erect penis, and sent her gift cards to buy sex toys. This conduct occurred continuously throughout the relationship until Ms. discovered appellant's identity and reported him to law enforcement.

Army Criminal Investigation Division searched appellant's home for evidence related to Ms. allegations. Among the evidence collected were two password­ protected laptops, with accounts linked to appellant's name, as well as clown memorabilia. A digital forensic examination (DFE) of the laptops discovered evidence of the search terms used and multiple uniform resource locator (URL) searches for "child erotica," multiple images of suspected Child Sexual Abuse Material, as well as thousands of images and multiple videos categorized as "age difficult" or "child erotica" contained in the unallocated space on both laptops.

Prior to trial, the government provided notice under MRE 404(b) that they intended to use evidence that appellant "sought out and viewed thousands of images and several videos of child porn/age difficult/child erotica/computer generated imagery/animation of child exploitation ...to prove [appellant's] motivation and intent" and "sexual interest in children," both generally and specifically as related to Ms. 3We have given full and fair consideration to the matters personally raised by appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J.431 (C.M.A. 1982), and determine they merit neither discussion nor relief.

LOPEZ -ARMY 20240141

The defense filed a motion to exclude the proffered evidence. The military judge subsequently issued a ruling granting in part the government's request to use the 404(b) evidence as proof of appellant's motive and intent to commit the charged misconduct.

At trial, appellant was convicted as discussed supra. After findings, the military judge engaged in a colloquy with appellant and explained his right to elect sentencing by the military judge or the members. Appellant elected sentencing by the members. At sentencing, appellant faced a maximum punishment including up to 480 years of confinement. Neither party offered additional evidence, other than the defense's very limited sentencing case that only included the admission of appellant's fifty-two page "Good Soldier Book," fourteen pages of appellant's mental health records, and appellant's unsworn statement, which comprised approximately one page of the record of trial and discussed his military career and family history. Appellant did not take accountability for the misconduct for which he was found guilty, nor did he offer an apology to Ms. .

LAW AND DISCUSSION

A. Whether the Military Judge Abused his Discretion Allowing the Prosecution to

Present Evidence under MRE 404(b)

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a military judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence under this rule for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Greene-Watson, 85 M.J. 340, 345 (C.A.A.F. 2025). The military judge abuses their discretion if: (1) their findings of fact are not supported by the evidence of record, (2) they use incorrect legal principles, or (3) their application of the correct legal principles to the fact is clearly unreasonable. Id. As our superior court has consistently held, "[T]he abuse of discretion standard of review recognizes that a judge has a wide range of choices and will not be reversed so long as the decision remains within that range." United States v. Wilson, 84 M.J. 383, 390-91 (C.A.A.F. 2024) (citing United States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 187 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).

We assess a military judge's decision to admit evidence under MRE 404(b) using the three-part test established in United States v. Reynolds, 29 M.J. 105 (C.M.A. 1989). Specifically, the Reynolds test asks: (1) does the evidence reasonably support a finding that appellant committed a specific act; (2) does evidence of this act make a fact of consequence more or less probable; and (3) is the probative value of the evidence of this act substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice? Id. at 109. "The second prong mirrors the relevance concerns reflected under Mil. R. Evid. 401 and Mil. R. Evid. 402, while the third prong reflects the concerns ordinarily handled under Mil. R. Evid. 403." United States v. Yammine, 69 M.J. 70, 77 (C.A.A.F. 2010). If the LOPEZ - ARMY 20240141 admitted evidence fails to meet any of the three prongs set forth in Reynolds, the military judge will have erred. Reynolds, 29 M.J. at 109.

2. Discussion

We find that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting the government to present evidence of appellant's uncharged misconduct under MRE 404(b). Of note, the military judge issued an extensive twelve-page ruling, analyzing the relevant factors along with the elements of the charged misconduct in this case and is entitled to a high degree of deference. See Wilson, 84 M.J. at 391; see also United States v. St. Jean, 83 M.J. 109, 113-14 (C.A.A.F. 2023).

The standard to meet the first prong of the Reynolds test is low; furthermore, as the military judge found, and appellant adopts, defense at trial did not contest that the government had met their burden under this factor. As such, the first Reynolds factor weighs in favor of the government.

Under the second prong, we examine the two bases for admission on which the military judge instructed the panel: motive and intent. See United States v. Wilson, 84 M.J. at 391. We find that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that the evidence tended to show appellant intended to possess the charged images of child pornography. The military judge clearly articulated that appellant's prior and concurrent possession of other child pornography "in a similar manner [to the charged misconduct]" made it more likely that the charged possession was both "knowing and wrongful." Though the military judge did not fully articulate a separate basis in his ruling for motive, "an absence on the record of a military judge's reasoning does not-by itself provide a basis for finding error. Unless there are contrary indications, we must assume a military judge properly considered an accused's claim consistent with the law." St. Jean, 83 M.J. at 113 (citing United States v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 2012)).

Under the third prong, we assess whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We conclude that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in finding it did not. Evaluating motive, in this case, we note part of appellant's defense at trial was that he believed Ms. to be older than she claimed and that they were engaging in "role playing" at the time that he committed the charged offenses. Thus, based on the facts of this case, it was not an abuse of discretion for the miliary judge to conclude that the uncharged evidence of child erotica was highly probative, "given the nature of the images and videos." See Wilson, 84 M.J. 383 at 395. Examining intent, we again find no abuse of discretion under the third prong of Reynolds. As our superior court has noted, an appellant may place his intent at issue where, as here, he pleads not guilty. Id. at 394. Appellant's testimony at trial clearly called into question his LOPEZ -ARMY 20240141 intent to commit the charged misconduct and the military judge did not err in finding that the evidence's probative value as to intent was high.4

We also do not find error in the military judge's weighing of the prejudicial effect of such evidence and note that he took appropriate steps to reduce such effect by issuing a limiting instruction at trial and by also limiting the government's methods of presenting the MRE 404(b) evidence. 5

B. Whether a Sentence to Thirty-Five Years Confinement is Inappropriately Severe

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law We review the appropriateness of a sentence under Article 66(d), UCMJ, de novo. United States v. McAlhaney, 83 M.J. 164, 166 (C.A.A.F. 2023). When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, this court "may affirm only such findings of guilty and a sentence, or such part or amount of a sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be