Russell Milling Co. v. Commissioner
Opinion of the Court
The taxpayer’s first contention is that it should be allowed to deduct, as accrued at December 31, 1916, one-half of the income and excess-profits taxes imposed by the ftevenue Act of 1917 for the portion of its fiscal year 1917 within the calendar year 1917. The theory upon which it bases this claim is that as it kept its accounts upon an accrual basis, and the 1916 Act permitted a deduction for all taxes for the calendar year 1916 or a fiscal year following thereafter, and as it was subjected to excess-profits taxes under the Act of 1917 upon the whole net income for the fiscal year, reduced to as many twelfths as there were months in its fiscal year 1917 falling within the calendar year 1917, and for income tax upon the same proportion after reducing the income by the excess-profits tax com
The Commissioner was clearly right in refusing to allow as a deduction any portion of the income and excess-profits taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1917. Section 1207 of that Act amended paragraph 4 of subdivision (a) of section 12 of the Revenue Act of 1916 so as to except from deduction income and excess-profits taxes imposed by authority of the United States for the year 1917. Nor could the taxpaper accrue as at December 31, 1916, any part of such taxes, for the reason that no part of the tax was then due. The theory that income taxes accrue proportionately with the income occasioning the income tax, even if it were sound, would not warrant the deduction claimed.
The next point presented by the taxpayer is his claimed right to deduct in the fiscal year 19Í7 State, county, and municipal taxes paid in December, 1916, for the year 1916, and one-half the taxes of the same character for the year 1917, accrued at June 30, 1917.
Section 200 of the General Statutes of Kansas, 1914 edition, provides that all taxes shall be due on the 1st day of November in each year. The taxes are payable on or before December 20, or at the option of the taxpayer in two installments — one on or before December 20 and the other on or before June 20 of the following year. The State, etc., taxes for the year 1916 were actually paid in full in December, 1916. The Commissioner allowed as a deduction for the fiscal year 1917 one-half the 1916 taxes paid in full in December, 1916, and in taxpayer’s said fiscal year and permitted it to accrue State, etc., taxes for the year 1917 to June 30, 1917, but denied the right to deduct the other half of the 1916 taxes. By this procedure the taxpayer has failed to obtain as a deduction one-half the taxes paid for the year 1916 within its fiscal year 1917. We think the Commissioner erred twice in this decision— first, in refusing to allow as a deduction for the taxpayer’s fiscal year 1917 the entire amount of taxes paid in December, 1916, for that year, and second, in permitting the taxpayer to accrue as at June 30, 1917, one-half the taxes which later became due for the year 1917. It is not necessary to enter into a discussion of when taxes are accrued further than to say that they can not be accrued until they become due, and as within the taxpayer’s jurisdiction they are not due until November 1, no part is accrued prior to that time. We are of opinion that the entire 1916 State, county, and municipal taxes paid in December, 1916, should be allowed as a deduction in computing taxpayer’s net income for its fiscal year ended June 30, 1917, and that no part of the 1917 State, etc., taxes is properly accruable or deductible in that fiscal year.
The taxpayer contends that the Commissioner erred in reducing its invested capital by the sum of $3,772.89 by reason of additional de
In view of the fact that there was a difference of only $3,772.89 over a 10-year period between the taxpayer and the agent, it is only fair to assume that the taxpayer was more familiar with the actual condition of its business and more competent to judge of the amount of the depreciation of its assets than the revenue agent who arrived at the amount by applying a rule of theoretical depreciation; further, no allowance was made for replacements in the prior years, and in the circumstances we are not disposed to disturb the depreciation set up by the taxpayer. Before taking such action evidence must be submitted showing clearly that the depreciation actually sustained had not been written off during the period in question.
The last claim of taxpayer relates to a reduction of invested capital for the fiscal year 1918 by $659.80 due to a deduction of interest paid in the fiscal year 1917 in excess of the limitation for interest bearing indebtedness permitted by law- Through error this amount was deducted in computing invested capital for the year 1918. As the Commissioner has admitted error as to this item, the amount will be restored to invested capital for the fiscal year 1918.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.