Devincenzi v. Commissioner
Opinion of the Court
The only question for our consideration is whether or not petitioner effectively transferred to his wife one-half of his interest in the grading contracting business so that the profits of such
Under the law of the State of California, a husband and wife may enter into any engagements with each other respecting property which each might enter into if unmarried. They may thus alter their legal relations as to property and thereby change the character of their property from community to separate property. Mutual consent is a sufficient consideration for the agreement. Sections 158, 159, 160, Civil Code of California; Wren v. Wren, 100 Cal. 276; 34 Pac. 775; Moore v. Crandall, 205 Fed. 689; Guy C. Earl, 10 B. T. A. 723. Under the law of California, however, it is a presumption that all property acquired after marriage by either spouse is community property, except that acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent, with the rents, issues and profits thereof, and this presumption can be overcome only by evidence of a clear, certain and convincing character establishing the contrary. In re Boody's Estate, 113 Cal. 682, 45 Pac. 858; In re Pepper's Estate, 158 Cal. 619, 112 Pac. 62; Stafford v. Martinoni, 192 Cal. 724; 221 Pac. 919;In re Jolly's Estate, 238 Pac. 353; J. B. Lilly, 4 B. T. A. 1149.
The document dated December 22, 1923, set forth in the statement of facts purports to transfer to petitioner’s wife a one-half interest in his property and in the revenue derived or to be derived therefrom. It was signed by the petitioner in the presence of his wife and others. It does not appear, however, that it was ever delivered to petitioner’s wife or was read by or to her. It was deposited in a safe-deposit box to which the petitioner as well as his wife and others had access. The wife, therefore, had no separate control over it. The petitioner took the document from the safe-deposit box for use at the hearing of this proceeding. At the date the document was signed the petitioner alone owned and operated the grading contracting business. On or about April 1, 1924, he sold a two-thirds interest in that business to two individuals and the business was thereafter carried on as a partnership. It does not appear that the petitioner’s wife joined him in the sale of the said two-thirds interest, was consulted in regard to it, or that the petitioner acted as her agent in respect thereto. On the contrary, the evidence is to the effect that the petitioner alone sold it.
It follows that on or about April 1, 1924, the petitioner was managing the grading business and disposing of an interest in it as if it were community property and his wife was not exercising any
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the evidence is not of a character clearly, certainly and convincingly establishing the contrary of the presumption that the income in question was community property. Hence, the principles stated in United States v. Robbins, 269 U. S. 315, are applicable. The petitioner had control and dominion of the whole of the income and it is therefore taxable to him.
Decision will be entered for the respondent.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.