Rust-Owen Lumber Co. v. Commissioner
Opinion of the Court
OPINION.
The issue in these proceedings, which were consolidated for hearing, relates to the amount of allowance for depletion of timber to be deducted from petitioner’s income for each of the years 1927, 1928, and 1929. In its returns petitioner claimed allowances computed upon its cuttings in those years at rates of $14 per thousand feet for pine and $4 for hardwood and hemlock. Although he allowed those rates in prior years, respondent reduced them to $7.5976 for pine and $2,042 for hardwood and hemlock in computing the depletion allowances for 1927 and 1928, and reduced them further to $6 for pine and $1.1375 for hemlock and hardwood in his computations for 1929. As a result of the application of the reduced unit rates, respondent disallowed, of the depletion allowances claimed by petitioner in its returns, $102,519.25 for 1927, $65,499.04 for 1928, and $104,433.35 for 1929. His denial of those claimed deductions from income gives rise to deficiencies of $16,172.71, $8,715.62, and $11,855.40, respectively, for these three years now before us. Petitioner objects to the reductions made in unit rates, and contends that the valuation of its reserves as of March 1, 1913, should be increased and the depletion allowances for its cuttings continued at the rates first fixed.
There is no dispute concerning the facts, and we adopt as our findings the written stipulation submitted and the statements agreed to upon the record at trial. Their repetition here is unnecessary to an understanding of the issue.
Prior to 1913 petitioner (a corporation having its principal office at Drummond, Wisconsin) owned in fee certain timber lands in Bayfield County, Wisconsin. During 1908 and 1909 these lands were cruised, and the estimates of reserves so obtained entered on the company’s records, and later adjusted for cuttings and purchases, to reflect the reserves as of March 1, 1913.
In February 1921, for the purpose of securing a depletion allowance, petitioner filed with respondent a questionnaire on the form required, setting forth detailed information respecting its timber and adjusting the first estimate of its reserves as of March 1, 1913,
By the end of 1926 it was apparent that both petitioner and respondent had underestimated the timber reserves as of March 1, 1913; that, using the unit rates previously allowed, the valuation base would be extinguished before the timber was exhausted. Accordingly, in computing the allowance for 1927 and 1928, respondent made a new estimate of uncut reserves and reduced the unit rate to figures (mentioned above) which, he calculated, would effect a proper extinguishment of the base value. However, when respondent considered petitioner’s return for 1929, he determined that the proper extinguishment of the base value. However, when respondent considered petitioner’s return for 1929, he determined that the unit rates were still too high, and again reduced them, as above stated.
The cutting of petitioner’s timber was completed during 1930; consequently, the actual figures as to the reserves are now available. Making adjustments for sales and purchases of timber, the reserves as of March 1, 1913, (1) according to the first estimates, based on cruises and set up on petitioner’s books, (2) according to the determination made by respondent in 1921, and (3) according to the records of cut, are as follows:
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Under the applicable statutes, and regulations promulgated thereunder,
With petitioner’s view we cannot agree. In determining the allowance for depletion to which petitioner may be entitled for any year, the primary inquiry concerns the depletable, basic value of the reserves, in this case, the value of the timber as of March 1, 1913. That value is the amount which, under the statute, shall be returned to petitioner through a ratable allowance as the property is depleted by cutting the timber. The unit rate, of course, depends upon the quantity of units contained in the reserve. If it appears that a mistake was made in estimating the number of units, with the result that the unit rate is erroneous, the unit rate should be adjusted or revised so that upon exhaustion of the reserves the depletable value will be extinguished. That is precisely what respondent has done here, and we see no error in his action.
Whether respondent made his determination of basic value by the method petitioner urges should now be used in making a revaluation, we do not know, and we regard the question as immaterial. That is not a correct method, for the basic value must be determined upon facts known, or reasonably to be anticipated, at the basic date. J. J. White Lumber Co., 24 B.T.A. 274.
Petitioner has not shown us that respondent’s determination of value is based upon gross error “ as to any facts determinable on the date of valuation.” As to the value of the timber reserves, whether by unit or in toto, no evidence has been presented. As to
Judgment will he entered for the resyondent.
Sec. 204 (b) ; see. 234 (a) (8), 1926 Act; see. 114 (b) ; see. 23 (1), (m), 1928 Act; art. 230, Regulations 69; art. 250, Regulations 74.
As to revision of unit rates see: Rayville Coal Co., 20 B.T.A. 525 ; Sterling Coal Co., 8 B.T.A. 549 ; Kehota Mining Co. v. Lewellyn, 28 Fed. (2d) 995; affd., 30 Fed. (2d) 17; certiorari denied.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.