Carson Estate Co. v. Commissioner
Cases that cite this one
2 later published cases cite this decision.
- Woolley v. Commissioner (United States Board of Tax Appeals 1939)
- Schoellkopf v. Commissioner (United States Board of Tax Appeals 1935)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
OPINION.
These consolidated proceedings seek redetermination of income tax deficiencies in the amounts of $2,086,02 for the year 1926, $1,780.08 for the year 1927, and $1,815.31 for the year 1928. The total deficiencies for 1926 and 1927 are not in controversy.
The facts are stipulated. A rather full resume of them follows:
Petitioner is a California corporation It acquired certain certificates of ownership from Municipal Bond Co., hereinafter referred to as the corporation.
The form of ownership certificate issued by the corporation provides that the corporation “ does hereby sell and transfer to the purchaser of this certificate all of its rights, title and interest in Municipal Improvement Bonds issued under the special assessment laws of
The trust agreement sets out that the corporation desires to sell municipal improvement bonds which it owns or may acquire; that such bonds vary in amounts and dates of maturity; that the corporation, instead of selling specific bonds, desires to sell to the purchaser an interest in such bonds in even sums such as $100 or mul
The petitioner received “ interest income ” pursuant to and in accordance with the terms and provisions of the above mentioned ownership certificates at the rate of 6 percent per annum, payable semiannually as follows;
Calendar year 1926_$9, 624. 01
Calendar year 1927 — __ 10, 327. 60
Calendar year 1928- 12,127. 51
During the taxable years here in controversy none of the “ interest income ” here involved flowed to petitioner by reason of any of the Avarranties or coi^enants of Municipal Bond Co. or from bonds bearing an interest rate of less than 7 percent.
All of the bonds which were deposited in the trust provided for in the above trust agreement were municipal improvement bonds.
In its returns filed for the calendar years 1926, 1927, and 1928, petitioner treated the above amounts as interest received from municipal bonds and reported it as tax exempt.
Respondent restored the amounts in controversy to taxable income on the ground that such amounts constituted interest on obligations of the Municipal Bond Co. and not interest on tax exempt securities.
Thus, the only issue is whether the petitioner’s acquisition of the certificates of ownership constituted a sale to it by the corporation of the beneficial ownership in municipal bonds, the interest on which is admittedly exempt from income tax, or was a loan by petitioner to the corporation, and the “ interest income ” thus received by petitioner as interest on the obligation of the corporation, and subject to that tax. This question is answered by the intention of the parties to the transaction evidenced by the “ certificates of ownership ” and the “ trust agreement ” made part thereof, construed as a whole (Heryford, v. Davis, 102 U. S. 225), together with the actual treatment of the transaction by the parties thereto. First National Bank in Wichita v. Commissioner, 57 Fed. (2d) 7, affirming 19 B. T. A. 744; certiorari denied, 287 U. S. 636; Bank of California, National Association, 30 B. T. A. 556. Since it is stipulated that the disputed “ interest income ” was received in accordance with the terms of the certificates of ownership, which incorporated the “ trust agreement ” therein, we are concerned here only with the proper construction of those instruments. Cf. Frank Turner, 28 B. T. A. 91.
Undoubtedly the. “ certificate of ownership” on its face purports to “ sell and transfer to the purchaser of this certificate all of its rights, title and interest in the Municipal Improvement Bonds ”, deposited with the trustee under the “ trust agreement ” made a part thereof. That agreement contains all the essentials of a valid irrevocable declaration of trust. In unmistakable terms, it states that “ It is the intention of the parties hereto that the delivery to the purchaser thereof of a certified certificate, vests in the holder of such certificate ownership of an amount in unpaid face value, bonds equal to the par value of the certificate ”, subject to the conditions of the agreement.
Respondent argues that the qualifications attached to this purported transfer of beneficial ownership, in the express and implied conditions of these instruments, are inconsistent with the transfer of any interest in the municipal bonds by the corporation to petitioner, and characterize the transaction as a loan from petitioner to the corporation, secured by a lien on escrowed guaranteed municipal bonds.
The corporation’s repurchase agreement did not invalidate the trust by making incomplete the otherwise completed transfer, nor did it divest the ownership then conveyed. Lyons v. Snider, 136 Minn. 252; 161 N. W. 532; Paulson v. Weeks, 80 Or. 468; 157 Pac. 590. Although the fact that the repurchase price" was par value, which was the basis upon which petitioner purchased, has been considered as some, though not compelling, indication of a loan (cf. First National Bank in Wichita v. Commissioner, supra, and Bank of California, National Association, supra, it has been held to evidence the transfer of an entire interest and thus imply sale. Chase & Baker Co. v. National Trust & Credit Co. (Dist. Ct., N. Dist. Ill.), 215 Fed. 633.
The warranty of the deposited bonds and the interest payable thereon, with the auxiliary 10 percent excess deposit of bonds, is at least equally consistent with an intended separate contract from that of sale or transfer in trust, as it is with a loan secured by guaranteed collateral. Chase & Baker Co. v. National Trust & Credit Co., supra.
The corporation’s right to any premiums or penalties on the deposited bonds, said to be evidential of its failure to transfer beneficial ownership therein, loses its value in the presence of petitioner’s right upon its demand to specific bonds, and thus to secure such profit. This right of petitioner, while possible of construction as an option if the transaction under consideration were a loan, is just as consistent with a condition terminating the trust as to petitioner if the transaction was a sale of a beneficial interest. Cary v. Slead, 220 Ill. 508; 77 N. E. 234; Tuck v. Knapp, 85 N. Y. S. 1001; 42 Misc. Rep. 140; In re Ames, 22 R. I. 54; 46 Atl. 47. Nor is that consistency lost by the mandatory selection by the trustee of bonds to satisfy such demand as the class for which the selection is to be made, is certain. In re Dewey's Estate, 45 Utah, 98; 143 Pac. 124.
The argument that if a valid trust was created it was “ in the avails of the bonds ” and not the bonds themselves, is of little, if any weight, generally, in itself, and fails here particularly because upon termination of the trust as to -petitioner it had the right to demand specific bonds. This right at maturity, as well as its alternative, the right to the “ avails of the bonds ” at the full par value of the certificate of ownership, contradicts the deposit of bonds as a mere escrow transfer to secure a primary obligation of the corporation. Cf. Frank Turner, supra; Frank P. Welch, 12 B. T. A. 800.
In short, the “ certificate of ownership ” and “ trust agreement ” disclose nothing inconsistent with the stated intention of creating an irrevocable trust in municipal bonds and selling the beneficial ownership therein. Neither document contains any primary obligation of the corporation to petitioner, certificate holder. The only obligation of the corporation was its secondary liability on its covenant of warranty, from which none of the questioned amounts flowed. The necessary complement of respondent’s present position would permit the pending disputed exemption to the corporation — certainly a difficult result to sustain.
Then again, and of emphatic if not compelling persuasion here, we have the uncontradicted background and purpose of the transaction.
This record contains no history or suggestion branding the corporation as at any time a borrower and petitioner as a lender. It indicates only that they were seller and purchaser. Cf. First National Bank in Wichita v. Commissioner, supra; Bank of California, National Association, supra; Frank Turner, supra.
The business of the corporation was the sale of these municipal bonds of odd face values and maturities. The present uncontradicted purpose of increasing the marketability of such bonds by eliminating these unfavorable features and the means chosen to effect it, are both credible and legal. Cf. Reginald Brooks, supra.
We conclude that the corporation created a valid irrevocable trust in municipal bonds, the interest on which, admittedly exempt from income tax, constituted its only income; that petitioner was a bene
Reviewed by the Board.
Decision will he entered wader Rule 50.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.