In re Tax Exemption of Sisters of Mercy
Opinion of the Court
It appears from the application and the evidence in this case that this property was acquired by the applicant by pur
From the application and the evidence it appears that the Sisters of Mercy of Fremont, Ohio, a catholic religious order, is a corporation not for profit under the laws of Ohio, and that it is incorporated and organized for the purpose of hospital and educational works; and the order and its members are actively engaged in carrying on such activities. In this connection it appears that the applicant operates and maintains St. Rita’s Hospital at Lima, Ohio, Mercy Hospital at Tiffin, Ohio, and Mercy Hospital at Toledo, Ohio, which last named hospital property as we are advised, is located almost directly across the street from the property here in question. As to this it further appears, however, that no part of the property covered by this application ior tax exemption is occupied or otherwise used by any of the student or graduate nurses who are employed at Mercy Hospital at Toledo or in any of the other hospitals owned or operated by the applicant. The buildings on and constituting a part of the above described property are used in part and to some extent in the conduct of a school thereon under the name of Regina Maria Art Studio in which class and individual instruction is given in sculpture and in painting and possibly in other subjects coming within the more definite and restricted meaning of the term art. Instruction in the art school is given by one of the sisters of the order who has charge of this work, who conducts her classes and gives her instructions in that part of the property here in question designated as the barn, which is on the rear end of the parcel of land here in question. Apparently, however, the major activity carried on in this building known as the barn is that involved in the printing or multigraphing of the many and various forms used by the applicant in the operation of the hospitals above named.
It further appears from the evidence that the principal use of the large building fronting on Woodruff Avenue is as a place of residence for twenty or more sisters, members of the order, who are employed as teachers at St. Catherine’s Parochial School and at Central Catholic High School which are located at several and different points in the City of Toledo about a mile and a half or two miles from the property here under consideration. In addition to serving as a place of residence for the sisters of the order engaged in teaching at the
The application for the exemption of the above described property from taxation is on the stated grounds (1) that this property is that of a public college or academy or a public institution of learning not used with a view to profit within the purview of §5349 GC, and (2) that the property in question is that of an institution used exclusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of §5353 GC. In this connection it may be observed in the consideration of the questions here presented that although the educational facilities in art, music and other subjects afforded by the applicant in the use of this property are open to the public without distinction as to race or breed presumably on the payment by students of reasonable fees for the instruction given, the houses or buildings in which this instruction is imparted cannot,, as is suggested by counsel, be characterized as “public school houses” within the purview of §5349 GC, and this for the reason that this term “public school houses” as used in §5349 and in predecessor sections of the statutes of this state, means such school houses “as belong to the public, and are designed for schools established and conducted under public authority”. Gerke, etc. v Purcell, 25 Oh St 229. Neither can we bring ourselves to the view .under the evidence in this case that the school conducted by the applicant on the premises is a public “college”, “academy” or “institution of learning” within the meaning of these terms as they are used in §5349 GC. Moreover, even if the eduqational activities carried on by the applicant on these premises could be properly characterized as those of a public college, academy or institution of learning within the meaning of this section, the property here in question would not on this ground be entitled to exemption from taxation unless the property devoted to the applicant’s educational activities is used exclusively for charitable purposes under the provisions of §5353 GC. As to this, the Supreme Court of this state in the case of the Ursuline Academy of Cleveland v Board of Tax Appeals, 141 Oh St 563, held:
On the consideration of the questions here presented as the same are limited by the decision of the Suprme Court of this state in the case just noted, the Board does not doubt that the applicant, the Sisters of Mercy of Fremont, Ohio, is, as to its purposes and general organization, a charitable institution within the purview of constitutional and statutory provisions applicable in the consideration and determination of this ease. As to this it is to be noted, however, that although the applicant is an institution devoted generally to charitable purposes, the question for consideration in a case of this kind, as is pointed out by the Supreme Court in the cases of ’Wehrle Foundation v Evatt, 141 Oh St 467, Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Workers Society v Evatt, 140 Oh St 185, and Ursuline Academy of Cleveland v Board of Tax Appeals, supra, is as to the use made of the property as to which the exemption from taxation is sought. In this connection the Supreme Court in the case of Wehrle Foundation v Evatt, supra, held:
“While Sec. 2 of Art XII of the Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to exempt institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes, such provision is not self-executing. The extent to which the General Assembly has acted under such authorization is to exempt property belonging to an institution provided such property is used exclusively for charitable purposes.”
Entertaining, as we do, this view as to the distinctly charitable character of the applicant as an institution, 'and keeping in mind the limitations imposed upon us by the above noted decisions of the Supreme Court of this state, we have been diligent in the consideration of the facts presented by the record in this.case in order to determine whether the premises here in question or any part thereof can be exempted from taxation consistent with the fair intendment of the provisions of §5353 GC. In the consideration of this question and having in mind the educational activities of the applicant in and upon these premises, it is recognized that a school operated by a corporation not for profit incorporated and organized for the purpose, may be so. conducted that the property used in carrying on the activities of the school may be
“The maintenance of a school for the benefit of the public is a charity. Gerke, Treas., v Purcell, supra. If the school is essentially a private institution, no such benefit is conferred. But where a school is operated to give service to the public generally, and is available to some without charge, the fact that tuition in a substantial amount is paid by others does not destroy the charitable character, so long as it extends charitable benefits to members of the public at large to an extent consistent with the. continued operation of the school. It is upon this recognition' of its obligation that its charitable character is determined.”
. However, wholly aside from the admitted fact that this property is not used exclusively by the applicant in the conduct of its school activities therein, the evidence in this case does not, in our opinion, bring this case within the decision of the Supreme Court in the case just noted. In other words, we do not feel that this decision of the Supreme Court can be extended to cover the case here presented with respect to. the educational activities carried on by the applicant in either of the buildings upon these premises without reading into the record facts not presented by the evidence as to the manner in which applicant’s educational activities are carried on.
Further in consideration of the questions presented in this casé, we are impressed with the fact that the dominant use of the building at the rear of these premises known as the barn is for the printing or multigraphing of the forms used by'Mercy Hospital of Toledo owned and operated by the applicant on adjacent property across the street from this property. Assuming, as we do, that Mercy Hospital of Toledo is a charitable institution, we are permitted to say under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Aultman Hospital Association v Evatt, 140 Oh St 114, that this printing or multigraphing done by the applicant in this building is likewise a charitable' use, and that this part of the premises in question is property used for a charitable purpose and is entitled to exemption from taxation.
On consideration of this application for tax exemption
It is, therefore, by the Board of Tax Appeals considered and ordered that the building above referred to as the barn, together with the land upon which said building is situated and a sufficient amount of additional land out of the premises to constitute a reasonable curtilage for this building, be and the same hereby is, exempted from taxation for the tax year 1945.
It is by the Board of Tax Appeals further considered and ordered that as to the residence building and the balance of the premises described in the application for tax exemption, said application be, and the same hereby is, denied.
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.