This is a consolidated appeal from the order of the district court, 329 F.Supp. 1394, authorizing the trustees of the Boston and Maine Corporation (B & M) to proceed with abandonment of the railroad line between Lincoln and Concord, New Hampshire. The B & M is a bankrupt railroad in reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 205). Pursuant to § 77(o), the trustees petitioned the district court for authorization to abandon the line, alleging that abandonment would benefit the railroad’s estate and not adversely affect the public interest. Protesting the abandonment were the State of New Hampshire, the Town of Lincoln, and several businesses operating along the line. This appeal was taken by the State and two of the protesting companies, the Franconia Paper Corporation (FPC) and the Prescott Lumber Company (PLC). The Franconia Manufacturing Corporation (FMC), which succeeded to the interests of FPC, has intervened as an appellant.

The line between Lincoln and Concord is approximately 71.8 miles in length1 and is used solely for freight. Although traffic on the line has decreased over the past decade, the line was quite profitable until August 1970.2 The cause of the financial turnabout was the closing of FPC, which had operated a paper mill in Lincoln. The mill was the line’s largest single source of revenue,3 over half of this being generated by the mill’s use of coal for fuel.4 On July 24, 1970, the mill ceased operations and FPC filed a Chapter XI proceeding. Thereafter, FPC used the railroad only to ship its inventory on hand and bring in minimal amounts of coal to heat the facilities for insurance and resale purposes.

The closing of FPC triggered an evaluation of possible abandonment of the line by the officers of the B & M, and on the basis of revenue projections *1207which assumed FPC would not reopen, the trustees petitioned the court.5 In addition to decreased revenues, the trustees alleged that maintenance on the line which had been deferred could not be delayed further, and therefore maintenance costs would rise sharply over the next five years.6 At the time of the district court hearing in February 1971, the mill in Lincoln remained closed and, although FPC was negotiating its sale, renewed operations were not imminent. The court authorized the abandonment, based substantially on its conclusion that “[i]t cannot be found at the present time that there is any firm prospect that paper manufacturing will be resumed at the mill in Lincoln. Furthermore, it is doubtful that any future operation of the mill would use coal.”

Since the date of the court’s order the mill has been purchased and reopened by FNC. According to the affidavit of John Potter, its president, renewal of operations began on July 26, 1971, and as of December 13 the mill was operating at 55 percent capacity. In this five month period FMC has used the railraod substantially more than its predecessor for outgoing shipments, and has received carloads of “furnish” materials (chemicals and raw materials) and coal.'7 Solely on the basis of Potter’s affidavit, FMC appears to be a viable enterprise. However, the primary source of revenue for the railroad had been its shipments of coal to the mill, and in May 1972 FMC is planning to convert to oil. Whether FMC will receive oil by rail rather than by truck is as yet uncertain, although Potter has stated that the corporation may be willing to pay the higher rail rates to maintain the line in operation. Whether and the extent to which it will in fact do so remain crucial questions, but the resumption of production at the Lincoln mill and the potential use of the railroad by the mill are significant changes in circumstances and likely sufficient to require a new hearing.

The balance is tipped in favor of remand for a plenary hearing by the district court’s refusal to receive evidence regarding the effect of the proposed abandonment upon the public interest. In so doing the court relied on In re Fonda, J. & G. R. Co., 95 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1938) and our citation with approval of that case in Commonwealth of Mass. v. Bartlett, 384 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003, 88 S. Ct. 1245, 20 L.Ed.2d 103 (1968). The question in Bartlett was whether the state, in order to exercise its power of eminent domain with respect to real estate owned by a railroad in reorganization, was obliged to obtain the consent of the district court as well as the Interstate Commerce Commission. We held that consent of only the Commission was required. In support of our decision, we observed, at 821 that

“[e]ven in the case of the abandonment of a part of the railroad operation at the behest of the trustee under section 77(o), the court’s only concern is with the economic effect upon the reorganization, and is not with the consequence to public transportation”

*1208because the public interest was to be protected by the Interstate Commerce Commission. For this proposition we cited In re Fonda, J. & G. F. Co., supra. Fonda does, in fact, so hold. However, the Fonda opinion did not quote that section of the statute, and, regrettably, we did not read it ourselves, it not being pertinent to the case before us. Had we read it we would have observed that the Fonda conclusion was in direct contradiction to the statutory language. Section 77(o) (11 U.S.C. § 205(o)) states in so many words that the court’s decision permitting abandonment must be “in the interest of the debtor’s estate and of ultimate reorganization but without unduly or adversely affecting the public interest.” (Emphasis added.) With our attention now focused upon this language we agree not with Fonda, but with the contrary case of In re Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 32 F.Supp. 244 (D.C.Col. 1940).

Under the statutory scheme, rail abandonment involves the trustees, the court, and the Commission in a three-step process. First, the trustees decide whether to abandon a line, balancing the economic interests of the railroad against unduly affecting the public interest. Thereafter the district court must determine whether the trustees’ decision is justified. Finally, if required by the Interstate Commerce Act, Chapter 1 of Title 49, U.S.C., the court-approved abandonment is presented to the Commission for its approval and authorization. It seems clear to us that if the district court is to consider whether the trustees’ abandonment request is justified, it must receive evidence on all aspects of the statutory criteria. The fact that the Commission at the final stage may also consider the possible effect on the public does not excuse the court from determining whether the trustees stuck a proper balance between private and public effects.8 We regret if our previous dictum misled the district court, but we cannot ignore the clear language of the statute.

To avoid repetitive appeals, we deal briefly with several of appellants’ remaining contentions.9 In the three-step process of abandonment, the first step must be taken by the trustees. But there is no prohibition against their reliance on the analyses and recommendations of corporate officers, as was the case here.10 It is assumed that the trustees exerted their independent judgment. The plenary judicial hearing and determination, with the burden resting upon the petitioning trustees, provide sufficient protection against erroneous conclusions without undue scrutiny of the mental processes of trustee deliberations.

*1209The relevant- private financial consideration, as stated in the statute, is the effect on the railroad’s estate and ultimate reorganization. The length and extent of prior losses are not talismanic, but are merely factors to be considered in determining the reasonable probability of future deficits. Another relevant consideration is whether realistic and practicable methods short of abandonment would make the line profitable, and the trustees’ failure to consider such alternatives, if any exist, may weigh against allowing their petition.

Included in the past and projected costs of the line’s operation are estimates of the cost to the railroad of handling the line’s traffic on other branches of the system. Such “beyond line costs,” although not susceptible to precise calculation, are properly includable in determinations of the line’s profitability. The cost estimate was derived by formula from gross revenue, using a factor of 50 percent.11 The Interstate Commerce Commission recognizes beyond line costs in both rate and abandonment proceedings. Although the Commission has adopted no single formula for calculating these costs, it has approved the 50 percent calculation in numerous cases, noting its correlation to empirical studies, see Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. Trustee Abandonment, 230 I.C. C. 645, 649 (1939), and its appropriateness in light of a system’s freight operating ratio, see Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. Abandonment, 275 I.C.C. 759, 775-76 (1951). Where parties disagree on the proper method of ascertaining beyond line costs, the Commission has adopted the commonly accepted 50 percent formula, without explicit foundation, as an equitable approach. Boston & Maine R. Abandonment, 249 I.C.C. 507, 512 (1941). See also New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. Abandonment, 324 I.C.C. 396, 398 (1965). The appellants have suggested no more accurate approach, and in view of its acceptance by the Interstate Commerce Commission in similar circumstances, we do not find adoption of the formula by the district court to be an abuse of discretion. We note, however, that the specific estimate of prospective beyond line costs was based on revenues received when the mill in Lincoln was closed. The mill’s reopening may necessitate new calculations.

In light of our holding and disposition, no other contentions warrant attention. The order of the district court is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.