USCA1 Opinion

          May 11, 1992
                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]










                              _________________________

          No. 91-2247

                     BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF MASSACHUSETTS,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                         v. 

                       THE HARVARD COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, ET AL.,
                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                               ________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                             and Fuste,* District Judge.
                                         ______________

                              _________________________

               Norman  Jackman, with whom  Martha M. Wishart  and Jackman &
               _______________             _________________      _________
          Roth were on brief, for appellant.
          ____
               Francis  J. Lawler, with whom Robert M. Shea and Peabody and
               __________________            ______________     ___________
          Brown were on brief, for appellees.
          _____

                              _________________________



                              _________________________














                    Per   Curiam.     Blue   Cross  and   Blue  Shield   of
                    ____________

          Massachusetts  (Blue Cross)  settled certain  claims advanced  by

          David Gaskell and Carolyn Gaskell, husband and wife.   As part of

          the  settlement, Blue Cross assigned  to the Gaskells "all rights

          of  any  kind  whatsoever  that  it  may  have"  against  various

          entities, including the present appellees.

                    The Gaskells then dropped Blue Cross as a defendant and

          continued  their original suit (Suit No. 1) against the appellees

          and others.   Eventually, the district court  ruled on Count X of

          the  Gaskells' amended  verified complaint  (a count  wherein the

          plaintiffs sought  to prevail against the  appellees as subrogees

          of Blue Cross), granting judgment in appellees' favor.  The court

          wrote:

                         After   a   review   of   the   relevant
                    provisions  of  the  Blue   Cross  Subscriber
                    Certificate, and after  consideration of  all
                    arguments raised by the pleadings, this Court
                    finds,  as   a  matter  of  law,   that  Blue
                    Cross/Blue   Shield   possessed   no   rights
                    pursuant   to   the  Subscriber   Certificate
                    against the [Harvard Cooperative Society] for
                    reimbursement  of  any  monies   paid  toward
                    plaintiffs'   medical   bills.     Thus,  the
                    plaintiffs, as assignees  of Blue  Cross/Blue
                    Shield, have  no right to recover  any monies
                    beyond that which  they are receiving  in the
                    form of continued medical benefits.

                    Little daunted, the Gaskells' attorney filed a new suit

          in  Blue Cross's name, in  a Massachusetts state  court (Suit No.

          2).   The appellees removed Suit No. 2 to federal district court.

          The district judge dismissed  it "on the basis of  the principles

          of res judicata."  Blue Cross appeals.  



                                          2














                    We  need  not linger.   We  note  that the  removal was

          proper.  See McCoy  v. MIT, 950 F.2d 13, 15 n.1  (1st Cir. 1991),
                   ___ _____     ___

          petition for cert. filed,  60 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. Feb.  14, 1992)
          ________________________

          (No.  91-1337).   We  note, further,  that  the doctrine  of  res

          judicata was appropriately invoked.  See, e.g.,  Kale v. Combined
                                               ___  ____   ____    ________

          Ins. Co. of America,  924 F.2d 1161, 1165 (1st  Cir.) (describing
          ___________________

          essential elements of claim preclusion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
                                                   _____ ______

          69 (1991).  We add only  two comments.  (1) The causes  of action

          asserted  in  Count  X  of  Suit   No.  1  and  in  Suit  No.  2,

          respectively, were sufficiently similar to  meet the requirements

          of  the rule.   See  id. at  1166 (test  is whether  the theories
                          ___  ___

          asserted  concern, or derive from, the  same operative nucleus of

          fact); Isaac v. Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1983) (same).
                 _____    ________

          (2)   The "identity of parties" required to meet the requirements

          of res  judicata is satisfied  when a person  in privity with  an

          original party  stands in as  a surrogate  for that party  in the

          second suit.  See, e.g., Fiumara v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 746
                        ___  ____  _______    ________________________

          F.2d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1984).  Here, the Gaskells were plainly the

          real parties in interest  on the plaintiffs' side in  both suits,

          Blue Cross having assigned all  its rights to them.  No  more was

          exigible.

                    We need go  no further.   Finding, as  we do, that  the

          appeal presents no substantial question, we affirm.  See 1st Cir.
                                                               ___

          Loc.  R.  27.1.   In  so  doing, we  express  no  opinion on  the

          correctness of any of the district court's rulings in Suit No. 1,

          those rulings not being before us at this time.



          Affirmed.  Costs to appellees.
          Affirmed.  Costs to appellees.

                                          3