Million v. United States
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Million v. United States
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
June 8, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
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No. 92-1131
EUGENE A. MILLION V,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
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Eugene A. Million V on brief pro se.
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Richard S. Cohen, United States Attorney, Margaret D. McGaughey,
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Assistant United States Attorney, and James L. McCarthy, Assistant
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United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
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Per Curiam. 1. Appellant contends he was
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incorrectly placed in criminal history category II, rather
than I, for sentencing purposes. The PSR listed two prior
convictions. The first, labelled "Juvenile Adjudications,"
was for theft. Appellant received a $100 fine ($70
suspended) and a $26.01 restitution order to Zayre's. The
second, labelled "criminal conviction," was for unauthorized
use of property (automobile). Appellant was fined $100 ($50
of which was suspended). Appellant argues that these are
very minor offenses -- mere convenience pleas -- and should
not be counted. His attack is threefold.
First, he says he intended to have the owner of the
automobile testify at sentencing that defendant had had
continuing permission to use the vehicle. The sentencing
transcript indicates, however, that the promised witness did
not appear at sentencing. Appellant did not seek a
continuance on that ground or procure a letter or affidavit
from the car owner. Appellant may not now complain of what
he failed to show at sentencing.
Second, appellant argues that U.S.S.G.
4A1.2(c)(1) specifically excludes the two offenses from
consideration in computing criminal history. Appellant
misreads the section. The section commences by stating that
"all felony offenses are counted" and that "[s]entences for
misdemeanor and petty offenses are counted, except as
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follows." Exclusions are then listed. Appellant's theft and
unauthorized use offenses are not in the list of exclusions
and are not similar to any in the list.
Third, appellant contends that the juvenile
adjudication for theft is excluded under U.S.S.G.
4A1.2(c)(2), which states that "[j]uvenile status offenses
and truancy" and "offenses similar to them, by whatever name
. . . known, are never counted." We "look to the substance
of the underlying state offense in order to determine whether
it falls within the proscription [of 4A1.2(c)(2)]." United
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States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759, 763 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
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denied, 111 S.Ct. 1005 (1991). In Unger, the conduct
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underlying the juvenile adjudications consisted of breaking
and entering with intent to commit larceny, receiving stolen
goods, and assault and battery. We concluded that "[u]nder
no stretch of the imagination can these malefactions be
considered 'status offenses' like, say, hitchhiking, truancy,
loitering, or vagrancy." Ibid. The same is true here.
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Appellant's offense, whether euphemistically labelled
shoplifting (as appellant phrases it) or theft (as stated in
the PSR) is materially more serious than a mere status
offense.
2. To the extent appellant now attempts to raise
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we do not consider
them as they were not presented in the 2255 petition below.
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3. We have considered all of appellant's other
arguments and find them without merit substantially for the
reasons stated by the government in its comprehensive brief.
Affirmed.
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Reference
- Status
- Published