Whitehouse v. Commissioner

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Whitehouse v. Commissioner

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion









July 7, 1992
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 91-2282


JOHN H. WHITEHOUSE AND
CAROL A. WHITEHOUSE,
Petitioners, Appellants,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent, Appellee.

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ERRATA SHEET



The opinion of this Court issued on April 29, 1992, is
amended as follows:


On page 5, Line 4 delete "at 7" and insert "3,7 (1st Cir.
1986)".


April 29, 1992




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No. 91-2282




JOHN H. WHITEHOUSE AND
CAROL A. WHITEHOUSE,
Petitioners, Appellants,















v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent, Appellee.


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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT

[Hon. Herbert L. Chabot, U.S. Tax Court Judge]
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Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
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Izen & Associates, P.C. and Joe Alfred Izen, Jr., on
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appellant's Response to Motion to Transfer.
James A. Bruton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Gary R.
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Allen, Gilbert S. Rothenberg and Doris D. Coles, Attorneys, Tax
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Division, Department of Justice, on Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Transfer.

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Per Curiam. This appeal springs from a decision of the
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Tax Court. The government, contending that venue properly

lies in the Second Circuit, has moved to transfer.

Venue over appeals from decisions of the Tax Court is

governed by 26 U.S.C. 7482(b). In "the case of a

petitioner . . . other than a corporation," venue lies in the

circuit in which the petitioner's "legal residence" is

located. 26 U.S.C. 7482(b)(1)(A). Thus, the essential

question is: where do the Whitehouses "reside?"

According to the petition that the Whitehouses filed in

the Tax Court, their legal residence is in West Suffield,

Connecticut -- which of course lies in the Second Circuit.

That would end the matter, except that, in opposing the

government's motion to transfer, the Whitehouses submitted an

affidavit in which Mrs. Whitehouse swore that although she

and her husband "did reside at an address in West Suffield,

Connecticut, the boundary line between Connecticut and

Massachusetts ran through our front yard." The Whitehouses

argue that this means they "resided partly within the State

of Connecticut and partly within the State of Massachusetts,"

and, we take it, that venue was therefore proper in the First

Circuit as well as the Second Circuit.

We disagree. For purposes of determining venue under

section 7482, the term "legal residence" means "domicile."

Brewin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 72 T.C. 1055
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(1979), rev'd on other grounds, 639 F.2d 805 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
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A person can have only one domicile at a time. General
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Electric Co. v. Cugini, 640 F.Supp. 113, 115 (D.P.R. 1986).
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See also Shafer v. Children's Hospital Society, 265 F.2d 107,
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120-21 (D.C.Cir. 1959); Hardin v. McAvoy, 216 F.2d 399, 403
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(5th Cir. 1954); Syme v. Rowton, 555 F.Supp. 33, 36 (D.Mont.
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1982). The Whitehouses' "legal residence" for venue purposes

is either in Massachusetts or in Connecticut; it cannot be in

both states.

Although the one-domicile rule ordinarily finds

expression in cases where the person has two or more

residences, it has also been applied to cases where the

person has one residence that lies in two jurisdictions. For

example, in Blaine v. Murphy, 265 F. 324, 325 (D.Mass. 1920),
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the defendants in a diversity-jurisdiction case lived at the

State Line Hotel, on the border of Massachusetts and New

York. The court decided that for diversity purposes the

defendants were domiciled in Massachusetts because "[t]he

place where a person habitually eats, sleeps and makes his

home is his domicile," and "the part of the hotel in which

the defendants habitually eat and sleep is in Massachusetts."

Id. See also Teel v. Hamilton-Wenham Regional School
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District, 433 N.E.2d 907 (Mass.App. 1982) ("it may generally
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be said that one resides in the jurisdiction in which he

sleeps"); Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 170
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(1840) ("if a man has a dwellinghouse, situated partly within

one jurisdiction and partly in another . . . he shall be

deemed an inhabitant within that jurisdiction, within the

limits of which he usually sleeps"). See generally 28
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C.J.S., Domicile 14.
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Applying this "follow the pillow" principle to the

record here, we conclude that the Whitehouses are domiciled

in Connecticut. Before we received Mrs. Whitehouse's

affidavit, there was nothing in the record that would even

remotely suggest that the Whitehouses made their home or any

part of it in Massachusetts. Rather, the allegation in the

Tax Court petition that the Whitehouses are "citizens" of

Connecticut, and the fact that the house has a Connecticut

address, create a strong inference to the contrary in the

mind of the reader.

Mrs. Whitehouse's affidavit is ambiguous at best. It

says that the Massachusetts-Connecticut border runs through

the front yard. This pretty clearly tells us that the house

is entirely in one state -- but it does not tell us which
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state. We conclude, therefore, (1) that the affidavit is

insufficient to negate the strong inference of Connecticut

residence that the Whitehouses' own previous submissions have

raised, (2) that the Whitehouses are domiciled and have

"legal residence" in Connecticut, and (3) that the

appropriate action is to transfer their appeal to the Second



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Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. 1631 (authorizing federal courts to
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transfer actions and appeals to court in which action or

appeal could have been brought); Dornbusch v. Commissioner of
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Internal Revenue, 860 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1988) (appeals court
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has both inherent and statutory authority to transfer Tax

Court appeals to proper venue); Clark & Reid Co. v. United
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States, 804 F.2d 3,7 (1st Cir. 1986) (court of appeals has
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"inherent discretionary power" to transfer proceeding to

another circuit).

It is ordered that this appeal be transferred to the
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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Reference

Status
Published