O'Brien v. Consolidated
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
O'Brien v. Consolidated
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
August 5, 1992 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 92-1086
WILLIAM J. O'BRIEN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
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Lay,* Senior Circuit Judge,
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and O'Scannlain,** Circuit Judge.
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Philip G. Boyle for appellant.
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Gary D. Buseck with whom Robert L. Farrell and Parker, Coulter,
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Daley & White were on brief for appellee.
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* Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
** Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: We must decide whether a state
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law providing for physical handicap discrimination claims against
employers is preempted by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C.
151-88.
I
In August 1985, William J. O'Brien was laid off by
Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") from his position as
yardmaster in the Boston area. O'Brien declined Conrail's offer
of a position in Springfield, Massachusetts and instead applied
for a stevedore position with Conrail, also in the Boston area.
Although such position was already filled, O'Brien had eight and
one-half years of seniority with Conrail and under the collective
bargaining agreement he was entitled to "bump" the less senior
employee filling the position.
O'Brien was born without a right hand. The supervisor of the
stevedoring operation told O'Brien he was disqualified from being
a stevedore because he was physically incapable of performing the
duties of a stevedore. O'Brien requested a field test to refute
the supervisor's contention. Six Conrail employees conducted the
field test, and concluded that O'Brien could not safely perform
all of the duties of a stevedore. In particular, the six-member
committee determined that O'Brien would not be able to climb
ladders safely in adverse weather, and would not be able to handle
safely the forty pound "bridge plates" used in the stevedoring
operation.
O'Brien filed a grievance under the procedures provided by
the collective bargaining agreement, claiming that Conrail
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violated the antidiscrimination provision of such agreement. The
grievance was first denied by the Manager-Labor Relations at
Conrail, and later by Conrail's Senior Director-Labor Relations.
O'Brien then submitted the matter to the National Railroad
Adjustment Board ("NRAB"), which was created by the RLA to resolve
labor disputes in the railroad industry. The NRAB denied O'Brien's
grievance.
O'Brien also filed a complaint with the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP"), which investigates
complaints of unlawful employment discrimination lodged against
federal contractors such as Conrail. The OFCCP determined that
Conrail had not violated the antidiscrimination provisions of its
contract with the government. O'Brien sought reconsideration by
the Director of the OFCCP, who affirmed the determination of the
OFCCP.
Eventually, O'Brien was called back from lay off by Conrail
to his former yardmaster job. In January 1988, however, O'Brien
was again laid off. O'Brien wrote to the stevedoring supervisor
requesting to "bump" an employee in a stevedore position, and the
supervisor replied that "Conrail's prior determination still
stands."
On March 14, 1988, after he had requested the stevedore
position but before his request was denied, O'Brien filed a
complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
("MCAD"), a prerequisite to bringing an action in court for a
violation of the state antidiscrimination law. O'Brien alleged
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that Conrail had violated Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B
("Chapter 151B"), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
physical or mental handicap, if the handicapped person is "capable
of performing the essential functions of the position involved
with reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate
that the accommodation required . . . would impose an undue
hardship to the employer's business." Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B,
4. The MCAD permitted O'Brien to file suit in Massachusetts state
court, and he did so.1
Conrail petitioned to remove the case to United States
district court, alleging that the district court had diversity
jurisdiction and jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1337(a), which
grants federal jurisdiction over a "civil action . . . arising
under any Act of Congress regulating commerce." The district
court granted the removal petition.
Conrail then moved for summary judgment on the following
grounds: (1) O'Brien's claims were preempted by the RLA, (2)
O'Brien's claims were preempted by Section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act, (3) the adverse determinations of the NRAB and
the OFCCP had preclusive effect on O'Brien's claims, and (4)
O'Brien's claim under Chapter 151B was barred by a six month
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In his state court complaint, O'Brien also alleged breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in his
employment contract and violation of his rights under the
Massachusetts Constitution, Amendment Article 114. On the
recommendation of the magistrate judge, these counts were
dismissed by the district court, and O'Brien does not
challenge such dismissals on appeal.1
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statute of limitations. A hearing on the motion was held before
U.S. Magistrate Judge Marianne Bowler.
The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be
granted for Conrail on all the grounds urged by Conrail except the
statute of limitations theory. The district court adopted the
recommendations of the magistrate judge in whole and entered
summary judgment for Conrail. O'Brien timely appealed.
II
O'Brien argues that the district court erred in determining
that his claim was barred because his state statutory rights under
Chapter 151B are independent of and exceed his rights under the
RLA and the collective bargaining agreement with Conrail. O'Brien
contends that the resolution of his claim under Chapter 151B
"hinge[s] upon the meaning to be given the terms of the statute
involved, and not those within the collective bargaining
agreement," and thus that the RLA and the collective bargaining
agreement are simply not implicated, let alone preemptive.
A
Preemption doctrine is founded on Article VI, clause 2 of the
Constitution, which states that "the Laws of the United States . .
. shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Under the Supremacy
Clause, "state laws that 'interfere with, or are contrary to the
laws of congress, made in pursuance of the constitution' are
invalid." Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476,
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2481 (1991) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 71 (1824)).
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Thus, the mere fact that O'Brien's cause of action under Chapter
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151B is "independent" of the RLA says nothing about whether such
action is preempted by the RLA. Indeed, in any case where
preemption doctrine is applied, there will be a state law cause of
action "independent" of federal law. Rather, the critical issue
is whether the state law, Chapter 151B, "interfere[s] with" the
federal RLA.
"'[P]reemption may be either express or implied, and is
compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose.'" Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
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2031, 2036 (1992) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403,
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407 (1990)). Where, as here, express preemption is absent,
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the challenged state law must yield when
it "regulates conduct in a field that
Congress intended the Federal Government
to occupy exclusively" . . . [or] where
the state law "actually conflicts with
federal law." . . . Such a conflict arises
where it is physically impossible to
comply with both the federal and the state
law or where "state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1991)
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(quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275
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(1990)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 993 (1992). Hence, we
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consider whether the RLA evinces a congressional intent to
occupy the field of railroad labor relations and whether
separate state causes of action such as Chapter 151B
undermine the "full purposes and objectives of Congress" in
enacting the RLA.
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This court has not previously had occasion to determine
the scope of preemption under the RLA. We have, however,
examined preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. 141-87. See Jackson v. Liquid
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Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
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490 U.S. 1107 (1989). The LMRA and the RLA are similar in
many respects: "[a]lthough the preemptive effect of . . .
the Labor Management Relations Act . . . cannot be 'imported
wholesale into the railway labor arena,' courts may look to
the construction of other federal labor statutes for
assistance in construing [the RLA]." McCall v. Chesapeake &
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Ohio Ry. Co., 844 F.2d 294, 299 (6th Cir.) (quoting
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Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
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394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988).
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In Jackson, an employee challenged drug testing by his
employer under Massachusetts' privacy laws. Jackson, 863
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F.2d at 113. The employer contended that the employee's
Massachusetts causes of action were barred, state law having
been preempted by the federal LMRA. Id. The court observed
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that "under state law, Massachusetts would look to the
[collective bargaining] Agreement to discern the scope of the
privacy right which [the employee] was attempting to assert."
Id. at 120. The court then held that "[b]ecause resolution
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of [the employee's] state-law claims 'requires the
interpretation of a collective bargaining contract,' . . . it
follows inexorably, as night unto day, that [the LMRA]
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preempts maintenance of the suit in its present form." Id.
at 122 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,
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108 S. Ct. 1877, 1883 n.8 (1988)).
We believe that the holding of Jackson is equally
applicable to asserted RLA preemption. The Jackson court
concluded that to allow state law claims arising out of the
employment relationship to be brought in court would
undermine the scheme for labor dispute resolution established
by Congress.
We are mindful of the need to preserve the
central role of arbitration in our system
of industrial self-government. . . . The
ordering and adjusting of competing
interests through a process of free and
voluntary collective bargaining is the
keystone of the federal scheme to promote
industrial peace. Grievance and
arbitration are important cogs in the
machinery. A plaintiff should not be
allowed to bypass the grievance procedures
established by the labor contract in a case
where his claims are so clearly dependent
on interpretation of the terms of that
contract. Allowing such an end run would
surely undermine the structure of
industrial self-government.
Id. at 121-22 (quotations and citations omitted).
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Such concerns are equally present here. The RLA
established a comprehensive conflict resolution procedure for
railroad labor disputes. The RLA divides disputes into major
disputes, those relating to the formation or existence of
collective bargaining agreements, and minor disputes, which
concern rights under an existing collective bargaining
agreement. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor
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Exec. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2480 (1989). "In the event of
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a major dispute, the RLA requires the parties to undergo a
lengthy process of bargaining and mediation." Id. In the
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event such mediation fails, the RLA provides for arbitration
of major disputes. Id. at 2480 n.3. "A minor dispute in the
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railroad industry is subject to compulsory and binding
arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board . .
. . The Board . . . has exclusive jurisdiction over minor
disputes." Id. at 2480-81.
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Thus, the RLA "envision[s] binding administrative
proceedings into which virtually all individual labor-
management disputes are directed." McCall, 844 F.2d at 301.
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The RLA's procedures were designed for quick and efficient
dispute resolution. Union Pac. Ry. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89,
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94 (1978) (per curiam). "The federal act was intended to
serve the interests of railroad employees by creating a
statutory scheme providing for the final settlement of
grievances by a tribunal composed of people experienced in
the railroad industry." McCall, 844 F.2d at 301.
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As in the case of the LMRA, to permit litigation in
court of state law claims connected with the collective
bargaining agreement would undermine the purposes behind the
RLA. "If the federal dispute resolution mechanism is to have
any force, juries cannot be allowed to second-guess the
decisions of arbitration boards." Id. at 302. Congress'
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intent that industry-based grievance and arbitration
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proceedings be used to resolve labor-management disputes in
the railroad industry would be frustrated if employees (or
employers) could bring actions requiring interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement in court, based on state
law. Costly litigation would replace efficient grievance and
arbitration procedures.
B
Having concluded that the preemption rule of Jackson
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governs here, we turn to applying it. Would resolution of
O'Brien's physical handicap discrimination claim under
Chapter 151B "require[] interpretation of a collective
bargaining contract?" We believe it would.2
In order to determine whether Conrail had unlawfully
discriminated against O'Brien, we would first have to
ascertain whether O'Brien was otherwise eligible for the
stevedore position he sought. That is, aside from his
handicap, would O'Brien be eligible? To answer this question
we would have to resort to the collective bargaining
agreement. O'Brien was laid off from his job as yardmaster
in the Boston area, but Conrail offered him another position
in Springfield, Massachusetts, where O'Brien had worked
before. Further, no stevedore positions were vacant in the
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2
O'Brien argues that Chapter 151B holds Conrail to a
different and higher standard of conduct than Conrail's duties
under the collective bargaining agreement because Chapter 151B
contains a "reasonable accommodation" requirement. We do not
need to decide whether that is correct because we conclude to
the extent that O'Brien's state law claim requires
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement such
claim is preempted under Jackson.
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Boston area. Thus, as a threshold issue to determine
O'Brien's contractual eligibility for the job, we would need
to interpret the collective bargaining agreement to determine
whether it entitled O'Brien to refuse to return to
Springfield, and whether it entitled O'Brien to "bump" the
present holder of the stevedore position.
More fundamentally, addressing the merits of O'Brien's
claim of physical handicap discrimination would require us to
assess O'Brien's fitness and ability to perform safely the
functions of a stevedore. Yet an employee's fitness and
ability are governed by the rules and procedures contained in
the collective bargaining agreement. Rule 49 of the
collective bargaining agreement sets forth the method by
which an employee's physical fitness to perform his job is
determined. Rule 50 describes Conrail's obligations to
accommodate disabled and incapacitated employees. Perhaps
the best indication that fitness and ability are the subject
of the collective bargaining agreement is the very grievance
that O'Brien brought under this collective bargaining
agreement on the issue of his fitness and ability to be a
stevedore. Chapter 151B requires a court to determine
whether the plaintiff is a "qualified handicapped person,"
but this determination would be impossible to make without
reference to the collective bargaining agreement.
Hence, we hold, following Jackson, O'Brien's claim under
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Chapter 151B is barred because resolution of his claim would
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require interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement.3 This holding is not inconsistent with Colorado
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Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.,
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372 U.S. 714 (1963), which held that a state racial
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discrimination claim statute was not preempted by the RLA.
Resolution of the question of whether an employer was engaged
in racial discrimination would not require interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement. As the Sixth Circuit
has noted, "racial discrimination [is] conduct that is not by
any construction a subject for collective bargaining and
arbitration." McCall, 844 F.2d at 302.
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"In enacting [the RLA], Congress endeavored to promote
stability in labor-management relations in this important
national industry by providing effective and efficient
remedies for the resolution of railroad-employee disputes
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3
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently held that
"[a]llowing [an aggrieved employee] to bring his claim of
handicap discrimination before the courts would interfere
impermissibly with Congress's intent that the Adjustment
Boards be the sole arbiter of claims related to railroad
'rules and working conditions.'" Maher v. New Jersey Transit
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Rail Oper., Inc., 593 A.2d 750, 765 (N.J. 1991). Similarly,
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the California Court of Appeal has stated that "[i]f an
employee's lack of fitness to perform his job is made
arbitrable under the parties' collective bargaining agreement,
the present action is preempted insofar as it alleges
discrimination based on physical handicap because it raises an
issue determinable solely under procedures established by the
RLA." Evans v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 262 Cal. Rptr.
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416, 420 (Cal. App.), review denied, 1989 Cal. LEXIS 5073
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(Cal. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990). See also
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Quinn v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 711 P.2d 139, 144 (Or.
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App. 1985) (because neither party argued that employee's
physical handicap discrimination claim under Oregon law
"implicate[d] any provision of a collective bargaining
agreement," Oregon law was not preempted by the RLA), review
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denied, 715 P.2d 93 (Or. 1986).
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arising out of the interpretation of collective-bargaining
agreements." Union Pacific Ry., 439 U.S. at 94. The
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procedures provided by the RLA were intended "to secure the
prompt, orderly, and final settlement of grievances that
arise daily between employees and carriers." Id. O'Brien
has fully availed himself of such procedures. To permit him
to relitigate the issue of his physical fitness by way of a
claim under a state physical handicap discrimination law
would clearly conflict with the "prompt, orderly, and final
settlement of grievances" sought by Congress in enacting the
RLA's dispute resolution procedures.
Affirmed.
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