Digiorgi Alegre v. United States

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Digiorgi Alegre v. United States

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 92-1089



CARLOS A. DIGIORGI ALEGRE,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent, Appellee.


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ERRATA SHEET

The first sentence of the second paragraph on page 11 in this
unpublished opinion dated August 31, 1992, is amended as follows:

Replace "prove his innocence" with "require the government to
prove his guilt."August 31, 1992
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]






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No. 92-1089

CARLOS A. DIGIORGI ALEGRE,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent, Appellee.











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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
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____________________

Before

Torruella, Cyr and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
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Lydia Lizarribar-Masini on brief for appellant.
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Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, United States Attorney, and Jorge E. Vega-
____________________ _______________
Pacheco, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
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Per Curiam. Carlos A. Digiorgi-Alegre
____________

("Digiorgi") seeks to invalidate his guilty plea to charges

of aiding and abetting the distribution and sale of cocaine.

28 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. 2. His petition under 28

U.S.C. 2255 to set aside his conviction and sentence was

dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal

challenges the district court's rejection of his claim that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his plea

involuntary. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
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At the change of plea hearing, the government outlined

its case. It would show that on two separate occasions

Digiorgi, with the assistance of others, had sold cocaine to

a federal agent. The government represented that, in

addition to the testimony of an informant and the undercover

agent who had consummated the sales, it had available the

following evidence: a record of conversations and photographs

taken at the first sale, video recordings of the second

larger sale (involving a kilogram of cocaine), and another

agent's testimony regarding Digiorgi's post-arrest statements

as to how he had obtained the cocaine.

After detailed explication and cautions by the district

judge, Digiorgi admitted that he had knowingly aided and

abetted another in the second cocaine sale. He acknowledged





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his signature on and acceptance of a written plea agreement1

filed with the court pursuant to Rule 11(e) of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Digiorgi testified that no one

had made any other promise which had induced him to plead

guilty. He said that he was fully cognizant of the nature of

the charges and the consequences2 of pleading guilty. The

court accepted the plea, and three months later sentenced


____________________

1. In parts relevant to this appeal, the plea agreement
indicated petitioner's understanding 1) of the penalty range
for the offense to which he would plead guilty, namely the
distribution more than 500 grams of cocaine, 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1), 2) that the government would recommend the minimum
sentence in accordance with the sentencing guidelines, 18
U.S.C. 3551 et seq., 3) that the government would request
the dismissal of petitioner's indictment on charges resulting
from the first cocaine sale, and 4) that he could not
withdraw his plea solely on the basis of the sentence
actually imposed.
The plea tendered carried a statutory minimum sentence
of five years and a maximum sentence of forty years, a fine
not to exceed two million dollars, or both, plus a term of
supervised release of at least four years. Section
841(b)(1)(B)(ii) also states: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the court shall not place on probation . .
. any person sentenced under this subparagraph. No person
sentenced under this subparagraph shall be eligible for
parole during the term of imprisonment imposed therein." See
___
also 18 U.S.C. 3561(a)(2) (Probation may not be imposed
____
when expressly precluded by statute.)


2. The court engaged in the following exchange at the plea
hearing:
COURT: Mr. Digiorgi, did you hear the Assistant
COURT
U.S. Attorney state the penalty range for the
offense to which you are pleading guilty?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENDANT
COURT: And do you understand, sir, that .
COURT
. . you are not eligible for parole or probation?
Are you aware of that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DEFENDANT
Appellant's Appendix at 84-85.


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Digiorgi, in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement,

to the statutory minimum term of 60 months, a supervised

release term of four years, and a mandatory penalty of $50.

One and one-half years later Dogiorgi filed this 2255

motion. It alleges, inter alia,3 that his plea was induced
__________

by his attorneys' misrepresentations regarding sentence and

probation, and was rendered involuntary because his counsel

did not file a single motion or seek discovery in aid of his

defense, had failed to file a change of plea petition,

pursuant to local rule, as "ordered" by the district court,

and had advised him prior to sentencing using the pre-

sentence report of another defendant in another case. The
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motion also alleged: "The lack of effective assistance of

counsel prejudiced me as I was made to take a plea without

proper legal representation, losing the opportunity of going

to trial to prove my innocence." In an affidavit attached to

the motion, Digiorgi's wife averred that she was present when

his attorney explained that a guilty plea would net only a

sentence of probation. If the "correct sentence" had been

explained, the affidavit concluded, "we would not have agreed

to my husband accepting culpability." Subsequently the

petitioner filed an affidavit in Spanish, but it is

incomplete, unsigned, and untranslated in the record.


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3. We address only those allegations and issues preserved by
appropriate objection to the magistrate's report and raised
and argued on appeal.

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The government's response and opposition to the 2255

motion included detailed affidavits4 from Digiorgi's two

retained attorneys who had represented him from arraignment

through sentencing. Both attested that Digiorgi had admitted

to them, at the outset, his participation in the offense.

Each stated that they had met with Digiorgi on several

occasions to discuss and evaluate the discovery material

supplied by the government, including laboratory test results

and agents' written reports, as well as the results of

attorney interviews with the agents in the case. Both

attorneys denied that probation was offered or deemed

probable. Rather, the plea agreement was predicated on a

definite term of incarceration to be served. Even so, the

client was clearly advised that the ultimate decision as to

sentence was with the presiding judge, regardless of the

recommendations of the parties. The affidavits also

indicated that the government's reports were fully discussed

and translated prior to the change of plea, and that even

though Digiorgi understood English, he had an interpreter at

the plea hearing. The attorneys affirmed that Digiorgi fully



____________________

4. While not dispositive of the ultimate question of
attorney effectiveness, see United States v. Butt, 731 F.2d
___ _____________ ____
75, 77-78 (1st Cir. 1984), such "evidence against a
petitioner's extra-record contentions [may be] so
overwhelming as to justify a conclusion that an allegation of
a dishonored plea agreement does not raise a substantial
issue of fact." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 82 n.25
__________ _______
(1977) (internal punctuation and attribution omitted).

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understood the evidence and charges against him, and had

accepted the plea agreement as preferable to the risk of

trial. They maintained that pre-trial motions had been

deemed unnecessary because, early on, the government had

provided full discovery, and because Digiorgi, who was

arrested during the offending transaction, had provided no

evidence in his own defense. In reply, petitioner, without

more, moved for a hearing.

A magistrate found that the record belied petitioner's

assertions that he was misinformed about the penalties he

would incur if he pled guilty, and concluded that even if

counsels' performance was otherwise constitutionally

inadequate under Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668
__________ __________

(1984), the petitioner had failed to show a reasonable

probability that, absent those errors, he would not have

pleaded guilty. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). The
____ ________

remaining grounds for relief were deemed frivolous, and

dismissal was recommended. The district court agreed.

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
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To begin, in order for a plea to be voluntary and

knowing in a constitutional sense, a defendant must be

"fairly apprised of its consequences." Mabry v. Johnson, 467
_____ _______

U.S. 504, 509 (1984). Normally, the plea and sentencing

proceeding records interpose "a formidable barrier in any

subsequent collateral proceeding", and the statements of the



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defendant and his lawyer at such a hearing are presumed to be

true. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) ("The
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subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported

by specifics is subject to summary dismissal. . . .") The

initial "critical question" is whether petitioner's 2255

allegations, when measured against the record are "palpably

incredible" or "palpably frivolous or false". Id. at 76
___

(attributions omitted). For 2255 purposes, summary

dismissal is permitted when such allegations even if true

would not entitle the petitioner to relief, or, as we

conclude is the case here, when they cannot be accepted as

true because "they are contradicted by the record, inherently

incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact."

Dziurgot v. Luther, 897 F.2d 1222, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990)
________ ______

(attribution omitted).

To set aside his plea, Digiorgi must allege, and

ultimately prove, not only that his counsels' representation

fell below an objectively reasonable standard, but also show
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it likely that that constitutionally deficient performance

actually affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill v.
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Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 57-59.
________

I
_

As to the first Hill requirement, petitioner's
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allegations fail to state a claim of attorney incompetence:





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a. Digiorgi's contentions that his counsel misinformed

him about sentence and probation do not withstand scrutiny.

Specifically, his claim was that "the Government had agreed

to a suspended sentence and that if I did not accept [guilt]

I would get a sentence of ten years to life."

Contemporaneous with the plea change, however, Digiorgi filed

a written plea agreement indicating his awareness that the

statutory minimum term of five years would be recommended by

the government. At the plea hearing he said that he

understood the penalty range and sentencing guidelines for

the offense to which he pleaded guilty. In addition, the

district court specifically informed him that he was not

eligible for probation or parole. See note 1. At sentencing
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three month later, in arguing for the minimum sentence of

five years, petitioner's attorney stated that Digiorgi "is

well aware that there is no probation in this case."

Digiorgi attempted to cast doubt on the presumed

regularity of the plea hearing by filing his wife's

affidavit. She attested to witnessing a conversation in

which her husband's attorney stated that a guilty plea was

the best decision as the only sentence would be probation.

These assertions, filed almost one and one-half years after

sentencing, are countered, by the express denials contained

in the affidavits of both counsel, and are also contradicted

by Digiorgi's assurances at the plea colloquy. There is no



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sworn statement by the petitioner detailing his attorneys

alleged misrepresentations to him. In sum, the records and

files in the case reliably show that Digiorgi knew what the

government would recommend and which sentence the court could

impose. Petitioner's claimed reliance on probation is clearly

refuted by the record.

b.



II
__

Second, to survive dismissal, Digiorgi must sufficiently

allege prejudice, i.e., that with adequate representation he
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would not have changed his plea and would have insisted on

going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 60; United States v.
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Giardino, 797 F.2d 30, 31 (1st Cir. 1986). Thus, even if we
________

assume, arguendo, that everything Digiorgi says is true and
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that, despite the present state of the record, he could prove

that his counsel were incompetent, he nonetheless bears the

additional burden to show that "but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been differest." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
__________ __________

668, 694 (1984).

Here, Digiorgi alleges, or rather, concludes that by

pleading guilty he lost the opportunity to go to trial and

require the government to prove his guilt. He has not

alleged that he would have withheld his guilty plea had he



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known that probation was unavailable. Hill requires that:
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"in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 474 U.S.

at 59. Digiorgi's recent marriage, the only circumstance

alleged to support particular reliance upon probation in

deciding to plead guilty, presumably remains an equally

plausible reason to plead guilty even when probation is

unavailable. Petitioner offers no other reason why he would

have risked trial and a higher penalty exposure had his

counsel correctly informed him in that regard.

But even allowing that Digiorgi had sufficiently alleged

the prejudice prong of Hill v. Lockhart, the record presents
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a barrier that conclusively undermines any reasonable

probability that petitioner would have insisted on going to

trial.







Digiorgi now contends that he was induced to enter a plea

because of misrepresentations made by his retained counsel.









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Reference

Status
Published