Tonev v. Sullivan

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Tonev v. Sullivan

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion




October 15, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]






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No. 92-1059

GEORGE TONEV,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant, Appellee.


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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
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George Tonev on brief pro se.
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Lincoln C. Almond, United States Attorney, Everett C. Sammartino,
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Senior Assistant United States Attorney, and Thomas D. Ramsey,
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Assistant Regional Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services,
on brief for appellee.


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Per Curiam. The only issue in this pro se appeal from
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the denial of disability insurance benefits is whether

substantial evidence supports the Secretary of Health and

Human Services conclusion that, because claimant's

impairments, taken together, were nonsevere, his claim was

properly disposed of at step two of the five-step sequential

evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. Finding

reasonable and adequate support for the Secretary's

determination, we affirm.

A year after his insured status expired on December 31,

1986, claimant-appellant George Tonev filed this application

for Social Security disability benefits. In it he alleged

that he had been unable to work since January 1982 in either

of the two businesses he owned and managed because he was

disabled by memory loss, constant pain, headaches, backache,

a spot on his left lung, breathing and vision problems, low

blood pressure and a broken left knee. Tonev, a college

graduate with two years of post-graduate work, was 61 years

old at the time of his application. An electrical engineer

by training, he testified, at a 1989 hearing before an

administrative law judge (ALJ), that both of his companies

ceased operation in the early 1980's when his health

problems, specifically, memory lapses, back pain, headaches

and exhaustion, curtailed his business traveling, rendering

him unproductive.



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The ALJ decided that Tonev suffered from hypotension, a

vitamin B12 deficiency, and hypertrophic ossification of the

left knee, but that he did not have any documented

impairments which significantly affected his ability to

perform basic work activities prior to December 31, 1986 when

his insured status lapsed. The ALJ concluded that Tonev was

not disabled because he did not, as of that date, have a

severe impairment or combination of impairments as required

by 404.1520(c). The ALJ made what we take to be a

subsidiary finding that Tonev was able to perform his past

relevant work as an electrical engineer and a business

manager prior to the critical date. Tonev submitted

additional materials to the Appeals Council, but it declined

to review the ALJ's decision. On judicial review, a

magistrate-judge found that there was substantial evidence to

support the ALJ's ruling, and, after a hearing on claimant's

objections to the magistrate's report, the district judge

approved the magistrate's findings and affirmed the

Secretary's determination.

To begin, a disability is defined, in part relevant to

the discussion here, as "the inability to do any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment." 404.1505(a). The

regulations which implement the administration of disability

determinations instruct a claimant:



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Your impairment must result from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which
can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques. A physical or
mental impairment must be established by medical
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evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and
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laboratory findings, not only by your statement of
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symptoms.
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404.1508 (emphasis added). Claimant's own description of

symptoms are evaluated in light of the extent to which

medical findings confirm those symptoms.

We will never find that you are disabled based on
your symptoms, including pain, unless medical signs
or findings show that there is a medical condition
that could be reasonably expected to produce those
symptoms.

404.1529; see also 404.1529.
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To prove disability, claimant must establish, at step

two, the existence of "a medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
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146 n.5 (1987). This means making "a reasonable threshold

showing that the impairment[s] ... could conceivably keep him

... from working." McDonald v. Secretary of Health & Human
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Services, 795 F.2d 1118, 1122 (1st Cir. 1986); Yuckert, 482
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U.S. at 149 n.7 ("[B]elow a threshold level of medical

severity, an individual is not prevented from engaging in

gainful activity 'by reason of' the physical or mental

impairment.") (citing 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1)(A)). To survive

step two, claimant must prove that his impairments would have

more than minimal limiting effects on his ability to perform
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basic work activities. McDonald, 795 F.2d at 1125 (endorsing
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de minimis interpretation of the "severity" threshold
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requirement); 404.1520(c) (a severe impairment

significantly limits claimant's physical or mental ability to

perform basic work activities); 404.1521(b) (basic work

activities, those abilities and aptitudes necessary to do

most jobs, defined in detail).

The Secretary, in making a nonseverity determination at

step two, must evaluate whether "the medical evidence

establishes only a slight abnormality [or combination of

slight abnormalities] which would have no more than a minimal

effect on an individual's ability to work even if the

individual's age, education, or work experience were

specifically considered." Social Security Ruling (SSR) 85-

28, quoted in Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 154 n.12; see also
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Barrientos v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 820 F.2d
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1, 2 (1st Cir. 1987). The Secretary may use "medical factors

alone to screen out applicants whose impairments are so

minimal that, as a matter of common sense, they are clearly

not disabled from gainful employment," McDonald, 795 F.2d at
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1122, i.e., prevented from working because of them. Id. at
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1125. If the medical evidence does not "clearly" establish

nonseverity, the adjudication process must continue. Id.
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quoting SSR 85-28. And, while step two focuses upon

limitations on the ability to perform the basic work
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activities common to most jobs, a denial at this step is also



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inappropriate when the evidence shows the claimant unable to

perform his or her past work. Id. at 1125 & n.6.
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We conclude that the Secretary correctly applied the

severity regulation in finding that the claimant had not

shown a medical basis for his claim that his ability to

engage in any substantial gainful work was seriously affected

as of the date he was last insured. The medical evidence,

which we have carefully reviewed and which is set out in

detail by the magistrate-judge, see Report and Recommendation
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at 5-8, Rec. Doc. 15, reveals that Tonev made intermittent

visits to the Mayo clinic in 1968 and 1970, twice in 1983 and

once again in 1987. It is undisputed that the sole purpose

of these brief visits was to undergo various diagnostic

tests. Over this time span, of the dozens of tests

performed, almost all were negative or within normal limits.

The exceptions were four 1983 tests which revealed a

calcified (and apparently benign) nodule in the lower lobe of

the left lung, below normal vitamin B12 levels, hypertrophic

ossification of the left knee due to a prior trauma, and some

degenerative changes of the first metatarsophalangeal joint

of the right foot suggestive of arthritis. Letters to the

claimant from the internist who had interpreted these 1983

test results recommended that claimant begin treatment with

B12 injections, and repeatedly stated that further

"suggestions" could not be made without a complete medical



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examination. Four years later, in 1987, Tonev again

underwent various tests at the Mayo Clinic. All were within

normal limits, except the B12 assay. Again it was

recommended that a regular physical examination be had.

Finally, there are two letters from a treating physician

regarding a November 1988 visit when claimant reported an 8-

10 year history of hypotension, progressively worsening

fatigue, cluster headaches, memory deficits, positional

vertigo, fainting spells, and right shoulder and left knee

injuries. The doctor found claimant's B12 levels and blood

pressure "to be low," and stated that Tonev was in the

process of completing a full diagnostic workup. Those

results are not in the record.

At the administrative hearing, claimant testified that

he suffered from memory lapses, back pain, incapacitating

headaches, and exhaustion, and had, in the early 1980's,

sought help for these problems from two doctor friends in

Chicago. He stated that he used an over-the-counter

medication for his headaches, and self-treated the back pain

and exhaustion by lying down and sleeping long hours. He

also recounted how his memory lapses interfered with his

ability to read, write, and concentrate. In both disability

reports filed with his January 1988 application (apparently

the original was thought lost and a duplicate was submitted

by the claimant), Tonev indicated that 1) he currently had no



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doctor, 2) other than taking aspirin-type medication and

"sleeping tablets", he had not been treated for his ailments,

and 3) no doctor had advised him to cut back on his

activities in any way. Later, in his request to the Appeals

Council for review of the ALJ's decision, when he was no

longer represented by counsel, Tonev, pro se, lodged
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objections, reiterated in the district court and here,1 that

his medical records as presented to the Secretary were

inadequate and inaccurate. The Appeals Council, in declining

review, reviewed these objections as well as representations

that the medical records of other doctors would be provided,
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and found no basis for delaying resolution of the case for

the protracted period that Tonev had requested.

In light of the evidence, we cannot say that the

Secretary acted unreasonably in deciding that Tonev's

impairments, as of the critical date, were not severe. It is

manifestly clear that the relatively sparse medical

foundation laid by the claimant is devoid of any report of a

complete medical examination or treatment prescribed. There

are no recorded clinical observations, no diagnoses, no

evaluation of functional limitations of any kind. "Gaps"

such as these, particularly the apparent failure to undergo a


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1. Tonev has moved to submit additional materials in support
of this appeal. Under the limitations on judicial review
imposed by 42 U.S.C. 405(g), we may only examine the
evidence in the administrative record before us. See also 20
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C.F.R. 404.951(b).

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medical examination or to seek care, provide substantial

evidence for the permissible inference by the Secretary that

claimant "would have secured more treatment had his

[conditions] been as intense as alleged." Irlanda Ortiz v.
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Secretary of Health & Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st
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Cir. 1991). The fact that the hypotension finding is

supported only by claimant's historical account, and not by

any objective data obtained within the critical period, also

supports the ALJ's finding discounting the degree of

incapacity alleged. Similarly, claimant's allegations of

severe pain are inconsistent with the medical evidence, and

provide an additional reason for the Secretary to doubt

Tonev's credibility in that regard. See, e.g., Gonzalez
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Garcia v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 835 F.2d 1, 3
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(1st Cir. 1987); Barrientos, 820 F.2d at 3.
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In sum, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's

conclusion that the claimant's impairments, as of December

31, 1986, did not significantly limit his ability to perform

either basic work activities, see Gonzalez-Ayala v. Secretary
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of Health & Human Services, 807 F.2d 255, 256 (1st Cir.
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1986), or any unique feature of his former work as an

engineer and business manager. See Gonzalez Garcia, 835 F.2d
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at 3.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.
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Appellant's motion for leave of court for submission of


three (identical) folders of 93 pages each is denied.

















































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Reference

Status
Published