[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]



                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT




                                 ___________________


          No. 92-2433

            


                                    UNITED STATES,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  HERMAN L. BREWTON,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                  __________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                 [Hon. Andrew A. Caffrey, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ___________________

                                        Before

                              Torruella, Cyr and Boudin,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ___________________

               Herman L. Brewton on brief pro se.
               _________________
               A.  John  Pappalardo, United  States  Attorney, and  Paul V.
               ____________________                                 _______
          Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee.
          _____



                                  __________________
                                     May 11, 1993
                                  __________________



















                 Per  Curiam.  Appellant  appeals from the  denial of his
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            motion to  correct sentence.   He contends that  his sentence

            for  unlawfully  possessing  a  firearm  after   having  been

            convicted  of a felony  (hereafter, felon in  possession), 18

            U.S.C.    922(g),  should  not have  been  enhanced under  18

            U.S.C.    924(e) because the  offense of conviction (felon in

            possession) is not a "violent  felony."  We disagree with the

            appellant's argument and affirm the district court's November

            23, 1992 order.

                 We  start with  the  words  of  the  relevant  statutes.

            Section 922(g) of title 18 states as follows:

                      (g) It shall be unlawful for any person -

                      (1) who has been  convicted in any  court
                      of              a  crime  punishable   by
                      imprisonment for        a  term exceeding
                      one year;
                                        . . .
                      to . . . possess . . . any firearm . . ..

            Appellant  does not  deny  that  he  possessed a  firearm  in

            violation of 18  U.S.C.   922(g) after  having been convicted

            of a felony.

                 Section 924  of title  18 sets  forth the penalties  for

            various crimes, including section 922(g) felon  in possession

            offenses.  Section 924(e) reads as follows:

                      (e)(1)  In  the  case  of  a  person  who
                      violates section 922(g) of this title and
                      has three  previous convictions . . . for
                      a  violent  felony  or   a  serious  drug
                      offense, or both,  committed on occasions
                      different from  one another,  such person



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                      shall be .  . . imprisoned not  less than
                      fifteen years . . ..

            Appellant did not  dispute below that he had  at least "three

            previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or  a serious

            drug offense."   He argued instead  that section 924(e)'s  15

            year  mandatory minimum sentence should not be imposed on him

            because the offense  of conviction -- felon  in possession --

            was not itself a violent felony or serious drug offense.

                 The  plain language of  section 924(e) does  not require

            that the offense of conviction  itself be a violent felony or

            a serious drug offense for section 924(e)'s mandatory 15 year

            prison term to apply.  Rather, it says that any defendant who

            has at  least three previous  violent felony or  serious drug
                                ________

            offense convictions when he unlawfully possesses a firearm in

            violation of  section 922(g)  must be sentenced  to at  least

            fifteen years in prison.

                 Bypassing  section  924(e)'s plain  language,  appellant

            reads United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1992),  to
                  _____________    ___

            say that the  offense of conviction itself must  be a violent

            felony  before  section   924(e)'s  15  year  term   applies.

            Appellant's reading is wrong.   In Doe, the defendant -- like
                                               ___

            appellant  --   had  been  convicted  of  being  a  felon  in

            possession in violation of 18 U.S.C.   922(g).  In addressing

            whether  Doe was subject  to   924(e)'s  mandatory minimum 15
                     ___

            year  prison  term,  we  determined that  a  prior  felon  in
                                                         _____

            possession conviction could not properly be counted as one of


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            the "three previous  convictions . . . for  a violent felony"

            within the  meaning of  18 U.S.C.    924(e) because  felon in

            possession was  not necessarily a  violent crime.  Doe  in no
                                                               ___

            manner  requires the  offense of  conviction itself  to be  a

            violent crime.

                 Next, appellant contends that  the district court  erred

            in  holding  that  appellant  was  a  career  criminal  under

            U.S.S.G.    4B1.1 because   4B1.1 specifically does not apply

            if the offense  of conviction (felon in possession)  is not a

            violent felony  and, under both  Doe and a 1991  amendment to
                                             ___

            U.S.S.G.   4B1.1, application note  2, felon in possession is

            not a violent felony.

                 While  appellant  correctly  reads     4B1.1,  appellant

            misunderstands the  record, for  there is  no indication  the

            district  court applied   4B1.1  to appellant.  Appellant was

            not sentenced  pursuant  to U.S.S.G.    4B1.1.   Rather,  the

            presentence  report, to which  appellant filed  no objection,

            calculated    appellant's   sentence    under   U.S.S.G.     

            2K2.1(a)(2)(1987), the guideline which applied to 18 U.S.C.  

            922(g)  offenses, and  U.S.S.G.  5G1.1(b) (statutory  minimum

            sentence imposed when  it is greater than the  maximum of the

            applicable   guideline  range).     Appellant   received  the

            statutory minimum  sentence, 15 years.   18 U.S.C.    924(e).

            Consequently, appellant's argument is meritless.   





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                 We have  addressed the arguments appellant  raised below

            in his Rule 35  motion and papers, and  we find them  without

            merit.     We  do  not  address  new   matter  (e.g.  whether

            appellant's predicate offenses  constituted violent felonies)

            raised for the first time in appellant's appellate brief.

                 Affirmed. 
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