O'Murchu v. United States

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

O'Murchu v. United States

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion









September 27, 1993

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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No. 92-2327




NOEL O'MURCHU,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.


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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Andrew A. Caffrey, Senior U.S. District Judge]
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Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
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Noel O'Murchu on brief pro se.
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A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Tobin N.
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Harvey, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
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Per Curiam. Noel O'Murchu was convicted of
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conspiring to export arms to Northern Ireland without a

license, conspiring to violate the domestic firearms laws,

and unlawful dealing in firearms. His convictions were

affirmed on direct appeal. See United States v. Murphy, 852
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F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989).
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Thereafter, O'Murchu filed a motion to vacate his conviction

and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, raising a host of claims.

This court vacated the district court's summary dismissal of

two of those claims and remanded them to a different district

judge for further factual development. See Murchu v. United
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States, 926 F.2d 50, 56-59 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
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Ct. 99 (1991). The remanded claims alleged that: (1) the

trial judge violated Fed. R. Crim P. 11(e) by attempting to

coerce O'Murchu into pleading guilty, and (2) O'Murchu's

defense attorney rendered him ineffective assistance by

failing to object to the trial judge's alleged misconduct

both at trial and on O'Murchu's direct appeal.

On remand, O'Murchu and the government submitted

additional affidavits on the judicial misconduct claim. The

district court conducted a partial evidentiary hearing.

O'Murchu was also permitted to take the depositions of the

trial attorneys who allegedly witnessed the judge's

impropriety. After surveying the evidence, the district

court concluded that O'Murchu's judicial misconduct claim was



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wholly lacking in supporting facts and that his ineffective

assistance claim was consequently groundless. The court

dismissed both claims. O'Murchu again appeals. We affirm.

The evidence developed on remand makes clear that

O'Murchu's judicial misconduct claim arises from the events

that occurred following the close of the second day of

O'Murchu's trial. O'Murchu averred that he heard the trial

judge instruct counsel not to leave the courtroom that day as

there was a matter he wished to discuss with them. Thirty

minutes later, O'Murchu and his co-defendant (Hughes) met

together with their respective attorneys in the marshall's

cellblock. O'Murchu swore that his attorney (McGinty) then

told him that, "Robert (or Bob) and I just left a discussion

with Judge Mazzone where he indicated that you would not

receive more than five years for a guilty plea." O'Murchu

further averred that Hughes's attorney, Robert Canty, told

Hughes that, "Judge Mazzone said that he would sentence you

to not more than four years for a guilty plea." O'Murchu and

McGinty then proceeded to discuss an entrapment defense.

O'Murchu maintained that he would not plead guilty because,

in his view, he had been entrapped by the F.B.I.

The three attorneys who allegedly witnessed the trial

judge make the aforementioned statements described a

significantly different chain of events. The prosecutor

(Stearns) testified that the only discussion of a plea



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involving the trial judge occurred at a scheduling conference

before the trial began. The judge simply asked whether the

case could be resolved. Counsel informed the judge that it

could not in view of O'Murchu's determination to proceed with

trial. Stearns maintained that there was no further

discussion of a possible plea with the trial judge. (Tr.

3).1

All counsel acknowledged that the trial judge engaged in

a discussion with them at the close of the second day of

trial. According to attorney McGinty, the discussion was

"terse" and "focused" on the defendants' entrapment defense.

McGinty had little present recollection of the discussion.

However, his notes of the events of that day, which were made

shortly after the events occurred, indicated that the judge

made it clear that the evidence thus far did not warrant an

entrapment instruction. The judge emphasized that the

defendants had better be aware of this. After this

discussion, which McGinty placed in chambers, counsel

proceeded to the hallway. There, outside the presence of the

trial judge, Stearns indicated that he would recommend five

years for O'Murchu and four years for his codefendant if



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1. Attorney Canty recalled that this pretrial scheduling
conference occurred in the judge's chambers. He emphasized
that the purpose of this conference was to establish a trial
date and the number of days needed for trial. Canty
maintained that this conference, "was not a plea negotiation
involving the court." (Tr. 5-9).

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there was a plea at that point. (Tr. 44-45). McGinty

indicated that the plea discussion with Stearns happened in

the trial judge's absence, for had the case been otherwise,

(i.e., had the trial judge been present and endorsed the
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government's recommendation), McGinty would have made a note

of it. (Tr. 50-52). McGinty had no recollection of telling

O'Murchu that the judge would not give him more than five

years for a guilty plea. (Tr. 48). Rather, McGinty

testified that he would have told O'Murchu that it was the

trial judge's frequent policy not to exceed a government

recommendation, and as the government recommendation was five

years, one could generally be secure that one would not face

more than that upon pleading guilty. (Tr. 68-69). McGinty

flatly denied telling O'Murchu that the trial judge had

participated in a plea discussion. (Tr. 68).

Attorneys Stearns and Canty generally corroborated

McGinty's version of the events of the second day of trial.2



Canty emphatically testified that there were no plea

negotiations with the trial judge in his presence at any

time. (Tr. 13). He specifically recalled that the five year

and four year terms that Stearns had offered were never



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2. However, Canty recalled that the discussion with the
trial judge occurred at sidebar, not in chambers, and that
the ensuing discussion with Stearns occurred at the back of
the courtroom, as opposed to in the hallway.

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uttered in the trial judge's presence. (Tr. 42). Stearns

agreed that the plea discussion occurred after the attorneys

had left the judge's lobby. (Tr. 37).

In short, the only witnesses to the judge's alleged

efforts to coerce a guilty plea affirmed that the plea

discussion occurred solely among counsel and outside the

presence of the trial judge. This is a far cry from the quid
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pro quo O'Murchu posited in his allegations. Indeed,
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O'Murchu's claim appears to have been based on rife

speculation that stands conclusively refuted.3

"An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary where a

petitioner lacks sufficient evidence to establish his

claims." Porcaro v. United States, 832 F.2d 208, 212 (1st
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Cir. 1987)(per curiam). The proceedings on remand have shown

that O'Murchu's judicial misconduct and ineffective

assistance claims are groundless. Accordingly, the judgment

of the district court is affirmed.4
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3. On appeal, O'Murchu argues that the pretrial scheduling
conference which Stearns and Canty described actually
occurred on the third day of trial. O'Murchu says that we
should infer this because the trial judge was trying to
ascertain whether his attempt to coerce O'Murchu into
pleading guilty on the previous day had been successful. No
rational decisionmaker could adopt such a view of the
evidence. O'Murchu has wholly failed to prove that the judge
attempted to coerce him. Moreover, both Canty and Stearns
were quite clear that the scheduling conference occurred
before the trial began.

4. O'Murchu's motions for oral argument are denied. His
motion for an order concerning his deportation is hereby
rendered moot.

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Reference

Status
Published