Murphy v. Molino

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Murphy v. Molino

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion









January 30, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 94-1924

WILLIAM J. MURPHY, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

DARWIN MOLINO,

Defendant, Appellant.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________


William J. Murphy, Jr. on brief pro se. ______________________
Darwin Molino on brief pro se. _____________




____________________


____________________



















Per Curiam. Darwin Molino rented a cabin from a __________

trust of which William J. Murphy, Jr. is trustee. After a

dispute about Molino's non-payment of rent, the Bristol

housing court at Murphy's behest issued a summons and

complaint on December 20, 1993. An attempted settlement

broke down, and in May 1994, Molino sought unsuccessfully to

transfer the pending case to the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court.

When this effort failed, Molino on June 3, 1994,

filed a petition to remove the case to federal district court

relying on federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. ___

1441(c), and on a provision allowing removal by defendant who

is denied or cannot enforce in state court his "equal civil

rights." 28 U.S.C. 1443(1). Removal was improper. No

federal question arises on the face of the complaint,

Oklahoma Tax Commis. v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989); and the _____________________ ______

equal rights provision relates to racial equality, Johnson v. _______

Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1975), whereas Molino's ___________

concern is with a supposed violation of his "right to

confidentiality" during a mediation proceeding.

On July 29, 1994, the district court dismissed

Molino's removed action for lack of jurisdiction. Judgment

was entered on August 1, 1994, and Molino filed a timely

appeal. Apparently after the dismissal the Bristol housing

court ordered the sheriff to take possession of the cabin and

















to collect past rent, interest and costs. Molino sought a

temporary restraining order from the district court, seeking

to prevent the eviction. The district court denied the

motion. On this appeal, Molino continues to insist that the

district court did have jurisdiction over the case and asks

that the housing court's writ to the sheriff be vacated.

Molino's brief on appeal is a two-page document

that is mainly a cross-reference to appended statutes and

other papers. Despite Molino's conclusory assertion, there

is no basis for believing that federal question jurisdiction

exists in the district court or that this is a case in which

equal rights removal is justified. If Molino were asking for

a remand rather than dismissal, he would arguably be entitled

to that relief, see 28 U.S.C. 1447(c); Ronan v. Stone, 396 ___ _____ _____

F.2d 502, 503 (1st Cir. 1968), but apparently the housing

court is the last place he wants to be, and we have no reason

to consider relief that Molino himself does not seek.

Molino's more interesting argument is that the

housing court should not have proceeded with the case after

dismissal by the district court since the case had been

removed, never remanded, and apparently never refiled in the

housing court. If the state court had proceeded while the

case was pending in federal district court, it would be

acting contrary to the district court's plenary authority

over the removed action, and the district court would indeed



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have had authority to protect its own jurisdiction. See ___

generally Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 842 _________ ________________________ ________

(1st Cir. 1988). But here the housing court apparently acted

only after the federal court had dismissed the case and

relinquished authority over it.

Whether the housing court should have required the

papers to be refiled by Murphy is a matter of state law. If

there was any error in the manner in which the state court

reassumed authority over the case, Molino was free to seek

review in the state system. This court, however, is not

entitled to engage collaterally in review of a state court

judgment where federal jurisdiction has not been infringed

upon. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413 (1923). ______ ______________

We affirm the judgment of the district court. ______

Molino's motion to expedite this appeal is dismissed as moot. _________























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Reference

Status
Published