Day v. Nakamura

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Day v. Nakamura

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion









Jun 30, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



____________________


No. 95-1475

ROY A. DAY,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

KENZO NAKAMURA, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Roy A. Davis, pro se, on motion for summary reversal. ____________
Marshall D. Stein and Cherwin & Glickman on motion for summary __________________ ___________________
affirmance and memorandum in support of motion for summary affirmance
for appellees.


____________________


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Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant, Roy A. Day, ___________

appeals pro se from the district court's dismissal of his ___ __

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Appellees have moved for summary

affirmance. Day has moved for summary reversal. We

summarily affirm the dismissal of this complaint.

I. Diversity Jurisdiction ______________________

"Once challenged, . . . , the party seeking to

invoke jurisdiction has the burden of alleging with

sufficient particularity the facts indicating that it is not

a legal certainty that the claim involves less than the

jurisdictional amount. A party may meet this burden by

amending the pleadings or by submitting affidavits."

Department of Recreation & Sports v. World Boxing Ass'n, 942 _________________________________ __________________

F.2d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1991).

Day has failed to meet his burden. He did not

amend the pleadings or submit affidavits in response to

appellees' motion to dismiss. Although the complaint seeks

$180,000 in compensatory damages, the entire purchase price

of the computer was only $2,385. Therefore, even if the

inability to purchase additional memory rendered the computer

completely useless (which Day admits it did not), the

compensatory damages would not approach $50,000. The

complaint does not allege lost profits or other consequential

business losses.



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Whether Massachusetts or Florida law controls (a

matter about which the parties disagree), damages for mental

pain and suffering and punitive damages are not recoverable

on these facts. Therefore, Day has failed to plead facts

indicating that it is not a legal certainty that his claims

involve less than $50,000.

II. Federal Question Jurisdiction _____________________________

Defendant's motion to dismiss was pursuant to both

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court

dismissed the complaint pursuant to 12(b)(1). Day argues on

appeal that the adequacy of the jurisdictional amount is

"moot" because the complaint arises under the Sherman and

Clayton Acts and that, therefore, there is federal question

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. We may affirm the

district court's 12(b)(1) dismissal on any independently

sufficient ground, including failure to state a claim. See ___

Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 7 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993). _________ ____

The basis of Day's claims under the Sherman and

Clayton Acts is that defendants engaged in the following

"monopolistic practices":

deny[ing] . . . citizens additional
`random accessory memory' . . . for NEC
computers at a reasonable and competitive
purchase price, solely for the purpose to
force, coerce and intimidate the citizens
to purchase a `new NEC computer' by using ________________
correspondence which is replete with
`falsehoods, fraud, misrepresentations
and half-truths,'. . . .



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As the appellees point out in their Opposition to Appellant's

Motion for Summary Reversal, the claim is illogical: "[W]ith

such a range of alternative[] [lap top computers] available,

appellant's dissatisfaction with the cost of enhancing the

memory on his NEC machine would result in his purchasing a

competitor's product, rather than being forced to buy another

product from NEC."

The complaint alleges that NEC sells additional

memory for the 286V at unreasonable and noncompetitive

prices. It also alleges, however, that NEC -- far from

having a monopoly in the supply of additional RAM for the

286V -- does not have the RAM for sale at all. The alleged

"monopolistic practices" could not even conceivably have the

effect of restraining competition or creating a monopoly.

The complaint's vague and contradictory allegations fail to

state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.

Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of this

complaint is affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1. Appellees' request ________ ___

for an injunction restricting Day's filings with the district

court is denied. Appellees may file a motion with the ______

district court seeking an injunction from future filings if

the need arises.









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Reference

Status
Published