USCA1 Opinion

          September 18, 1995

                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                 ___________________



                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________



        No. 95-1347



                                GENERAL TRADING, INC.,



                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,



                                          v.



                            YALE MATERIALS HANDLING CORP.,



                                 Defendant, Appellee.



                                     ___________



                     GONZALEZ TRADING, INC. & JOSE M. BAEZA, JR.,



                                Defendants-Appellants



                                 ___________________



                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO



                  [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________



                                 ____________________



                                        Before



                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
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                          Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, and
                                   ____________________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge.
                                    ____________________

                                 ____________________



            Edelmiro Salas Garcia for appellants.
            _____________________

            Leslie W.  Jacobs  with whom  Robert  F.  Ware, Thompson,  Hine  &
            _________________             ________________  __________________

        Flory, Jorge  I.  Peirats, Maria  C.  Jimenez Perez,  and  Pietrantoni
        _____  ____________________________________________        ___________

        Mendez & Alvarez are on brief for appellees.
        ________________



                                 ____________________



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                 Per  Curiam.   On April  28, 1993,  a final  judgment in
                 ___________



            favor  of Yale Materials  Handling Corporation  ("Yale"), was



            entered  in  the  federal  district court  for  the  Southern



            District of  Florida against  General Trading, Inc.  and Jose



            Baeza.  On Yale's motion, this judgment was registered in the



            District of Puerto  Rico on  December 8, 1993.   The  Florida



            district  court subsequently  appointed James  S. Feltman  as



            permanent receiver  and authorized him to  take possession of



            and conserve the property  of General Trading, Inc. and  Jose



            Baeza in order to satisfy the judgment.



                 On December  13, 1994,  Feltman filed an  "Urgent Motion



            Authorizing  Receiver to  Take  Possession of  Asset" in  the



            Puerto Rico federal district  court, seeking authorization to



            seize a yacht in  the possession of Baeza's son,  Jose Baeza,



            Jr.   The district court granted Feltman's motion on the same



            day.  After  discovering that  the yacht had  been moved  and



            apparently renamed,  Feltman filed a  second "Urgent  Motion"



            requesting  authorization to  seize the  re-described vessel.



            The district court granted  the motion on December  16, 1994,



            and Feltman took possession of the yacht the following day.



                 On December 29, 1994, Jose  Baeza, Jr. filed a "Petition



            to  Enjoin Illegal  Acts and to  Vacate `Order,'"  seeking in



            substance the  vacation of  the district court's  December 16



            order.  On January  24, 1995, the district court  denied this



            motion.   Baeza,  Jr. filed  a second  motion on  February 7,







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            1995, captioned  "Motion to Reconsider and  to Enjoin Further



            Acts,"  in which  he  sought reconsideration  of the  court's



            January 24  denial of  his first  motion and  again requested



            vacation of the  December 16  order.  The  court denied  this



            second  motion on February 22,  1995, and Baeza,  Jr. filed a



            notice of appeal on February 27, 1995, challenging the denial



            of both of his motions.



                 Despite their labels, neither of  Baeza's motions sought



            injunctive  relief.  Substance  controls the determination of



            whether an order  is injunctive  for the  purposes of  appeal



            under 28 U.S.C.   1292(a)(1).  Sierra Club v. Marsh, 907 F.2d
                                           ___________    _____



            210, 213 (1st Cir. 1990).  Baeza's first motion simply sought



            the vacation of the court's December 16 order and amounted to



            a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 59(e) or  Fed. R. Civ. P.



            Rule 60(b).   If an appeal  had been taken within  30 days of



            its  denial, we  would face  the question  whether  the order



            denying the  first  motion was  a "final"  decision under  28



            U.S.C.   1291, which it quite arguably was.



                 But  no appeal was taken.   Instead, Baeza,  Jr. filed a



            new  motion in February 1995  that could extend  the time for



            appeal only  if it were a Rule 59(e) motion.  Fed. R. App. P.



            4(a).   It may be  debatable whether  a Rule 59(e)  motion to



            alter or amend "a judgment" can be used to challenge an order



            authorizing  a  receiver  to  take  possession  of  property.



            Assuming it  can be, it is  settled that a Rule  59(e) motion







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            that merely repeats arguments made in  a motion attacking the



            original  judgment  does  not  extend the  time  for  appeal.



            Charles L.M. v. Northeast  Independent School Dist., 884 F.2d
            ____________    ___________________________________



            869, 870 (5th  Cir. 1989);  Charles v. Daley,  799 F.2d  343,
                                        _______    _____



            347-48 (7th Cir.  1986).  Nor does a Rule 60(b) motion extend



            the time to appeal from the order sought to be reopened.



                 Here,  the bulk  of  the second  motion merely  restates



            arguments  made in  the  first motion;  the balance  contains



            nothing  of importance that could not have been argued in the



            first motion.  In these circumstances,  the February 7 motion



            did not  toll the time for  appeal.  That in  turn means that



            the time  for appeal is to  be computed from the  date of the



            denial  of the first motion on January 24, 1995.  Appellants'



            notice of appeal was filed on February 27, 1995, more than 30



            days later.  The appeal was therefore untimely.



                 The appeal is dismissed.
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