United States v. London

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

United States v. London

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

__________

No. 93-1898

UNITED STATES,
Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL B. LONDON,
Defendant, Appellant
_______

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Coffin and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges, _____________________
Selya, Cyr, Boudin, Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges. ______________
__________

ORDER OF COURT

Entered: October 20, 1995
__________


The panel of judges that rendered the decision in this

case having voted to deny the petition for rehearing submitted by

the appellant and the suggestion for the holding of a rehearing

en banc having been carefully considered by the judges of the

court in regular active service and a majority of said judges not

having voted to order that the appeal be heard or reheard by the

court en banc. __ ____

It is ordered that a petition for rehearing and a

suggestion for rehearing en banc be denied. __ ____

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge (Dissenting). I TORRUELLA, Chief Judge (Dissenting). ____________

believe the panel opinion in this case is contrary to the Supreme

Court's decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 _______ _____________













(1994). I reach this conclusion for primarily two reasons.

First, Ratzlaf held that in order to sustain a _______

conviction for "structuring" under 31 U.S.C. 5324(3) the

government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge

that his conduct was unlawful. In my view, the clear

implication, if not the plain language, of Ratzlaf precludes a _______

structuring conviction based on the "reckless disregard" theory

utilized in this case. Second, in denying the petition, the

majority virtually ignores the fact that our decision in United ______

States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1993) (en banc), which ______ ______

upheld a reckless disregard jury instruction, was vacated and

remanded by the Supreme Court "for further consideration in light

of" Ratzlaf. See Donovan v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 873 _______ ___ _______ ______________

(1994). Because the Court had just decided Ratzlaf, one would _______

think that if Aversa was consistent with that case the Court ______

would simply have denied the writ of certiorari. The most

logical inference from this state of affairs is that the Court

viewed our pre-Ratzlaf decision in Aversa as contrary to Ratzlaf, _______ ______ _______

and wanted to give us a chance to remedy it. We should do so.

Because I believe the panel opinion misinterprets

settled law, I dissent from the denial of the petition for

rehearing or rehearing en banc. __ ____

















Reference

Status
Published