Tate v. Dubois

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Tate v. Dubois

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion












[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 95-1828

CALVIN F. TATE,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LARRY E. DUBOIS,
ELEEN ELIAS AND
IAN TINK,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Calvin F. Tate on brief pro se. ______________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Gregory I Massing, __________________ ___________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees, Eleen Elias and
Ian Tink.
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and ____________________
Daniel A. Less, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for ________________
appellee, Larry E. DuBois.

____________________

March 8, 1996
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Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant, who was committed __________

in 1983 to the Bridgewater, Massachusetts Treatment Center

for the Sexually Dangerous, appeals the dismissal of his

civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as barred by

the statute of limitations. The district court fairly

construed the complaint as seeking damages for appellant's

transfer, in 1990, to M.C.I., Cedar Junction where allegedly

he was held without treatment for more than a year, in

violation of state law governing the indeterminate commitment

of sexually dangerous persons under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 123A.

Correctly applying federal law standards, the court

determined that the alleged cause of action accrued at the

latest on September 25, 1991, when the state court declared

the transfer improper and ordered plaintiff's return to

Bridgewater. Appellant's continued incarceration at M.C.I.,

Cedar Junction for a period of time after the accrual date

did not trigger a new limitations period because in fact

appellant had requested or approved the stay of his return to

Bridgewater while he petitioned for release on the ground

that he was "no longer sexually dangerous." Thus, the court

properly held this complaint barred by the borrowed state

limitations period of three years for the commencement of an

action sounding in tort under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Plaintiff argues on appeal that his suit was timely

commenced by his earlier filing in the district court of a



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petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he describes as

"identical" to the instant complaint.1 We have compared 1

plaintiff's pending petition for habeas relief with the

complaint in this action. Without attempting a precise

characterization of his allegations, we conclude that the

pleadings are significantly different from one another. In

the habeas petition plaintiff seeks release from his current

imprisonment at the Bridgewater treatment center. The thrust

of his civil rights complaint, as we have said, is a quest

for damages for the period during which he was incarcerated

without treatment at M.C.I., Cedar Junction. Although the

civil rights complaint also contains a demand for immediate

release, it was properly dismissed without prejudice since

habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner

seeking release from his current confinement. See Heck v. ___ ____

Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2369 (1994). Any implied claim for ________

damages based on the alleged invalidity of the current

confinement also was properly dismissed, as premature. Id. ___

at 2373. The district court's observations in footnote one




____________________

1 The habeas proceeding was closed in November, 1994, 1
apparently due to a clerical error. It was reopened on
plaintiff's motion during the pendency of this appeal. See ___
Tate v. Commonwealth, No. 94-cv-10716, (D. Mass. Oct. 13, ____ ____________
1995) (endorsed order). Although plaintiff represented to
the district court that he would withdraw this appeal if his
habeas case was reopened, he has not sought to dismiss this
appeal.

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of its memorandum order do not require a different

conclusion.

Affirmed. ________















































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Reference

Status
Published