Tate v. Dubois
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Tate v. Dubois
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1828
CALVIN F. TATE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
LARRY E. DUBOIS,
ELEEN ELIAS AND
IAN TINK,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Calvin F. Tate on brief pro se. ______________
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Gregory I Massing, __________________ ___________________
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees, Eleen Elias and
Ian Tink.
Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and ____________________
Daniel A. Less, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for ________________
appellee, Larry E. DuBois.
____________________
March 8, 1996
____________________
Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant, who was committed __________
in 1983 to the Bridgewater, Massachusetts Treatment Center
for the Sexually Dangerous, appeals the dismissal of his
civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as barred by
the statute of limitations. The district court fairly
construed the complaint as seeking damages for appellant's
transfer, in 1990, to M.C.I., Cedar Junction where allegedly
he was held without treatment for more than a year, in
violation of state law governing the indeterminate commitment
of sexually dangerous persons under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 123A.
Correctly applying federal law standards, the court
determined that the alleged cause of action accrued at the
latest on September 25, 1991, when the state court declared
the transfer improper and ordered plaintiff's return to
Bridgewater. Appellant's continued incarceration at M.C.I.,
Cedar Junction for a period of time after the accrual date
did not trigger a new limitations period because in fact
appellant had requested or approved the stay of his return to
Bridgewater while he petitioned for release on the ground
that he was "no longer sexually dangerous." Thus, the court
properly held this complaint barred by the borrowed state
limitations period of three years for the commencement of an
action sounding in tort under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that his suit was timely
commenced by his earlier filing in the district court of a
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he describes as
"identical" to the instant complaint.1 We have compared 1
plaintiff's pending petition for habeas relief with the
complaint in this action. Without attempting a precise
characterization of his allegations, we conclude that the
pleadings are significantly different from one another. In
the habeas petition plaintiff seeks release from his current
imprisonment at the Bridgewater treatment center. The thrust
of his civil rights complaint, as we have said, is a quest
for damages for the period during which he was incarcerated
without treatment at M.C.I., Cedar Junction. Although the
civil rights complaint also contains a demand for immediate
release, it was properly dismissed without prejudice since
habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner
seeking release from his current confinement. See Heck v. ___ ____
Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2369 (1994). Any implied claim for ________
damages based on the alleged invalidity of the current
confinement also was properly dismissed, as premature. Id. ___
at 2373. The district court's observations in footnote one
____________________
1 The habeas proceeding was closed in November, 1994, 1
apparently due to a clerical error. It was reopened on
plaintiff's motion during the pendency of this appeal. See ___
Tate v. Commonwealth, No. 94-cv-10716, (D. Mass. Oct. 13, ____ ____________
1995) (endorsed order). Although plaintiff represented to
the district court that he would withdraw this appeal if his
habeas case was reopened, he has not sought to dismiss this
appeal.
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of its memorandum order do not require a different
conclusion.
Affirmed. ________
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Reference
- Status
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