United States v. Lambert

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

United States v. Lambert

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion




[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT





____________________

No. 95-2115

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

LINDA LAMBERT,

Defendant, Appellant.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________

____________________

Philip P. Mancini and Cloutier & Briggs, P.A. on brief for ___________________ _________________________
appellant.
Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, George T. Dilworth, __________________ ___________________
Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant U.S. ______________________
Attorney, on brief for appellee.


____________________

February 26, 1996
____________________




















Per Curiam. Appellant Linda Lambert appeals from __________

the district court's decision revoking her term of supervised

release and sentencing her for violating a condition of her

supervised release. Having concluded that the appeal

presents no substantial question of law or fact, we hereby

summarily affirm the court's decision under Local Rule 27.1.

For the same reason, we deny her motion for release pending

appeal. See 18 U.S.C. 3143(b)(1)(B). ___

Lambert's primary contention on appeal is that the

court did not explicitly consider, apply, or articulate the

sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1),

(a)(2)(B)-(D), and (a)(4)-(6). In this circuit, a sentencing

court need not make explicit findings on statutory sentencing

factors, as long as the record reveals that the court made

implicit findings or otherwise evinced its consideration of

the relevant factors. See, e.g., United States v. Savoie, ____ ____ ______________ ______

985 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir. 1993) (restitution order). For

the reasons persuasively stated in the government's brief, we

have no doubt that the district court gave the requisite

thought to all applicable statutory sentencing factors.

Lambert's remaining contentions are also meritless.

First, in sentencing Lambert, the court was required to

consider applicable United States Sentencing Commission

policy statements, including statements pertaining to

supervised release violations. See 18 U.S.C. ___



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3553(a)(4)(B), (5). Second, as the revocation hearing

transcript makes plain, the court had no punitive intent in

revoking Lambert's term of supervised release and sentencing

her as it did. Rather, it sought to devise the most

effective means to ensure her rehabilitation from the drug

abuse behind her crime of conviction.

Affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1. ____________________________







































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Reference

Status
Published