United States v. Ortiz-Medina
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
United States v. Ortiz-Medina
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 97-2219
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
DANIEL J. ORTIZ-MEDINA, A/K/A FLAT TOP, A/K/A FLAT, A/K/A DEINI,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
____________________
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
____________________
Lydia Lizarribar-Masini on brief for appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Camille Velez-Rive and Nelson
Perez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorneys, and Jose A. Quiles-
Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, on brief for appellee.
____________________
March 20, 1998
____________________
Per Curiam. Upon careful review of the briefs and record,
we perceive no merit in appellant's contentions.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing appellant's request to withdraw his guilty plea. The
district court weighed the proper factors and sensibly
concluded that appellant had not shown a fair and just reason
to withdraw the plea. That conclusion was well supported by
appellant's answers during the regular plea colloquy, along
with the testimony of appellant's former attorney. We cannot
say that the district court was required to adopt appellant's
subsequent, contradictory statements, which the district court
found to lack credibility. See United States v. Marrero-
Rivera, 124 F.3d 342, 347-48 (1st Cir. 1997).
Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in imposing a 2-level weapons enhancement under U.S.S.G.
2D1.1(b)(1). That enhancement was amply supported by the
government's version of the facts as agreed to by appellant,
along with other information about the reasonably foreseeable
violent nature of the conspiracy. At sentencing, the district
court was not required to allow appellant to attempt to impeach
a particular co-defendant's prior testimony on that point. SeeFed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1).
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.
Reference
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