USCA1 Opinion

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit











No. 98-1771



                          UNITED STATES,



                            Appellee,



                                v.



                     ALBERTO MARTINEZ-TORRES,



                      Defendant, Appellant.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO



          [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]







                              Before



                     Torruella, Chief Judge,

               Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

                                

                                





     Luis A. Medina-Torres on brief for appellant.

     Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles-

Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Camille Velez-Rive,

Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.













SEPTEMBER 8, 1998





                                

                                







      Per Curiam.  Appellant Alberto Martinez-Torres appeals

    from an order of pretrial detention.  Having conducted "an

    independent review ... tempered by deference to the district

    court's firsthand judgment of the situation," United States v.

    Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 520 (1st Cir. 1985), we agree with the

    district judge's conclusion that detention is warranted here on

    the ground of "dangerousness"--i.e., that "no condition or

    combination of conditions will reasonably assure ... the safety

    of any other person and the community."  18 U.S.C.  3142(e). 

    We therefore affirm.

        Appellant, a member of the municipal police force in

    Vieques, Puerto Rico, is one of ten law-enforcement officers

    charged in a sting operation with providing protection to

    purported drug traffickers thought to be transshipping cocaine

    through the island.  (In fact, the "traffickers" were

    undercover FBI agents.)  He has been indicted on two counts:

    conspiring to possess more than five kilograms of cocaine with

    intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.  841(a)(1),

    846, and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-

    trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  924(c)(1). 

    After a hearing, the magistrate-judge ordered that appellant be

    released subject to stringent conditions--such as that he be

    confined to house arrest with electronic monitoring and post a

    $40,000 bond.  Four other defendants were also granted release

    on bail; the remaining five were ordered detained.  

        The district judge stayed the five release orders at the

    government's request.  He thereafter ruled, in a consolidated

    opinion, that these defendants (appellant and the four others)

    should likewise be detained pending trial.  The court deemed it

    significant that defendants were charged with abusing their

    positions of trust and that firearms were allegedly employed in

    the scheme.  Of special concern, however, was the prominent

    role defendants occupied in the "small community" of Vieques. 

    Defendants effectively "controlled" the area.  And with their

    knowledge of the community and their influence therein, they

    were in a position to "coerce and intimidate witnesses" and

    otherwise "derail the government's investigation."  In the

    court's view, clear and convincing evidence had been presented

    that appellant and the others would pose an unreasonable risk

    of danger "even if released under the most restrictive

    conditions."  Appellant now seeks review of this ruling,

    requesting that the conditions of release imposed by the

    magistrate-judge be reinstated.  We of course confine our

    analysis to appellant's situation.

        From the sparse record before us, a number of factors

    appear that militate in appellant's favor.  A life-long

    resident of Vieques, he has been married for fourteen years and

    has two children, aged thirteen and twelve.  He owns a house

    worth approximately $75,000, which he has offered as security. 

    He has served as a municipal police officer for the past nine

    years.  He denies using drugs or owning a passport.  He has no

    criminal record.  In particular, there is no indication that he

    participated in earlier, alleged transshipment schemes, or that

    he has ever had contact with genuine drug traffickers.  From

    these facts, one might reasonably conclude that appellant is

    unlikely to flee (as was effectively conceded below), and that

    he is unlikely to engage in any sort of drug activity if

    released on bail (particularly if confined to house arrest). 

        Other factors, however, militate in the opposite

    direction.  The charges, if proven, would constitute a grievous

    breach of trust on appellant's part.  The evidence against him

    is considerable; most of it was obtained through the use of

    confidential informants and undercover agents, and much of it

    was recorded on tape.  He faces significant penalties if

    convicted.  And the offenses with which he is charged give rise

    to a presumption of danger, see 18 U.S.C.  3142(e)--one that,

    even if rebutted, would retain some evidentiary weight here,

    see, e.g., United States v. Palmer-Contreras, 835 F.2d 15, 18

    (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

        With regard to the specific risk that appellant might

    tamper with witnesses or otherwise impede the investigation,

    several points deserve mention.  Appellant, even if not one of

    the ringleaders of the criminal scheme, played something of a

    prominent role; for example, at least two meetings were held at

    his residence.  Moreover, the court was justified in inferring,

    under the circumstances, that appellant would have unusual

    access to outside resources and inside information, even if

    held under house arrest.  Appellant objects that no Vieques

    residents have been identified as potential witnesses, but the

    court reasonably could conclude that evidence from local

    observers might be forthcoming.  And the court was obviously

    justified in believing, as a general matter, that corrupt law-

    enforcement officers pose special risks in this regard.    

        Two other points help tip the scale.  First, appellant was

    allegedly captured on tape proclaiming that he would "kill" any

    "squealers."  Rather than deny voicing such a threat, appellant

    simply dismisses it as a meaningless bit of braggadocio.  Yet

    no matter how much swaggering was involved, such a

    pronouncement cannot be entirely discounted--especially coming

    from someone with ready access to firearms.  Second, this court

    has indicated that two of the proposed conditions of release

    here--electronic monitoring and the posting of real estate as

    security--are less effective in "dangerousness" cases than in

    "flight risk" cases.  See United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d

    880, 886-87 & n.8 (1st Cir. 1990).

        Appellant's remaining claims likewise prove unavailing. 

    He insists that the district court erred in concluding that he

    had failed to rebut the statutory presumption of dangerousness. 

    Yet no such finding appears in the court's opinion; indeed, the

    discussion therein is equally if not more consistent with a

    finding that the presumption, although rebutted, remained

    relevant.  He also complains, from a procedural standpoint,

    that the district court failed to adequately delineate the

    reasons for its decision.  To the contrary, we think the

    court's explanation was sufficiently detailed to permit

    "meaningful appellate review."  United States v. Moss, 887 F.2d

  333, 338 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam).  

        For these reasons, along with others specified by the

    district judge, we agree that appellant's detention pending

    trial is warranted on the ground of dangerousness.

        The motion for oral argument is denied, and the order of

    pretrial detention is affirmed.