USCA1 Opinion

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit











No. 98-1336



                        RONALD L'HEUREUX,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



                       LEO ASHTON, ET AL.,



                      Defendants, Appellees.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND



          [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]







                              Before



                     Torruella, Chief Judge,

               Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

                                

                                





     Ronald L'Heureux on brief pro se.

     Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General and Elisabeth A. Wallace,

Special Assistant Attorney General, on Motion to Dismiss Appeal or

to Summarily Affirm the Judgment Below and Memorandum in Support,

for appellees.











October 13, 1998







                                

                                



            Per Curiam.  Upon careful consideration of

    plaintiff's brief and defendants' motion to dismiss this

    appeal, and de novo review of the record, we conclude that the

    district court did not err in granting summary judgment for

    defendants and in refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction. 

    We reach this conclusion for the following reasons:

              1.   As to the first amendment claims, even to the

    extent that plaintiff may have had some constitutional right to

    act as a jailhouse lawyer for other inmates, any such right was

    not unfettered:  "plaintiff in this case is a prisoner and

    unlike an ordinary citizen, his associational rights may be

    permissibly restricted by prison authorities because of the

    institutional need to maintain order."  Rizzo v. Dawson, 778

    F.2d 527, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1985).  Such restriction is "valid

    if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological

    interests."  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). 

    Here, defendants presented sufficient justification for the

    subject restrictions, the substance of which plaintiff failed

    to refute as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).  Thus, as

    far as the record shows, the regulations violated by plaintiff

    and the resulting disciplinary actions did not unreasonably

    impinge on his first amendment rights.  Accordingly, summary

    judgment for defendants on the first amendment claims was

    warranted.  

              2.   As to plaintiff's due process claims, the

    disciplinary  segregatio  imposed was not such an atypical, 

                                -2-

    significant deprivation as would create a liberty interest

    subject to constitutional due process protection.  See Sandinv. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1995).  Further, plaintiff's

    claims regarding loss of good time credits were not cognizable

    in this  1983 action.  See Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1584,

    1588-89 (1997).  Because, under Sandin and Balisok, neither of

    plaintiff's disciplinary proceedings raised due process claims

    cognizable in this federal action, there was no call to

    consider plaintiff's additional arguments that the proceedings

    violated various consent decrees and other state laws and

    regulations.  Accordingly, summary judgment for defendants on

    the due process claims was appropriate, and the district court

    properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's

    state law claims. 

              3.   Defendants' conduct in disciplining plaintiff,

    even if not unconstitutional, still might have been actionable

    if it was done in retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of

    constitutionally protected rights.  See Ferranti v. Moran, 618

    F.2d 888 892 n.4 (1st Cir. 1980).  To succeed on such a

    retaliation claim, plaintiff must prove that the action would

    not have been taken "but for" the alleged improper reason. 

    McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979).  Conclusory

    allegations are not sufficient.  See Leonardo v. Moran, 611

    F.2d 397, 398 (1st Cir. 1979).  Here, plaintiff's allegations

    of a retaliatory conspiracy remained vague and conclusory, and

    those allegations did not establish a "but for" connection

    between the disciplinary proceedings and the alleged

    retaliatory motive.  Therefore, on the record here, summary

    judgment for defendants on the retaliation claims also was

    proper.  See McDonald, 610 F.2d at 18-19.

              4.   Further, we agree with the district court that

    all defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the

    damage claims.  And we note that the state Department of

    Corrections was not a party to the district court action or to

    this appeal, so that plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief

    against the state DOC have no merit whatsoever.

              5.   To the extent that the additional arguments and

    claims raised in plaintiff's brief are cognizable at all in

    this appeal, they are meritless.

              Affirmed.  See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.