USCA1 Opinion

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit











No. 97-2349



                         RONALD J. KOGUT,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



                    DR. BERNARD KATZ, ET AL.,



                      Defendants, Appellees.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



           [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]







                              Before



                     Torruella, Chief Judge,

                Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.

                                

                                





     Ronald J. Kogut on brief pro se.

     Bruce R. Henry and Morrison, Mahoney & Miller on brief for

appellees Katz and Neitlich.

     Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and

Michael H. Cohen, Supervising Counsel, on brief for appellees

Centola, Nelson and Brady.

     







September 22, 1998









                                

                                

           Per Curiam.  Plaintiff Ronald Kogut, a Massachusetts

    inmate, claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated

    when, upon his transfer from the Bridgewater State Hospital

    (BSH) to a county jail in Northampton, he was unable to obtain

    copies of his BSH medical records.  He alleges that treatment

    of his various psychological ailments was thereby disrupted--

    resulting in a suicide attempt, severe depression, sleep

    deprivation, and other impairments.  The instant pro se action,

    brought under 42 U.S.C.  1983 against five BSH officials,

    followed.  In due course, the district court dismissed the

    complaint for failure to state a claim.  We affirm.

        Little discussion is required.  With respect to three of

    the defendants (Brady, Katz and Neitlich), there has been no

    allegation of any personal involvement on their part, whether

    direct or otherwise, in the matters at issue here.  This alone

    provided a sufficient basis for dismissal of the claims against

    them.  See, e.g., Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23

    F.3d 576, 581-82 (1st Cir. 1994). 

        With respect to the remaining two defendants (Nelson, the

    BSH superintendent, and Centola, the BSH records keeper), no

    showing of "deliberate indifference" has been made.  This

    standard requires a state of mind akin to criminal

    recklessness--i.e., that the official knew of and consciously

    disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.  See, e.g.,

    Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Mahan v. Plymouth

    County House of Corrections, 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995). 

    Even with all reasonable inferences drawn in plaintiff's favor,

    the allegations in his complaint and supporting papers fall

    well short of such a showing--for at least three reasons.  

        First, there has been no suggestion that either Nelson or

    Centola was aware of plaintiff's psychological condition, much

    less that it might have required close monitoring.  In his

    several written requests for his BSH records, for example,

    plaintiff never described his ailments or conveyed any sense of

    urgency.  Second, even if defendants had learned of his

    condition, there is no indication that they would have thereby

    been alerted to the need for prompt medical treatment. 

    Although plaintiff was eventually treated with lithium at the

    jail with positive results, he indicates that, while at BSH, he

    was simply given "strong medication to sleep at night"--a

    course of treatment that defendants could reasonably assume was

    available at the jail.  Compare, e.g., Hudson v. McHugh, 148

    F.3d 859, 863-64 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that claim had been

    stated against officials at receiving correctional facility,

    but not against those at transferring facility, where required

    daily dose of anti-convulsive medicine had been withheld from

    inmate for eleven days following transfer despite his repeated

    requests, resulting in epileptic seizure).  Finally, from all

    that appears, the actions of both Nelson and Centola were

    unobjectionable here with regard to plaintiffs requests for his

    records.  Nelson simply referred those requests to Centola. 

    And Centola properly advised plaintiff that a "witnessed"

    request form and a waiver of copying costs (or prepayment

    thereof if not indigent) were required.

        We need not address whether defendants' alleged failure to

    forward the medical records to the jail officials (as opposed

    to plaintiff personally) comported with state law.  See, e.g.,

    105 C.M.R.  205.503 (requiring that copy of medical record or

    summary sheet "accompany the inmate" upon transfer to another

    correctional or health care facility).  Plaintiff has not

    argued the point.  And even if one or more of the defendants

    might have been negligent in this regard (a matter we do not

    decide), no deliberate indifference is apparent under the

    circumstances here presented. 

        Affirmed.