USCA1 Opinion

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit











No. 97-2421



                           JORGE FARIA,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



                 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,



                       Defendant, Appellee.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO



          [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]







                              Before



                     Torruella, Chief Judge,

                 Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

                     Stahl, Circuit Judge.

                                

                                





     Fabio A. Roman Garcia on brief for appellant.

     Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Lilliam Mendoza-Torro,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Wayne G. Lewis, Assistant Regional

Counsel, on brief for appellee.







October 2, 1998









                                

                                

                                                                                    

                                                      Per Curiam.  Claimant Jorge Faria appeals a district

    court order that upheld the denial of his claim for Social

    Security disability benefits.  Claimant maintains that he

    suffers from a schizoaffective disorder that disabled him

    before his insured status expired in 1992.

              Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the

    parties' briefs on appeal, we conclude that the Commissioner's

    decision should be affirmed.  We reject claimant's contention

    that the administrative law judge (ALJ) breached his duty to

    develop the record.  Claimant was represented by counsel.  When

    a claimant is represented, the ALJ, "should ordinarily be

    entitled to rely on claimant's counsel to structure and present

    the claimant's case in a way that claimant's claims are

    adequately explored."  See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162,

    1167 (10th Cir. 1997).  See also Sears v. Bowen, 840 F.2d 394,

    402 (7th Cir. 1988)("an ALJ is entitled to presume that

    claimant represented by counsel in the administrative hearings

    has made his best case").  We will not fault the ALJ for

    failing to secure Dr. Jimenez's treatment notes or ask further

    questions, particularly where claimant has not shown how he was

    prejudiced by the ALJ's alleged shortcomings.  See, e.g.,

    Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir. 1998)("'Mere

    conjecture or speculation that additional evidence may be

    obtained ... is insufficient to warrant a remand.'"(citation

    omitted)); Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir.

    1995)("Reversal due to [an ALJ's alleged] failure to develop

    the record is only warranted where such failure is unfair or

  prejudicial.").  

       Claimant's remaining contentions are equally

    unavailing.  Given the dearth of evidence, medical and

    otherwise, in the record, the ALJ's conclusion that claimant

    retained the ability to perform his past work was adequately

    supported.  See Jones v. Chater, 65 F.3d 102, 104 (8th Cir.

    1995)(retrospective medical opinions are usually insufficient

    to establish disability absent corroboration of claimant's

    condition during insured period by lay witnesses, such as

    family members); Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human

    Services, 955 F.2d 765, 770 (1st Cir. 1991)(per curiam)(absence

    of evidence of sustained mental health treatment bolstered

    nondisability finding).  Claimant  plainly errs insofar as he

    contends that he was not required to prove his impairment with

    objective medical evidence.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 

    423(d)(3)(defining physical or mental impairments as those

    which result from abnormalities demonstrable by medically

    acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques); 20

    C.F.R. 404.1529, 404.1527(a)(1)(similar); 20 C.F.R. 404.1508

    (physical and mental impairments must be established by medical

    evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory

    findings).

       In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the

    district court is affirmed.