[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 98-2186

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

EDWARD C. FORD,

Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.

Richard N. Foley for appellant. Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

April 14, 1999

Per Curiam. Defendant Edward Ford appeals the revocation of his supervised release on two grounds. First, he challenges the magistrate's denial of his motion to subpoena several witnesses. Second, he argues, for the first time on appeal, that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. We affirm. In 1993, Ford pleaded guilty to credit card fraud charges and was sentenced to a prison term followed by thirty-three months of supervised release. The supervised release was conditioned on several things, including, inter alia, not committing new crimes and informing his supervisor of address changes. In 1998, claiming that Ford violated various terms of the release, Ford's probation officer petitioned the court to revoke Ford's supervised release. The magistrate issued a warrant for Ford based on the officer's charges. Ford's attorney filed an ex parte motion to issue and serve subpoenas on thirteen people. The motion stated only that the witnesses "may testify that some of Defendant's alleged violations are only civil in nature and not criminal." The motion did not supply street addresses for most of the witnesses, and neglected to even supply the cities or states for four of the witnesses. The magistrate denied the motion, and Ford did not raise this issue in the district court. After a revocation hearing, the district court entered an order revoking the supervised release and imposing a new sentence. On appeal, Ford argues that the magistrate abused his discretion in refusing to issue the subpoenas. We do not, however, have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the magistrate's order. See28 U.S.C. 1291 (giving the courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals "from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States") (emphasis added); United States v. Ecker,

(1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ("[A] magistrate's order is not a 'final' order which can be reviewed directly by a court of appeals."). Ford attempts to distinguish an ex parte motion for subpoenas from the usual types of pre-trial motions before a magistrate. We have stated, however, that we are not authorized to review any magistrate orders. See

. Indeed, this court has rejected a similar argument that a magistrate's commitment order was an "anomalous" order that qualified for immediate review in the circuit court. See

("[N]othing in the Magistrates Act permits [defendant] to bypass the first level of review simply because commitment decisions may qualify as 'collateral orders.'"). Therefore, we need not reach the merits of Ford's argument. Ford also argues, for the first time on appeal, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, suggesting that his trial attorney was deficient in the manner in which he sought the subpoenas. We do not ordinarily accept ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Martinez-Martinez,

(1st Cir. 1995). We only accept such claims "where the critical facts are not genuinely in dispute and the record is sufficiently developed to allow reasoned consideration of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. . . ." United States v. Natanel,

(1st Cir. 1991). This is not such a case. Ford has provided no affidavit from the trial attorney, and there is nothing in the record that would indicate the attorney's thought process. On such a scant record, we have no means to divine what happened. Therefore, we see no reason to deviate from our usual rule. See Martinez-Martinez,

. For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the revocation of the supervised release. Affirmed.