USCA1 Opinion

       [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit

                                

                                







No. 98-2186



                         UNITED STATES,

                                

                           Appellee,

                                

                               v.

                                

                        EDWARD C. FORD,

                                

                           Appellant.

                                





APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]







                             Before

                                

                     Torruella, Chief Judge,

               Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.

                                

                                





     Richard N. Foley for appellant.

     Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, with

whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, was on brief, for

appellee.









April 14, 1999







                                

                                



  Per Curiam.  Defendant Edward Ford appeals the revocation

of his supervised release on two grounds.  First, he challenges the

magistrate's denial of his motion to subpoena several witnesses. 

Second, he argues, for the first time on appeal, that he did not

receive effective assistance of counsel.  We affirm.

  In 1993, Ford pleaded guilty to credit card fraud charges

and was sentenced to a prison term followed by thirty-three months

of supervised release.  The supervised release was conditioned on

several things, including, inter alia, not committing new crimes

and informing his supervisor of address changes.  In 1998, claiming

that Ford violated various terms of the release, Ford's probation

officer petitioned the court to revoke Ford's supervised release. 

The magistrate issued a warrant for Ford based on the officer's

charges.

  Ford's attorney filed an ex parte motion to issue and

serve subpoenas on thirteen people.  The motion stated only that

the witnesses "may testify that some of Defendant's alleged

violations are only civil in nature and not criminal."  The motion

did not supply street addresses for most of the witnesses, and

neglected to even supply the cities or states for four of the

witnesses.  The magistrate denied the motion, and Ford did not

raise this issue in the district court.  After a revocation

hearing, the district court entered an order revoking the

supervised release and imposing a new sentence.

  On appeal, Ford argues that the magistrate abused his

discretion in refusing to issue the subpoenas.  We do not, however,

have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the magistrate's order.  See28 U.S.C.  1291 (giving the courts of appeals jurisdiction over

appeals "from all final decisions of the district courts of the

United States") (emphasis added); United States v. Ecker, 923 F.2d

7, 8 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ("[A] magistrate's order is not

a 'final' order which can be reviewed directly by a court of

appeals.").   Ford attempts to distinguish an ex parte motion for

subpoenas from the usual types of pre-trial motions before a

magistrate.  We have stated, however, that we are not authorized to

review any magistrate orders.  See id. at 9.  Indeed, this court

has rejected a similar argument that a magistrate's commitment

order was an "anomalous" order that qualified for immediate review

in the circuit court.  See id.  ("[N]othing in the Magistrates Act

permits [defendant] to bypass the first level of review simply

because commitment decisions may qualify as 'collateral orders.'"). 

Therefore, we need not reach the merits of Ford's argument.

     Ford also argues, for the first time on appeal, that he

was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel, suggesting that his trial attorney was deficient in the

manner in which he sought the subpoenas.  We do not ordinarily

accept ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time

on appeal.  See United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215,

1225 (1st Cir. 1995).  We only accept such claims "where the

critical facts are not genuinely in dispute and the record is

sufficiently developed to allow reasoned consideration of an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. . . ."  United States v.

Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 1991).  This is not such a

case.  Ford has provided no affidavit from the trial attorney, and

there is nothing in the record that would indicate the attorney's

thought process.  On such a scant record, we have no means to

divine what happened.  Therefore, we see no reason to deviate from

our usual rule.  See Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d at 1225.

     For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the revocation

of the supervised release.

     Affirmed.