USCA1 Opinion

       [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit











No. 99-1044



                         BEGASHAW AYELE,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



                  ALLRIGHT BOSTON PARKING, INC.,

                  CHARLES LANE, AS PRESIDENT AND

                          MOHAMMED AZIM,



                      Defendants, Appellees.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



           [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]







                              Before



                     Boudin, Circuit Judge,

                Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

                   and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

                                

                                

                                

                                

     

     Begashaw Ayele on brief pro se.

     Andrew C. Pickett, Christopher J. Campbell and Jackson, Lewis,

Schnitzler & Krupman on brief for appellees.











October 13, 1999







                                

            Per Curiam. Pro se plaintiff Begashaw Ayele appeals

  a district court order that granted the defendants summary

  judgment on his claim that the defendants violated Title VII by

  failing to reasonably accommodate his request to have Sundays

  off from his job as a parking cashier.  See 42 U.S.C.  2000e-

  (a)(2), (j).  Plaintiff further contends that he was unlawfully

  discharged in retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC.

            We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the

  parties' briefs on appeal.  Where it is undisputed that the

  defendants transferred plaintiff to a position that eliminated

  his religious conflict and that plaintiff rejected the new

  position, we agree with the district court that the issue is

  whether the new position amounted to an accommodation of

  Ayele's religious beliefs that was reasonable.  See 42 U.S.C.

   2000e(j).  To be reasonable the accommodation, as the

  district court explained, need not measure up to plaintiff's

  preferences, but it must be sufficiently comparable to the

  original position to amount to a reasonable alternative.  See,

  e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.2d 771, 775-76 (7th

  Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1038 (1999); Wright v.

  Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993); Cook v. Lindsay Olive

  Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 241 (9th Cir. 1990).  We agree with the

  district court that, while comparability of two jobs might

  usually be a factual issue requiring determination by a

  factfinder, Ayele here has failed to proffer adequate

  admissible evidence so as to create such an issue.  We agree

  with the court that no material factual issue as to a purported

  pay differential or other purported disadvantages has been

  raised. Moreover, the record fails as a matter of law to

  support plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim.  See, e.g., 

  Greenberg v. Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1995);

  Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 828-29 (1st Cir.

  1991).    

            The numerous other claims of error that Ayele

  ascribes to the district court are patently meritless. 

  Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed

  substantially for the reasons stated by the district judge. 

  See Local Rule 27.1.